JOINING post

2004-01-06 Thread Georges Quenot
Hi all,

I am Georges Quénot. I have a PhD in Computer Science. I have worked
on computer architectures dedicated to speech recognition and image
processing. I am now more on the software side and I am working in
the field of Multimedia Information Retrieval. My main work is not
so related to the subject of this group but I have personal interest
into it. I also have a background in Physics and Biology.
My professional home page: http://clips.imag.fr/mrim/georges.quenot/

Georges.



Is the universe computable?

2004-01-06 Thread Georges Quenot
I start from a part of this post from David Barrett-Lennard (Mon,
3 Nov 2003 19:48:49) but I could probably hev selected several
similar other ones:

 Given the source code for the simulation of our universe, it would
 seem to be possible to add some extra instructions that test for a
 certain condition to be met in order to tamper with the simulation.
 It would seem likely that there will exist simulations that match our
 own up to a certain point in time, but then diverge.  Eg it is
 possible for a simulation to have a rule that an object will suddenly 
 manifestitself at a particular time and place.  The simulated conscious 
 beings in such a universe would be surprised to find that induction
 fails at the moment the simulation diverges.

It seems to me that there is a very strong assupmtion here which
is that there should be some synchronicity between the time in the
postulated computer into which the universe would be simulated and
the time inside that simulated universe (as this is typically the
case when an electronic device is simulated).

But such an assumption not only does not seem necessary in any way
but it also does not seem possibly consistent (or it would be very
arbitrary at least) with a universe like ours for what we know of
the implications of general relativity (it does not seem possible
to define any global time in any consistent way in our universe).

Many other way of simulating the universe could be considered like
for instance a 4D mesh (if we simplify by considering only general
relativity; there is no reason for the approach not being possible in
an even more general way) representing a universe taken as a whole
in its spatio-temporal aspect. The mesh would be refined at each
iteration. The relation between the time in the computer and the time
in the universe would not be a synchrony but a refinement of the
resolution of the time (and space) in the simulated universe as the
time in the computer increases.

Alternatively (though both views are not necessarily exclusive), one
could use a variational formulation instead of a partial derivative
formulation in order to describe/build the universe leading again to
a construction in which the time in the computer is not related at
all to the time in the simulated universe.

It seems to me finally that the simulations in which there is a
synchrony between the time in this universe and the time in the
computer simulating it are very specific (if even existing) among
all other possible simulations of the same universe (at least
for the kind of relativistic universe we live in). I would even
conjecture that the measure of the set of synchronous simulations
is null within the set of all possible simulations of a given (not
so trivial) universe (if one can give a sound sense to this).

I would be interested in reading the opinions of the participants
about that point and about the sense that could be given to the
question of what happens (in the simulated universe) in any non-
synchronous simulation when the simulation diverges ?

Georges.



Re: Is the universe computable?

2004-01-06 Thread Frank
Indeed, I've always thought there was a dubious assumption there.
There isn't a universal time to pace the clock tics of a simulation.
Relativity forbids it.
Anyway, time is a subjective illusion.

Back to the question:
So what happens when the simulation diverges from regularity?
Some possibilities:
a) The universe ends
b) Pink elephants pop up everywhere
c) It's already happening

I like (c)


- Original Message - 
From: Georges Quenot [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Tuesday, January 06, 2004 8:32 AM
Subject: Is the universe computable?


 I start from a part of this post from David Barrett-Lennard (Mon,
 3 Nov 2003 19:48:49) but I could probably hev selected several
 similar other ones:

  Given the source code for the simulation of our universe, it would
  seem to be possible to add some extra instructions that test for a
  certain condition to be met in order to tamper with the simulation.
  It would seem likely that there will exist simulations that match our
  own up to a certain point in time, but then diverge.  Eg it is
  possible for a simulation to have a rule that an object will suddenly
  manifestitself at a particular time and place.  The simulated conscious
  beings in such a universe would be surprised to find that induction
  fails at the moment the simulation diverges.

 It seems to me that there is a very strong assupmtion here which
 is that there should be some synchronicity between the time in the
 postulated computer into which the universe would be simulated and
 the time inside that simulated universe (as this is typically the
 case when an electronic device is simulated).

 But such an assumption not only does not seem necessary in any way
 but it also does not seem possibly consistent (or it would be very
 arbitrary at least) with a universe like ours for what we know of
 the implications of general relativity (it does not seem possible
 to define any global time in any consistent way in our universe).

