Re: [EM] Sequential STV method

2013-04-07 Thread Kristofer Munsterhjelm

On 04/07/2013 03:59 AM, Ross Hyman wrote:

More general variant: Candidate sets of N candidates are notated by
Greek letters.


[snip]

You said that this method was based on a cloneproof single-winner method.

Woodall generalized the clone criteria in 
http://www.votingmatters.org.uk/issue3/p5.htm to Clone-in, 
Clone-no-harm, and Clone-no-help, so clone independence could more 
easily be applied to multiwinner methods. He noted that Clone-no-harm 
conflicts with the DPC, and generally, isn't desirable in proportional 
multiwinner methods.


My question is then: do you know whether the multiwinner method you've 
given passes the clone independence criteria useful for multiwinner 
methods (i.e. clone-in and clone-no-help)?



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Re: [EM] Sequential STV method

2013-04-07 Thread Kristofer Munsterhjelm

On 04/07/2013 03:59 AM, Ross Hyman wrote:

More general variant: Candidate sets of N candidates are notated by
Greek letters.


[snip]

You said that this method was based on a cloneproof single-winner method.

Woodall generalized the clone criteria in 
http://www.votingmatters.org.uk/issue3/p5.htm to Clone-in, 
Clone-no-harm, and Clone-no-help, so clone independence could more 
easily be applied to multiwinner methods. He noted that Clone-no-harm 
conflicts with the DPC, and generally, isn't desirable in proportional 
multiwinner methods.


My question is then: do you know whether the multiwinner method you've 
given passes the clone independence criteria useful for multiwinner 
methods (i.e. clone-in and clone-no-help)?



Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info


Re: [EM] Sequential STV method (Oops)

2013-04-07 Thread Kristofer Munsterhjelm

On 04/07/2013 10:19 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:

On 04/07/2013 03:59 AM, Ross Hyman wrote:

More general variant: Candidate sets of N candidates are notated by
Greek letters.


[snip]

You said that this method was based on a cloneproof single-winner method.


Sorry about the 3x duplication. My mail server glitched.

If any moderators see this, just remove the other duplicates :-)


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Re: [EM] Sequential STV method

2013-04-06 Thread Ross Hyman
More general variant:
Candidate sets of N candidates are notated by Greek letters.

Define V(Alpha,Beta) by performing your favorite version of STV on a modified 
ballot set where all candidates have been removed from ballots except those in 
set Alpha that are ranked higher than all candidates in Beta not in Alpha and 
returning the votes for the candidate in Alpha with the fewest votes.

Define M(Alpha,Beta) as an odd function of V(Alpha,Beta)-V(Beta,Alpha) so that 
it is antisymmetric in Alpha and Beta.  Some examples are M(Alpha,Beta) = 
V(Alpha,Beta)-V(Beta,Alpha), M(Alpha,Beta) = Sign(V(Alpha,Beta)-V(Beta,Alpha)), 
and M(Alpha,Beta) = (V(Alpha,Beta)-V(Beta,Alpha))/( 
V(Alpha,Beta)+V(Beta,Alpha)).

Define V(Alpha) by performing your favorite version of STV on a modified ballot 
set where all candidates have been removed from ballots except those in set 
Alpha that are ranked higher than all candidates not in Alpha and returning the 
votes for the candidate in Alpha with the fewest votes.

M(Alpha,Beta) for Alpha and Beta still in contention, will not change as the 
count proceeds.  V(Alpha) will change when candidates are eliminated.   

Begin with all candidate sets of N candidates in contention.  
1.  Scores are calculated for each candidate set that is in contention via: 
S(Alpha) = Sum_Beta M(Alpha,Beta)V(Beta) where the sum is over all candidate 
sets that are in contention.  
2.  The candidate set with the lowest score is removed from contention.  If 
only one candidate set remains in contention that candidate set is the winning 
set and the count ends.  Otherwise proceed to step 3.  
3.  If a candidate set is removed from contention that is the last one to 
contain a certain candidate, then that candidate is eliminated and the 
V(Alpha)'s are recalculated with eliminated candidates removed from all ballots.
4.  Go to Step 1.



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[EM] Sequential STV method

2013-04-05 Thread Ross Hyman
I think this will be the final version.

For sequential STV, as defined by Hill and Gazeley in Voting Matters Issue 20, 
a candidate set of N candidates should win if it is the only candidate set 
where “any set of N+1 candidates, consisting of those N and 1 more, will result 
in the election of those N when an STV election is performed.”   

Here is a method that does that.  If there is more than one such candidate set 
it will pick one of them as the winner.  If no candidate set satisfies, it will 
still pick one winning set. (Except for ties.)

Candidate sets of N candidates are notated by Greek letters.

Define V(Alpha,B) by performing your favorite version of STV on a modified 
ballot set where all candidates have been removed from ballots except those in 
set Alpha that are ranked higher than B and returning the votes for the 
candidate in Alpha with the fewest votes.

Define V(Alpha) by performing your favorite version of STV on a modified ballot 
set where all candidates have been removed from ballots except those in set 
Alpha that are ranked higher than the highest ranked candidate not in Alpha and 
returning the votes for the candidate in Alpha with the fewest votes.

Define V(Alpha,Beta) as the V(Alpha,B) where B is the candidate in Beta that is 
not in Alpha and that maximizes V(Alpha,B).

V(Alpha,Beta) for Alpha and Beta still in contention, will not change as the 
count proceeds.  V(Alpha) will change when candidates are eliminated.   

Begin with all candidate sets of N candidates in contention.  Scores are 
calculated for each candidate set that is in contention via:
S(Alpha) = Sum_Beta (V(Alpha,Beta)-V(Beta,Alpha))V(Beta)
where the sum is over all candidate sets Beta that are in contention.  The 
candidate set with the lowest score is removed from contention.  If a candidate 
set is eliminated that is the last one to contain a certain candidate, then 
that candidate is also eliminated.  The S(Alpha)’s and V(Alpha)'s are 
recalculated retaining only terms in the sum for candidate sets still in 
contention and with eliminated candidates removed from all ballots.  Repeat 
until only one candidate set remains.

Here is a method for calculating V(Beta,A) based on Schulze STV.  Other 
versions of STV can also be used.:
1.Each ballot approves those candidates from candidate set Beta that are 
ranked higher than candidate A.
2.V_i,C is the vote from ballot i for candidate C. Initially the vote value 
of each ballot is distributed equally amongst each of its approved candidates.
3. The total vote for each candidate C, V_C = sum_i V_i,C is calculated.  
V_Smallest is the vote total of the candidate with the smallest vote total. 
4.V_i,C is reduced to V_i,C V_smallest/V_C.
5. The reduced total vote on each ballot i, W_i = sum_C V_i,C is calculated.
6.V_I,C is increased to V_i,C V_i/W_i.
7.Go to step 3.
The count is repeated until V_smallest has converged.  V(Beta,A) is the 
converged value of V_smallest.
V(Beta) is calculated similarly, except that each ballot approves those 
candidates from candidate set Beta that are ranked higher than every candidate 
not in Beta.


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