Re: [EM] [Election-Methods] [english 94%] PR favoring racial minorities
On Sun, Aug 17, 2008 at 6:06 AM, Juho [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: (Continuous elections could also increase the level of participation in decision making in the sense that old votes could be valid for a long time even if the voter wouldn't bother to change the vote often. Well, on the other hand the votes must have some time/event limits after which they become invalid. Otherwise the system would e.g. make any changes in the party structure very unprofitable.) There is also the security issue. Continuous voting requires some way for a person to cancel their vote. That is hard to achieve in a way that maintains the secret ballot. One option would be to allow a voter decide in advance how long their vote will stay active, when they cast it. A voter could pick 3 months, 6 months, 1 year, 2 years, 4 years for their vote. Each ballot would be marked with the length of time it will remain valid for. The results would then be announced broken down by length of time they remain active for. If you pick 4 years, then you will not be permitted to cast another vote for at least 4 years (for that office). OTOH, if you pick 3 months, then you will have to vote again 3 months later. This would be reasonably simple for methods that don't have rounds. However, it would be complex for things like IRV. If the ballot lists are a matter of public record, then voters who vote every 3 months and reliably vote could end up being targeted by the parties as they have the ability to withdraw support much more rapidly. (kinda like how politicians currently spend much more time with their supporters near election time). When thinking about the problems of continuous elections and direct democracy maybe the first problem in my mind is the possibility of too fast reactions. Populism might be a problem here. Let's say that the economy of a country is in bad shape and some party proposes to raise taxes to fix the problem. That could cause this party to quickly lose lots of support. Actually, one option would be to allow each voter vote once every 4 years, but stagger when each person gets to vote. For example, their might be an election every 6 months electing one eights of the legislature. This gives continuous feedback, but still requires time to change the composition of the legislature. A swing in the votes would only have 1/8 the effect on the legislature. These rather direct forms of democracy could be said to require the voters to be more mature than in some more indirect methods in the sense that the voters should understand the full picture and not only individual decisions that may sometimes even hurt them. In an indirect democracy painful decisions are typically not made just before the elections. This is not an ideal situation either. But all in all, the more direct forms of democracy seem attractive if the voters are mature enough. I think it probably depends on how it works. Initially, people might switch their vote at the drop of a hat, but as time passes, people are less likely to bother. Also, under a PR/coalition based government system, it would encourage any coalition formed to have more than a simple majority. If the coalition has 60% of the legislature, it is less likely to be massively swayed by short term popularity changes. This kinda happens already. In Ireland, coalitions tends to aim for the high 80's (of 166) so that they can lose a few to byelections without causing the coalition to fall. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] [Election-Methods] [english 94%] PR favoring racial minorities
On Aug 17, 2008, at 19:44 , Raph Frank wrote: On Sun, Aug 17, 2008 at 6:06 AM, Juho [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: (Continuous elections could also increase the level of participation in decision making in the sense that old votes could be valid for a long time even if the voter wouldn't bother to change the vote often. Well, on the other hand the votes must have some time/event limits after which they become invalid. Otherwise the system would e.g. make any changes in the party structure very unprofitable.) There is also the security issue. Continuous voting requires some way for a person to cancel their vote. That is hard to achieve in a way that maintains the secret ballot. Yes, not an easy task since votes can not be anonymous as they normally are after voting. It is possible to develop methods where the election officials would not know the identity of each voter (only the voter would have that information) but this may get quite complex. One (at least theoretically) simple approach would be to arrange elections say every Saturday and assume that each voter has a computer (or corresponding device) that is on-line and votes on behalf of the voter every Sunday. If the voter has not updated the data then the application just uses the old data. This method would not require keeping a record on how each voter voted. (P.S. I used Saturdays above instead of Sundays sine that way the politicians have one day time to pack their belongings before the next working week and new representatives to move in. In real life we would however probably need some hysteresis here. Maybe that could be in time. Maybe we could also use different voting weights for the representatives. This would allow longer times