 Many other way of simulating the universe could be considered like
 for instance a 4D mesh (if we simplify by considering only general
 relativity; there is no reason for the approach not being possible in
 an even more general way) representing a universe taken as a whole
 in its spatio-temporal aspect. The mesh would be refined at each
 iteration. The relation between the time in the computer and the time
 in the universe would not be a synchrony but a refinement of the
 resolution of the time (and space) in the simulated universe as the
 time in the computer increases.

 Alternatively (though both views are not necessarily exclusive), one
 could use a variational formulation instead of a partial derivative
 formulation in order to describe/build the universe leading again to
 a construction in which the time in the computer is not related at
 all to the time in the simulated universe.

 It seems to me finally that the simulations in which there is a
 synchrony between the time in this universe and the time in the
 computer simulating it are very specific (if even existing) among
 all other possible simulations of the same universe (at least
 for the kind of relativistic universe we live in). I would even
 conjecture that the measure of the set of synchronous simulations
 is null within the set of all possible simulations of a given (not
 so trivial) universe (if one can give a sound sense to this).

 I would be interested in reading the opinions of the participants
 about that point and about the sense that could be given to the
 question of what happens (in the simulated universe) in any non-
 synchronous simulation when the simulation diverges ?

 Georges.




Re: Is the universe computable?

2004-01-06 Thread Erick Krist
 It seems to me that there is a very strong assupmtion here which
 is that there should be some synchronicity between the time in the
 postulated computer into which the universe would be simulated and
 the time inside that simulated universe

I have been studying the function of what I refer to as intergalactic time
in a case I call,
Where does time come from when I am a rock,
very akin to the what is it like to be a bat question in philosophy,
studying the funcitons of actual physical time from a molecular standpoint
are very different to the nature of time from a human perceptual standpoint.

when we measure the universe in motion, we tend to do so in orbital cycles
of days, years and orbital pathways [i.e. comets...]

(as this is typically the
case when an electronic device is simulated).

Also, keeping in mind that the computer itself is not only finite it's own
containment of self, as the universe, speciafically [imposed] is not. the
computer is also nothing more than a synthesized state of physio-temporal
events//effects within motion by theory of time.

the computer has a common ground, a 60hz, 120v input freq.
this is translated into +/- 5,12v dc (1,1.5 amp) current,
which in turn becomes functionally oscillative at a rate of
20mhz - 2ghz and is thereby functional as a very sensitive
binary computational [oscillative] device. In this very sense, the
computer's function is the very operative essence of the coputer timing it's
own functions, measuring the binary differences of the temporant input
values, and [based on interal programming sequences] delivers some form of
variable perceptual output predetermined by the user upon [data] entry.

the universe itsself recives no common input aside from the relative
[translational//fluctuational] fields of masses being present in light
within space time and other such physical frequency noises, the entire
universe has little to no common relation between all of its billions of
galaxies and it's infinite sections of space time [mass energy] in motion.
The inter relative movements of the motions of planets and suns would simply
be much to complex for calculating some from of common frequency/time ration
by which time can 'now' be determined instantaneously [by measured
perceptions] universally.

whereas the computer itself can predict cross sections of temporal alignment
within motion, it cannot use these inflections to determine any set ultimate
beginnings or endings to these patterns to an infinite [temporally chaotic,
unpredicatable, misaligned] universe without us as humans, actually
physically understanding what its like, for a rock, to [physically] know
[its] own 'time'.

ultimately, the computer would not be able to define an infinite of logical
matter based temporant rotations in a singular moment.
The 'base' frequency rate of measure is always provided by some form of
external course. In the case of the computer, it's a function of translating
the input source voltage by using an internal power supply.

How could the computer control the function of realization by which the
source control input of measurable time is determined. When exploring how
the computer relates to time universally, it is important to keep in mind
that this is somewhat akin to sudying the biological process of your own
body, using your own eyes, brain and feelings in order to 'compute' them
temporally as biological functions, using those same biological functions as
the source of that internal 'self' computation{al}// measure



- Original Message -
From: Georges Quenot [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Tuesday, January 06, 2004 11:32 AM
Subject: Is the universe computable?


