Re: "Any human who has played a bit of Arimaa can beat a computer hands down."

2013-03-31 Thread Craig Weinberg 


On Sunday, March 31, 2013 10:59:22 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 30 Mar 2013, at 14:19, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Saturday, March 30, 2013 7:08:25 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 29 Mar 2013, at 13:31, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Friday, March 29, 2013 6:28:02 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 28 Mar 2013, at 20:36, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thursday, March 28, 2013 1:29:19 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 28 Mar 2013, at 13:23, Craig Weinberg wrote:

 Strong AI may not really want to understand consciousness


 This is a rhetorical trick. You put intention in the mind of others. 
 You can't do that. 

 You can say something like,: "I read some strong AI proponents and they 
 dismiss consciousness, ..., and cite them, but you can't make affirmative 
 statement on a large class of people.

>>>
>>> That's interesting because it seems like you make statements about large 
>>> classes of UMs frequently. You say that they have no answers on the deep 
>>> questions, or that they don't see themselves as machines. What if Strong AI 
>>> is a program...a meme or spandrel?
>>>
>>>
>>> What if the soul is in the air, and that each time you cut your hair you 
>>> become a zombie? 
>>>
>>
>> Then people would avoid cutting their hair I would imagine. Unless they 
>> were suffering. But seriously, what makes you think that Strong AI is not 
>> itself a rogue machine, implanted in minds to satisfy some purely 
>> quantitative inevitability?
>>  
>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
 You are coherent because you search a physical theory of consciousness, 
 and that is indeed incompatible with comp.

>>>
>>> I don't seek a physical theory of consciousness exactly, I more seek a 
>>> sensory-motive theory of physics.
>>>
>>>
>>> I will wait for serious progresses.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>  
>>>

 But your argument against comp are invalid, beg the questions, and 
 contains numerous trick like above. Be more careful please.

>>>
>>> That sounds like another 'magician's dismissal' to me. I beg no more 
>>> question than comp does.
>>>
>>>
>>> You miss the key point. There is no begging when making clear what you 
>>> assume. You can assume comp, as you can assume non-comp. But you do 
>>> something quite different; you pretend that comp is false. So we ask for an 
>>> argument, and there you beg the question, by using all the time that comp 
>>> must be false in your argument, and that is begging the question.
>>>
>>
>> Comp is false not because I want it to be or assume it is, but because I 
>> understand that experience through time can be the only fundamental 
>> principle, and bodies across space is derived. I have laid out these 
>> reasons for this many times - how easy it is to succumb to the pathetic 
>> fallacy, how unlikely it is for experience to have any possible utility for 
>> arithmetic, how absent any sign of personality is in machines, how we can 
>> easily demonstrate information processing without particular qualia 
>> arising, etc. These are just off the top of my head. Anywhere you look in 
>> reality you can find huge gaping holes in Comp's assumptions if you choose 
>> to look, but you aren't going to see them if you are only listening to the 
>> echo chamber of Comp itself. Indeed, if we limit ourselves to only 
>> mathematical logic to look at mathematical logic, we are not going to 
>> notice that the entire universe of presentation is missing. Comp has a 
>> presentation problem, and it is not going to go away.
>>
>>
>> Well if you *understand* that time is fundamental, then comp is false for 
>> you. 
>>
>
> I understand that *experience* (through 'time') is fundamental, only 
> because no other option ultimately makes as much sense.
>
>
> OK, but you never explain why. Of course experience are very important, 
> but why could a machine not support one, when it can be shown that they 
> will develop talk on their experience, and, if instrosoecive enough, be 
> confronted to the same feeling that it has to be fundamental, and they are 
> correct from the first person view.
>

If, instead of a video screen and joystick, I had an arcade game fitted 
with a speaker and microphone, I could have another computer programmed to 
play PacMan on the first machine using only modem-like screeching to 
satisfy the logic of the PacMan game. Instead of graphic ghosts and visible 
maze, there would be squealing sound representing what would have been the 
pixels on a screen. There would be no difference for this equipment at all. 
As long as the representation was isomorphic, it would make no difference 
to either computer that there was no visual experience of PacMan at all but 
instead just one dimensional noise streaming back and forth between two 
machines.

