Re: An analogy for Qualia

2012-01-05 Thread Craig Weinberg
On Jan 5, 12:29 am, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:
 On Tue, Jan 3, 2012 at 9:53 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote:

  Sure, our belief in simulations can make them seem quite realistic to us.
  That doesn't make them real though.

 And so simulators join a long long long list of things that you say are not
 real.

Simulators are real, and the experience generated by them is real, but
the experience is not really what we are led to believe is what is
being simulated. That's why they are called 'flight simulators' and
not 'aircraft'.

 If X contradicts your philosophy you just declare that X is not real;
 that's what the opponents of Galileo did, they insisted that everything
 rotated around the Earth but when they looked through Galileo's telescope
 they could clearly see that Jupiter's moons rotated around Jupiter NOT the
 Earth. So what was their response to this powerful evidence? You guessed
 it, things seen through a telescope were not real.

I think I'm actually playing the Galileo role. What I am pointing out
is not real is the obsolete misinterpretations of observations, not
the observations themselves. I am questioning the assumption of their
reality, revealing the emperor's nakedness, and suggesting a coherent
alternative worldview which explains the observations more completely.

  Why even have robots? Why not just make a simulation of outer space and

 decide that it's real?

 Only one reason, we can't make a good enough simulation for that because we
 don't have enough INFORMATION.

If our contemporary knowledge of physics is so complete, then that
should be all the information we need.


  We don't have to guess

 Incorrect, you should have said I don't have to guess, you have no way of
 knowing if I or anybody else really understands anything, all you know is
 that sometimes we behave as if we do.

Not necessarily. Just because the logic of my conscious intellect
dictates that it cannot know anything unless it has been explicitly
told doesn't mean that there aren't other epistemological resources at
our disposal. We don't have to question that people who seem to be
human might not be human.


  that neurons have understanding, because we are associated with them and

 we have understanding.

 There are about 100 billion neurons in the human brain, if you divide
 understanding into 100,000,000,000 parts is the the result still
 understanding? If you divided even the largest library on Earth into 100
 billion parts you'd be lucky to have a part that contained even one single
 letter. Is the letter Y a library?

Dividing human subjective understanding into fragments isn't the same
as dividing an object into fragments. I think what you get is a
qualitative change in the depth and richness of experience. If you
take a mirror reflecting the sun and break it into a thousand pieces,
each piece still reflects the sun and can be used as a mirror also.
It's not really important to know how it feels on these other levels
of perception external to ourselves, but it is important to see the
difference between sense, feeling, or detection, and a physical
mechanism. The mistake our modern view makes is to gloss over the
insurmountable chasm that separates subjective experience on any level
and objective mechanics of any complexity.


  We do have to doubt that transistors have understanding because they

 don't produce any results which remind us of an organism which has
 understanding like ours.

 Solving equations playing Chess winning at Jeopardy and asking Siri
 questions on a iPhone certainly reminds me of  organisms which have
 understanding like I do, but I have no way and will never have a way of
 knowing if any of these thing's understanding is really real, and given
 what a good job they do there is no reason for me to care. And I could say
 exactly the same thing about my fellow human beings.

The reason to care is the same reason to care whether the Earth
revolves around the Sun or not, only this is much more important since
it is the difference between a worldview which sees us as we actually
are and one which denies any possibility of life, order, awareness, or
significance.


  It's [the brain] nothing like a computer which drops the contents of RAM
  as soon as electricity is cut off

 As anyone who has ever used a flash drive could tell you not all RAM acts
 that way.

I didn't say all RAM. My point is that there are many ways that the
brain is nothing like a computer. There are no discrete registers used
as memory locations, no computations being completed and stored as
fixed values. It doesn't work like that. It's a biological community.


   Mind is doing things too. It has analogs to current and power (sense and
  motive), relativity (perceptual frame), entropy (negentropy-significance)
  which relate to electromagnetism in an anomalous symmetry.

 Analogs? Ah, so you're a fan of analog processes, then welcome to the
 exciting world of analog computing.

