Re: [EM] Voting reform statement; a clearer and more inspiring version
I did not see this message until after I had added the names of the Wikipedia articles. If we really are trying to get people to use our supported election methods then we cannot send them to academic journals or even general-audience books because the expected convention is to find information online. Another option is to provide one online location for each of the four supported methods. You could supply a website you like for your preferred method. The most appropriate choice for the Condorcet methods is the Condorcet method Wikipedia article. Richard Fobes On 8/29/2011 6:39 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote: I have made some further changes to the statement https://docs.google.com/document/d/1oyJLxI9dciXBbowM5mougnbGHzkL3Ue1QkD8nnMwWLg/edit?hl=en_US, mostly to clarify the advantages and to speak of how this issue spans the political spectrum; you may see them by looking at the doc. Currently, I think that the weakest point of the statement is the exhortation to look things up on Wikipedia. I suggest giving a bibliography, and saying that we do not endorse everything in every paper or book cited in our bibliography, and in particular we do not believe that any negative statement about the systems we have mentioned should be construed to imply that the system criticized is worse than plurality overall. The bibliography can include some Wikipedia articles, including voting system, but it should also include important scholarly articles, whether published in peer-reviewed journals or not. JQ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Voting reform statement; a clearer and more inspiring version
Please do your work on the google dochttps://docs.google.com/document/d/1oyJLxI9dciXBbowM5mougnbGHzkL3Ue1QkD8nnMwWLg/edit?hl=en_US. If you understand how, please post the changes here when you're done (to help involve others in the discussion). JQ 2011/8/28 Richard Fobes electionmeth...@votefair.org I'll try to find a balance. I too recognize the importance of starting by educating voters through non-governmental elections -- so that later it will be much easier to get fairer election methods adopted in governmental elections. Yet I was wondering if maybe this explanation about Roberts Rules of Order was too long, and based on the feedback I'll try to shorten it. Also I think I can merge it with another request to cover multiple rounds of voting, which is not yet covered -- and which also is important. The other two paragraphs I expect to keep in the next draft -- at the end as a part of the summary -- but they can be removed if they prove to be disliked. I'll start working on the next draft. It will be longer than the first because of all the additions that were requested, but fortunately I expect to be able to shorten it in a few places. Richard Fobes On 8/28/2011 2:13 PM, Ralph Suter wrote: Even if improving public elections is the statement's primary aim, that needn't be its only aim -- nor, I'm convinced, should it be. One point I've tried to make is that one of the best practical means for improving the prospects for reforming difficult-to-change public elections would be to promote the use of alternative voting and representation methods for use in non-public elections and other kinds of decisionmaking processes (both public and non-public), including not only formal ones such as organizational and formal meeting elections and decisions but also informal ones that involve small and temporary groups -- and for not only critically important decisions such as presidential elections and constitutional referendums but also much less important decisions such as groups of friends and co-workers deciding where to eat lunch together. (For the latter, I believe approval voting and other quick and simple methods are, in virtually all cases, indisputably better than more complicated and time-consuming though maybe technically superior ones.) The important things to keep in mind regarding this point are, first, that it is much easier to experiment with alternative voting and representation methods in other than public elections and, second, that doing so has the great added advantage of helping educate people about alternative methods and (hopefully) helping persuade much larger numbers of people that some alternative methods would be great improvements over plurality voting and single-representative legislative districts for use in public elections. -RS On 8/28/2011 12:45 PM, Dave Ketchum wrote: I question adding this collection of paragraphs to the major declaration, which seems more aimed at improving public elections. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Voting reform statement; a clearer and more inspiring version
Good Afternoon, Mr. Suter You made excellent points with brevity and clarity. Thank you, Fred Gohlke Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Voting reform statement; a clearer and more inspiring version
The latest changes to the voting reform consensus
statementhttps://docs.google.com/document/d/1oyJLxI9dciXBbowM5mougnbGHzkL3Ue1QkD8nnMwWLg/edit?hl=en_USpli=1#(copied
from file:revision history. Changes show as green, apologies to
those with text-only mail clients which won't show the difference between
unchanged, new, and removed text.)
-
We, the undersigned election-method experts from around the world,
unanimously denounce the use of plurality voting in elections in which
there are more than two candidates. In this declaration we offer several
ready-to-adopt replacement election methods that we agree will reliably
produce much fairer results. The systems we suggest offer different
advantages, but we agree to suggest the simplest of them, Approval voting,
as a good first step to reform. We also endorse any of many possible
proportional representation (PR) systems to solve the problems of
gerrymandered single-seat elections for legislatures.
.
* Bucklin voting, which uses ranked ballots, and which initially counts
only the most-preferred candidate on each ballot, and identifies a winner
only if that candidate receives a majority of votes, and which successively
adds consideration for lower-ranked candidates until a majority outcome is
reached.
* Condorcet methods, which use ranked ballots and pairwise counting to
compare each candidate with each of the other candidates, with the winner
being the candidate who is pairwise preferred over each and every other
candidate. In some elections none of the candidates will win all of their
pairwise comparisons, so there are variations that resolve these cases. In
practical use, such situations will be rare, so while we may debate about
which “cycle resolution” method is best, we unanimously endorse any of the
various computable Condorcet methods which have serious advocates.
* Majority Choice Approval, which uses score ballots, and elects a candidate
with the highest median score. {footnote: Other similar median-based methods
exist, and are sometimes called “Bucklin” methods. If the term “median” is
too technical, they can be described equivalently as methods which attempt
to pick the highest possible ratings threshold such that the winner is
ranked above that threshold by a majority of voters. We would endorse such
methods if there were a serious proposal to implement a specific one of
them.}
(The choice of counting method determines which kind of ballot is needed.)
These methods have different advantages, and we disagree about which of them
are the overall best systems for public elections. However, despite these
disagreements, we can agree that Approval Voting represents a step towards
whatever system we feel is ideal. It also has the advantage that it is a
simple, well-defined system, with no room for distracting disagreements
about trivial details. And of course, to reiterate, it would be a
substantial improvement over plurality. Therefore, while few of us feel that
Approval is the absolutely ideal system, we find that it is the best
consensus endorsement, and we agree to work together to promote its
adoption, without abandoning the right to individually promote others of the
systems above.
The Wikipedia articles about these methods provide detailed descriptions and
characteristics of these methods.
Most of us agree that an even better choice would be to adopt an election
method in which the choice of who wins one seat interacts with who wins
another equivalent seat in ways that ensure that the overall composition of
the legislature at least roughly matches the preferences of the voters,
especially in terms of political-party preferences. However, we disagree
about which election method best serves this purposeThere are many systems
for accomplishing this “proportional representation” (PR). While the
signatories to this statement reserve our right to disagree with specific PR
systems, we believe that the broad majority of such systems would be clear
improvements over even the most impartially-drawn single-member districts,
and would get our unanimous endorsement..
Most European nations (but not the United Kingdom) use party list”
proportional
representation to match legislative representatives with the
political-party preferences of the voters. Specifically, when electing
members of parliament (MPs) by this method, voters not only vote for a
candidate, but they also indicate their favorite political party.
Proportional representation then makes adjustments to ensure that the
percentage of legislative seats filled by members of each party roughly
matches the percentage of voters who support each party. In other words, if
15% of the voters mark the Green Party as their favorite, then approximately
15% of the parliamentary seats are filled by Green Party politicians.
Proportional representation methods typically use either open lists,
closed lists, or “candidate-centric” methods to determine which
politicians are selected.
[EM] Voting reform statement; a clearer and more inspiring version
I've just been looking at the statement - https://docs.google.com/document/d/1oyJLxI9dciXBbowM5mougnbGHzkL3Ue1QkD8nnMwWLg/edit?hl=en_USpli=1# I think overall it's pretty good, but there are a couple of things I thought I'd mention. It seems to repeat itself: Four of the counting methods that we agree would produce significantly better results compared to plurality voting are, in alphabetical order: And then: Yet most of us also agree that we will support the adoption of any of the supported methods, namely, in alphabetical order: followed by the same list. I think that it can therefore be shortened a bit. I think it can probably also be shortened elsewhere, but it depends on how long you think is reasonable for it to be. Also in the second list it individually lists the Condorcet methods. It also says the Condorcet methods implying that it is an exhaustive list. But anyway, I don't think it is probably necessary to list them at all. Also, and I think this has been mentioned, it refers to election-method experts, and that may put some of us off signing. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Voting reform statement; a clearer and more inspiring version
I have made some further changes to the
statementhttps://docs.google.com/document/d/1oyJLxI9dciXBbowM5mougnbGHzkL3Ue1QkD8nnMwWLg/edit?hl=en_US,
mostly to clarify the advantages and to speak of how this issue spans the
political spectrum; you may see them by looking at the doc.
Currently, I think that the weakest point of the statement is the
exhortation to look things up on Wikipedia. I suggest giving a bibliography,
and saying that we do not endorse everything in every paper or book cited
in our bibliography, and in particular we do not believe that any negative
statement about the systems we have mentioned should be construed to imply
that the system criticized is worse than plurality overall. The
bibliography can include some Wikipedia articles, including voting system,
but it should also include important scholarly articles, whether published
in peer-reviewed journals or not.