If you want me to believe that a machine could support an experience, then 
you have to explain why and how that is e

Re: Quick question

2013-03-31 Thread Telmo Menezes 
On Sun, Mar 31, 2013 at 4:16 PM, John Clark  wrote:
> On Sat, Mar 30, 2013  Joseph Knight  wrote:
>
>> > True or False: COMP implies that any fundamental physical constant is
>> > non computable?
>
>
> I still don't know exactly what "COMP" means but about 1860 Maxwell computed
> the speed of light and that is certainly a fundamental constant, not only
> that but his mathematics said that computed speed of light would always be
> the same regardless of the speed of the observer or of the source of the
> light. But of course Maxwell didn't start from zero, he had to know what the
> values of the magnetic constant and the electric constant are, and as far as
> we know those numbers can only be obtained from experiment. At the time
> electricity and magnetism didn't seem to have anything to do with light but
> Maxwell showed that they did.

Hi John,

I'm curious about your views TOE-wise. This is a honest question. What
is reality according to John K. Clark? What is consciousness?

Cheers,
Telmo.

>   John K Clark
>
>
>
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Re: "Any human who has played a bit of Arimaa can beat a computer hands down."

2013-03-31 Thread Telmo Menezes 
On Sun, Mar 31, 2013 at 4:32 PM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
> On 30 Mar 2013, at 13:58, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>
>
>
>
> On Thu, Mar 28, 2013 at 1:23 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, March 28, 2013 5:52:04 AM UTC-4, telmo_menezes wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wed, Mar 27, 2013 at 6:29 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>>


 On Wednesday, March 27, 2013 1:03:27 PM UTC-4, telmo_menezes wrote:

> Hi Craig,
>
>
> On Wed, Mar 27, 2013 at 4:03 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>> From the Quora http://www.quora.com/Board-**Gam**
>> es/What-are-some-fun-games-**to-**play-on-an-8x8-**Checkerboard-**
>> besides-chess-**checkers
>>
>> This is interesting because I think it shows the weakness of the
>> one-dimensional view of intelligence as computation. Whether a program 
>> can
>> be designed to win or not is beside the point,
>
>
> That's not really fair, is it?
>

 Why not?

>>>
>>> How else can I counter your argument against intelligence as computation
>>> if I am not allowed to use computation? My example would not prove that
>>> it's what the brain does, but it would prove that it can be. You are
>>> arguing that it cannot be.
>>>
>>
>> I'm arguing that a screw is not the same thing as a nail because when you
>> hammer a screw it doesn't go in as easily as a nail and when you use a
>> screwdriver on a nail it doesn't go in at all.
>>
>
> Ok.
>
>
>> Sometimes the hammer is a better tool and sometimes the driver is. As
>> humans, we have a great hammer and a decent screwdriver. A computer can't
>> hammer anything, but it has a power screwdriver with a potentially infinite
>> set of tips.
>>
>
> Ok, but if I understand your ideas, you're claiming that the hammer is
> also the fundamental stuff that reality is made of. Sorry if I'm
> misrepresenting what you're saying. If I'm not, I don't understand why
> computers can't have the hammer.
>
>
>>
>>
>>>
>>>


>
>
>> as it is the difference between this game and chess which hints at
>> the differences between bottom-up mechanism and top-down intentionality
>
>
> I see what you're saying but I disagree. It just highlights the weak
> points of tree-search approaches like min-max. What I gather from what
> happens when one plays Arimaa (or Go): due to combinatorial explosion,
> players (even human) play quite far away from the perfect game(s). The way
> we deal with combinatorial explosion is by mapping the game into something
> more abstract.
>

 How do you know that any such mapping is going on? It seems like
 begging the question.

