Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?
Hal Finney wrote: Part of what I wanted to get at in my thought experiment is the bafflement and confusion an AI should feel when exposed to human ideas about consciousness. Various people here have proffered their own ideas, and we might assume that the AI would read these suggestions, along with many other ideas that contradict the ones offered here. It seems hard to escape the conclusion that the only logical response is for the AI to figuratively throw up its hands and say that it is impossible to know if it is conscious, because even humans cannot agree on what consciousness is. In particular I don't think an AI could be expected to claim that it knows that it is conscious, that consciousness is a deep and intrinsic part of itself, that whatever else it might be mistaken about it could not be mistaken about being conscious. I don't see any logical way it could reach this conclusion by studying the corpus of writings on the topic. If anyone disagrees, I'd like to hear how it could happen. And the corollary to this is that perhaps humans also cannot legitimately make such claims, since logically their position is not so different from that of the AI. In that case the seemingly axiomatic question of whether we are conscious may after all be something that we could be mistaken about. Hal --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: A sequel to my 1996 ultimate ensemble theory paper
Hi Max, In line with my preoccupation and passion: consciousness. I confine my comments to that narrow scope and offer the following observations (which I did with my phenomenal consciousness! :-) Page 4 Section D. I cannot utter a 'WOOHOO!' too loud here, to finally see these kinds of words appearing. There is a long record on this forum of me trying to get people to _really_ grasp the nature of the difference between Description/Appearance(apparent causal necessity)/Phenomenon to Explanation/Actual Causal Necessity/Noumenon. In Max's work we clearly have the arrival of a scientifically valid noumenon. You may be aware that I have been raving on ad nauseum here recently about my EC, which literally is a 'MUH'. The universe literally 'is' an instantated EC, say MUHcol. We humans are literally an ongoing proof written in EC.albeit of a different nature to the one proposed, say MUHmax. The difference between MUHmax and MUHcol are not important - the fact of the clear appreciation and expression of the ontological/epistemological 'cut' (as Howard Pattee[2] puts it) and distinction is what is important. ..the words clearly distinguish 'being' from 'appearance'. They embed the origins of all knowledge as sourced subjectively from within itthrough the embedded agency of the FROG scientist's depiction of the BIRD side of the cut. More than that, the words emerge in a way that is hard to argue against without appearing (at least methodologically/virtually) to hold rather bizarre views about the ontology (underlying reality) of the universe - ...far more bizarre than any MUH.as the final para clearly shows. so YES! RE: Frogs and Birds Having said the above, I detect a possible small crack in the Bird/ Frog depiction that might open up a door for unfounded criticism from those who struggle to see the difference between a noumenon and phenomenon. What you are describing is what I have written about (rather badly!) [1]: It is a 'dual aspect science'. What I described there is the phenomenon aspect (T = FROG) and the 'noumenon' aspect (T' = BIRD). Both are completely equivalent descriptions of the same thing, the universe U(.) as T' and how that universe appears (T') when you are made of it, inside it, with observational capacities delivered by T', _not_ T. The 'helicopter/bird' view metaphor is not quite right, IMO - the MUH is a noumenon and not to be confused with an 'objective view' (there is no such thing!)...the BIRD metaphor might confuse things. The missing subtlety, which undermines all empirical support for MUHmax, is that both the FROG's view _AND_ the BIRD's view are equally supported by any and all empirical work. (with specific ref to the isomorphism sentence on P4, section D). The FROG can lay no claim to exclusive use of empirical work - for the noumenon is the thing that is actually generating the 'observation' intrinsic in ...as you say on P4, top.'processes that give rise to the familiar sensations of self awareness' ..that the FROG has... that are the single, mandated and only sources of all scientific evidence (where scientist = FROG, and everything about the MUH is a product of that perspective). Without that faculty there is no science. I hope I am making sense hereI don't think you have made enough mileage out of this brute FROG/BIRD reality as regards their place as equals in provision of DESCRIPTION/EXPLANATION resp. using the same evidence system: phenomenal consciousness. RE: Final Note There is one aspect to MUH which remains completely absent and which, IMO, is absolutely vital to any real 'TOE'. Whilst recognizing that 'it is like something' to be FROG.MUHmax provides no basis for the necessity that it be 'like something' to be FROG under the circumstances of being configured as a FROG. That 'contents of consciousness/that which is seen/observed', is the single source of all scientific evidence used in support of all FROG and BIRD MUH rule sets (=FROG/BIRD aspect science)Fine...But nowhere is the paper MUHmax explanatory of how the BIRD view/descriptions provide the phenomenal consciousness that the FROG uses to do observation in support of all propositions for either collection of rules. After all.it is not the FROGs descriptions, derived _directly using_ observation of MUH that deliver the observations.this is oxymoronic.rather it is the noumenon (The BIRD rules of MUHmax) that delivers observation (the faculty of observation, through which all FROG views are delivered). A TOE must deliver 'everything', right? Well this chunk of 'everything' is not in the paper. None of the QM or anything else in your paper does it, nor does it propose a principle upon which it may be deliveredAFAICT. Maybe I missed it or have wires crossedHaving said that, I don't believe you actually have to deliver it right nowwhat is more important is mere recognition of the need and a clear
Re: Reasons and Persons
Can I add a nuance that seems to be missing from this discourse? What if the original 'programming' or 'configuration' of the neurons (the entire brain including the neuron/astrocyte syncitium) was as a single entity and intrinsically dynamic? That is, the laying down of the brain configuration is to some extent based on the manner(order) of exposure of new information and the net of all prior history. Subsequent recall is then only possible via the brain itself recreating the equivalent to the sensory feeds that originally programmed them and that correspond to that which is required to be recalled. An intrinsically dynamic associative memory would behave like this. We are all used to thinking of things in terms of static 'declarative' (which I think may be a misnomer in brain function, not sure yet) memory. In computers we are all used to dynamic declarative memory in the form of the ubiquitous dynamic RAM (the memory stick) , where the dynamic part is hidden from us in the hardware. We are able to point to a location with a stick and say that information is stored there. But a dynamic associative memory is a very different beast. If this is the case then at any moment during the conversion from one brain configuration to another you would have to duplicate the sensory feeds as well so as to completely duplicate (reprogram) the dynamic transitional states so that you could claim to have properly performed the conversion. If so then a neural level conversion becomes inappropriate as the hardware replacement alone is not taking the characteristics with it that we think are being taken. Neuron by neuron replacement becomes arguably inappropriate to achieve the aim of the thought experiment. The neuron by neuron replacement is possibly a more valid thought experiment tool for the (human = philosophical zombie) conversion, but it could be inappropriate for (human A to human B) conversion. Also assumed here is that astrocytes play no role, which is not justified. It would seem that this 'dynamic' aspect provides an nuance currently missing, unless I have misinterpreted things. The real situation could be far more complex than the thought experiment and thus the thought experiment may be impoverishing the discussion by limiting our conclusions. cheers, colin --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Duplicate email from everything-list
Am I the only one getting duplicate mails from the list? Any clues as to what is going on? cheers colin --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