JQ
2011/8/29 Jameson Quinn jameson.qu...@gmail.com
The latest changes to the voting reform consensus
statementhttps://docs.google.com/document/d/1oyJLxI9dciXBbowM5mougnbGHzkL3Ue1QkD8nnMwWLg/edit?hl=en_USpli=1#(copied
from file:revision history. Changes show as green, apologies to
those with text-only mail clients which won't show the difference between
unchanged, new, and removed text.)
-
We, the undersigned election-method experts from around the world,
unanimously denounce the use of plurality voting in elections in which
there are more than two candidates. In this declaration we offer several
ready-to-adopt replacement election methods that we agree will reliably
produce much fairer results. The systems we suggest offer different
advantages, but we agree to suggest the simplest of them, Approval voting,
as a good first step to reform. We also endorse any of many possible
proportional representation (PR) systems to solve the problems of
gerrymandered single-seat elections for legislatures.
.
* Bucklin voting, which uses ranked ballots, and which initially counts
only the most-preferred candidate on each ballot, and identifies a winner
only if that candidate receives a majority of votes, and which successively
adds consideration for lower-ranked candidates until a majority outcome is
reached.
* Condorcet methods, which use ranked ballots and pairwise counting to
compare each candidate with each of the other candidates, with the winner
being the candidate who is pairwise preferred over each and every other
candidate. In some elections none of the candidates will win all of their
pairwise comparisons, so there are variations that resolve these cases. In
practical use, such situations will be rare, so while we may debate about
which “cycle resolution” method is best, we unanimously endorse any of the
various computable Condorcet methods which have serious advocates.
* Majority Choice Approval, which uses score ballots, and elects a
candidate with the highest median score. {footnote: Other similar
median-based methods exist, and are sometimes called “Bucklin” methods. If
the term “median” is too technical, they can be described equivalently as
methods which attempt to pick the highest possible ratings threshold such
that the winner is ranked above that threshold by a majority of voters. We
would endorse such methods if there were a serious proposal to implement a
specific one of them.}
(The choice of counting method determines which kind of ballot is needed.)
These methods have different advantages, and we disagree about which of
them are the overall best systems for public elections. However, despite
these disagreements, we can agree that Approval Voting represents a step
towards whatever system we feel is ideal. It also has the advantage that it
is a simple, well-defined system, with no room for distracting disagreements
about trivial details. And of course, to reiterate, it would be a
substantial improvement over plurality. Therefore, while few of us feel that
Approval is the absolutely ideal system, we find that it is the best
consensus endorsement, and we agree to work together to promote its
adoption, without abandoning the right to individually promote others of the
systems above.
The Wikipedia articles about these methods provide detailed descriptions
and characteristics of these methods.
Most of us agree that an even better choice would be to adopt an election
method in which the choice of who wins one seat interacts with who wins
another equivalent seat in ways that ensure that the overall composition of
the legislature at least roughly matches the preferences of the voters,
especially in terms of political-party preferences. However, we disagree
about which election method best serves this purposeThere are many systems
for accomplishing this “proportional representation” (PR). While the
signatories to this statement reserve our right to disagree with specific PR
systems, we believe that the broad majority of such
Re: [EM] Voting reform statement; a clearer and more inspiring version
Here are some additional paragraphs that can be added to our declaration. I've written them to cover some important concepts that are currently not explained. --- begin new paragraphs -- Roberts Rules of Order contain rules about voting, so any organization that has formally adopted these rules, and has not adopted additional overriding rules about voting, must ensure compatibility with these rules. Roberts Rules of Order wisely require that when an officer is elected, the winning candidate must receive a majority of votes. If none of the candidates receives a majority on the first round of voting, these rules require additional rounds of voting until one of the candidates receives a majority. Very significantly the rules specify that the candidate with the fewest votes must not be asked to withdraw. This means that instant-runoff voting is not compatible with Roberts Rules of Order. Also notice that Roberts Rules of Order oppose the use of plurality voting. In situations that require compatibility with Roberts Rules of Order, all of us support the use of any of our supported election methods as a way to identify which candidate or candidates should be encouraged to withdraw. (Before withdrawing the candidate deserves to be given an opportunity to express support for a remaining candidate.) In this case the supported election method is being used to identify the least popular candidates instead of the most popular candidate. Therefore all the available counts and calculated rankings produced by the supported method must be shared. This information gives the candidates, and their supporters, clear evidence as to which candidates should withdraw. The final round of voting typically would involve either two or three candidates, and the final round must use single-mark ballots, and the winning candidate must receive a majority of votes. Almost all of us signing this declaration recommend that an organization formally adopt a rule that specifies that one of our supported election methods will be used to elect the organization's officers. If there is uncertainly about which supported method to choose, the adopted rule can specify that any of the election methods supported by this declaration are acceptable for electing the organization's officers, and that the current organization's officers can choose which of our supported methods will be used in the next election. ... Here is another way to summarize what we support, and what we oppose. If voters only indicate a single, first choice on their ballot, then the candidate with the most first-choice votes is not necessarily the most popular, and the candidate with the fewest first-choice votes is not necessarily the least popular. A source of confusion for some people is the similarity between getting the most votes and getting a majority of votes. Although it is true that getting a majority of votes also means getting the most votes, it is not true that getting the most votes also implies getting a majority of votes. Expressed another way, when there are three or more candidates and the candidate with the most first-choice votes does not receive a majority of votes, then that means that a majority of voters oppose this candidate (as their first choice). To resolve this situation fairly, additional preference information must be considered. --- end new paragraphs -- If anyone is putting together the pieces I've written, please let me know. Otherwise I'll create a new draft that contains what I've written, plus some refinements to accommodate the request that the different Condorcet methods be explained separately (not within the main list), plus some paragraphs to accommodate the request for statements about multiple rounds of voting. Richard Fobes On 8/23/2011 9:38 PM, Ralph Suter wrote: ... 5. Finally, I think the statement could be greatly improved and made more interesting, relevant, and compelling to a wider range of readers by explaining that alternative voting and representation methods can also be beneficially used for a large variety of purposes other than general political elections and that different methods are often more suitable for some kinds of purposes than for other purposes. Some example of other purposes are: US-style primary elections; party convention votes; decisions in legislative bodies and committees; decisions by informal groups; decisions in meetings of different kinds and sizes; uncritical or relatively minor decisions vs. major, critically important decisions; opinion polling; TV/radio audience voting; provisional (straw) voting; and choosing organizational board members and conference attendees. ... ... Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Voting reform statement; a clearer and more inspiring version
I question adding this collection of paragraphs to the major declaration, which seems more aimed at improving public elections. On Aug 28, 2011, at 2:22 AM, Richard Fobes wrote: Here are some additional paragraphs that can be added to our declaration. I've written them to cover some important concepts that are currently not explained. --- begin new paragraphs -- Roberts Rules of Order contain rules about voting, so any organization that has formally adopted these rules, and has not adopted additional overriding rules about voting, must ensure compatibility with these rules. Roberts Rules of Order wisely require that when an officer is elected, the winning candidate must receive a majority of votes. If none of the candidates receives a majority on the first round of voting, these rules require additional rounds of voting until one of the candidates receives a majority. Very significantly the rules specify that the candidate with the fewest votes must not be asked to withdraw. This means that instant-runoff voting is not compatible with Roberts Rules of Order. Also notice that Roberts Rules of Order oppose the use of plurality voting. In situations that require compatibility with Roberts Rules of Order, all of us support the use of any of our supported election methods as a way to identify which candidate or candidates should be encouraged to withdraw. (Before withdrawing the candidate deserves to be given an opportunity to express support for a remaining candidate.) In this case the supported election method is being used to identify the least popular candidates instead of the most popular candidate. Therefore all the available counts and calculated rankings produced by the supported method must be shared. This information gives the candidates, and their supporters, clear evidence as to which candidates should withdraw. The final round of voting typically would involve either two or three candidates, and the final round must use single-mark ballots, and the winning candidate must receive a majority of votes. I question two or three - there is no need to dump losers - we care about winners. Dave Ketchum Almost all of us signing this declaration recommend that an organization formally adopt a rule that specifies that one of our supported election methods will be used to elect the organization's officers. If there is uncertainly about which supported method to choose, the adopted rule can specify that any of the election methods supported by this declaration are acceptable for electing the organization's officers, and that the current organization's officers can choose which of our supported methods will be used in the next election. ... Here is another way to summarize what we support, and what we oppose. If voters only indicate a single, first choice on their ballot, then the candidate with the most first-choice votes is not necessarily the most popular, and the candidate with the fewest first-choice votes is not necessarily the least popular. A source of confusion for some people is the similarity between getting the most votes and getting a majority of votes. Although it is true that getting a majority of votes also means getting the most votes, it is not true that getting the most votes also implies getting a majority of votes. Expressed another way, when there are three or more candidates and the candidate with the most first- choice votes does not receive a majority of votes, then that means that a majority of voters oppose this candidate (as their first choice). To resolve this situation fairly, additional preference information must be considered. --- end new paragraphs -- If anyone is putting together the pieces I've written, please let me know. Otherwise I'll create a new draft that contains what I've written, plus some refinements to accommodate the request that the different Condorcet methods be explained separately (not within the main list), plus some paragraphs to accommodate the request for statements about multiple rounds of voting. Richard Fobes On 8/23/2011 9:38 PM, Ralph Suter wrote: ... 5. Finally, I think the statement could be greatly improved and made more interesting, relevant, and compelling to a wider range of readers by explaining that alternative voting and representation methods can also be beneficially used for a large variety of purposes other than general political elections and that different methods are often more suitable for some kinds of purposes than for other purposes. Some example of other purposes are: US-style primary elections; party convention votes; decisions in legislative bodies and committees; decisions by informal groups; decisions in meetings of different kinds and sizes; uncritical or relatively minor decisions vs. major, critically important decisions; opinion polling;
