Re: The consciousness singularity
Dear Bruno, I agree with you (almost) completely that "we" (bio-beings) are computers, except for the *diminishing factor* we HAVE to include into a "computer" as a machine of knowable components and capabilities, observed WITHIN our perspectives as of yesterday. Your term "universal computer" may fit better: an infinite 'machine' with infinite capabilities/domain of which we (may) select aspects we DO know of... (That may be MY version as I understand (or don't) it. The "humanized" size reduced description. "Computer" BTW is called in other languages something like 'calculational machine' which separates it sharply from the more subtle sense of 'computing in English (I think even more in French) as closer to "mentally put together" straight from the Latin origin. The calculational aspect - I think - dates back to Babbage way before Turing. GAI applies series of thoughts to 'compute' instead of numbers (sorry!) and 'meanings' are the result. (Nevertheless I consider AI still a humanly limited art, since it starts from what we can observe and deduce and arrives at - similarly - what we can observe and deduce (even if surprised).) The "bio" - indeed one of the two science-domains we know the least of (the other is neurology/psych) includes infinite networks of influences, applies infinite inputs and we observe only part of them: the "perceived reality" part. E.g. a cell does not end at its outer membrane and those characteristics WE apply. It reacts to wider physical domains and not-so-physical procedures as well. In my agnostic view I do not presume what kind of 'items' populate the infinite (beyond our models) complexity of everything (call it: existence) what kind of relations they may have what we translate in our ignorance as "our world" (call it:* physical*). We cannot even look beyond our limited models of known items/aspects of yesterday. We (conventional science) explain them all in the framework of our knowledge base (of yesterday) and improve on THAT whenever we 'get' something more to it. Don't let yourself drag into a narrower vision just to be able to agree, please. I say openly: I dunno (not Nobel-stuff I admit). John Mikes On Tue, Nov 29, 2011 at 12:44 PM, benjayk wrote: > > > Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > >> I only say that I do not have a perspective of being a computer. > > > > If you can add and multiply, or if you can play the Conway game of > > life, then you can understand that you are at least a computer. > So, then I am computer or something more capable than a computer? I have no > doubt that this is true. > > > Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > >> When I look > >> at myself, I see (in the center of my attention) a biological being, > >> not a > >> computer. > > > > Biological being are computers. If you feel to be more than a > > computer, then tell me what. > Biological beings are not computers. Obviously a biological being it is not > a computer in the sense of physical computer. It is also not an abstract > digital computer (even according to COMP it isn't) since a biological being > is physical and "spiritual" (meaning related to subjective conscious > experience beyond physicality and computability). > Neither physicality nor spirituality can be reduced to computations. > Neither > can they be derived from it. Your reasoning doesn't work (due to the > reasons > I already gave and clarify below). > > And no, there is no need for any evidence for some non-turing emulable > infinity in the brain. We just need non-turing emulable finite stuff in the > brain, and that's already there. No one yet succeeded to emulate the brain, > and we can just assume something can be substituted by an emulation if we > show that it can be. > That seems quite unlikely, since already very simple objects like a stone > can't be emulated. If we simulate a stone, we just simulate our description > of it, we can't actually touch it and use it. > > BTW, I am not saying this non-turing emulable stuff is some mysterious > primitive matter that actually no one can show the existence of. It is > consciousness, and you can see for yourself that it exists. > > > Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > >> > >> > >> Bruno Marchal wrote: > >>> > It's harder to dinstinguish > yourself from other simulated selfes than from other biological > selves, > because of the natural biological barriers that we have, that > computers > lack. > >>> > >>> Ah? > >> I can see that I am physically/biologically seperate from you, > > > > You cannot see that. > ??? > Of course I can see that. We don't share the same brain and body, > relatively > speaking. Of course we can't be seperate in any ultimate way (even just > according to QM), but I don't say that. > > > Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > >> while we > >> could be both simulated on one computer, without any clear physical > >> dividing > >> barrier. > > > > All my point is that once we assume comp, the word "physical" can no > > more be taken as granted. > No, that's
