Re: [-empyre-] Week 4 - Bio/Nano/Materialisms
Thanks to all who engaged during week 3 and welcome week 4Patricia From: empyre-boun...@lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au [empyre-boun...@lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au] On Behalf Of Elle Mehrmand [ellemehrm...@gmail.com] Sent: Saturday, June 23, 2012 8:43 PM To: empyre@lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au Subject: [-empyre-] Week 4 - Bio/Nano/Materialisms Hello out there, I am honored to have this opportunity to neuro-jaculate on this list. The notions of materialisms/ immaterialisms/ bio-materialisms/ -erialisms, within the context of the bio-political, bring to mind the pixellated flesh of my holographic/ fauxlographic clones who live in my most recent performative installation entitled fauxlographic. For the past year I have been working within the speculative space of an ethno-dysphoric cloning laboratory, where diasporic anxiety is analyzed through the process of fauxlographic cloning. The clones enact sonic rituals, singing in Farsi, English and Perz-ish [a faux-ish language], based on multiple sources of information including embodied memories, wikileaks cables, and textual/ visual/ aural references concerning Iran and Persia. The ethno-dysphoric scientist analyzes her dislocated subjectivity by performing a daily neurotic ritual within a glass computing chamber while wearing an EEG neuro-headset. As she neuro-jaculates with the clones in order to (pars)e their data streams, the diasporic computing sounds of the EEG oscillate in pitch based on her neural activity. When high levels of CO2 are detected by the lab's sensors, the clones become aware of those gazing upon them, resulting in an anxious act of erasure and multiplication of their pixellated flesh on the fauxlographic screen, reciprocating the affective presence and implications of other bodies within the laboratory. The use of organic sensors transforms the lab into a cyborgian spatial interface, allowing for unconscious collaboration between multiple bodies in space, confusing the somatic architecture of the performance. // bodies [fragmented.dislocated.flesh] the metaphor of the split subject in a multitude of representations calls for the split subjectivity of the diasporic body. the hologram. the clone. the screenal flesh of the projection. the reflection on the glass. the live specimen with a neural prosthetic. //donna haraway's cyborg reconfigured the live specimen lays in a burst of stillness within the glass chamber for 30 minutes. the liveness of her naked body creates an affect that the clones cannot produce, but ultimately she will become a reproduction of herself. she performs analysis on the clones by means of neural computing. her experiments are open to the public, allowing for multiple bodies to inhabit the laboratory. the intersectionality of all of the bodies produce the organic energy that is necessary for the installation to function. the fauxlographic clones are fragmented and displaced as they interact with their ironic head scarfs from american apparel through gestural research. the black scarf cuts into their screenal skin, erasing their flesh due to the translucent nature of the fauxlographic screen. they are never fully in or out of the fabric, creating a fluidic relationship to the object, one that is not part of a binary construct, but one that arises from a unique space within the perception of being persian, and is expressed through the gestures of their diasporic anxiety. fractured elements of their being are echoed in the displacement of their body parts. they are vulnerable in their nudity with their pixellated flesh and informatic contents exposed, but that is the nature of the clone. - elle mehrmand -- elleelleelle.orghttp://elleelleelle.org assemblyofmazes.comhttp://assemblyofmazes.com ___ empyre forum empyre@lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au http://www.subtle.net/empyre
Re: [-empyre-] Meillassoux / Harman
Hi Tim, I thought that the basic point was that these entities are ontologically different but not substantially different. In other words, there are indeed different modes of existence but they are not ordered hierarchically by reference to substance (substantialism) or divided by recourse to dualism. Best, Tom On 12-06-23 4:46 PM, Timothy Morton timothymorton...@gmail.com wrote: Hi Davin, We obviously treat different entities differently. But this is not the same as saying that these entities are ontologically different. Yours, Tim http://www.ecologywithoutnature.blogspot.com On Jun 20, 2012, at 5:51 AM, davin heckman davinheck...@gmail.com wrote: Thank you Ian, for these thoughts. My initial encounter with this work came via a brief discussion of flat ontology, which I found somewhat offputting. I followed up by reading through the re:press book. What I like the most, I suppose, is the sense that the discussions are in motion with a lot of people participating. Reading some of the discussion of mereology, I find they resonate with one of my favorite passages from Hegel. Pardon me for cannibalizing another piece of writing (a draft of which can be found here: http://isea2011.sabanciuniv.edu/paper/disturbed-dialectic-literary-critic ism). * In The Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel describes the dialectical process: The bud disappears in the bursting-forth of the blossom, and one might say the former is refuted by the latter; similarly, when the fruit appears, the blossom is shown up in its turn as a false manifestation of the plant, and the fruit now emerges as the truth of it instead. These forms are not just distinguished from one another, they also supplant one another as mutually incompatible. Yet at the same time their fluid nature makes them moments of an organic unity in which they not only do not conflict, but in which each is as necessary as the other; and this mutual necessity alone constitutes the life of the whole. [1] Viewed from within the Hegelian process, the Real is positioned outside its present manifestations, consisting, rather, of the dynamic processes that comprise its totality. This insight, crucial to critical practice, requires revision in light of