Re: [EM] Voting reform statement; a clearer and more inspiring version
Even if improving public elections is the statement's primary aim, that needn't be its only aim -- nor, I'm convinced, should it be. One point I've tried to make is that one of the best practical means for improving the prospects for reforming difficult-to-change public elections would be to promote the use of alternative voting and representation methods for use in non-public elections and other kinds of decisionmaking processes (both public and non-public), including not only formal ones such as organizational and formal meeting elections and decisions but also informal ones that involve small and temporary groups -- and for not only critically important decisions such as presidential elections and constitutional referendums but also much less important decisions such as groups of friends and co-workers deciding where to eat lunch together. (For the latter, I believe approval voting and other quick and simple methods are, in virtually all cases, indisputably better than more complicated and time-consuming though maybe technically superior ones.) The important things to keep in mind regarding this point are, first, that it is much easier to experiment with alternative voting and representation methods in other than public elections and, second, that doing so has the great added advantage of helping educate people about alternative methods and (hopefully) helping persuade much larger numbers of people that some alternative methods would be great improvements over plurality voting and single-representative legislative districts for use in public elections. -RS On 8/28/2011 12:45 PM, Dave Ketchum wrote: I question adding this collection of paragraphs to the major declaration, which seems more aimed at improving public elections. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Voting reform statement; a clearer and more inspiring version
I'll try to find a balance. I too recognize the importance of starting by educating voters through non-governmental elections -- so that later it will be much easier to get fairer election methods adopted in governmental elections. Yet I was wondering if maybe this explanation about Roberts Rules of Order was too long, and based on the feedback I'll try to shorten it. Also I think I can merge it with another request to cover multiple rounds of voting, which is not yet covered -- and which also is important. The other two paragraphs I expect to keep in the next draft -- at the end as a part of the summary -- but they can be removed if they prove to be disliked. I'll start working on the next draft. It will be longer than the first because of all the additions that were requested, but fortunately I expect to be able to shorten it in a few places. Richard Fobes On 8/28/2011 2:13 PM, Ralph Suter wrote: Even if improving public elections is the statement's primary aim, that needn't be its only aim -- nor, I'm convinced, should it be. One point I've tried to make is that one of the best practical means for improving the prospects for reforming difficult-to-change public elections would be to promote the use of alternative voting and representation methods for use in non-public elections and other kinds of decisionmaking processes (both public and non-public), including not only formal ones such as organizational and formal meeting elections and decisions but also informal ones that involve small and temporary groups -- and for not only critically important decisions such as presidential elections and constitutional referendums but also much less important decisions such as groups of friends and co-workers deciding where to eat lunch together. (For the latter, I believe approval voting and other quick and simple methods are, in virtually all cases, indisputably better than more complicated and time-consuming though maybe technically superior ones.) The important things to keep in mind regarding this point are, first, that it is much easier to experiment with alternative voting and representation methods in other than public elections and, second, that doing so has the great added advantage of helping educate people about alternative methods and (hopefully) helping persuade much larger numbers of people that some alternative methods would be great improvements over plurality voting and single-representative legislative districts for use in public elections. -RS On 8/28/2011 12:45 PM, Dave Ketchum wrote: I question adding this collection of paragraphs to the major declaration, which seems more aimed at improving public elections. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Voting reform statement; a clearer and more inspiring version
Dear all, please consider including a list of endorsed election methods for proportional elections, just as you have done for single winner elections. Otherwise the bold statement will just cover one special case in election theory - single winner elections. Furthermore you might consider covering the issues of (i) proportional rank orders. For instance when electing the party list in primaries, in countries where closed lists are used. (ii) proportional rank orders to elect a hierarchy of functions proportionally, like board president, vice presidents and other board members. Best regards Peter Zborník On Wed, Aug 24, 2011 at 3:06 AM, Richard Fobes electionmeth...@votefair.org wrote: I very much agree with Jameson Quinn that the time has come to write, sign, and widely distribute a formal statement of the election-method principles that we agree upon. Yet instead of just providing a checklist of what we approve, I suggest we take advantage of this opportunity to ... * ... inspire(!) policymakers, politically active citizens, and frustrated voters to take action, and ... * ... give them a clearly explained declaration they can use as ammunition in their battles to implement election-method reforms. To serve these purposes, I'm boldly suggesting an entirely new wording. Keep in mind that one of my professions has been to work as a technical writer specializing in translating especially complex technology into clear English, and I also have experience writing marketing materials. This version incorporates the suggestions and refinements already discussed, so the revision work already done is not being wasted. Previously I too was thinking that the other version was too long. Ironically this version is even longer. I now realize that the other version went into too much detail about subtle issues, and that's what made it seem long. In contrast, this version uses the extra words to clearly explain fundamental voting concepts that most people do not already understand, and to serve the above-listed purposes. Also I think (or at least hope) that this version better identifies our real areas of agreement. My hope is that either this version, or a merging of this version with other versions, will produce a declaration that we can sign with much more enthusiasm. - The Declaration of Election-Method Experts - We, the undersigned election-method experts from around the world, unanimously denounce the use of plurality voting in elections in which there are more than two candidates, and in this declaration we offer ready-to-adopt replacement election methods that we agree will reliably produce much fairer results. We agree that there are no perceived political or economic risks associated with adopting the election methods recommended here. In fact, we believe that improving the fairness of election results will produce many political and economic benefits. Some of the benefits we expect include reduced voter frustration, reduced government costs (that arise from excessive political influence from self-serving special interests), wiser use of tax dollars (based on electing problem-solving leaders who solve underlying problems that waste money), dramatically increased voter turnout because of having meaningful choices, increased compliance with laws including taxation laws, and likely increases in widespread economic prosperity (arising from increased fairness in the business world). We use the term plurality voting to refer to the commonly used counting method in which each voter marks only a single choice on the ballot, and the number of marks for each candidate are counted, and the candidate with the highest number is regarded as the winner. In some nations this method is called First Past The Post (and abbreviated FPTP). Although this election method produces fair results when there are only two candidates, the results are often dramatically unfair when this approach is used in elections with three or more candidates. In spite of its well-known weaknesses, plurality voting is predominantly used in most elections in most democratic nations around the world, with Australia and New Zealand being notable exceptions. It is also the preferred election method in nations that pretend to be democracies, yet lack the freedoms and economic benefits of democracy. Unanimously we agree that the kind of ballot used in plurality voting is not appropriate when there are more than two choices. Its deficiency is that it does not collect enough preference information from the voters in order to always correctly identify the most popular candidate when there are more than two candidates. Unanimously we agree that there are three kinds of ballots that collect enough preference information to always, or almost always, correctly identify the most popular candidate. The names and descriptions of these ballot types are, in alphabetical order: *
Re: [EM] Voting reform statement; a clearer and more inspiring version
2011/8/25 Peter Zbornik pzbor...@gmail.com Dear all, please consider including a list of endorsed election methods for proportional elections, just as you have done for single winner elections. Otherwise the bold statement will just cover one special case in election theory - single winner elections. The statement does address proportional methods. Essentially, it endorses any non-closed-list system. The problem with including a list is that there are too many good options. I was afraid that even if we explicitly stated that the list was only meant to be exemplary, not exhaustive, it would be an invitation for potential statement signers to battle over what should be included. So, how about this: when you state your intention to sign, you can mention one or two PR systems, and any systems which get mentioned twice or more will be on the exemplary list. JQ Furthermore you might consider covering the issues of (i) proportional rank orders. For instance when electing the party list in primaries, in countries where closed lists are used. (ii) proportional rank orders to elect a hierarchy of functions proportionally, like board president, vice presidents and other board members. Best regards Peter Zborník On Wed, Aug 24, 2011 at 3:06 AM, Richard Fobes electionmeth...