 I start from a part of this post from David Barrett-Lennard (Mon,
 3 Nov 2003 19:48:49) but I could probably hev selected several
 similar other ones:

  Given the source code for the simulation of our universe, it would
  seem to be possible to add some extra instructions that test for a
  certain condition to be met in order to tamper with the simulation.
  It would seem likely that there will exist simulations that match our
  own up to a certain point in time, but then diverge.  Eg it is
  possible for a simulation to have a rule that an object will suddenly
  manifestitself at a particular time and place.  The simulated conscious
  beings in such a universe would be surprised to find that induction
  fails at the moment the simulation diverges.

 It seems to me that there is a very strong assupmtion here which
 is that there should be some synchronicity between the time in the
 postulated computer into which the universe would be simulated and
 the time inside that simulated universe (as this is typically the
 case when an electronic device is simulated).

 But such an assumption not only does not seem necessary in any way
 but it also does not seem possibly consistent (or it would be very
 arbitrary at least) with a universe like ours for what we know of
 the implications of 

Re: Is the universe computable?

2004-01-06 Thread Erick Krist
 I would be interested in reading the opinions of the participants
 about that point and about the sense that could be given to the
 question of what happens (in the simulated universe) in any non-
 synchronous simulation when the simulation diverges ?

I would expect that the situation would expand or inflate.
My general conjecture of time as a relative [temporant] instantiative
universal [state] constant is such that time is a singular relative
universal now instance, by which on one hand we have the physical time
constraints of the behaviours of matters in time space, and on the other
hand, we have the theory of motions, speed, light, 'measurable movements' /
instants of 'self' within time.

Therefor, time is a universal constraint by which all matter now exists
within one singular [temporal] continuum of advancement by which only
relative internal state of [co] localized time based behaviours can be
established. The universe, while highly difficult to define spatially on an
infinite basis, can be explained quite sufficiently time wise in terms of a
temporant continual infinite, in which by infinite is actually the
cumulative maximum sum of 'time' avaliable in the universe by which motion,
from the atomic level to the intergalactic  level may occur within that
temporal now instance of being within 'this' universe. Therefor the entire
set of ratios of fixed temporal movements and maximum time sums would hold
as a fixed constraint network by which then the rationalizations of the
universe are defined. as opposed to looking for fixed spatial boundaries or
outer limits of matter based existence, one can suppose instead the fixed
temporant relation of all matter based particles by sum constraint constants
of [maximum] time [avaliability now] therefor the function of universal
boundary becoms instead a maximum probable set constituent of things going
be, or the 'futures' of temporant [interactive dynamic] interactions between
'fixed instants' of absolute now moments, by which then the 'set state' of
more+ probable instants are likely to occur. This function is highly
illogical, not due to some highly inpredicatble nature, but due to the
innability of applying formal logic to the probable predictions of future
event states of time, having not yet as happened in any [logically] relative
state.
It would therefor be digitally unviable to try and set the probabilistic
event states of temporal passage by means of any logical/binary
prescription. Even if you could mathematically explicate ALL of the
figurative interactions between all unversal instances now, the means by
which any universal algorythms could be symbolically connected to temporant
relations are not 'absolutely' digitally compatible. much like the argument
about 44khx cd's vrs. true analog records, one can assume that if there is
any skepticism at all on a sound frequency level alone, that this type of
'digital skewing' would no doubt, on a universally computational level,
render to enter 'analog conception' entirely temporantly inaccurate due to
the necessary digitalization [.: the finitization] of absolute [non finite]
temporant mathematical theory.

Therefor, in conclusion to the the question of divergence above, I think
that one can necessarily assume that if indeed you believe you have in fact
protrayed the universe some how, algorythimically prcise to a digital
summation of absolute temporant events [universally now] you are in fact
already presenting a divergence within the basic process of synthesis by
which your very calculations/measurements are being made. The computer is
simply not capable of defining a temorally infinite universe in motion ,
continuously, [while being] while within it's own micro-measurable states //
digital [frequency] time flow are simply not sensitive enough to predict the
absolute natures of analog time flow without missing entire layers and
frquencies of temporant relation between EVERY space-time axis.

in order to compute this properly, you would need 1 network computing the
actual values themselves on a specific matter frequency level [macro
instances] {i.e. the universe of matter[1-d time]} you would then need a
second network analyzing temporant molecular interactions of those macro
instances themselves. {i.e. the phsyio-cehmical instances of the matter
based universe[2-d time]}
you would then need a third network that analyzes the energy based frequency
interactions between the pysio chemical instances on a micro scale, and also
the matter based interactions on a macro level,[chemical-matter
ineraction{3-d time}], then converting those frequency changes over a period
of time into a set state of changed ratios, feeding those ratios into the
first network, such that it can now calculate a new state of set probable
eevents based on ALL [frequency] time changes in the universe at ALL moments
in time.
evidently, you then need a fourth network to calculate how the energy
freuqncy changes in the phsyio-chemical-matter 

Re: Is the universe computable?

