Re: [Emu] EAP-GPSK: Ciphersuites

2006-08-22 Thread Charles Clancy
Interesting idea, but what does it gain you?  Why not just use an 
AES-CBC and CMAC ciphersuite?


--
t. charles clancy, ph.d.  |  [EMAIL PROTECTED]  |  www.cs.umd.edu/~clancy

Lakshminath Dondeti wrote:
I guess we agree to disagree.  The addition integrity checksum is 
spurious in my view and I believe we can define things so that combined 
modes can be employed without encrypting anything, so I am somewhat 
confused here.  What's your opinion on the latter part of my email?


thanks,
Lakshminath

At 05:12 PM 8/22/2006, Hannes Tschofenig wrote:

Hi Lakshminath,

Lakshminath  Dondeti schrieb:

At the expense of generating some confusion, here is my take on this:
The objection is to having to carry multiple integrity checksums in 
GPSK, if we used the combined mode *and* an integrity algorithm.


I don't agree with you. There is no reason to optimize a few bits in a 
pre-shared secret method.

Note that we are not talking about a protocol for data transfer.
We wanted the flexibility to use different cipher suites. We do not 
only want to use cipher suites that provide authenticated encryption 
(since we almost have nothing to encrypt; currently 1 bit and almost 
no EAP method provides this functionality).


Ciao
Hannes

I think CCM is fine for instance, the only catch is that we need to 
make sure and define AAD for CCM carefully to include appropriate 
data into the integrity checksum calculation.  So, once we define CCM 
as the mode, we shouldn't need AES-CMAC-128 if encryption is being used.
I would suggest using CCM and specifying the use of it fully so it 
can be used without misunderstandings.  If you want me to put some 
time into writing that up, let me know.

cheers,
Lakshminath
At 10:55 PM 8/20/2006, Hannes Tschofenig wrote:

Hi all,

the current version of the document
http://tools.ietf.org/wg/emu/draft-clancy-emu-eap-shared-secret-01.txt
still supports AES-EAX:

   
+---++-+---++
   | CSuite/   | KS | Encryption  | Integrity | Key 
Derivation |
   | Specifier || |   | 
Function   |
   
+---++-+---++
   | 0x01  | 16 | AES-EAX-128 | AES-CMAC-128  | 
GKDF-128   |
   
+---++-+---++


At the IETF#66 EMU meeting AES CCM was suggested.

Later, it got the impression that AES-CBC was more appreciated. 
Should we update the draft with AES-CBC?


Ciao
Hannes


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AW: [Emu] EAP-GPSK: Ciphersuites

2006-08-22 Thread Tschofenig, Hannes
Hi Lakshminath, 

I am not sure that the group wants to use CCM. 
(If you are referring to this part of your mail.)

Ciao
Hannes

 -Ursprüngliche Nachricht-
 Von: Lakshminath Dondeti [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] 
 Gesendet: Dienstag, 22. August 2006 11:44
 An: Hannes Tschofenig
 Cc: emu@ietf.org
 Betreff: Re: [Emu] EAP-GPSK: Ciphersuites
 
 I guess we agree to disagree.  The addition integrity checksum is 
 spurious in my view and I believe we can define things so that 
 combined modes can be employed without encrypting anything, so I am 
 somewhat confused here.  What's your opinion on the latter 
 part of my email?
 
 thanks,
 Lakshminath
 
 At 05:12 PM 8/22/2006, Hannes Tschofenig wrote:
 Hi Lakshminath,
 
 Lakshminath  Dondeti schrieb:
 At the expense of generating some confusion, here is my 
 take on this:
 The objection is to having to carry multiple integrity checksums in 
 GPSK, if we used the combined mode *and* an integrity algorithm.
 
 I don't agree with you. There is no reason to optimize a few bits in 
 a pre-shared secret method.
 Note that we are not talking about a protocol for data transfer.
 We wanted the flexibility to use different cipher suites. We do not 
 only want to use cipher suites that provide authenticated encryption 
 (since we almost have nothing to encrypt; currently 1 bit and almost 
 no EAP method provides this functionality).
 
 Ciao
 Hannes
 
 I think CCM is fine for instance, the only catch is that we need to 
 make sure and define AAD for CCM carefully to include appropriate 
 data into the integrity checksum calculation.  So, once we define 
 CCM as the mode, we shouldn't need AES-CMAC-128 if 
 encryption is being used.
 I would suggest using CCM and specifying the use of it fully so it 
 can be used without misunderstandings.  If you want me to put some 
 time into writing that up, let me know.
 cheers,
 Lakshminath
 At 10:55 PM 8/20/2006, Hannes Tschofenig wrote:
 Hi all,
 
 the current version of the document
 http://tools.ietf.org/wg/emu/draft-clancy-emu-eap-shared-se
cret-01.txt
 still supports AES-EAX:
 
 
 +---++-+---++
 | CSuite/   | KS | Encryption  | Integrity | Key 
 Derivation |
 | Specifier || |   | 
 Function   |
 
 +---++-+---++
 | 0x01  | 16 | AES-EAX-128 | AES-CMAC-128  | 
 GKDF-128   |
 
 +---++-+---++
 
 At the IETF#66 EMU meeting AES CCM was suggested.
 
 Later, it got the impression that AES-CBC was more appreciated. 
 Should we update the draft with AES-CBC?
 
 Ciao
 Hannes
 
 
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[Emu] EAP-GPSK: Ciphersuites

2006-08-20 Thread Hannes Tschofenig

Hi all,

the current version of the document
http://tools.ietf.org/wg/emu/draft-clancy-emu-eap-shared-secret-01.txt
still supports AES-EAX:

   +---++-+---++
   | CSuite/   | KS | Encryption  | Integrity | Key Derivation |
   | Specifier || |   | Function   |
   +---++-+---++
   | 0x01  | 16 | AES-EAX-128 | AES-CMAC-128  | GKDF-128   |
   +---++-+---++

At the IETF#66 EMU meeting AES CCM was suggested.

Later, it got the impression that AES-CBC was more appreciated. Should 
we update the draft with AES-CBC?


Ciao
Hannes


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