>>>
>>> I don't know. I have a strong intuition in it's favor for a few reasons,
>>> scientific and otherwise.
>>>
>>
>> Have you tried thinking about it another way? Where does 'mapping' come
>> from? Can you begin mapping without already having a map?
>>
>
> Yes, I think I begin with a map based on previous experiences and then
> improve it as I discover it's weaknesses. I think the original map came
> from brute-force experimentation while my brain was developing in my early
> months of live. But this is just wild guessing, of course.
>
>
>>
>>
>>>  The non-scientific one is introspection. I try to observe my own
>>> thought process and I think I use such mappings.
>>>
>>
>> Maybe you do. Maybe a lot of people do. I don't think that I do though. I
>> think that a game can be played directly without abstracting it into
>> another game.
>>
>
> Ok, I believe you but I don't have the same experience. My wife does. She
> works in a creative field and she is very intuitive, with the typical
> aversion for math. She can beat me at chess quite easily, without appearing
> to resort to conscious strategic thinking. She describes it as doing what
> "feels right".
>
>
>>
>> The scientific reason is that this type of approach has been
>>> used successfully to tackle AI problems that could not be solved with
>>> classical search algorithms.
>>>
>>
>> I don't doubt that this game is likely to be solved eventually, maybe
>> even soon, but the fact remains that it exposes some fundamentally
>> different aesthetics between computation and intelligence. This is
>> impressive to me because any game is already hugely biased in favor of
>> computation. A game is ideal to be reduced to a set of logical rules, it's
>> turn play is already a recursive enumeration. A game is already a computer
>> program. Even so, we can see that it is possible to use a game to bypass
>> computational values - of generic, unconscious repetition, and hint at
>> something completely different and opposite.
>>
>>
>>>
>>>
 Put another way, if there were top-down non-computational effort going
 into the game play, why would it look any different than what we see?


> Our brain seems to

Re: Quick question

2013-03-31 Thread Bruno Marchal 


On 31 Mar 2013, at 18:03, meekerdb wrote:


On 3/31/2013 7:16 AM, John Clark wrote:

On Sat, Mar 30, 2013  Joseph Knight  wrote:

> True or False: COMP implies that any fundamental physical  
constant is non computable?


I still don't know exactly what "COMP" means but about 1860 Maxwell  
computed the speed of light and that is certainly a fundamental  
constant, not only that but his mathematics said that computed  
speed of light would always be the same regardless of the speed of  
the observer or of the source of the light. But of course Maxwell  
didn't start from zero, he had to know what the values of the  
magnetic constant and the electric constant are, and as far as we  
know those numbers can only be obtained from experiment. At the  
time electricity and magnetism didn't seem to have anything to do  
with light but Maxwell showed that they did.


I thought the speed of light was 1.


Lol.

But even with the unities making the speed of light equal to 1, we  
cannot be sure that in the next theory, to accommodate some unexpected  
particles, we might need to accept that the speed of light is the  
constant 0.6779435210033012878856... as  
measured by some technology. And the question remains, is that  
computable (algorithmically generable)?


With comp we can expect bad news, like it will take 400,000 years for  
solving that problem, and showing that the speed of light is  
determined by some constants appearing in the distribution of the twin  
primes number, say. That would show that in some theory, the speed of  
light is computable. But in the year 898,675,908, that theory will be  
disproved, by measurement, making the question of the computability of  
the speed of light still unsolved.


We can hope for the simple, but we can expect surprises and  
complexities, and a growing ignorance awareness, proportional to a  
deepening in the fundamentals. I think.


Bruno




Brent

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Re: Quick question

2013-03-31 Thread Bruno Marchal 


On 31 Mar 2013, at 16:16, John Clark wrote:


On Sat, Mar 30, 2013  Joseph Knight  wrote:

> True or False: COMP implies that any fundamental physical constant  
is non computable?


I still don't know exactly what "COMP" means



It is the hypothesis that there is a level of description of your  
brain such that your consciousness (or first person experience) would  
remain unchanged in case your brain, or body, is replaced by a  
computer emulating it at that level, or below.


It is the idea that your brain is a machine, even if natural and  
physical.





but about 1860 Maxwell computed the speed of light and that is  
certainly a fundamental constant, not only that but his mathematics  
said that computed speed of light would always be the same  
regardless of the speed of the observer or of the source of the  
light. But of course Maxwell didn't start from zero, he had to know  
what the values of the magnetic constant and the electric constant  
are, and as far as we know those numbers can only be obtained from  
experiment. At the time electricity and magnetism didn't seem to  
have anything to do with light but Maxwell showed that they did.



Getting number by experiment does not provide information on the  
computability issue of some possible constant occurring in physics.


Most mathematical constants are computable or reductible to computable  
functions on the non negative integers, and individual non computable  
object occur mainly in mathematical logic and theoretical computer  
science.