@votefair.org wrote: I very much agree with Jameson Quinn that the time has come to write, sign, and widely distribute a formal statement of the election-method principles that we agree upon. Yet instead of just providing a checklist of what we approve, I suggest we take advantage of this opportunity to ... * ... inspire(!) policymakers, politically active citizens, and frustrated voters to take action, and ... * ... give them a clearly explained declaration they can use as ammunition in their battles to implement election-method reforms. To serve these purposes, I'm boldly suggesting an entirely new wording. Keep in mind that one of my professions has been to work as a technical writer specializing in translating especially complex technology into clear English, and I also have experience writing marketing materials. This version incorporates the suggestions and refinements already discussed, so the revision work already done is not being wasted. Previously I too was thinking that the other version was too long. Ironically this version is even longer. I now realize that the other version went into too much detail about subtle issues, and that's what made it seem long. In contrast, this version uses the extra words to clearly explain fundamental voting concepts that most people do not already understand, and to serve the above-listed purposes. Also I think (or at least hope) that this version better identifies our real areas of agreement. My hope is that either this version, or a merging of this version with other versions, will produce a declaration that we can sign with much more enthusiasm. - The Declaration of Election-Method Experts - We, the undersigned election-method experts from around the world, unanimously denounce the use of plurality voting in elections in which there are more than two candidates, and in this declaration we offer ready-to-adopt replacement election methods that we agree will reliably produce much fairer results. We agree that there are no perceived political or economic risks associated with adopting the election methods recommended here. In fact, we believe that improving the fairness of election results will produce many political and economic benefits. Some of the benefits we expect include reduced voter frustration, reduced government costs (that arise from excessive political influence from self-serving special interests), wiser use of tax dollars (based on electing problem-solving leaders who solve underlying problems that waste money), dramatically increased voter turnout because of having meaningful choices, increased compliance with laws including taxation laws, and likely increases in widespread economic prosperity (arising from increased fairness in the business world). We use the term plurality voting to refer to the commonly used counting method in which each voter marks only a single choice on the ballot, and the number of marks for each candidate are counted, and the candidate with the highest number is regarded as the winner. In some nations this method is called First Past The Post (and abbreviated FPTP). Although this election method produces fair results when there are only two candidates, the results are often dramatically unfair when this approach is used in elections with three or more candidates. In spite of its well-known weaknesses, plurality voting is predominantly used in most elections in most democratic nations around the world, with Australia and New Zealand being notable exceptions. It is also the preferred election method in nations that pretend to be democracies, yet lack the freedoms
Re: [EM] Voting reform statement; a clearer and more inspiring version
Peter Zbornik wrote: Dear all, please consider including a list of endorsed election methods for proportional elections, just as you have done for single winner elections. Otherwise the bold statement will just cover one special case in election theory - single winner elections. Furthermore you might consider covering the issues of (i) proportional rank orders. For instance when electing the party list in primaries, in countries where closed lists are used. (ii) proportional rank orders to elect a hierarchy of functions proportionally, like board president, vice presidents and other board members. I think it would be better to have a separate statement for details about multiwinner methods than to put everything into one grand document, so as not to burden the latter too greatly. The statement we're considering now could have details about what single-winner methods we agree to support and then say just about all multiwinner methods but closed list, then, if necessary, have another statement that mentions proportional rank orders, STV/QPQ/Schulze STV, open list, and so on. Perhaps it would be enough to say anything but closed list and be done without needing a second statement, as multiwinner methods have the advantage of multiple seats to even out strange results that would otherwise make for a bad method. On the other hand, it may be useful to have a common position on semiproportional methods (SNTV, parallel voting and limited vote systems, and so on). Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Voting reform statement; a clearer and more inspiring version
I like the idea (from Jameson Quinn) of allowing our signature-line preferences to include methods that are not mentioned in the formal statement. (I had suggested only allowing the names of methods that are formally supported.) To prevent these expressed preferences from becoming too long, I suggest limiting them to 100 characters (including the word prefers). I'm not as enthusiastic about the idea of including an exemplary list in the declaration based on how many signatures express preference for a specific method. That's because, as we know, it's easy to stuff the ballot box, including by getting signatures from experts who aren't really election-method experts. As it is, supporters of each election method will try to get fellow supporters to sign, in hopes of making it appear that their method is more popular than other election methods. Richard Fobes On 8/25/2011 4:35 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote: 2011/8/25 Peter Zbornik pzbor...@gmail.com mailto:pzbor...@gmail.com Dear all, please consider including a list of endorsed election methods for proportional elections, just as you have done for single winner elections. Otherwise the bold statement will just cover one special case in election theory - single winner elections. The statement does address proportional methods. Essentially, it endorses any non-closed-list system. The problem with including a list is that there are too many good options. I was afraid that even if we explicitly stated that the list was only meant to be exemplary, not exhaustive, it would be an invitation for potential statement signers to battle over what should be included. So, how about this: when you state your intention to sign, you can mention one or two PR systems, and any systems which get mentioned twice or more will be on the exemplary list. JQ Furthermore you might consider covering the issues of (i) proportional rank orders. For instance when electing the party list in primaries, in countries where closed lists are used. (ii) proportional rank orders to elect a hierarchy of functions proportionally, like board president, vice presidents and other board members. Best regards Peter Zborník Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Voting reform statement; a clearer and more inspiring version
Hi, I aggree it would be good to make a separate statement for proportional election methods. Some other comments for the record: Looking at single-winner elections 1) What about multiple round single-winner methods? For instance the Brittish conservatives vote on who to eliminate each round . The candidate with the least number of votes is eliminated, using only bullet voting. So far, as I have understood, the only disadvantage with such an election system is many election rounds. 2) All of the endorsed methods could be improved by simply letting the top two contenders meet in a second round. Tactical voting might lead to changes in preference orderings between the rounds and thus to improved results by introducting a second round. 3) what about the option None of the above, the blank vote, are we neutral to this option? I certainly think this option is good and important. Looking at proportional elections: 4) Aren't we in a position to a) recommend Meek's method ahead of IRV-STV, when it comes to a better proportional representation? b) recommend IRV-STV (scottish STV) for its simplicity and relative ease of being explained c) recommend fractional vote transfer in STV? I cannot endorse random vote transfer in STV. d) fractional quotas instead of integer quotas? I cannot endorse integer quotas. e) be able to recommend at least one Condorcet-STV method, which is used somewhere? f) endorse that the majority rule should be fulfilled, i.e.that a majority of voters get a majority of the seats? I would not like to endorse proportional election methods violating the majority rule, like IRV-STV and the Hare quota. The Hare quota with Meek's method might however satisfy the majority criterion, as the only STV method (have seen no proof though). 6) proportional election methods are most certainly not only appropriate for elections to state legislative, but also for elections in any organisation, the statement limits the scope of consideration to public elections, especially to parliamentary bodies. 7) I do not think that it is a good idea to recommend proportional methods outside the statement, i.e. at the time of signature. Well normally, i.e. in our party, alternative proposals are voted upon. If the proposals are supported, then they are included in the final text. Sometimes a qualified majority is needed (like two thirds). As this is an expert opinion, it is important that almost all experts agree, ofherwise it is not an expert opinion. So the qualified majority quota could be higher, maybe 80 percent or five sixths (used in Sweden for some constitutional changes). Then the other question is who is an expert. Someone who has published at least one paper in a peer-reviewed journal. Well that's how policy is made in politics. I think noone has come up with something better, except for enlightened dictatorship :o) In any case, it is great a statement is being made and I hope the people on this list will be able to agree on a final wording. Best regards Peter Zborník On Thu, Aug 25, 2011 at 4:48 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm km_el...@lavabit.com wrote: Peter Zbornik wrote: Dear all, please consider including a list of endorsed election methods for proportional elections, just as you have done for single winner elections. Otherwise the bold statement will just cover one special case in election theory - single winner elections. Furthermore you might consider covering the issues of (i) proportional rank orders. For instance when electing the party list in primaries, in countries where closed lists are used. (ii) proportional rank orders to elect a hierarchy of functions proportionally, like board president, vice presidents and other board members. I think it would be better to have a separate statement for details about multiwinner methods than to put everything into one grand document, so as not to burden the latter too greatly. The statement we're considering now could have details about what single-winner methods we agree to support and then say just about all multiwinner methods but closed list, then, if necessary, have another statement that mentions proportional rank orders, STV/QPQ/Schulze STV, open list, and so on. Perhaps it would be enough to say anything but closed list and be done without needing a second statement, as multiwinner methods have the advantage of multiple seats to even out strange results that would otherwise make for a bad method. On the other hand, it may be useful to have a common position on semiproportional methods (SNTV, parallel voting and limited vote systems, and so on). Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Voting reform statement; a clearer and more inspiring version
Here are additional paragraphs we can add to the declaration to further resolve the criticism from Markus Schulze that there are too many ... methods: To appreciate the importance of the few election methods we support, consider that there are hundreds of other election methods and voting methods, plus countless combinations of them, that we unanimously agree should not be used in governmental elections. All of us agree that we will oppose the adoption of any of those inferior methods. Why do we not support a single best election method? We are highly trained in mathematics and there is a mathematical proof (commonly called Arrow's Impossibility Theorem) that mathematically proves that there cannot be a voting method that has all the expected and desirable characteristics of a best voting method. This means that each of our supported election methods has advantages and disadvantages compared to each another. For example, approval voting has the advantage of using a ballot layout that is similar to single-mark ballots (with the difference being that approval voting allows marking more than one candidate as acceptable). As another example, the range ballot (which is used in range voting) collects more preference information compared to the ranked ballot (because the distance between candidates can be expressed). As a related complexity, different election methods have different levels of vulnerability to strategic voting, which means that if a group of voters knows how other voters will vote, they may be able to mark their ballots differently in a way that increases their influence in the election results. We have rejected as unacceptable the election methods that are most vulnerable to strategic voting. All of our supported election methods have at least some vulnerability to strategic voting, but their vulnerability is small compared to plurality voting, which is highly vulnerable to strategic voting. Richard Fobes On 8/24/2011 5:52 PM, Richard Fobes wrote: On 8/24/2011 2:15 PM, Markus Schulze wrote: ... Well, one of the most frequently used arguments against Condorcet methods is that there are too many Condorcet methods and that there is no agreement on the best one. Markus Schulze Perhaps we can add a statement that says something like: In most cases the different Condorcet methods identify the same winner. Occasionally they identify different winners, but those situations involve complications that make it difficult to objectively determine which candidate is really the most popular. Each of these Condorcet methods has slight advantages and disadvantages compared to one another, and some are easier to explain than others. Yet in all cases they provide dramatically fairer results compared to plurality voting, and significantly fairer results compared to instant-runoff voting, so any of them is suitable for use in governmental elections. Richard Fobes Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Voting reform statement; a clearer and more inspiring version
