Unrestricted War: the leveller
Compensating for the PLA's slow rate of military modernisation, Chinese
military strategists have published a new theory of warfare that focuses on the
weaknesses of potential adversaries. Dr Ehsan Ahrari investigates.
ALTHOUGH economic development is Beijing's foremost priority, since 1991 China
has been steadily modernising its armed forces. Aside from initiating various
modernisation programmes for the People's Liberation Army (PLA), Chinese
strategic thinkers have also started to concentrate on making the best of their
relative military weakness. A number have concluded that China should look for
the 'Achilles' heels' of its potential adversaries and enemies.
Since the implosion of the Soviet Union, the only powerful potential enemy
facing China is the USA - a superpower that has successfully used its economic
power to build its military muscle. China has always been wary of both US
intentions in the Asia-Pacific region and US aspirations to be a dominant force
in the international arena. It has never ruled out the potential for future
military conflict with the USA. The future status of Taiwan might be a key
source of friction, but it is by no means the only one.
China is also fully aware of its economic underdevelopment and the attendant
military weakness vis-à-vis the USA. So how should it handle the reality of US
military power? The answer is to study the weak points of the US war machine
and warfighting style and try to master the US mindset regarding war. Only
then, say Chinese strategists, will China be able to level the playing field in
a future military conflict.
So what major lessons has China drawn about the overall US approach to war?
First and foremost, Americans greatly value human life. The human losses
absorbed by US forces in two World Wars were heavy, but in view of what was at
stake, the US perspective was that the sacrifice was worth taking. However, the
Second World War might have been the 'last good war' the USA fought. The Korean
War, although fought under the banner of the UN, became an unpopular domestic
issue in the 1950s; the Vietnam War almost tore the social fabric of the
country apart. The USA's political will to get involved in military conflict
has dramatically diminished, unless it is possible to fight from a distance and
with minimum human loss.
Secondly, the USA's near obsession with minimising casualties in military
conflict means it will rely heavily on technological systems to keep its troops
as far from harm as possible. Since the USA has always preferred quality to
quantity in its military research and development and the production of
military wherewithal, its weapon systems have generally been rated as far
superior to those of the former Soviet Union or other European countries.
Conflict in the 1991 Gulf War was decisive: proof of the qualitative
superiority of US war-making technology. Nevertheless, no country, no matter
how superior a force it might create at a given time, is entirely invulnerable.
If its adversaries try hard enough, they are likely to find weak points.
Since US forces are heavy consumers of high-technology equipment, an adversary
should examine in detail the major technological systems used by US forces to
determine which ones are vulnerable and at what point in the evolution of a
military conflict those systems could be attacked or even destroyed.
Thirdly, US forces have been victimised twice by acts of terrorism in Saudi
Arabia. The potential for transnational terrorism remains a source of concern
for US strategic planners. This substantial pre-occupation with potential acts
of terrorism against US troops deployed on foreign soil has made the issue of
'force protection' a crucial one for US commanders.
The essence of the doctrine
Unrestricted War, the book by two senior colonels of China's People's
Liberation Army/Air Force (PLAAF), Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, mentions the
use of terrorism as a strategy of war. Colonel Qiao has pointed out in an
interview about the book: "You will find . . . not a single word about how
China should use the 'terror war'". He added: "Unrestricted war . . . is a
double-edged sword and is not aimed at the war plans of a specific country."
However, the USA is the chief focus of analysis for Qiao and Wang. Their
interpretation of US foreign policy behaviour is highly unconventional, and at
times their phraseology is similar to that used by anti-US groups in different
parts of the world. What seems to have brought this book to the attention of
the Western media is that it was written by two senior PLA officials and that
it was reportedly read not only by the Chinese defence and foreign policy
establishment but also by President Jiang Zemin himself.
Unrestricted War has been described by some in China as "an original theory in
two decades", and the "emergence of a new military thinking". The authors claim
they have tried to put forth "new ideas, new thinking and new angles concerning
war". To fight future wars with advanced technology, they believe it is
"necessary to dare to completely upset the order of the cards in one's hands
and reorganise them in accordance with the needs of war and the interests of a
nation".
They point out that many traditional phenomena are undergoing radical changes.
Increasing interdependence among states has blurred notions of national
sovereignty. The emergence of international finance markets has enhanced money
transactions, capital flow and currency exchange rates across the globe, and
the Internet has ensured communications to and from far-off places can take
place in seconds. Established governments which could once monopolise
information in all spheres of life within their borders now have to compete
with other transnational sources of information.