Bruno





  John K Clark




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Re: Quick question

2013-03-31 Thread meekerdb 

On 3/31/2013 7:16 AM, John Clark wrote:
On Sat, Mar 30, 2013  Joseph Knight > wrote:


> True or False: COMP implies that any fundamental physical constant is non computable? 



I still don't know exactly what "COMP" means but about 1860 Maxwell computed the speed 
of light and that is certainly a fundamental constant, not only that but his mathematics 
said that computed speed of light would always be the same regardless of the speed of 
the observer or of the source of the light. But of course Maxwell didn't start from 
zero, he had to know what the values of the magnetic constant and the electric constant 
are, and as far as we know those numbers can only be obtained from experiment. At the 
time electricity and magnetism didn't seem to have anything to do with light but Maxwell 
showed that they did.


I thought the speed of light was 1.

Brent

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Re: "Any human who has played a bit of Arimaa can beat a computer hands down."

2013-03-31 Thread Bruno Marchal 


On 30 Mar 2013, at 14:19, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Saturday, March 30, 2013 7:08:25 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 29 Mar 2013, at 13:31, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Friday, March 29, 2013 6:28:02 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 28 Mar 2013, at 20:36, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Thursday, March 28, 2013 1:29:19 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 28 Mar 2013, at 13:23, Craig Weinberg wrote:


Strong AI may not really want to understand consciousness


This is a rhetorical trick. You put intention in the mind of  
others. You can't do that.


You can say something like,: "I read some strong AI proponents and  
they dismiss consciousness, ..., and cite them, but you can't make  
affirmative statement on a large class of people.


That's interesting because it seems like you make statements about  
large classes of UMs frequently. You say that they have no answers  
on the deep questions, or that they don't see themselves as  
machines. What if Strong AI is a program...a meme or spandrel?


What if the soul is in the air, and that each time you cut your  
hair you become a zombie?


Then people would avoid cutting their hair I would imagine. Unless  
they were suffering. But seriously, what makes you think that  
Strong AI is not itself a rogue machine, implanted in minds to  
satisfy some purely quantitative inevitability?









You are coherent because you search a physical theory of  
consciousness, and that is indeed incompatible with comp.


I don't seek a physical theory of consciousness exactly, I more  
seek a sensory-motive theory of physics.


I will wait for serious progresses.







But your argument against comp are invalid, beg the questions, and  
contains numerous trick like above. Be more careful please.


That sounds like another 'magician's dismissal' to me. I beg no  
more question than comp does.


You miss the key point. There is no begging when making clear what  
you assume. You can assume comp, as you can assume non-comp. But  
you do something quite different; you pretend that comp is false.  
So we ask for an argument, and there you beg the question, by using  
all the time that comp must be false in your argument, and that is  
begging the question.


Comp is false not because I want it to be or assume it is, but  
because I understand that experience through time can be the only  
fundamental principle, and bodies across space is derived. I have  
laid out these reasons for this many times - how easy it is to  
succumb to the pathetic fallacy, how unlikely it is for experience  
to have any possible utility for arithmetic, how absent any sign of  
personality is in machines, how we can easily demonstrate  
information processing without particular qualia arising, etc.  
These are just off the top of my head. Anywhere you look in reality  
you can find huge gaping holes in Comp's assumptions if you choose  
to look, but you aren't going to see them if you are only listening  
to the echo chamber of Comp itself. Indeed, if we limit ourselves  
to only mathematical logic to look at mathematical logic, we are  
not going to notice that the entire universe of presentation is  
missing. Comp has a presentation problem, and it is not going to go  
away.




Well if you *understand* that time is fundamental, then comp is  
false for you.


I understand that *experience* (through 'time') is fundamental, only  
because no other option ultimately makes as much sense.


OK, but you never explain why. Of course experience are very  
important, but why could a machine not support one, when it can be  
shown that they will develop talk on their experience, and, if  
instrosoecive enough, be confronted to the same feeling that it has to  
be fundamental, and they are correct from the first person view.





The pathetic fallacy is not a logical fallacy.

No, it's more important than logic.


I think the pathetic fallacy is, as a fallacy, itself a pathetic  
fallacy. From which I can't conclude.






You just say that you believe that comp is false, but machines have  
naturally that belief, as comp is provably counter-intuitive.


