Re: [EM] Is there a PR voting method obeying participation criterion?
At 11:21 AM 11/18/2009, Terry Bouricius wrote: Abd wrote snip Under Robert's Rules, if a voter writes something on a ballot, the voter has voted, and the vote is counted in the basis for majority, snip This is not necessarily correct. Bouricius raises a doubt, but does not impeach the general assertion. First of all, the context is single-winner elections. Special rules exist for multiwinner elections, where a voter has more than one vote. But even there, Bouricius is incorrect. We'll see. He is arguing because he knows that the conclusion one might make from is are that IRV, as being proposed in the U.S., is a poor method, that the preferential voting that Robert's Rules of Order describes is different in this critical aspect from IRV, whereas the top-two runoff method which is aggressively being replaced by IRV actually does satisfy the intention of Robert's Rules more closely. And FairVote has extensively used the supposed recommendation of RRONR to promote IRV, and lots of election officials have fallen for it. Abd is probably relying on the statements on page 402-3 of RRONR 10th edition, that even illegal votes cast by legal voters are included in the basis and that a ballot that registers any evidence of having some opinion should be included. Indeed. Pretty clear, eh? However, a voter who casts a ballot may partially abstain by marking fewer candidates than allowed (see Right of Abstention page 394). Yes. So? Bouricius, as has been common, wants us to jump to a conclusion. Amazing, actually. Does he really not understand what he's doing? Abstaining (as with a blank ballot) removes the ballot from the basis of a majority calculation (see Majority Vote - the Basic Requirement page 387). Full abstention has that effect. Partial abstention in the case mentioned does not. How is it that Bouricius covers this up, implying otherwise? His reference is to the right of abstention. It says nothing about the basis for a majority. The section on voting, which does cover this, Bouricius doesn't mention. P. 427: In an election of members of a board or committee in which votes are cast in one segment of the ballot for multiple positions on the board or committee, every ballot with a vote for one or more candidates is counted as one vote cast, and a candidate must receive a majority of the total of such votes to be elected. This is no different than single-winner. Every elected member must receive a vote on a majority of non-blank ballots cast. (One can read this section differently, but a vote for one or more candidates is clearly intended to be the same as the previous idea that a ballot contains a possible vote, even if unintelligible.) In any case, if a voter casts one vote, and not the multiple number to which the voter is entitled, the voter still is part of the basis for a majority for *all* the elections. The voter has not, in this sense, abstained from those elections. An abstention would take place in the second form for multimember elections given, where seats are elected one at a time. In that case, the majority is a majority of all those who vote on that election, and the right of abstention refers to this. Balloting is repeated if necessary to elect remaining members, and this means entirely new elections, not restricted-set elections. So if four were elected, our of six total, then voters would have two votes allowable on the next ballot. The principle behind Robert's Rules is clear: no action is taken without the explicit approval of a majority. I'm not aware of any exceptions, and the preferential voting form RR describes is not an exception, that is where it differs from IRV. RRONR does indeed mention election by plurality as a possibility, but also clearly considers this an action to be taken only when alternatives are impossible. It requires an explicit bylaw allowing election by plurality. What the editors of RRONR probably didn't understand was that preferential voting, of the sequential elimination kind (i.e, the IRV counting method) almost never finds, in nonpartisan elections, a majority where it isn't found in the first round, unless members actually do rate all candidates, or come sufficiently close to this. I don't think they had extensive experience with preferential voting. They describe preferential voting as a means of finding a majority, a true majority, without repeated balloting, which would happen if voters basically vote for all but one candidate (in sequence of preference). This may work in small societies where all candidates are well-known, but not in situations where voters may only be familiar with one or two candidates. This continued insistence that IRV is compatible with RRONR is an example of political polemic that doesn't care if it deceives. That's what's wrong with American politics, much more than the voting system! Thus in an IRV election it is arguable either way as to
Re: [EM] Is there a PR voting method obeying participation criterion?