Re: The consciousness singularity
Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> I only say that I do not have a perspective of being a computer. > > If you can add and multiply, or if you can play the Conway game of > life, then you can understand that you are at least a computer. So, then I am computer or something more capable than a computer? I have no doubt that this is true. Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> When I look >> at myself, I see (in the center of my attention) a biological being, >> not a >> computer. > > Biological being are computers. If you feel to be more than a > computer, then tell me what. Biological beings are not computers. Obviously a biological being it is not a computer in the sense of physical computer. It is also not an abstract digital computer (even according to COMP it isn't) since a biological being is physical and "spiritual" (meaning related to subjective conscious experience beyond physicality and computability). Neither physicality nor spirituality can be reduced to computations. Neither can they be derived from it. Your reasoning doesn't work (due to the reasons I already gave and clarify below). And no, there is no need for any evidence for some non-turing emulable infinity in the brain. We just need non-turing emulable finite stuff in the brain, and that's already there. No one yet succeeded to emulate the brain, and we can just assume something can be substituted by an emulation if we show that it can be. That seems quite unlikely, since already very simple objects like a stone can't be emulated. If we simulate a stone, we just simulate our description of it, we can't actually touch it and use it. BTW, I am not saying this non-turing emulable stuff is some mysterious primitive matter that actually no one can show the existence of. It is consciousness, and you can see for yourself that it exists. Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> >> >> Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> It's harder to dinstinguish yourself from other simulated selfes than from other biological selves, because of the natural biological barriers that we have, that computers lack. >>> >>> Ah? >> I can see that I am physically/biologically seperate from you, > > You cannot see that. ??? Of course I can see that. We don't share the same brain and body, relatively speaking. Of course we can't be seperate in any ultimate way (even just according to QM), but I don't say that. Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> while we >> could be both simulated on one computer, without any clear physical >> dividing >> barrier. > > All my point is that once we assume comp, the word "physical" can no > more be taken as granted. No, that's not your only point as presented by you. You say that assuming COMP experience is related only to a measure on the computations. You can't just assume there is only computational immaterialism and materialsm. Bruno Marchal wrote: > > You seem to *presuppose* a primary physical universe (Aristotle). I do > not. I don't either. Frankly I wonder why you think that, given that I have taken a very obvious non-material standpoint in our discussions thus far. It somehow seems like you pretend that all opinions except your own and the ones of your favorite opponents (the ones you can easily refute) do not exist. Honestly I am quite stupid to discuss with someone that just chooses to plainly ignore everything that doesn't fit into his own preconceived notions of what someone that's criticizing is saying. It is quite strange to say over and over again that I haven't studied your arguments (I have, though obviously I can't understand all the details, given how complicated they are), while you don't even bother to remember the most fundamental premise of my argumentation (non-materialism). It is like I was saying to you: "Oh it seems to me you just presuppose that we are material computers, that's why your argument works". Your argument may work against materialism (I am not sure, I don't take materialism seriously anyway - frankly materialism is a joke, since materialist are not even capable to say what matter is supposed to be), but you don't take into account any of the alternatives that can be taken more seriously (any sort of non-materialism). It seems very much you presuppose a purely material or computational ontology. Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> >> >> Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> We can only say YES if we assume there is no self-referential loop between my instantiation and my environment (my instantiation influences what world I am in, the world I am in influences my instantiation, etc...). >>> >>> Why? Such loops obviously exist (statistically), and the relative >>> proportion statistics remains unchanged, when doing the substitution >>> at the right level. If such loop plays a role in consciousness, you >>> have to enlarge the digital "generalized" brain. Or comp is wrong, >>> 'course. >> I think it is self-refuting if we not already take the conclusion for >> granted (saying YES only based