Today's citizens are well-informed and less susceptible to manipulation by
their governments through mis-/disinformation. Such changes in peacetime
transactions are bound also to affect the mode and scope of warfighting.
Unrestricted War should be studied in the context of changes that will remain
in flux for some time.
'Unrestricted war' will be fought in a world where national borders have lost
their original meaning. It will be conducted by nations, one or more of whose
armed forces are heavy consumers of the most sophisticated, highly integrated,
precision-guided war-making technologies. In Unrestricted War, distinctions
between the traditional and unconventional battlefields are blurred;
war-fighters will include conventional soldiers as well as civilian
programmers, technocrats and computer hackers. Other non-traditional
war-fighters will include financial institutions, drug cartels, transnational
crime syndicates and terrorist groups. So, while stealth and precision as well
as digital, biochemical and technological issues will continue to play a
crucial role in the warfare of the future, an increasing number of actors from
the civilian and technological communities will also participate more in war.
As the authors of Unrestricted War observe: "[The] war will be fought and won
in a
war beyond the battlefield."
The basic question raised by Qiao and Wang is this: "Faced with high-tech
warfare, how can a weak and developing country survive?" To answer it, they
decided to study the USA, the sole superpower of the post-Cold War era whose
economic power and dominance in contemporary warfare is unquestioned. As a
general strategy, the authors of Unrestricted War also analyse the overall
foreign policy behaviour of the USA since the implosion of the USSR. Their
analysis includes military operations, such as 'Desert Storm' in 1991, 'Desert
Fox' in 1998 and 'Allied Force' in 1999. They also focus on US policies
regarding the Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) countries and North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) as well as looking at the Asian financial
crisis of the 1990s.
Their unstated assumption is that, with the disappearance of the Soviet Union,
the global arena is receptive to US tactics aimed at establishing its global
hegemony. Qiao and Wang say the USA is "an extremely rich country" with an
"extreme fear of casualties", which would rather "treat war as a marathon
contest in military technology" than "a trial of strength in morale, bravery,
cleverness and resourcefulness". Americans "like a war of luxury weapons in
which only millionaires can fight". In the most recent air campaign against
Yugoslavia, the USA "dispatched aircraft costing an average of US$26 million
each and used Tomahawk cruise missiles costing US$1.6 million apiece to destroy
buildings and bridges that cost a great deal less". Yet the US people were very
pleased with this kind military "extravagance" with "zero casualties".
Qiao and Wang identify 25 different types of warfare, a number of which, they
claim, have been used by the USA. For example, in dealing with Osama bin Laden,
they write: "[The] Americans have used state terrorist warfare, intelligence
warfare, financial warfare, network warfare and legal warfare." Their use of
the phrase "state terrorist warfare" apparently refers to the August 1998
decision by the Clinton administration to launch cruise missiles into Sudan and
Afghanistan. Against Iraq, say the authors, the USA has simultaneously used
"conventional warfare, diplomatic warfare, sanctions warfare, legal warfare,
media warfare, psychological warfare and intelligence warfare". Other states,
they claim, also use such practices. For instance, Hong Kong, since becoming a
part of China, has used various types of warfare against financial speculators.
These include "financial warfare, legal warfare, psychological warfare and
media warfare".
Individual states are likely to indulge in "international law warfare". The USA
has also been a leader in this arena. In the pursuit of its national and
security interests, "a mature great power like the United States appeared much
smarter than Iraq", write the authors. "Since the day they stepped onto the
international stage, the Americans have been seizing things by force or by
trickery, and the benefits they obtained from other countries were many times
greater than what Iraq got from Kuwait."
To maintain its dominance in world affairs, the USA, the authors claim, "never
misses any opportunity to take a hand in international organisations involving
US interests" and makes sure that all of these organisations are "closely
related to US interests". They give two examples to make their argument:
l when Australian Prime Minister Bob Hawke originally promoted the idea of
APEC, it was only aimed at including Asian countries. Washington opposed this
idea and successfully insisted on incorporating itself and Canada, then "spared
no effort in insisting [that] some Asian countries sign independent agreements
with the NAFTA";
l the USA opposed the Japanese proposal to create an Asian monetary fund to
deal with the Asian financial crisis. Instead, Washington "advocated the
implementation of a rescue plan, with strings attached, by way of the
International Monetary Fund, of which it is a major shareholder".