to allow new representatives in and kick the old ones out. Also a system where the representatives could work at home instead of at the capital is possible.) One option would be to allow a voter decide in advance how long their vote will stay active, when they cast it. A voter could pick 3 months, 6 months, 1 year, 2 years, 4 years for their vote. In order to allow a party to be split in two, or popular representatives to retire, then the time should be short enough not to penalize this party too much. If all votes will be outdates say in one year then a one year delay between announcement of the event and its final implementation would be sufficient (since then there would be no lost votes, assuming that the voters can vote in the new way right after the announcement). Also faster changes would be possible since most votes would probably be changed sooner. Each ballot would be marked with the length of time it will remain valid for. The results would then be announced broken down by length of time they remain active for. If you pick 4 years, then you will not be permitted to cast another vote for at least 4 years (for that office). OTOH, if you pick 3 months, then you will have to vote again 3 months later. I'm not sure if this is still a continuous election in the sense that the voter could change opinion at any time. This would be reasonably simple for methods that don't have rounds. However, it would be complex for things like IRV. Wouldn't IRV be at least easier than a two round runoff? (= instant runoff vs. sequential runoff) If the ballot lists are a matter of public record, then voters who vote every 3 months and reliably vote could end up being targeted by the parties as they have the ability to withdraw support much more rapidly. (kinda like how politicians currently spend much more time with their supporters near election time). When thinking about the problems of continuous elections and direct democracy maybe the first problem in my mind is the possibility of too fast reactions. Populism might be a problem here. Let's say that the economy of a country is in bad shape and some party proposes to raise taxes to fix the problem. That could cause this party to quickly lose lots of support. Actually, one option would be to allow each voter vote once every 4 years, but stagger when each person gets to vote. For example, their might be an election every 6 months electing one eights of the legislature. This gives continuous feedback, but still requires time to change the composition of the legislature. A swing in the votes would only have 1/8 the effect on the legislature. Yes, gradual impact could help in stabilizing the system. These rather direct forms of democracy could be said to require the voters to be more mature than in some more indirect methods in the sense that the voters should understand the full picture and not only individual decisions that may sometimes even hurt them. In an indirect democracy painful decisions are typically not made just before the elections. This is not an ideal situation either. But all in all, the more direct forms of democracy seem
Re: [EM] [Election-Methods] [english 94%] PR favoring racial minorities
On Aug 16, 2008, at 0:48 , Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Jobst Heitzig said: It is of no help for a minority to be represented proportionally when still a mere 51% majority can make all decisions! I disagree. The advantage is that it allows 'on the fly' coalition re-organisation. If all the legislators are elected via a single seat system, then in effect, the 2 coalitions must be decided prior to the election. In fact, in the US, the Republican and Democrat 'coalitions' last on a multi-decade scale. A block of 15% of the legislature would be a minority. However, if something oppressive was attempted against them, they could switch sides. However, if all the legislators were elected via a single seat method, then the supporters of those 15% would have to wait until the subsequent election and it might be to late by then. This appears to be, more generally, an issue of feedback. Democracy itself does better than dictatorship (even from a purely technical point of view, as opposed to a moral one) because the people can steer the representatives in the right direction. If the rulers get too detached from this correction, they get corrupted by the power and bad things happen. If that's correct, then we should try to find ways of connecting the system even more tightly. Proportional representation would fit within this idea set for the reasons you point out, or broadly, that as minorities change, the representative-voter links update more quickly than they do within a majoritarian system. Predictions based on that idea would consider the ideal to be direct democracy. Next to that would be continuous update of representative power (continuous elections). While both of these might work if we were machines, the former scales badly and the latter would put an undue load on the voters unless they could decide whether to be part of any given readjustment. I don't see the burden to voters as a big problem since the system allows some voters to follow and influence politics daily and some to react only on a yearly basis. (Continuous elections could also increase the level of participation in decision making in the sense that old votes could be valid for a long time