On 10 Apr 2014, at 03:52, LizR wrote:

I received my copy yesterday and am up to page 25. Very interesting so far, and "discretely charming" :)

Thank Liz. I was euphoric when writing it, as I thought that 20 years of stress would end up, but I was naive. I feel like I should write a sequel, but I have not the mind up to it. Yet there would nice chapters, like the everything-list, Plotinus, Salvia divinorum, Eric Vandenbussch (who solved the first conjecture), ... But also more dark chapters. Not sure I could avoid 9/11, climate changes and the general problem of the (Löbian) possible deception(s). How far nature and arithmetic play that game already ? You can interpret the formal "Gödel incompleteness theorem", <>t -> <>[]f, into the machine's understanding that if she is in the lucky situation where shit does not happen, then, necessarily shit can happen. We are warned at the real start!
May be it is time to reread Alan Watts "The wisdom of insecurity".

Tell me, do you know the second incompleteness theorem? Do you see it is <>t -> ~[]<>t, or ~[]f -> <>[]f? (When Gödel's provability predicate beweisbar('p') interprets []p in arithmetic, with 'p' being a number describing p.

(I ask your for planning the sequel of the math thread, if you are still interested). Are you still trying to prove (W, R) respects <>A -> []<>A iff R is euclidian? It is the last which remains.

I recall that the goal is the derivation of physics from arithmetic, (through a detour in "machine theology"). This necessitates a good understanding of UDA1-7, and, a good understanding of how to translate "provable(x)" in arithmetic. The relation with computation is that provable(x) is sigma_1 complete, it defines a universal number/program/machine. Comp can exploit a bit of computer science. There is no rush, but the path is a bit long. I guess I will have to explain more on first order logic. I have to explain enough so that you can grasp the enunciation of the theorems used in the derivation.

Bruno






--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Reply via email to