technical change. By revision, I do not mean that we need to fundamentally alter Hegel¹s argument, I only mean to suggest that we see this passage with respect to new temporal modalities that have shaken up the pursuit of knowledge. * I come at many of the same issues, but my inclination lead me to embrace a kind of humanism, but one which cannot easily understand as we continually muddle the conversations of humanism with an ontology that is expressed in our metaphors. One grip I have with the use of Deleuze or McLuhan, is the idea that our capacity to personalize prosthetics has a tendency to be reduced to a situation in which it becomes possible to imagine that we see machines, interpersonal relationships, people with tools, etc. as the same thing. When, in fact, my psychic investment in my bike or computer, while deep, is not nearly as deep or as complex as my psychic investment in my (which I can only refer to as mine with a sense of obligation to, rather than ownership over) child. If my bike decided to bite me.which it can't, even if it can hurt me I would not feel so simultaneously restrained in my response AND emotionally florid as I would if my 8 year old bit me for some crazy reason (but with my three year old, I he is only a missed nap away from engaging in something so obvious and horrible as biting someone). A bike, on the other hand, can hurt me a lot more than a bite from a toddler, and I suppose I am not above kicking a bike and yelling but I have very limited feelings about a bike malfunction or hitting my thumb with a hammer. On the other hand, a bike goes wherever I want it to go (except when there's an accident). a toddler, not so much an eight year old, he usually comes with a counter proposal (and it is a monstrous adult that would treat kids like a bike, insist that they only go where told, speak when it is demanded). A lot of really deep thinking about human subjectivty simply does not go this far and part of this has to do with a poor understanding of objects. What is worse is when this understanding infects interpersonal relationships in the context of a Randian sort of world where there is no such thing as society, only individuals (yet, bosses treat workers like bikes and bad boyfriends treat their partners like robots). I am very excited to read more. I feel like it is important to free our thinking from patterns and habits of the past. In particular, the culture of academic citation has gone from being about finding good ideas where they are to deriving authority from the aura of the great figure. I also have no problem with accumulations of wisdom that translate into an
Re: [-empyre-] Meillassoux / Harman
I agree, this is a good starting point that all things that exist have being as their common condition of existence (that is, they are not not beings), which is a sort of foundational ontological similarity. But if the only significant ontological claim we can make about things is either yes or no, do they exist or not, then this means all things carry this single quality, which is to say that there is no difference between things. If we admit difference, then we must account for those differences in meaningful ways. For instance, waffle #1 differs from waffle #2 in a different way than waffle #1 differs from a toaster (or waffle #1 changes in the course of being eaten, it is still in one meaningful sense the same waffle after it has been bitten, but in another sense, it is a different waffle, too. While both toasters and waffles are different from something like an idea or a memory rendered in media (a waffle recipe or story about waffles) or a process habituated in muscle memory (the habit of making a waffle or eating one). My concern is that if we reduce all that can be known about being to a simple recognition of being, we commit to a kind of abstraction and alienation from being of the sort that happens when markets try to mediate everything through the common denominator of dollars. Davin On Sat, Jun 23, 2012 at 4:46 PM, Timothy Morton timothymorton...@gmail.com wrote: Hi Davin, We obviously treat different entities differently. But this is not the same as saying that these entities are ontologically different. Yours, Tim http://www.ecologywithoutnature.blogspot.com On Jun 20, 2012, at 5:51 AM, davin heckman davinheck...@gmail.com wrote: Thank you Ian, for these thoughts. My initial encounter with this work came via a brief discussion of flat ontology, which I found somewhat offputting. I followed up by reading through the re:press book. What I like the most, I suppose, is the sense that the discussions are in motion with a lot of people participating. Reading some of the discussion of mereology, I find they resonate with one of my favorite passages from Hegel. Pardon me for cannibalizing another piece of writing (a draft of which can be found here: http://isea2011.sabanciuniv.edu/paper/disturbed-dialectic-literary-criticism). * In The Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel describes the dialectical process: The bud disappears in the bursting-forth of the blossom, and one might say the former is refuted by the latter; similarly, when the fruit appears, the blossom is shown up in its turn as a false manifestation of the plant, and the fruit now emerges as the truth of it instead. These forms are not just distinguished from one another, they also supplant one another as mutually incompatible. Yet at the same time their fluid nature makes them moments of an organic unity in which they not only do not conflict, but in which each is as necessary as the other; and this mutual necessity alone constitutes the life of the whole. [1] Viewed from within the Hegelian process, the Real is positioned outside its present manifestations, consisting, rather, of the dynamic processes that comprise its totality. This insight, crucial to critical practice, requires revision in light of technical change. By revision, I do not mean that we need to fundamentally alter Hegel’s argument, I only mean to suggest that we see this passage with respect to new temporal modalities that have shaken up the pursuit of knowledge. * I come at many of the same issues, but my inclination lead me to embrace a kind of humanism, but