On Aug 25, 2011, at 2:29 PM, Peter Zbornik wrote: Hi, I aggree it would be good to make a separate statement for proportional election methods. Agreed. Need something brief here that some of us promote such for such as legislatures and are working on a separate effort for this. Some other comments for the record: Looking at single-winner elections 1) What about multiple round single-winner methods? For instance the Brittish conservatives vote on who to eliminate each round . The candidate with the least number of votes is eliminated, using only bullet voting. So far, as I have understood, the only disadvantage with such an election system is many election rounds. Only need a few words here, if any - seems like this might be done with Approval, whatever may get done for other elections. Primary elections should be workable with whatever is done for the main election (minimize related costs - or perhaps with something simpler). Still, how much need for primaries if main election can tolerate multiple candidates from any one party. 2) All of the endorsed methods could be improved by simply letting the top two contenders meet in a second round. Tactical voting might lead to changes in preference orderings between the rounds and thus to improved results by introducting a second round. Plurality needs to have a second round since its voters sometimes need to, but cannot, vote for more than one in the main election. With better voting methods second rounds are less needed, and ARE an expense for all, including the voters. Agreed that making second rounds standard could have improved results - unless it cost too much and voters react in a less than useful way. 3) what about the option None of the above, the blank vote, are we neutral to this option? I certainly think this option is good and important. When is this a useful addition? Argue again that Condorcet should be considered a single method here - and something said about such as cycles existing, though not necessarily what to do about them. Claim that what I wrote about simplifying Condorcet voting August 24, 2011 3:05:19 PM EDT needs to be seen by more at this point. Dave Ketchum Looking at proportional elections: 4) Aren't we in a position to a) recommend Meek's method ahead of IRV-STV, when it comes to a better proportional representation? b) recommend IRV-STV (scottish STV) for its simplicity and relative ease of being explained c) recommend fractional vote transfer in STV? I cannot endorse random vote transfer in STV. d) fractional quotas instead of integer quotas? I cannot endorse integer quotas. e) be able to recommend at least one Condorcet-STV method, which is used somewhere? f) endorse that the majority rule should be fulfilled, i.e.that a majority of voters get a majority of the seats? I would not like to endorse proportional election methods violating the majority rule, like IRV-STV and the Hare quota. The Hare quota with Meek's method might however satisfy the majority criterion, as the only STV method (have seen no proof though). 6) proportional election methods are most certainly not only appropriate for elections to state legislative, but also for elections in any organisation, the statement limits the scope of consideration to public elections, especially to parliamentary bodies. 7) I do not think that it is a good idea to recommend proportional methods outside the statement, i.e. at the time of signature. Well normally, i.e. in our party, alternative proposals are voted upon. If the proposals are supported, then they are included in the final text. Sometimes a qualified majority is needed (like two thirds). As this is an expert opinion, it is important that almost all experts agree, ofherwise it is not an expert opinion. So the qualified majority quota could be higher, maybe 80 percent or five sixths (used in Sweden for some constitutional changes). Then the other question is who is an expert. Someone who has published at least one paper in a peer-reviewed journal. Well that's how policy is made in politics. I think noone has come up with something better, except for enlightened dictatorship :o) In any case, it is great a statement is being made and I hope the people on this list will be able to agree on a final wording. Best regards Peter Zborník On Thu, Aug 25, 2011 at 4:48 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm km_el...@lavabit.com wrote: Peter Zbornik wrote: Dear all, please consider including a list of endorsed election methods for proportional elections, just as you have done for single winner elections. Otherwise the bold statement will just cover one special case in election theory - single winner elections. Furthermore you might consider covering the issues of (i) proportional rank orders. For instance when electing the party list in primaries, in countries where closed lists are used. (ii)
Re: [EM] Voting reform statement; a clearer and more inspiring version
Good Afternoon, Jameson I understand the point you make, even if I don't see it as a good idea for those seeking to define rational concepts. While the technology of communication has advanced over time, its effectiveness has lagged because the modes of communication, whether printed or broadcast, are uni-directional - from an author or announcer to an audience. Such communication, unfortunately and inaccurately, assumes the author or announcer has greater knowledge than the audience. Not only is that rarely (if ever) true, it tends to propagate the inadequacies and biases of the source. One of the results is that the audience habitually discounts the source's assertions. Instead of building a sound knowledge base, the audience ignores opinions it doesn't share. Rational conclusions cannot be reached unless assertions are challenged and the underlying concepts examined. That is best done, one at a time. It is a slow process of assembling and distilling bits of information that, taken together, help us identify basic principles. The process is difficult because, in the realm of human interaction, most, if not all, principles are dynamic. What is true in one set of circumstances may be untrue in another. I understand your point of view and have used it often. It works well when seeking material accomplishment. For intellectual analysis, though, my personal preference is for a more structured approach, building a solid structure, one brick at a time. Fred Gohlke Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Voting reform statement; a clearer and more inspiring version
Good Afternoon, Richard re: Your implication (at the bottom of your message) that our goal should be to create something that is 'supported by all members' ... I apologize for giving you that impression; it was not my intent. What I was suggesting was that it might be a good idea to step back and find out which principles all members approve - and which they don't - so those on which there is disagreement can be examined. Examination may lead to agreement, or to discovery of a different principle, or to discarding the idea, or to separate lines of analysis, all of which are helpful in achieving the goal of the discussion. Specific feedback on your list is not possible for me because it would require accepting the assumption that party politics is the only means of achieving democratic government. It's not. A deliberative process is more effective in achieving what Lincoln described as government 'of the people, by the people, for the people.' There is some recent work that shows how deliberation resolves partisan differences and is beneficial to the participants. Two papers describing such results will be presented at the American Political Science Association meeting in Seattle, early in next month. They are: Pogrebinschi, Thamy, Participatory Democracy and the Representation of Minority Groups in Brazil (2011). APSA 2011 Annual Meeting Paper. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1901000 and Esterling, Kevin M., Fung, Archon and Lee, Taeku, Knowledge Inequality and Empowerment in Small Deliberative Groups: Evidence from a Randomized Experiment at the Oboe Townhalls (2011). APSA 2011 Annual Meeting Paper. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1902664 These papers should provide the impetus for seeking an electoral process that is less destructive than party politics. Fred Gohlke Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Voting reform statement; a clearer and more inspiring version
Again I choke on IRV getting near Condorcet, even though they use the same ballot. I've seen several results arguing for Condorcet/IRV hybrids as having good strategy resistance compared to other Condorcet methods. For instance, http://www.votingmatters.org.uk/FORTHCOMING/I29P1f.pdf . Tideman, for instance, is on record as supporting such a hybrid as the best realistic method. At a more basic level, I think that if we're going to reach consensus, it's important to not be to facile about shooting down methods others favor. I hear several Condorcet advocates reacting to the statement by repeating pro-Condorcet arguments, essentially saying that they are reluctant to sign something which advocates methods they consider inferior to Condorcet. If we have to decide whether Condorcet is better or Approval is better [1] before we have a statement, we're never going to get anywhere. JQ [1] See http://www.cs.brown.edu/~ws/personal/approval.pdf for an example of an argument that Approval is better than Condorcet. I'm not trying to fan the flames here, I'm just trying to illustrate that there are two sides to this issue. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Voting reform statement; a clearer and more inspiring, version
2011/8/24 Markus Schulze markus.schu...@alumni.tu-berlin.de in my opinion, the Voting Reform Statement endorses too many alternative election methods. Opponents will argue that this long list demonstrates that even we don't have a clue which election method should be adopted. Is that worse than what happens if we can't agree? Jameson Quinn Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Voting reform statement; a clearer and more inspiring version
If one wishes to distribute a formal statement of the election-method principles that we agree upon., would it not be wise to start by finding out which principles command agreement? Perhaps it would be better to take one step back and jointly define the principles before attempting a formal statement. One possibility might start something like this: Electoral Method Principles: * Principles express a consensus. * No principle has primacy over another principle. * Any principle can be challenged by rational argument. Principles of human interaction: * The interactions between humans is known as politics. * The scope of politics is immense. * The immensity of politics requires organization. * The first step of forming an organization is to define its principles. Principles of government: * The people have the right to define their government. * The Electoral Method must implement government by the people. * Government by the people means that every individual in the society can participate in the political process to the full extent of the individual's desire and ability. It is not my place to list the principles for this board, except as an example, so the foregoing is merely a suggested outline. Participants in the discussion must define the principles important to them, and should do so before attempting a formal statement alleged to be supported by all members. Fred Gohlke Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Voting reform statement; a clearer and more inspiring version