Not analog 

Beyond quantum theory: a realist psycho-biological

2012-01-05 Thread ronaldheld
article copy from Arxiv.org
   Ronald

‘Beyond quantum theory: a realist psycho-biological
interpretation of reality’ revisited
Brian D. Josephson
Cavendish Laboratory, Madingley Road, Cambridge CB3 0HE, UK
Abstract
It is hypothesised, following Conrad et al. (1988) that quantum
physics is not the ultimate theory of nature, but
merely a theoretical account of the phenomena manifested in nature
under particular conditions. These
phenomena parallel cognitive phenomena in biosystems in a number of
ways and are assumed to arise from
related mechanisms. Quantum and biological accounts are complementary
in the sense of Bohr and quantum
accounts may be incomplete. In particular, following ideas of Stapp,
‘the observer’ is a system that, while
lying outside the descriptive capacities of quantum mechanics, creates
observable phenomena such as wave
function collapse through its probing activities. Better understanding
of such processes may pave the way to
new science.
Keywords: complementarity, subjective–objective parallelism, the
observer, state vector
collapse, epistemology
Michael Conrad was an unusually gifted scientist. My experience with
him was that if one
had a question about anything one could go and ask him about it and
get back a clear
explanation of the issue concerned, no matter what field it belonged
to. And if one was
working on an idea of one’s own and wanted some feedback, he would
always come back
with deep insights.
I will leave to others in this volume the task of explaining his many
innovative ideas, and
focus here on some specific ideas that we worked on together. One of
these was the idea
from Eastern Philosophy that in certain states of consciousness the
subjective states of the
mind, irrespective of learning, closely reflect objective reality, a
state of affairs contrary to
that of the usual assumption, whereby the contents of the mind reflect
objective reality
— page 1 —
purely as a consequence of what one has learnt about it. Such an idea
had been discussed by
Fritjof Capra in his book the Tao of Physics (Capra 1983), concerned
with the deep parallels
that appear to exist between patterns found in objective reality as
revealed by modern
science, and patterns found in deeper personal experiences as revealed
by meditation or
mystical experience and reported by the mystics. A related theoretical
idea, based on
Whitehead’s process philosophy, was developed by Stapp (1982, 1985).
This is the idea
that reality evolves by a mind-like process, decisions made by this
process being apparent in
the context of ordinary physics as the collapse of the wave function.
In our Urbino
conference paper (Conrad et al. 1988) we tried to take this idea
further (see Table 1),
proposing a number of logical correspondences between the two modes of
description (in the
original paper we called the right hand side biological, since we
regarded phenomena such as
signals, decisions and regulation as characteristically biological, a
theme developed in more
detail in Josephson and Conrad (1992)):
[table 1 about by here]
The details of quantum physics and biology are very different, but we
argued that they might
nevertheless be derivative of some common underlying subtler
background process, in the
same way that waves and particles emerge from a common subtler domain,
that of quantum
mechanics, and in some cases share certain features such as
propagation along a trajectory.
Quantum mechanics would then be the specific theory that emerges as a
good description in
some domain of nature, whilst more biological accounts would be
relevant in some other
phenomenal domain. We thus envisaged the possibility, highlighted in
some of the writings of
Bohr (1958), that biological and quantum accounts of nature might,
like the wave and particle
accounts, of certain phenomena, be complementary rather than, as with
the conventional
view, the first being entirely derivative of the latter.
We finished our paper with considerations of knowability (in which
discussion our coauthor,
Dipankar Home, played a major role), it being our view that the form
of a scientific domain is
— page 2 —
very much influenced by its paradigm. Biology concerns itself largely
with processes, while
quantum mechanics is concerned fundamentally with quantifiability. As
already noted, these
aspects may be complementary and also incompatible. Quantum mechanics
achieves its
quantitative aspects by an averaging process, but this may lead to
neglecting characteristics of
individual cases which may be relevant in the case of a biosystem,
provided we are prepared
to recognise the uniqueness of the individual case instead of treating
all cases of a class as if
they were the same. This may point to a fundamental inadequacy in the
quantum point of
view, as we illustrated by consideration of a classical gas where the
options exist for
statistical or deterministic accounts, there being an epistemology
acknowledging only
statistical properties or properties 

Re: Beyond quantum theory: a realist psycho-biological

2012-01-05 Thread Craig Weinberg
On Jan 5, 3:58 pm, ronaldheld ronaldh...@gmail.com wrote:

 Keywords: complementarity, subjective–objective parallelism

These are the first two keywords for good reason. Subject-object
symmetry is fundamental.


 from Eastern Philosophy that in certain states of consciousness the
 subjective states of the
 mind, irrespective of learning, closely reflect objective reality, a
 state of affairs contrary to
 that of the usual assumption, whereby the contents of the mind reflect
 objective reality
 purely as a consequence of what one has learnt about it.

A good point, and one which supports the idea of multisense
epistemology. We have other ways of knowing about ourselves and our
universe than what our conscious intellect might assume.

 proposing a number of logical correspondences between the two modes of
 description (in the
 original paper we called the right hand side biological, since we
 regarded phenomena such as
 signals, decisions and regulation as characteristically biological, a
 theme developed in more
 detail in Josephson and Conrad (1992)):
 [table 1 about by here]
 The details of quantum physics and biology are very different, but we
 argued that they might
 nevertheless be derivative of some common underlying subtler
 background process, in the
 same way that waves and particles emerge from a common subtler domain,
 that of quantum

Yes. I found that biology seems to belong on the right hand side also,
or, more provocatively, the Eastern or Orienting side. My
interpretation differs in that this side is not limited to biology,
it's jut that since we are biological, our orienting qualities are
closely associated with biology so that biological qualities are
identified with anthropic qualities.


 phenomenal domain. We thus envisaged the possibility, highlighted in
 some of the writings of
 Bohr (1958), that biological and quantum accounts of nature might,
 like the wave and particle
 accounts, of certain phenomena, be complementary rather than, as with
 the conventional
 view, the first being entirely derivative of the latter.

Exactly. The square peg of quantitative analysis does not always fit
the round whole.

Craig

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