one which cannot easily understand as we continually muddle the conversations of humanism with an ontology that is expressed in our metaphors. One grip I have with the use of Deleuze or McLuhan, is the idea that our capacity to personalize prosthetics has a tendency to be reduced to a situation in which it becomes possible to imagine that we see machines, interpersonal relationships, people with tools, etc. as the same thing. When, in fact, my psychic investment in my bike or computer, while deep, is not nearly as deep or as complex as my psychic investment in my (which I can only refer to as mine with a sense of obligation to, rather than ownership over) child. If my bike decided to bite me.which it can't, even if it can hurt me I would not feel so simultaneously restrained in my response AND emotionally florid as I would if my 8 year old bit me for some crazy reason (but with my three year old, I he is only a missed nap away from engaging in something so obvious and horrible as biting someone). A bike, on the other hand, can hurt me a lot more than a bite from a toddler, and I suppose I am not above kicking a bike and yelling but I have very limited feelings about a bike malfunction or hitting my thumb with a hammer. On the other hand, a bike goes wherever I want it to go (except when there's an accident). a
Re: [-empyre-] Meillassoux / Harman
Hi--OOO is the least abstract and generalizing of any ontology in the West since the Pre-Socratics. Everyone else pretty much reduces things to substance, fire, water, atoms, quantum fluctuations, ideas, etc. We don't--waffle maker a is irreducibly not b, and not simply because it looks different to me. Tim http://www.ecologywithoutnature.blogspot.com On Jun 24, 2012, at 4:44 AM, davin heckman davinheck...@gmail.com wrote: I agree, this is a good starting point that all things that exist have being as their common condition of existence (that is, they are not not beings), which is a sort of foundational ontological similarity. But if the only significant ontological claim we can make about things is either yes or no, do they exist or not, then this means all things carry this single quality, which is to say that there is no difference between things. If we admit difference, then we must account for those differences in meaningful ways. For instance, waffle #1 differs from waffle #2 in a different way than waffle #1 differs from a toaster (or waffle #1 changes in the course of being eaten, it is still in one meaningful sense the same waffle after it has been bitten, but in another sense, it is a different waffle, too. While both toasters and waffles are different from something like an idea or a memory rendered in media (a waffle recipe or story about waffles) or a process habituated in muscle memory (the habit of making a waffle or eating one). My concern is that if we reduce all that can be known about being to a simple recognition of being, we commit to a kind of abstraction and alienation from being of the sort that happens when markets try to mediate everything through the common denominator of dollars. Davin On Sat, Jun 23, 2012 at 4:46 PM, Timothy Morton timothymorton...@gmail.com wrote: Hi Davin, We obviously treat different entities differently. But this is not the same as saying that these entities are ontologically different. Yours, Tim http://www.ecologywithoutnature.blogspot.com On Jun 20, 2012, at 5:51 AM, davin heckman davinheck...@gmail.com wrote: Thank you Ian, for these thoughts. My initial encounter with this work came via a brief discussion of flat ontology, which I found somewhat offputting. I followed up by reading through the re:press book. What I like the most, I suppose, is the sense that the discussions are in motion with a lot of people participating. Reading some of the discussion of mereology, I find they resonate with one of my favorite passages from Hegel. Pardon me for cannibalizing another piece of writing (a draft of which can be found here: http://isea2011.sabanciuniv.edu/paper/disturbed-dialectic-literary-criticism). * In The Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel describes the dialectical process: The bud disappears in the bursting-forth of the blossom, and one might say the former is refuted by the latter; similarly, when the fruit appears, the blossom is shown up in its turn as a false manifestation of the plant, and the fruit now emerges as the truth of it instead. These forms are not just distinguished from one another, they also supplant one another as mutually incompatible. Yet at the same time their fluid nature makes them moments of an organic unity in which they not only do not conflict, but in which each is as necessary as the other; and this mutual necessity alone constitutes the life of the whole. [1] Viewed from within the Hegelian process, the Real is positioned outside its present manifestations, consisting, rather, of the dynamic processes that comprise its totality. This insight, crucial to critical practice, requires revision in light of technical change. By revision, I do not mean that we need to fundamentally alter Hegel’s argument, I only mean to suggest that we see this passage with respect to new temporal modalities that have shaken up the pursuit of knowledge. * I come at many of the same issues, but my inclination lead me to embrace a kind of humanism, but one which cannot easily understand as we continually muddle the conversations of humanism with an ontology that is expressed in our metaphors. One grip I have with the use of Deleuze or McLuhan, is the idea that our capacity to personalize prosthetics has a tendency to be reduced to a situation in which it becomes possible to imagine that we see machines, interpersonal relationships, people with tools, etc. as the same thing. When, in fact, my psychic investment in my bike or computer, while deep, is not nearly as deep or as complex as my psychic investment in my (which I can only refer to as mine with a sense of obligation to, rather than ownership over) child. If my bike decided to bite me.which it can't, even if it can hurt me I would not feel so simultaneously restrained in my response AND emotionally florid as I would if my 8 year old bit me for some crazy