I think that, in discussing the statement specifics, we are discussing our shared principles. And I think that people are more likely to participate when it relates to a specific draft statement. As a python programmer, one of my community's maxims is It's better to ask forgiveness than permission. In programming practice, what that means is that often the best way to find out how something is broken is to try to use it in a real-world task and see what happens. Not smart when fixing airplanes, but in the realm of ideas or software, where you can fix most anything once you understand the error, it works out. And the application to the current case is: assume we agree and write a statement, then see who objects to what. JQ 2011/8/24 Fred Gohlke fredgoh...@verizon.net If one wishes to distribute a formal statement of the election-method principles that we agree upon., would it not be wise to start by finding out which principles command agreement? Perhaps it would be better to take one step back and jointly define the principles before attempting a formal statement. One possibility might start something like this: Electoral Method Principles: * Principles express a consensus. * No principle has primacy over another principle. * Any principle can be challenged by rational argument. Principles of human interaction: * The interactions between humans is known as politics. * The scope of politics is immense. * The immensity of politics requires organization. * The first step of forming an organization is to define its principles. Principles of government: * The people have the right to define their government. * The Electoral Method must implement government by the people. * Government by the people means that every individual in the society can participate in the political process to the full extent of the individual's desire and ability. It is not my place to list the principles for this board, except as an example, so the foregoing is merely a suggested outline. Participants in the discussion must define the principles important to them, and should do so before attempting a formal statement alleged to be supported by all members. Fred Gohlke Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Voting reform statement; a clearer and more inspiring version
Your implication (at the bottom of your message) that our goal should be to create something that is supported by all members is impractical. (As we know, a consensus requirement easily leads to a dictatorship by someone holding out for their favorite cause.) I agree with Jameson Quinn that we should try to write a statement, then see who objects to what. Already that approach is revealing new information. The key word is try. If we don't succeed and very few people want to sign it, then we have still learned a lot. I am interested in your specific feedback about what you like and dislike about the declaration. If you dislike most of the declaration, then I encourage you to do what I did in response to the previous declaration, which is to write an alternate version. Richard Fobes On 8/24/2011 9:57 AM, Fred Gohlke wrote: If one wishes to distribute a formal statement of the election-method principles that we agree upon., would it not be wise to start by finding out which principles command agreement? Perhaps it would be better to take one step back and jointly define the principles before attempting a formal statement. One possibility might start something like this: Electoral Method Principles: * Principles express a consensus. * No principle has primacy over another principle. * Any principle can be challenged by rational argument. Principles of human interaction: * The interactions between humans is known as politics. * The scope of politics is immense. * The immensity of politics requires organization. * The first step of forming an organization is to define its principles. Principles of government: * The people have the right to define their government. * The Electoral Method must implement government by the people. * Government by the people means that every individual in the society can participate in the political process to the full extent of the individual's desire and ability. It is not my place to list the principles for this board, except as an example, so the foregoing is merely a suggested outline. Participants in the discussion must define the principles important to them, and should do so before attempting a formal statement alleged to be supported by all members. Fred Gohlke Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Voting reform statement; a clearer and more inspiring, version
On 8/24/2011 6:39 AM, Markus Schulze wrote: ... in my opinion, the Voting Reform Statement endorses too many alternative election methods. Opponents will argue that this long list demonstrates that even we don't have a clue which election method should be adopted. Markus Schulze I agree it would be advantageous to shorten the list of supported election methods. However, the methods you and I would remove are supported by other potential signers, and they would want to remove what you and I support. As someone (Jameson Quinn?) earlier said, we are splitting the vote in our opposition to plurality voting. Ironically, as election-method experts, we know we can't even vote on what to include in our recommendation list, because we wouldn't be able to agree on which voting method to use, and which choices to rank or score. My software negotiation tool at www.NegotiationTool.com attempts to provide a way to resolve such disagreements, but so far I haven't received any feedback about that tool from election-method experts. Richard Fobes Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Voting reform statement; a clearer and more inspiring, version
To Ralph Suter, thank you for your extremely useful feedback! You are the kind of person who is in a position to use our declaration as (for lack of a better metaphor) ammunition in the battles against plurality voting. The fact that you like it reveals that we are on the right track. The fact that you do not find the declaration to be too long is very helpful! I like your idea of emphasizing that these election methods first should to be used in non-governmental organizations as a way of educating voters about what works, and what doesn't. This approach could have prevented the situations in which instant-runoff voting was adopted and then rejected. For this purpose we can add paragraphs such as: -- begin -- The same election methods we recommend here for governmental elections also can be used for electing officers (such as president, treasurer, and secretary) in an organization. In fact, all(?) of the methods recommended here have been used for officer elections, and the fairer results have been widely appreciated (except by incumbents who were not reelected). We unanimously agree that plurality voting should not be used to elect corporate board members. As a replacement we support using the same election methods that we recommend for governmental elections. If legal restrictions only allow plurality voting, we unanimously support legal reforms that allow any one (or more) of the election methods supported here. The above-recommended election methods also can be used in any organization to make single-choice decisions, such as choosing a new logo, choosing a time or date for an event, and choosing a restaurant for a gathering. However, if one of the choices is to not make a change (such as not changing the organization's logo), then two rounds of voting are needed, with the first round choosing the most popular change, and the second round choosing between that change and not making any change. Although instant-runoff voting is not being recommended for governmental elections, instant-runoff voting is useful when a small group of people is physically gathered together and does not have access to voting software. In this case paper-based ranked ballots can be collected and then physically sorted into stacks based on the ballot's top-ranked remaining choice. Until one of the ballot stacks contains more than half the ballots, the smallest remaining stack of ballots can be re-sorted based on the voter's next-ranked choice. This approach is much fairer than plurality voting. -- end -- Regarding your comment about 1-2-3 ballots, verbally I have used that name numerous times and it seldom produces the glazed and baffled look I get when I use words like ranked ballot and order-of-preference ballot. In other words, I have been testing it with success. Yet I agree that there might be a better name. I agree that the term pairwise would benefit from further explanation. Yet I suspect that if I had done so in the first draft, there would be criticisms from supporters of non-Condorcet methods claiming that the declaration is biased in favor of Condorcet methods. Your feedback reveals that this declaration accomplishes what I had hoped it would accomplish, namely that it would be useful to the many people who want election-method reform, but either don't know what would work (and what wouldn't work), or do know what would work but need evidence (they can give to others) to support their beliefs. Again, thank you! Richard Fobes On 8/23/2011 9:38 PM, Ralph Suter wrote: Several thoughts (not a thorough critique) after one straight-through reading: 1. Length: I agree that for the reasons Richard described, the length of his proposed declaration (less than 2300 words) is appropriate and that trying to shorten it very much would be a mistake. It's long compared to previously proposed versions, but it's still very short compared to, say, a small pamphlet or even a fairly short magazine article, and it's only two to three times the length of a typical US newspaper op-ed article. At the same time, I think it is long enough (or nearly so -- see #5 below) to convey clearly, to a broad non-expert audience, at least the minimum necessary information and explanation. 2. Readability: When opening the email Richard's post was in (I got it along 4 other posts in an issue of Election-Methods Digest), I didn't expect to want to take the time to read it carefully all the way through, but after I started reading, I found it well-written and compelling enough to want to do so -- almost like a page turner novel. 3. Language: I'm guessing most readers will find the language clear with just a few exceptions. One exception, for example, may be pairwise. This is a word most non-expert readers will be unfamiliar with and many may find puzzling and jargon-like. To find other exceptions, a variety of non-expert readers should be asked to read the
Re: [EM] Voting reform statement; a clearer and more inspiring version
Your suggestions make sense. I suggest that someone post a Google Docs version of this declaration that you and others can edit. I've already expressed my opinions about what should be said. As a clarification, the Condorcet-Kemeny method does not use the same way to find the CW as other Condorcet methods. The Condorcet-Kemeny method uses an approach that automatically reveals the overall ranking of all the choices (by considering all possible rankings and finding which ranking has the highest sequence score), and if there is a Condorcet winner, it is always the one at the top. Richard Fobes On 8/23/2011 9:10 PM, Dave Ketchum wrote: On Aug 23, 2011, at 9:06 PM, Richard Fobes wrote: I very much agree with Jameson Quinn that the time has come to write, sign, and widely distribute a formal statement of the election-method principles that we agree upon. Yet instead of just providing a checklist of what we approve, I suggest we take advantage of this opportunity to ... * ... inspire(!) policymakers, politically active citizens, and frustrated voters to take action, and ... * ... give them a clearly explained declaration they can use as ammunition in their battles to implement election-method reforms. To serve these purposes, I'm boldly suggesting an entirely new wording. Keep in mind that one of my professions has been to work as a technical writer specializing in translating especially complex technology into clear English, and I also have experience writing marketing materials. This version incorporates the suggestions and refinements already discussed, so the revision work already done is not being wasted. Previously I too was thinking that the other version was too long. Ironically this version is even longer. I now realize that the other version went into too much detail about subtle issues, and that's what made it seem long. In contrast, this version uses the extra words to clearly explain fundamental voting concepts that most people do not already understand, and to serve the above-listed purposes. Also I think (or at least hope) that this version better identifies our real areas of agreement. My hope is that either this version, or a merging of this version with other versions, will produce a declaration that we can sign with much more enthusiasm. - The Declaration of Election-Method Experts - ** Unanimously we agree that the kind of ballot used in plurality voting is not appropriate when there are more than two choices. Its deficiency is that it does not collect enough preference information from the voters in order to always correctly identify the most popular candidate when there are more than two candidates. The mention of two choices confuses. The kind of