2004-01-06 Thread Eric Hawthorne
Frank wrote:

Indeed, I've always thought there was a dubious assumption there.
There isn't a universal time to pace the clock tics of a simulation.
Relativity forbids it.
Anyway, time is a subjective illusion.
Back to the question:
So what happens when the simulation diverges from regularity?
Some possibilities:
a) The universe ends
b) Pink elephants pop up everywhere
c) It's already happening
I like (c)


Ok. How about:

The multiverse is a very long qubit-string. (This is an informal 
statement to drive intuition.)

Being a qubit string it simultaneously exhibits all of its potential 
information-states.

If there is something like this qubitstring simultaneously exhibiting 
all possible information
states, then note that to do computation, within that qubit-string, no 
actual computational
process need take place. Any tour through any subset of the information 
states (i.e.
visiting one information-state after another after another...) can be
considered equivalent to a computation. Any tour through a subset of the 
information
states which is such that the direction of the tour is restricted to 
only those successor
information-states Si+1 (of the state Si we're currently at) which are 
different from Si
by only a single bit-flip in a single position in the bitstring, and 
where that bit-flip
would only happen based on some function of only the state of the bits 
in a local vicinity
of the flipping bit, can be considered equivalent to a computation which 
is comprised
solely of localized operations, similar to the kinds of computation we 
understand.

So the universe (or any observable universe) could be a tour through a 
subset of the
information-states of the qubit-string multiverse, which is such that 
the tour
computes only self-consistent spaces and objects, perhaps using only 
local computational
steps (part this computational locality is part of the secret of 
ensuring consistency, locality,
metric etc properties of the space and the objects, prehaps).

Observers which were self-aware substructures WITHIN  the set of objects 
computed
in a consistent tour, maybe can only observe other information states 
which are also
within that tour.

TIME AND LIGHTSPEED
As Wolfram postulates, the concept of time and speed of light c within 
such an
informational universe may be related to how fast the informational 
changes (from one
state to another) can propagate (across the qubitstring) using only 
local computations
as the medium of state-change propagation. It is wrong to suppose that 
this implies
computational time outside of the qubitstring. How fast state-change 
propagates
is purely a question of how the metric spacetime that the consistent 
tour defines
can evolve in form within a consistent tour.

The tour itself could be imagined to be real if you like (with the
qubitstring really in some god-quantum-computer-thingy which has a 
god's-now-program-
pointer which moves from state to state in the consistent tour).
But it is better to think of the consistent tour as a virtual tour, an 
abstraction,
defined by nothing more nor less than its BEING a subset of information 
states, and an order
of traversal of those (very large) information states which is such that 
the ordered set
of information-states IS and CONJURES reality.

OBSERVERS, AND TOUR-TRAVERSAL AS THE TIME ARROW FOR OBSERVERS

An OBSERVER is a set of local subsets of the some of the set of 
information-states in the
consistent tour which is the universe. The notion of locality there is 
information-distance.

OBSERVERS can observe any aspect (part) of the information states in the 
tour which has
the following properties:

1. The observable substates must be within a light-cone of the observer. 
Photons or waves of light are
information travelling through the set of information-states. They are 
closely related to the putative
local computations which are imagined as defining sensible localized 
change between sets of
information states. So the observable substates are those that are 
reachable from the observer
states by local computations. These observation computations are 
computations that can
affect the observer-part of the now information-state based on the 
prior-to-now configuration
of other adjacent-to-the-observer parts of the prior-to-now information 
states, with the information
moving at a speed of one local computation (or is that one bitshift) per 
information-state-distance
in the consistent tour. Confusing? Yes I'm confused too. This bit's 
hard. (Pun intended)

2. Argument 1 implies that only parts (in some informational locality to 
the observer within the
information-states) of PRIOR-IN-THE-TOUR information-states can be 
observed by the observer.
That's what being in the light-cone from the observer implies: 1. 
Informationally-local to the observer's
own states, and also 2. PRIOR in the consistent tour to the 
now-in-tour state of the observer.

In fact we will stand these arguments on their heads now, and say that