That's just comp feeding back on its own confirmation bias. Comp is  
a machine which can only see itself. It's the inevitable inversion  
meme which arises from mistaking forms and functions for reality  
rather than the capacity to project and receive them.


Yes, comp feedback in this way. You don't like that, apparently, but  
that's not an argument. I am not defending comp, I am just criticizing  
the reason you provide to think that comp is false.


















I have no tricks or invalid arguments that I know of, and I don't  
see that I am being careless at all.


Which means probably that you should learn a bit of argumentation,  
to be frank. Or just assume your theory and be cautious on the  
theory of other people.


I'm only interested in uncovering the truth about consciousness.  
What other people think and do is none of my business

Re: "Any human who has played a bit of Arimaa can beat a computer hands down."

2013-03-31 Thread Bruno Marchal 


On 30 Mar 2013, at 13:58, Telmo Menezes wrote:





On Thu, Mar 28, 2013 at 1:23 PM, Craig Weinberg  
 wrote:



On Thursday, March 28, 2013 5:52:04 AM UTC-4, telmo_menezes wrote:



On Wed, Mar 27, 2013 at 6:29 PM, Craig Weinberg   
wrote:



On Wednesday, March 27, 2013 1:03:27 PM UTC-4, telmo_menezes wrote:
Hi Craig,


On Wed, Mar 27, 2013 at 4:03 PM, Craig Weinberg   
wrote:

From the Quora 
http://www.quora.com/Board-Games/What-are-some-fun-games-to-play-on-an-8x8-Checkerboard-besides-chess-checkers

This is interesting because I think it shows the weakness of the one- 
dimensional view of intelligence as computation. Whether a program  
can be designed to win or not is beside the point,


That's not really fair, is it?

Why not?

How else can I counter your argument against intelligence as  
computation if I am not allowed to use computation? My example would  
not prove that it's what the brain does, but it would prove that it  
can be. You are arguing that it cannot be.


I'm arguing that a screw is not the same thing as a nail because  
when you hammer a screw it doesn't go in as easily as a nail and  
when you use a screwdriver on a nail it doesn't go in at all.


Ok.

Sometimes the hammer is a better tool and sometimes the driver is.  
As humans, we have a great hammer and a decent screwdriver. A  
computer can't hammer anything, but it has a power screwdriver with  
a potentially infinite set of tips.


Ok, but if I understand your ideas, you're claiming that the hammer  
is also the fundamental stuff that reality is made of. Sorry if I'm  
misrepresenting what you're saying. If I'm not, I don't understand  
why computers can't have the hammer.






as it is the difference between this game and chess which hints at  
the differences between bottom-up mechanism and top-down  
intentionality


I see what you're saying but I disagree. It just highlights the weak  
points of tree-search approaches like min-max. What I gather from  
what happens when one plays Arimaa (or Go): due to combinatorial  
explosion, players (even human) play quite far away from the perfect  
game(s). The way we deal with combinatorial explosion is by mapping  
the game into something more abstract.


How do you know that any such mapping is going on? It seems like  
begging the question.


I don't know. I have a strong intuition in it's favor for a few  
reasons, scientific and otherwise.


Have you tried thinking about it another way? Where does 'mapping'  
come from? Can you begin mapping without already having a map?


Yes, I think I begin with a map based on previous experiences and  
then improve it as I discover it's weaknesses. I think the original  
map came from brute-force experimentation while my brain was  
developing in my early months of live. But this is just wild  
guessing, of course.



The non-scientific one is introspection. I try to observe my own  
thought process and I think I use such mappings.


Maybe you do. Maybe a lot of people do. I don't think that I do  
though. I think that a game can be played directly without  
abstracting it into another game.


Ok, I believe you but I don't have the same experience. My wife  
does. She works in a creative field and she is very intuitive, with  
the typical aversion for math. She can beat me at chess quite  
easily, without appearing to resort to conscious strategic thinking.  
She describes it as doing what "feels right".



The scientific reason is that this type of approach has been used  
successfully to tackle AI problems that could not be solved with  
classical search algorithms.


I don't doubt that this game is likely to be solved eventually,  
maybe even soon, but the fact remains that it exposes some  
fundamentally different aesthetics between computation and  
intelligence. This is impressive to me because any game is already  
hugely biased in favor of computation. A game is ideal to be reduced  
to a set of logical rules, it's turn play is already a recursive  
enumeration. A game is already a computer program. Even so, we can  
see that it is possible to use a game to bypass computational values  
- of generic, unconscious repetition, and hint at something  
completely different and opposite.