ballot to be used must be decided, in at least most cases, before one can be certain how many candidates will be chosen from. If nothing else, write-in candidates can mean the possibility of more choices. Unanimously we agree that there are three kinds of ballots that collect enough preference information to always, or almost always, correctly identify the most popular candidate. The names and descriptions of these ballot types are, in alphabetical order: * Approval ballot, on which a voter marks each candidate who the voter approves as an acceptable choice, and leaves unmarked the candidates who are not acceptable * Ranked ballots (or 1-2-3 ballots), on which a voter indicates a first choice, and optionally indicates a second choice, and optionally indicates additional choices at lower preference levels * Score ballots, on which a voter assigns a number for each candidate, with the most familiar versions of such voting being to rate something with 1 to 5 stars or rate a choice with a number from 1 to 10, but any range of numbers can be used The type of ballot used in plurality voting does not have an academically recognized name, but the term single-mark ballot can be used to refer to this primitive ballot type. Why is the unfairness of plurality voting not better known? Single-mark ballots do not collect enough information to reveal the actual preferences of voters in elections that have three or more reasonably popular candidates. This lack of full preference information makes it nearly impossible for anyone to produce clear proof, or even evidence, of unfair election results. The Approval ballot allows selecting one or more, but does not allow indicating preference among them. When this same ballot was used in plurality it worked because the voter was only allowed to select one. Perhaps the target of this discussion is desire to indicate more than one AND which are more or less desired. ** In addition to the four supported methods listed above, we also support some combined methods. Specifically we support the use of the Condorcet method to identify a Condorcet winner (who is pairwise-preferred over all the other candidates) and then, if there is no Condorcet winner, we support using
Re: [EM] Voting reform statement; a clearer and more inspiring version
I was attempting to use your post-feedback statement as an indication of what methods to include in what I wrote, yet I am not familiar with the variations on Bucklin voting beyond what I read in Wikipedia, so I am certainly open to your suggested edits. Just as you created a version that you expected to change as a result of feedback, I too expect that what I wrote will be changed. As I suggested in another response, I think it would be appropriate to post a Google Docs version for you and others to edit. (In another response I suggested some additional paragraphs, and those can be inserted into the Google Docs version.) I too welcome collaboration in this effort to create a declaration. After all, the whole point of voting methods is to use a well-defined process for arriving at a collaborative decision; in this case we do not have a well-defined process, but basically we are voting for a declaration most of us like. As in voting, everyone deserves an informed vote in the process. Speaking of which, I suggested using our signature lines as a way of indicating which declaration-named election method we most prefer, and that's a way of voting. It will be interesting to see which supporters of which methods sign the document. Admittedly that will place IRV proponents in the awkward position of being tempted to sign it so they can indicate their support for IRV. 0 0 \___/ (I wouldn't be opposed to IRV if there was widespread recognition that it uses the right kind of ballot but the wrong kind of counting. One average-person reaction to this concept was I didn't know there was more than one way to count a ballot.) Richard Fobes On 8/24/2011 5:27 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote: I like this version, and would sign on to it, as I would with all the other versions which have been discussed. 2011/8/23 Richard Fobes electionmeth...@votefair.org mailto:electionmeth...@votefair.org I very much agree with Jameson Quinn that the time has come to write, sign, and widely distribute a formal statement of the election-method principles that we agree upon. Yet instead of just providing a checklist of what we approve, I suggest we take advantage of this opportunity to ... * ... inspire(!) policymakers, politically active citizens, and frustrated voters to take action, and ... Yes. I believe that it is worth pointing out specific advantages for different groups, including centrist and extremist voters and major party and insurgent politicians. It may sound contradictory, but reform, by helping cause a healthier dialogue, can benefit all of these groups; the customary zero-sum model does not apply. * ... give them a clearly explained declaration they can use as ammunition in their battles to implement election-method reforms. To serve these purposes, I'm boldly suggesting an entirely new wording. Keep in mind that one of my professions has been to work as a technical writer specializing in translating especially complex technology into clear English, and I also have experience writing marketing materials. This version incorporates the suggestions and refinements already discussed, so the revision work already done is not being wasted. Previously I too was thinking that the other version was too long. Ironically this version is even longer. I now realize that the other version went into too much detail about subtle issues, and that's what made it seem long. In contrast, this version uses the extra words to clearly explain fundamental voting concepts that most people do not already understand, and to serve the above-listed purposes. Also I think (or at least hope) that this version better identifies our real areas of agreement. I like your explicit repetition and variations on we agree. It works. My hope is that either this version, or a merging of this version with other versions, will produce a declaration that we can sign with much more enthusiasm. - The Declaration of Election-Method Experts - We, the undersigned election-method experts from around the world, unanimously denounce the use of plurality voting in elections in which there are more than two candidates, and in this declaration we offer ready-to-adopt replacement election methods that we agree will reliably produce much fairer results. We agree that there are no perceived political or economic risks associated with adopting the election methods recommended here. In fact, we believe that improving the fairness of election results will produce many political and economic benefits. Some of the benefits we expect include reduced voter frustration, reduced government costs (that arise from excessive political influence from self-serving special interests), wiser use of tax dollars (based on electing problem-solving leaders who solve underlying
Re: [EM] Voting reform statement; a clearer and more inspiring, version
Hallo, I wrote (24 Aug 2011): In my opinion, the Voting Reform Statement endorses too many alternative election methods. Opponents will argue that this long list demonstrates that even we don't have a clue which election method should be adopted. Jameson Quinn wrote (24 Aug 2011): Is that worse than what happens if we can't agree? Well, one of the most frequently used arguments against Condorcet methods is that there are too many Condorcet methods and that there is no agreement on the best one. Markus Schulze Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Voting reform statement; a clearer and more inspiring, version
2011/8/24 Markus Schulze markus.schu...@alumni.tu-berlin.de Hallo, I wrote (24 Aug 2011): In my opinion, the Voting Reform Statement endorses too many alternative election methods. Opponents will argue that this long list demonstrates that even we don't have a clue which election method should be adopted. Jameson Quinn wrote (24 Aug 2011): Is that worse than what happens if we can't agree? Well, one of the most frequently used arguments against Condorcet methods is that there are too many Condorcet methods and that there is no agreement on the best one. Yes. And will not agreeing on a consensus statement help that situation? What I'm saying is: yes, it would be ideal if we could reduce the list and all unite behind one system. But we as voting theorists should be able to find a way to keep this apparently-unattainable ideal from getting in the way of whatever agreement is actually possible. JQ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Voting reform statement; a clearer and more inspiring, version
Why not agree to a shared Condorcet method definition to compete here with Range, etc. Condorct ballot has rank level (unranked is bottom, don't care if voter skips levels (only care when comparing two whether /=/), properly attend to CW. Have to attend to cycles, but differences here not counted as method differences. Dave Ketchum On Aug 24, 2011, at 5:34 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote: 2011/8/24 Markus Schulze markus.schu...@alumni.tu-berlin.de Hallo, I wrote (24 Aug 2011): In my opinion, the Voting Reform Statement endorses too many alternative election methods. Opponents will argue that this long list demonstrates that even we don't have a clue which election method should be adopted. Jameson Quinn wrote (24 Aug 2011): Is that worse than what happens if we can't agree? Well, one of the most frequently used arguments against Condorcet methods is that there are too many Condorcet methods and that there is no agreement on the best one. Yes. And will not agreeing on a consensus statement help that situation? What I'm saying is: yes, it would be ideal if we could reduce the list and all unite behind one system. But we as voting theorists should be able to find a way to keep this apparently-unattainable ideal from getting in the way of whatever agreement is actually possible. JQ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Voting reform statement; a clearer and more inspiring, version
On 8/24/2011 2:15 PM, Markus Schulze wrote: ... Well, one of the most frequently used arguments against Condorcet methods is that there are too many Condorcet methods and that there is no agreement on the best one. Markus Schulze Perhaps we can add a statement that says something like: In most cases the different Condorcet methods identify the same winner. Occasionally they identify different winners, but those situations involve complications that make it difficult to objectively determine which candidate is really the most popular. Each of these Condorcet methods has slight advantages and disadvantages compared to one another, and some are easier to explain than others. Yet in all cases they provide dramatically fairer results compared to plurality voting, and significantly fairer results compared to instant-runoff voting, so any of them is suitable for use in governmental elections. Richard Fobes Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
[EM] Voting reform statement; a clearer and more inspiring version