Despite its power, the authors observe, the USA has not been effective in
dealing with transnational terrorism. They write: "Global terrorist activity is
one of the by-products of globalisation, a trend that has been ushered in by
the technological integration." Terrorist groups are "posing a greater and
greater threat to sovereign nations". Compared to these groups, "professional
armies are like gigantic dinosaurs that lack strength commensurate to their
size in this new age".
"The advent of Bin Laden-style terrorism has deepened the impression that
national force, no matter how powerful, will find it difficult to gain the
upper hand in a game that has no rules." This comment refers to the US firing
of cruise missiles in retaliation for attacks on the US embassies in Nairobi
and Dar-es-Salaam in August 1998.
The greatest controversy concerning Unrestricted War stems from a statement
made by Colonel Qiao in an interview after the book was published. He is said
to have observed that President Slobodan Milosevic of Yugoslavia "did not know
how to fight a people's war". Qiao says he should have sent teams of terrorists
to Italy, France, Germany and Belgium, especially to US bases in some of these
countries, during NATO's war on his country. Then he should have started an
urban guerrilla war in Europe: "Once continental Europe feels the pain, it will
no longer let . . . Britain and the United States conduct war on its
territory."
Views on Unrestricted War
Unrestricted War may not be compared to anything written by Clausewitz or Sun
Tzu, but it does demonstrate some original thinking. As a statement linking the
conduct of war in the 21st century to the emerging 'megatrends' and continuing
'powershift', it is a respectable endeavour. However, as a general review of
war, it is unlikely to be remembered for long. Most of the observations
regarding information warfare, cyber warfare, cyber-terrorism, space warfare
and other types of warfare have already been covered by other Chinese defence
specialists.
As China enhances its theoretical understanding of warfare in the future,
Chinese strategists are attempting to integrate various largely Western
theories of warfare and indigenise (or 'Sinicise') them. To the extent that
Qiao and Wang advocate that Milosevic should have followed a 'People's War'
principle and used urban terrorists during NATO's war on Yugoslavia, it is an
interesting contribution to the theory of conventional warfare - and a variable
about which the USA was highly concerned during the Gulf War and every time a
US force built up in the Gulf since then. The fact that two Chinese military
strategists have advocated the use of this tactic will only intensify the
resolve of all nations to be more careful about potential terrorist acts when
involved in military conflicts.
When China was in the process of becoming a nuclear power, it ridiculed nuclear
war and labelled nuclear powers 'paper tigers'. Yet even while it derided the
established notions of the destructive power of nuclear weapons, China was
labouring to possess them and gain entry into the 'big power' league. This
episode is an important aspect of China's strategic legacy, and the ploy will
be utilised repeatedly to gain advantage for the PRC in the coming decades.
Following Unrestricted War, Chinese strategic thinkers are establishing a new
framework. Claiming that future wars will be without limits is another way of
saying that a militarily weak and economically underdeveloped nation (China)
should go to any extreme, violate any rules and break any traditional precepts
of war to be victorious over a technologically superior and militarily powerful
country (the USA). Rules of war, Qiao and Wang say, need only be followed by
the strong powers who make the rules; a weak nation is not obliged to follow
suit. The all-encompassing aspects of unrestricted war underscore the fact that
a militarily stronger side will not win simply because it enjoys technological
superiority over its weaker opponent.
The US armed forces took note of this study, which came out at a time when
Sino-US relations were fragile. However, since then Washington and Beijing are
unlikely to allow their mutual ties to deteriorate to the extent of triggering
a military conflict.
In this context, while the Taiwan issue is popular among Republican lawmakers
in the USA, they are unlikely to push a US president to go to war with China
over it. However, the PRC should be careful with rhetoric about the use of
force to reunite Taiwan. While the USA might not want a war with China over
Taiwan, it does represent a commitment made by the USA in the Taiwan Relations
Act of 1979. The USA needs to stand by its security commitments in case Japan
and Korea conclude that if Washington can violate its promise to defend Taiwan
from a Chinese military takeover, it is also likely to violate commitments made
to Tokyo and Seoul.
Dr Ehsan Ahari is a Professor of National Security and Strategy at the Joint
Combined Warfighting School, Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, Virginia,
USA.
©Jane's Information Group 2000
http://jir.janes.com/
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