Put another way, if there were top-down non-computational effort  
going into the game play, why would it look any different than what  
we see?


Our brain seems to be quite good at generating such mappings. We do  
it with chess too, I'm sure. Notice that, when two humans play  
Arimaa, both can count on each other's inabilities to play close to  
the perfect game. As with games with incomplete information, like  
Poker, part of it is modelling the opponent. Perhaps not  
surprisingly, artificial neural networks are quite good at producing  
useful mappings of this sort, and on predicting behaviours with  
incomplete information. Great progress has been achieved lately with  
deep learning. All this fits bottom-up mechanism and intelligence as

Re: Quick question

2013-03-31 Thread John Clark 
On Sat, Mar 30, 2013  Joseph Knight  wrote:

> True or False: COMP implies that any fundamental physical constant is non
> computable?


I still don't know exactly what "COMP" means but about 1860 Maxwell
computed the speed of light and that is certainly a fundamental constant,
not only that but his mathematics said that computed speed of light would
always be the same regardless of the speed of the observer or of the source
of the light. But of course Maxwell didn't start from zero, he had to know
what the values of the magnetic constant and the electric constant are, and
as far as we know those numbers can only be obtained from experiment. At
the time electricity and magnetism didn't seem to have anything to do with
light but Maxwell showed that they did.

  John K Clark

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Re: Quick question

2013-03-31 Thread Bruno Marchal 


On 31 Mar 2013, at 01:15, Joseph Knight wrote:

Sorry for the vagueness of my question; I would not count pi as a  
physical constant. I would count the empirically determined  
circumference:diameter ratio for a circle in our observed curved  
spacetime as a physical constant.


The reason I asked is because Bruno has repeatedly claimed that  
COMP=>"noncomputability of physics" but I'm wondering what exactly  
this would mean in practice.




In practice it would mean that some phenomena are not predictible or  
computable. Russell and Brent are right, it comes from the FPI (first  
person indeterminacy) which introduces "genuine randomness" in the  
first person experience.
In fact that randomness might be so great as leading to the "white  
rabbits", and with comp it is astonishing that the world around us  
seems so much computable. But the redundancy of the UD, and the  
constraints of correct self-reference add much structure, and if comp  
is true, that should be enough. The non computable sequence will still  
have computable distribution, like with QM, when, for example, we send  
a sheaf of electron is the 1/sqrt(2)(up + down) on a up/down Stern- 
Gerlach analyser. From the first person perspective, this leads to  
uncomputable sequence of events (even incompressible strings of up and  
down), but statistically, with Avogadro-like numbers of particles, the  
electronic sheaf will just split in symmetrical halves, like the big  
number statistical laws predict.


It is an open problem if there are non computable constants in nature,  
as it is an open problem if some oracle might play a role in the  
development of the appearance of physical laws in the UD (or in  
arithmetic). That seems unlikely, but who knows? As Brent says, that  
would be hard to test, but it might make some sense from theoretical  
assumption, both in comp-physics, and in theoretical physics.  Note  
that it is easy to build a non computable solution to the SWE  
(something like Ae^ikHt, with k a non computable number, but it is  
impossible to test the non computability of such wave in case they  
occur. Machines can prove only the individual incompressibility of a  
*finite* number of strings.


Bruno



On Mar 30, 2013 6:53 PM, "Russell Standish"   
wrote:

On Sat, Mar 30, 2013 at 04:15:54PM -0700, Joseph Knight wrote:
> True or False: COMP implies that any fundamental physical constant  
is non

> computable?
>

I would say false, unless you can say that pi is _not_ a physical
constant. Another example that springs to mind is the magnetic moment
of the neutron which is definitely physical, but maybe not  
fundamental.


--


Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au


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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Dennis Prager on the Holocaust

2013-03-31 Thread Roger Clough 

"What do you mean you can't believe in God after the Holocaust ?
Can you believe in HUMANITY after the Holocaust ?"

Dennis Prager (a Jewish conservative)


Dr. Roger Clough NIST (ret.) 3/31/2013 
http://team.academia.edu/RogerClough

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