I very much agree with Jameson Quinn that the time has come to write, sign, and widely distribute a formal statement of the election-method principles that we agree upon. Yet instead of just providing a checklist of what we approve, I suggest we take advantage of this opportunity to ... * ... inspire(!) policymakers, politically active citizens, and frustrated voters to take action, and ... * ... give them a clearly explained declaration they can use as ammunition in their battles to implement election-method reforms. To serve these purposes, I'm boldly suggesting an entirely new wording. Keep in mind that one of my professions has been to work as a technical writer specializing in translating especially complex technology into clear English, and I also have experience writing marketing materials. This version incorporates the suggestions and refinements already discussed, so the revision work already done is not being wasted. Previously I too was thinking that the other version was too long. Ironically this version is even longer. I now realize that the other version went into too much detail about subtle issues, and that's what made it seem long. In contrast, this version uses the extra words to clearly explain fundamental voting concepts that most people do not already understand, and to serve the above-listed purposes. Also I think (or at least hope) that this version better identifies our real areas of agreement. My hope is that either this version, or a merging of this version with other versions, will produce a declaration that we can sign with much more enthusiasm. - The Declaration of Election-Method Experts - We, the undersigned election-method experts from around the world, unanimously denounce the use of plurality voting in elections in which there are more than two candidates, and in this declaration we offer ready-to-adopt replacement election methods that we agree will reliably produce much fairer results. We agree that there are no perceived political or economic risks associated with adopting the election methods recommended here. In fact, we believe that improving the fairness of election results will produce many political and economic benefits. Some of the benefits we expect include reduced voter frustration, reduced government costs (that arise from excessive political influence from self-serving special interests), wiser use of tax dollars (based on electing problem-solving leaders who solve underlying problems that waste money), dramatically increased voter turnout because of having meaningful choices, increased compliance with laws including taxation laws, and likely increases in widespread economic prosperity (arising from increased fairness in the business world). We use the term plurality voting to refer to the commonly used counting method in which each voter marks only a single choice on the ballot, and the number of marks for each candidate are counted, and the candidate with the highest number is regarded as the winner. In some nations this method is called First Past The Post (and abbreviated FPTP). Although this election method produces fair results when there are only two candidates, the results are often dramatically unfair when this approach is used in elections with three or more candidates. In spite of its well-known weaknesses, plurality voting is predominantly used in most elections in most democratic nations around the world, with Australia and New Zealand being notable exceptions. It is also the preferred election method in nations that pretend to be democracies, yet lack the freedoms and economic benefits of democracy. Unanimously we agree that the kind of ballot used in plurality voting is not appropriate when there are more than two choices. Its deficiency is that it does not collect enough preference information from the voters in order to always correctly identify the most popular candidate when there are more than two candidates. Unanimously we agree that there are three kinds of ballots that collect enough preference information to always, or almost always, correctly identify the most popular candidate. The names and descriptions of these ballot types are, in alphabetical order: * Approval ballot, on which a voter marks each candidate who the voter approves as an acceptable choice, and leaves unmarked the candidates who are not acceptable * Ranked ballots (or 1-2-3 ballots), on which a voter indicates a first choice, and optionally indicates a second choice, and optionally indicates additional choices at lower preference levels * Score ballots, on which a voter assigns a number for each candidate, with the most familiar versions of such voting being to rate something with 1 to 5 stars or rate a choice with a number from 1 to 10, but any range of numbers can be used The type of ballot used in plurality voting does not have an academically recognized name, but
Re: [EM] Voting reform statement; a clearer and more inspiring version
On Aug 23, 2011, at 9:06 PM, Richard Fobes wrote: I very much agree with Jameson Quinn that the time has come to write, sign, and widely distribute a formal statement of the election-method principles that we agree upon. Yet instead of just providing a checklist of what we approve, I suggest we take advantage of this opportunity to ... * ... inspire(!) policymakers, politically active citizens, and frustrated voters to take action, and ... * ... give them a clearly explained declaration they can use as ammunition in their battles to implement election-method reforms. To serve these purposes, I'm boldly suggesting an entirely new wording. Keep in mind that one of my professions has been to work as a technical writer specializing in translating especially complex technology into clear English, and I also have experience writing marketing materials. This version incorporates the suggestions and refinements already discussed, so the revision work already done is not being wasted. Previously I too was thinking that the other version was too long. Ironically this version is even longer. I now realize that the other version went into too much detail about subtle issues, and that's what made it seem long. In contrast, this version uses the extra words to clearly explain fundamental voting concepts that most people do not already understand, and to serve the above-listed purposes. Also I think (or at least hope) that this version better identifies our real areas of agreement. My hope is that either this version, or a merging of this version with other versions, will produce a declaration that we can sign with much more enthusiasm. - The Declaration of Election-Method Experts - ** Unanimously we agree that the kind of ballot used in plurality voting is not appropriate when there are more than two choices. Its deficiency is that it does not collect enough preference information from the voters in order to always correctly identify the most popular candidate when there are more than two candidates. The mention of two choices confuses. The kind of ballot to be used must be decided, in at least most cases, before one can be certain how many candidates will be chosen from. If nothing else, write-in candidates can mean the possibility of more choices. Unanimously we agree that there are three kinds of ballots that collect enough preference information to always, or almost always, correctly identify the most popular candidate. The names and descriptions of these ballot types are, in alphabetical order: * Approval ballot, on which a voter marks each candidate who the voter approves as an acceptable choice, and leaves unmarked the candidates who are not acceptable * Ranked ballots (or 1-2-3 ballots), on which a voter indicates a first choice, and optionally indicates a second choice, and optionally indicates additional choices at lower preference levels * Score ballots, on which a voter assigns a number for each candidate, with the most familiar versions of such voting being to rate something with 1 to 5 stars or rate a choice with a number from 1 to 10, but any range of numbers can be used The type of ballot used in plurality voting does not have an academically recognized name, but the term single-mark ballot can be used to refer to this primitive ballot type. Why is the unfairness of plurality voting not better known? Single- mark ballots do not collect enough information to reveal the actual preferences of voters in elections that have three or more reasonably popular candidates. This lack of full preference information makes it nearly impossible for anyone to produce clear proof, or even evidence, of unfair election results. The Approval ballot allows selecting one or more, but does not allow indicating preference among them. When this same ballot was used in plurality it worked because the voter was only allowed to select one. Perhaps the target of this discussion is desire to indicate more than one AND which are more or less desired. ** In addition to the four supported methods listed above, we also support some combined methods. Specifically we support the use of the Condorcet method to identify a Condorcet winner (who is pairwise-preferred over all the other candidates) and then, if there is no Condorcet winner, we support using either instant-runoff voting (IRV) or approval voting to resolve the ambiguity and identify a single winner. Most, if not all, Condorcet methods use the same way to find the CW and, if found, declare that to be the winner. If not found, different methods have their own way to find a winner. I question involving IRV here. Seems like, unless defending against such, that it would have its home problem of wrong choices. Note that each member of the cycle would be the CW if all other cycle members were excluded. Note
Re: [EM] Voting reform statement; a clearer and more inspiring, version
Several thoughts (not a thorough critique) after one straight-through reading: 1. Length: I agree that for the reasons Richard described, the length of his proposed declaration (less than 2300 words) is appropriate and that trying to shorten it very much would be a mistake. It's long compared to previously proposed versions, but it's still very short compared to, say, a small pamphlet or even a fairly short magazine article, and it's only two to three times the length of a typical US newspaper op-ed article. At the same time, I think it is long enough (or nearly so -- see #5 below) to convey clearly, to a broad non-expert audience, at least the minimum necessary information and explanation. 2. Readability: When opening the email Richard's post was in (I got it along 4 other posts in an issue of Election-Methods Digest), I didn't expect to want to take the time to read it carefully all the way through, but after I started reading, I found it well-written and compelling enough to want to do so -- almost like a page turner novel. 3. Language: I'm guessing most readers will find the language clear with just a few exceptions. One exception, for example, may be pairwise. This is a word most non-expert readers will be unfamiliar with and many may find puzzling and jargon-like. To find other exceptions, a variety of non-expert readers should be asked to read the statement (or later drafts of it) and note any words, phrases, or explanations they find unclear. 4. When describing Condorcet methods: I suggest briefly describing Condorcet himself and his role in developing such methods. I would also explain that the main point of Condorcet methods is to use the preference information voters provide to determine how each candidate would fare against every other candidate in a series of one-to-one contests, just as in a round-robin athletic tournament in which each contestant competes one-to-one against every other contestant. In addition, I suggest mentioning that for this reason, an alternative name sometimes used to describe Condorcet methods is Instant Round Robin methods, which can be abbreviated as IRR methods to distinguish them from Instant Runoff Voting (IRV), a more widely known and promoted method that makes use of the same kinds of ballots IRR methods do. (By the way, 1-2-3 ballots may not be much better than preferential ballots; there may better names than either, such as rank voting ballots, rank order ballots, or just ranking or ranked ballots. This may be worth asking non-expert readers about.) 5. Finally, I think the statement could be greatly improved and made more interesting, relevant, and compelling to a wider range of readers by explaining that alternative voting and representation methods can also be beneficially used for a large variety of purposes other than general political elections and that different methods are often more suitable for some kinds of purposes than for other purposes. Some example of other purposes are: US-style primary elections; party convention votes; decisions in legislative bodies and committees; decisions by informal groups; decisions in meetings of different kinds and sizes; uncritical or relatively minor decisions vs. major, critically important decisions; opinion polling; TV/radio audience voting; provisional (straw) voting; and choosing organizational board members and conference attendees. Furthermore, because alternative voting and representation methods have the potential to greatly improve collective decisionmaking in a large variety of situations other than general political elections and because abstract analyses of different methods need to be supplemented with well-designed experimentation and social scientific research, there is a great need and justification for support for such experimentation and research, possibly in the form of a new well-funded non-partisan research institute. Explaining these things would require lengthening the statement, though I think not by a lot. An objection may be that this would make the statement less focused and therefore less compelling and influential. My reply would be that while election laws are generally very difficult to change, it is often much easier (as I know from some personal experience) to change how decisions are made for purposes other than public elections. If such changes became increasingly frequent and widespread, people would increasingly become more familiar with alternative voting and representation methods and with the idea that alternative methods are often far superior to ones currently used, and it should also become increasingly easy to persuade people to support major changes in public election laws. -RS PS: I'm actually not an election-methods expert and haven't read messages on this list at all regularly for several years. At most, I'm a fairly well-informed amateur, and even that may be overstating it. My
