Returned mail: User unknown
The original message was received at Thu, 4 Nov 1999 13:28:35 -0800 from smartlst@localhost - The following addresses had permanent fatal errors - [EMAIL PROTECTED] - Transcript of session follows - flist: Strange group or user id 451 [EMAIL PROTECTED] reply: read error from mail-relay3.idt.net. 451 [EMAIL PROTECTED] reply: read error from mail-relay4.idt.net. ... while talking to mail-pr.eisa.net.au.: >>> RCPT To:<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> <<< 550 <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>... User unknown 550 [EMAIL PROTECTED] User unknown Reporting-MTA: dns; mx1.eskimo.com Arrival-Date: Thu, 4 Nov 1999 13:28:35 -0800 Final-Recipient: RFC822; [EMAIL PROTECTED] Action: failed Status: 5.1.1 Remote-MTA: DNS; mail-pr.eisa.net.au Diagnostic-Code: SMTP; 550 <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>... User unknown Last-Attempt-Date: Thu, 4 Nov 1999 13:43:43 -0800 Received: (from smartlst@localhost) by mx1.eskimo.com (8.9.1a/8.8.8) id NAA29987; Thu, 4 Nov 1999 13:28:35 -0800 Resent-Date: Thu, 4 Nov 1999 13:28:35 -0800 Date: Thu, 4 Nov 1999 16:28:33 -0500 (EST) From: "Jacques M. Mallah" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: everything-list <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Subject: Re: On begin very old In-Reply-To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Message-ID: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII Resent-Message-ID: <"WGV_B.0.UK7.3gV8u"@mx1> Resent-From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] X-Mailing-List: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> archive/latest/1350 X-Loop: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Precedence: list Resent-Sender: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: tautology
On Thu, 4 Nov 1999, Russell Standish wrote: > > On Tue, 26 Oct 1999, Russell Standish wrote: > > [JM wrote] [&BTW I am getting tired of RS omitting the attribution] > > ^^^ Blame my email software. I almost always leave the .signatures in > to make it obvious who I'm responding to. Since your software is bad, you should add it manually. > > It is obvious that p(Y1&X) = p(Y1&Z), because in all instances in > > It is not obvious, for the same reason that p(Y1&X) = p(Y2&X) is not obvious. > If QTI is true, then it is clearly not true. Don't assume what you're > trying to prove. Perhaps I should have been a little more clear. I am discussing the ASSA, not trying to prove it but to show that it is self consistent. You are right in the sense that I left something out. I am assuming a reasonable measure distribution based on the physical situation. For example, the measure could be proprtional to the number of implementations of a computation, as I like to assume. It is also possible to assume an unreasonable measure distribution, like the RSSA. This of course would require new, strange and complicated laws of psycho-physics. So what I am really doing is showing that (ASSA + reasonable measure (RM)) is self consistent. However, the way we have been using the term ASSA, RM has almost always been assumed. In any case it is always true that some way of calculating the measure distribution is needed. Your claim was that the RSSA is needed. My example shows that RM does the job. - - - - - - - Jacques Mallah ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) Graduate Student / Many Worlder / Devil's Advocate "I know what no one else knows" - 'Runaway Train', Soul Asylum My URL: http://pages.nyu.edu/~jqm1584/
Re: Turing vs math
Juergen Schmidhuber writes: > Hal: > > >Approximate probabilities based on approximations to the > >K. complexity of a string are no more computable than precise ones. > >There is no fixed bound B which allows you to compute the K. complexity > >of an arbitrary string within accuracy B. > > You should add "within a given fixed time interval." Within finite > (though unknown) time you can compute the K of finite string x. In > general you'll just never know whether your current lowest upper bound > on K is tight. Right, but the fact that we observe probabilities means that they are being computed to within some bounds, right? And the bounds have to be low enough that we don't observe discrepancies from what probability theory would predict, it seems to me. Kolmogorov complexity is uncomputable to the same extent and for much the same reason that the halting problem is undecideable. Yes, if you had infinite time you could compute the K. complexity of any string, and you could also solve the halting problem for any program. Wouldn't you be uncomfortable with an ontology which required solving the halting problem in order to produce the observable universe? It seems that requiring evaluating K. complexity, even to within some specific bounds, raises the same difficulties. Hal
Re: Turing vs math
> Step n owns 2^(n-1) initial segments. Bruno, why are we discussing this? Sure, in finite time you can compute all initial segments of size n. In countable time you can compute one real, or a countable number of reals. But each of your steps needs more than twice the time required by the previous step. Therefore you need more than countable time to compute all reals. > Now, could you give me a bitstring which is not generated > by this countably infinite process ? Sure. The output of the program "While TRUE print 1" won't be computed in countable time by your procedure. Juergen
Re: Turing vs math
Jacques M. Mallah wrote: >On 2 Mar -1, Marchal wrote: >> Take the self-duplication experiment as a simple illustration, where >> after having been read I am reconstitued at two different places. >> Nobody (not even God) can compute where I will find myself after the >> duplication. > > That has nothing to do with computability! The fact is, depending >on how 'you' is defined, you are either at BOTH places, or at NEITHER >place! That has nothing to do with computability, but that has a lot to do with the computationalist hypothesis: the hypothesis that there is a level of description such that I survive a (finitely describable) digital functional substitution at that level. Now you are partially right. But you should have said: ``The fact is, depending on how 'you' is defined, you are either at BOTH places, or at NEITHER place ... OR at one or the other place". Precisely: if you survive classical teleportation, you survive classical duplication. OK ? (this need a minimal amount of folk-psychology). Now if you define ``you" by the 3-person description of your body at the correct level of description then indeed you will be at BOTH places. If you define ``you" by an owner of your personal historical-memories (such as those you would put in a diary), i.e. what I call the 1-person, then after the duplication one of such ``you" will write in (each) diary book either ``I am in Washington" (let us say), and the other ``you" will write ``I am in Moscow". No 1-person will write ``I am simultaneously" at Moscow and Washington. It is easy to show that before the duplication the result of the 1-self localisation experience after the duplication is totaly undetermined. That is what I call the comp-indeterminism. And that is a major step in my argument that IF we are digitalisable, then the physical sciences are reducible to the psychology of digital machines. In particular quantum indeterminism will be explained by the comp-indeterminism. With an ad hoc definition of ``you", you can be at NEITHER place. But with comp this amount to say that ``I" totaly disappear at each instant. It means that my expected life duration is O second. In that case I would prefer to abandon comp, for I take it for sure that I have been living for at least 2 seconds. Bruno
