Re: choice and the quantum

2006-01-25 Thread daddycaylor

Lennart Nilsson wrote:

What on earth does the following footnote mean? Are we back to 

consciousness

where the quantumbuck stops?
/LN

Understanding Deutsch's Probability in a Deterministic Multiverse by 

Hilary

Greaves

Footnote 16
The following objection is sometimes raised against the 

decision-theoretic
approach: in an Everettian context, all outcomes of a decision are 

realized,
and therefore it simply does not make sense to make choices, or to 

reason
about how one should act. If that is correct, then while we may agree 

that
probability can in principle be derived from rationality, this is of 

no use
to the Everettian, since (it is claimed) the Everettian cannot make 

sense of

rationality itself.
If this was correct, it would be a pressing 'incoherence problem' for 

the
decision-theoretic approach. The objection, however, is simply 

mistaken. The

mistake arises from an assumption that decisions must be modelled as
Everettian branching, with each possible outcome of the decision 

realized on
some branch. This is not true, and it is not at all what is going on 

in the

decision scenarios Deutsch and Wallace consider.
Rather, the agent is making a genuine choice between quantum games, 

only one
of which will be realized (namely, the chosen game). To be sure, each 

game
consists of an array of branches, all of which will, if that game is 

chosen,
be realized. But this does not mean that all games will be realized. 

It is

no less coherent for an Everettian to have a preference ordering over
quantum games than it is for an agent in a state of classical 

uncertainty to

have a preference ordering over classical lotteries.


To me this looks like an attempt to hold onto rationality and meaning, 
which requires genuine choice.  Modern man has been stripped of his/her 
rationality as a result of trying to hold onto rationalism in a closed 
system.  But like I've said on my soapbox before, the multiverse 
doesn't solve this problem, it just makes it worse if anything.  
Actually, if we truly accept the conclusions of rationalism in a closed 
system, the multiverse doesn't make it worse; but it also doesn't help 
one iota, contrary to the hopes of its proponents.


Tom Caylor



choice and the quantum

2006-01-24 Thread Lennart Nilsson
What on earth does the following footnote mean? Are we back to consciousness
where the quantumbuck stops?
/LN


Understanding Deutsch's Probability in a Deterministic Multiverse by Hilary
Greaves



Footnote 16

The following objection is sometimes raised against the decision-theoretic
approach: in an Everettian context, all outcomes of a decision are realized,
and therefore it simply does not make sense to make choices, or to reason
about how one should act. If that is correct, then while we may agree that
probability can in principle be derived from rationality, this is of no use
to the Everettian, since (it is claimed) the Everettian cannot make sense of
rationality itself.
If this was correct, it would be a pressing 'incoherence problem' for the
decision-theoretic approach. The objection, however, is simply mistaken. The
mistake arises from an assumption that decisions must be modelled as
Everettian branching, with each possible outcome of the decision realized on
some branch. This is not true, and it is not at all what is going on in the
decision scenarios Deutsch and Wallace consider.
Rather, the agent is making a genuine choice between quantum games, only one
of which will be realized (namely, the chosen game). To be sure, each game
consists of an array of branches, all of which will, if that game is chosen,
be realized. But this does not mean that all games will be realized. It is
no less coherent for an Everettian to have a preference ordering over
quantum games than it is for an agent in a state of classical uncertainty to
have a preference ordering over classical lotteries.