Abd wrote snip Under Robert's Rules, if a voter writes something on a ballot, the voter has voted, and the vote is counted in the basis for majority, snip This is not necessarily correct. Abd is probably relying on the statements on page 402-3 of RRONR 10th edition, that even illegal votes cast by legal voters are included in the basis and that a ballot that registers any evidence of having some opinion should be included. However, a voter who casts a ballot may partially abstain by marking fewer candidates than allowed (see Right of Abstention page 394). Abstaining (as with a blank ballot) removes the ballot from the basis of a majority calculation (see Majority Vote - the Basic Requirement page 387). Thus in an IRV election it is arguable either way as to whether a ballot that abstains as to any preference between two finalists (registers no opinion on this particular question) should be included in the basis or not. The actual practice of organizations using IRV (preferential voting) on which RRONR is based, indicates rather convincingly that exhausted ballots are not used in the basis for calculating a winning threshold. Abd and I have been around and around on this in the past, and I have no desire to revisit the topic, but I just wanted to indicate that this is not an open and shut case as Abd suggests. Terry Bouricius - Original Message - From: Abd ul-Rahman Lomax a...@lomaxdesign.com To: Warren Smith warren@gmail.com; election-methods election-meth...@electorama.com Sent: Tuesday, November 17, 2009 10:27 PM Subject: Re: [EM] Is there a PR voting method obeying participation criterion? At 01:08 PM 11/17/2009, Warren Smith wrote: This seems to be an open question at present. But it might be pretty easy to prove or disprove. A multiwinner voting method obeys participation if an extra voter, by voting honestly, cannot make the election result worse (in her view) than if she had not voted. Might be a small point, but voted should be defined. Under Robert's Rules, if a voter writes something on a ballot, the voter has voted, and the vote is counted in the basis for majority, and analogous for PR would be that the voter has possibly increased the quota. But we can also look at what happens if the voter votes for an irrelevant candidate. If we are going to be able to properly analyze the systems in a fair way, I think we have to assume that the voter votes for someone who is at least eligible, and that if it's Asset, the candidate actually is available to recast the vote and fairly functions as an effective representative of the voter in further process. No voting method can protect a voter from being dissatisfied with the candidate they voted for! Asset, then, could only change the outcome negatively for the voter by causing some effect due to increasing the quota. How could that happen? From the voter voting, the quota increased by a fraction. For accuracy of vote transfers later on, I recommend that exact quotas be used. In the first round, the fractional vote is irrelevant, but it would be considered when determining excess votes available for transfer. In any case, an increase in quota could cause a failure to immediately elect, or could prevent a later election. But the candidate holding this voters' vote could overcome this, still effectively casting the voter's vote to improve the outcome, should an initial election that would improve the outcome fail by one vote, being a fractional vote short. I think Asset, properly implemented, satisfies a reasonable interpretation of participation. There is no harm caused by the voter's participation that cannot be remedied by a proper recasting of the voter's vote. Ah! The voter's vote can affect more than one election. But if fractional vote transfers can be made (which I recommend) then the voter's proxy can fix the problem by spreading that vote among the affected candidates. If fractional vote transfers can't be made, then, sure, there is a technical failure which is basically roundoff error. That's silly, an example of voting criteria gone mad, separated from practical reality. It is fair if symmetric under permuting the candidates and voters. Conjecture: there does not exist a fair multiwinner proportional representation voting method obeying participation. I don't know how to apply fair. Can you give an example of a system which is not fair by this definition? That would help. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
[EM] Is there a PR voting method obeying participation criterion?
This seems to be an open question at present. But it might be pretty easy to prove or disprove. A multiwinner voting method obeys participation if an extra voter, by voting honestly, cannot make the election result worse (in her view) than if she had not voted. (If you remove a winner and replace it with somebody that voter considers better, the winner set got better. Any change in the winner set not arising from a finite sequence of such improvement steps, is a worsening in the view of some voter.) It is fair if symmetric under permuting the candidates and voters. Conjecture: there does not exist a fair multiwinner proportional representation voting method obeying participation. -- Warren D. Smith http://RangeVoting.org -- add your endorsement (by clicking endorse as 1st step) and math.temple.edu/~wds/homepage/works.html Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Is there a PR voting method obeying participation criterion?
At 01:08 PM 11/17/2009, Warren Smith wrote: This seems to be an open question at present. But it might be pretty easy to prove or disprove. A multiwinner voting method obeys participation if an extra voter, by voting honestly, cannot make the election result worse (in her view) than if she had not voted. Might be a small point, but voted should be defined. Under Robert's Rules, if a voter writes something on a ballot, the voter has voted, and the vote is counted in the basis for majority, and analogous for PR would be that the voter has possibly increased the quota. But we can also look at what happens if the voter votes for an irrelevant candidate. If we are going to be able to properly analyze the systems in a fair way, I think we have to assume that the voter votes for someone who is at least eligible, and that if it's Asset, the candidate actually is available to recast the vote and fairly functions as an effective representative of the voter in further process. No voting method can protect a voter from being dissatisfied with the candidate they voted for! Asset, then, could only change the outcome negatively for the voter by causing some effect due to increasing the quota. How could that happen? From the voter voting, the quota increased by a fraction. For accuracy of vote transfers later on, I recommend that exact quotas be used. In the first round, the fractional vote is irrelevant, but it would be considered when determining excess votes available for transfer. In any case, an increase in quota could cause a failure to immediately elect, or could prevent a later election. But the candidate holding this voters' vote could overcome this, still effectively casting the voter's vote to improve the outcome, should an initial election that would improve the outcome fail by one vote, being a fractional vote short. I think Asset, properly implemented, satisfies a reasonable interpretation of participation. There is no harm caused by the voter's participation that cannot be remedied by a proper recasting of the voter's vote. Ah! The voter's vote can affect more than one election. But if fractional vote transfers can be made (which I recommend) then the voter's proxy can fix the problem by spreading that vote among the affected candidates. If fractional vote transfers can't be made, then, sure, there is a technical failure which is basically roundoff error. That's silly, an example of voting criteria gone mad, separated from practical reality. It is fair if symmetric under permuting the candidates and voters. Conjecture: there does not exist a fair multiwinner proportional representation voting method obeying participation. I don't know how to apply fair. Can you give an example of a system which is not fair by this definition? That would help. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Is there a PR voting method obeying participation criterion?
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote: At 01:08 PM 11/17/2009, Warren Smith wrote: It is fair if symmetric under permuting the candidates and voters. Conjecture: there does not exist a fair multiwinner proportional representation voting method obeying participation. I don't know how to apply fair. Can you give an example of a system which is not fair by this definition? That would help. Choose the first n candidates who registered (not invariant under permutation of the candidates). Turn the first n voters who voted into dictators (not invariant under permutation of the voters). Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