even if the voter wouldn't bother to change the vote often. Well, on the other hand the votes must have some time/event limits after which they become invalid. Otherwise the system would e.g. make any changes in the party structure very unprofitable.) If we consider the case where decisions have effects that don't appear instantly, it gets more complex. For instance, democratic opinion could shift more quickly than the decisions made by one side has time to settle or actually do any difference. But even there, if we consider it an issue of feedback, we have parallels; in this case to oscillations or hunting, and to control theory regarding how to keep such oscillations from happening. When thinking about the problems of continuous elections and direct democracy maybe the first problem in my mind is the possibility of too fast reactions. Populism might be a problem here. Let's say that the economy of a country is in bad shape and some party proposes to raise taxes to fix the problem. That could cause this party to quickly lose lots of support. These rather direct forms of democracy could be said to require the voters to be more mature than in some more indirect methods in the sense that the voters should understand the full picture and not only individual decisions that may sometimes even hurt them. In an indirect democracy painful decisions are typically not made just before the elections. This is not an ideal situation either. But all in all, the more direct forms of democracy seem attractive if the voters are mature enough. Juho The feedback point of view is not an end-all-be-all. If there's a static or consistent majority that decide to, as an example, exclude minorities, that is democratic, but still not a good state of things, and no amount of making the democracy more accurately translate the wishes of the majority into action can fix that, since the majority wants to keep on excluding the minority. PS Anyone know a better free mail system that doesn't cause lots of ??? when I post to this group? The usual suspects should work: Gmail, hotmail, Yahoo; or see the Wikipedia comparison page at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Comparison_of_webmail_providers . Most ISPs also provide mail accounts of their own for their subscribers, and (without knowing more) I'd assume yours do as well; if that is so, you could use that account and a dedicated mail reader like Thunderbird. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info ___ Try the all-new Yahoo! Mail. The New Version is
Re: [EM] [Election-Methods] [english 94%] PR favoring racial minorities
Jobst Heitzig said: It is of no help for a minority to be represented proportionally when still a mere 51% majority can make all decisions! I disagree.? The advantage is that it allows 'on the fly' coalition re-organisation. If all the legislators are elected via a single seat system, then in effect, the 2 coalitions must be decided prior to the election.? In fact, in the US, the Republican and Democrat 'coalitions' last on a multi-decade scale. A block of 15% of the legislature would be a minority.? However, if something oppressive was attempted against them, they could switch sides.? However, if all the legislators were elected via a single seat method, then the supporters of those 15% would have to wait until the subsequent election and it might be to late by then. Even if they aren't part of the majority coalition at the time, they could offer to replace one of the current members at a lower 'price'. Also, if the legislature doesn't also decide the government, then there might not even be a fixed majority coalition. PS Anyone know a better free mail system that doesn't cause lots of ??? when I post to this group? Raphfrk Interesting site what if anyone could modify the laws www.wikocracy.com Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] [Election-Methods] [english 94%] PR favoring racial minorities
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Jobst Heitzig said: It is of no help for a minority to be represented proportionally when still a mere 51% majority can make all decisions! I disagree. The advantage is that it allows 'on the fly' coalition re-organisation. If all the legislators are elected via a single seat system, then in effect, the 2 coalitions must be decided prior to the election. In fact, in the US, the Republican and Democrat 'coalitions' last on a multi-decade scale. A block of 15% of the legislature would be a minority. However, if something oppressive was attempted against them, they could switch sides. However, if all the legislators were elected via a single seat method, then the supporters of those 15% would have to wait until the subsequent election and it might be to late by then. This appears to be, more generally, an issue of feedback. Democracy itself does better than dictatorship (even from a purely technical point of view, as opposed to a moral one) because the people can steer the representatives in the right direction. If the rulers get too detached from this correction, they get corrupted by the power and bad things happen. If that's correct, then we should try to find ways of connecting the system even more tightly. Proportional representation would fit within this idea set for the reasons you point out, or broadly, that as minorities change, the representative-voter links update more quickly than