Bruno:
Given what I know about the laws of Physics. A matter human in a
matter Universe(similar to ours) is Consciousness and self aware. An
antimatter human in an antimatter Universe should be expected to be
Consciousness and self aware.
I do not understand the second to last paragraph. One starts with a
Universe that "splits" upon taking measuremennts, or there are N
parallel Universes to start and diverge from each other as unique
measurements occur over time.
Ronald
On Dec 22, 11:49 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> On 21 Dec 2010, at 21:40, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > On 12/21/2010 5:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> >> On 20 Dec 2010, at 20:01, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
> >>>> Russell has given the correct answer. Here by mind I mean the
> >>>> conscious first person mind. By UDA-8 (MGA), consciousness is not
> >>>> attached to the physical running of a computer, but is attached
> >>>> to the logical number-theoretical relations describing that
> >>>> computation ... and all similar (with respect to the relevant
> >>>> levels) computations which exist in Sigma_1 (computational)
> >>>> arithmetical truth (and which might bear on beliefs and proofs
> >>>> which extends far beyond the computable).
>
> >>> But do you mean to assert that all computations have consciousness
> >>> attached? In what sense does this allow us to distinguish human
> >>> introspection from human perception from my dog's awareness from a
> >>> snail's awareness from a rock's awareness?
>
> >> Not at all. Only very special computations have consciousness,
> >> although it is better to attach consciousness to the sheaf of
> >> equivalent computations, going through the relevant (relative)
> >> states. For example, assuming many things by default, for any
> >> different electron positions in the atoms in your brain you have a
> >> different computations. Your actual consciousness is attached to
> >> all those computations.
>
> > When you express it that way it sounds as if you take consciousness
> > to be something apart from the sheaf of equivalent computations -
> > something I have but maybe a snail does not. Don't you rely on
> > Everett's idea that consciousness just goes with the computations -
> > so that when computations of quantum events become classically
> > inconsistent then there is a different consciousness associated with
> > the each (classically) consistent sheaf?
>
> Consciousness differentiates only when it is aware of a specific
> result making his world different from the worlds where the observer
> would have seen another result, both in the WM duplication, or in the
> measure of an electron position or spin. If not, we would not been
> able to be aware of the quantum coherence.
> Here there is an ambiguity present in both quantum mechanics and
> computationalism.
>
> Suppose an electron in your brain, or elsewhere, is in the
> superposition state here+there. You are described by B.
> The state of you + the electron is described as well by B . (here
> +there) or by B . here + B . there. If B does not interact (observe)
> the electron he will be able to decide to do a measure of the electron
> in the complementary base of {here, there}, and observe interference
> between the two different "classical" worlds (where the electron is
> respectively here and there. But if the observer looks where is the
> electron, then the evolution leads to B_here . here + B_there .
> there. And without amnesia, the observer will be unable to make the
> two worlds above fusing, and he has lost the ability to observe the
> interference.
>
> The ambiguity is due to the factorization. I suggest, both for the
> definition of the measure on the computational histories, and the
> consistent quantum histories, to use the rule Y = II. This consists in
> interpreting a(b+c) always as a shorthand for a.b + a.c. I think that
> David Deutsch does the same in the quantum case when he says that the
> universe never splits: it is split right at the start, and the
> parallel universe only differentiate. With comp it is really
> consciousness which differentiate, and somehow the subjective
> experience plays the role of the universes.
>
> But those two views are really equivalent. The splitting/fusing
> vocabulary is more easy for the description of the statistical
> interference between subjective experience/ first person plural
> realities, but the global measure on the computations is better seen
> when distributing all the factors at once, unravelling all histories
> by applying the rule Y = II all along the complete universal deployment.
>
> Does this make sense?
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> > Brent
>
> >> If electrons are specified by continuous variable, your
> >> consciousness will be related to a continuum of computations
> >> generated by the UD. In that case you have to consider the
> >> dovetailing of the UD on the real and complex numbers. Of course
> >> that continuum is an internal first person view which existence is
> >> due to your non-awareness of the delays made by the UD. It belongs
> >> to the epistemology, not the ontology where everything is finite
> >> (can be considered as finite once we assume digitalism).
> >> Humans, dogs, snails and even rock (immaterial rock patterns) share
> >> histories, notably thanks to the plausible linearity of the
> >> computations at the bottom, and the computational depth of our very
> >> long history. Actually I begin to think that computationalism makes
> >> the big bang a cosmic explosion among an infinity of similar
> >> explosions. First person computational depth is probably infinite
> >> (but here I speculate a little bit, and I will not insist on that).
>
> >> Bruno
>
> >>http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
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