Oops: replace Newton's demon by Maxwell's demon. George George Levy wrote:
> Hi Bruno, > Yes I am still on the list, barely trying to keep up, but I have been > very busy. Actually the ball was in my court and I was supposed to > answer to your last post to me about a year ago!!!. Generally I agree > with you on many things but here I am just playing the devils' > advocate. The Maudlin experiment reminds me of an attempt to prove the > falsity of the second law of thermodynamics using Newton's demon. As > you probably know, this attempt fails because the thermodynamics > effect on the demon is neglected when in fact it should not be The > Newton Demon experiment is not thermodynamically closed. If you > include the demon in a closed system, then the second law is correct. > Similarly, Maudlin's experiment is not informationally closed because > Maudlin has interjected himself into his own experiment! The > "accidentally" correctly operating machines need to have their tape > rearranged to work correctly and Maudlin is the agent doing the > rearranging. > > So essentially Maudlin's argument is not valid as an attack on > physical supervenience. As you know, I am at the extreme end of the > spectrum with regards the physical world supervening on consciousness. > (Mind over matter instead of matter over mind), so I would very much > like to see an argument that could prove it, but in my opinion > Maudlin's does not cut it. More comments below. > > Bruno Marchal wrote: > >>Hi George, >> >>Are you still there on the list? >>I am really sorry to (re)discover your post just now, with a label >>saying that I have to answer it, but apparently I didn't. So here is >>the answer, with a delay of about one year :( >> >> >> >>Le 08-oct.-06, à 08:00, George Levy wrote : >> >> >> >> >>>Finally I read your filmed graph argument which I have stored in my >>>computer. (The original at the Iridia web site >>>http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/bxlthesis/Volume3CC/3%20%202%20.pdf >>>is not accessible anymore. I am not sure why.) >>> >>> >> >> >>Apparently it works now. You have to scroll on the pdf document to see >>the text. >> >> >> >> >> >>>In page TROIS -61 you describe an experience of consciousness which is >>>comprised partially of a later physical process and partially of the >>>recording of an earlier physical process. >>> >>> >> >> >>Right. >> >> >> >> >> >>>It is possible to resolve the paradox simply by saying that >>>consciousness involves two partial processes ... >>> >>> >> >>Why? With comp, consciousness can be associated with the active boolean >>graph, the one which will be recorded. No need of the second one. >> >> >> > Yes, but in the eyes of a materialist but I have restored the > possibility that consciousness can supervene on the physical. I have > exposed Maudlin's trickery. I agree that consciousness can be > associated with a boolean graph and that there is no need for physical > substrate. However, Maudlin does not prove this case because he got > involved in his own experiment. > >>>... each occupying two >>>different time intervals, the time intervals being connected by a >>>recording, such that the earlier partial process is combined with the >>>later partial process, the recording acting as a connection device. >>> >>> >> >> >>But is there any sense in which consciousness can supervene on the >>later partial process? All the trouble is there, because the later >>process has the same physical process-features than the active brain, >>although by construction there is no sense to attribute it any >>computational process (like a movie). >> >> >> >> >> >>>I am not saying that consciousness supervene on the physical substrate. >>> >>> >> >> >>ok. >> >> >> >> >> >>>All I am saying is that the example does not prove that consciousness >>>does not supervene the physical. >>> >>> >> >> >>Yes, you are right from a logical point of view, but only by assuming >>some form of non-computationalism. >>With comp + physical supervenience, you have to attach a consciousness >>to the active boolean graph, and then, by physical supervenience, to >>the later process, which do no more compute. (And then Maudlin shows >>that you can change the second process so that it computes again, but >>without any physical activity of the kind relevant to say that you >>implement a computation. So, physical supervenience is made wrong. >> >> >> > > Yes but Maudlin cheated by interjecting himself into his experiment. > So this argument does not count. > >>>The example is just an instance of >>>consciousness operating across two different time intervals by mean of >>>a >>>physical substrate and a physical means (recording) of connecting these >>>two time intervals. >>> >>> >> >> >>The problem is that with comp, consciousness has to be associated to >>the first process, and by physical supervenience, it has to be attached >>also to the second process. But then you can force the second process >>to do the correct computation (meaning that it handles the >>counterfactuals), without any genuine physical activity (reread Maudlin >>perhaps, or its translation in term of filmed graph like in chapter >>trois of "Conscience et Mécanisme"). >> >>So, postulating comp, we have to associate the many possible "physical >>brains" to a type of computation, and not the inverse. >> >>Does this help? >> >> > No. Maudlin cheated. Sorry. > > George > > > --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