they do within a majoritarian system. Predictions based on that idea would consider the ideal to be direct democracy. Next to that would be continuous update of representative power (continuous elections). While both of these might work if we were machines, the former scales badly and the latter would put an undue load on the voters unless they could decide whether to be part of any given readjustment. If we consider the case where decisions have effects that don't appear instantly, it gets more complex. For instance, democratic opinion could shift more quickly than the decisions made by one side has time to settle or actually do any difference. But even there, if we consider it an issue of feedback, we have parallels; in this case to oscillations or hunting, and to control theory regarding how to keep such oscillations from happening. The feedback point of view is not an end-all-be-all. If there's a static or consistent majority that decide to, as an example, exclude minorities, that is democratic, but still not a good state of things, and no amount of making the democracy more accurately translate the wishes of the majority into action can fix that, since the majority wants to keep on excluding the minority. PS Anyone know a better free mail system that doesn't cause lots of ??? when I post to this group? The usual suspects should work: Gmail, hotmail, Yahoo; or see the Wikipedia comparison page at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comparison_of_webmail_providers . Most ISPs also provide mail accounts of their own for their subscribers, and (without knowing more) I'd assume yours do as well; if that is so, you could use that account and a dedicated mail reader like Thunderbird. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] [english 94%] PR favoring racial minorities
Hello all, although I did not follow all of the discussion so far, the following question strikes me: Why the hell do you care about proportional representation of minorities when the representative body itself does not decide with a method that ensures a proportional distribution of power? It is of no help for a minority to be represented proportionally when still a mere 51% majority can make all decisions! So, if you really care about the rights of minorities, the consequence would be to also promote some non-majoritarian, truly democratic decision method for the representative body itself. Examples of such methods have been discussed here. Yours, Jobst Warren Smith schrieb: Instead it is based on the mathematical theorem that if people vote in a racial manner, then if X percent of people vote black, and enough black candidates are available, then we get X percent black winners. Dopp: And this theorem while it may sound believable at first glance is instead of course obvious mathematical nonsense and easily rebutted with any one of a countable infinite number of counterexamples. --I reply... How fascinating that Kathy Dopp has refuted over a century of research into PR voting systems. But rather than keeping her infinite number of obvious counterexamples secret, how about exhibiting one? I mean, I'll settle for just one. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] [english 94%] PR favoring racial minorities
Jobst Heitzig wrote: Hello all, although I did not follow all of the discussion so far, the following question strikes me: Why the hell do you care about proportional representation of minorities when the representative body itself does not decide with a method that ensures a proportional distribution of power? It is of no help for a minority to be represented proportionally when still a mere 51% majority can make all decisions! If the assembly is elected using a majoritarian method, then that 51% majority is a majority of a majority. Thus, even with the constraint of power inequity, a majority of a representative body is better than a majority of a majority. So, if you really care about the rights of minorities, the consequence would be to also promote some non-majoritarian, truly democratic decision method for the representative body itself. Examples of such methods have been discussed here. That's right, but it would also have to be somehow moderated so that the result isn't just that the position puts some laws into effect (or elect a government), and then, because they lose temporary power, what was opposition and now is position uses all of *their* power to cancel it (or elect another government), making the collective decision pattern oscillate wildly. One possible way to handle this would be to increase the majority required to pass anything from 50%+1 to, say 55%, or 60%, towards consensus. That'll have a bias towards the status quo, but not towards any given political majority in the assembly, and it won't have problems with hunting. Another non-compensation option is to weight the coalitions so that they get near-equal power by Banzhaf calculations. But in party-neutral systems, who the coalitions are is not obvious, and there may be that there's no solution even in declared-party systems; for instance, there's no way that I know of to adjust relative assembly seat proportions so that coalitions have Banzhaf (or Shapely-Shubik) power of 40%, 31%, 29%. The power indices won't be relevant if some coalition members vote against the grain, either. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
