[FIS] Modeling Complexity

2007-02-07 Thread karl javorszky

Dear Fis,

the discussion appears to move in a very interesting direction, connecting
the experiences learnt by the kid with the subject the kid learned. How this
subtle connection influences our concepts about Nature is a central
philosophical problem.
In my contributions in the last few years, there were attempts to raise the
subject of additions in this context.
Now I have written a comprehensive treatise about this, in a literary style.
It is about 92 pages long and is in German. If a member of this list wishes
to read this work of art, not a scientific article, he is welcome to contact
me. The manuscript is not yet published, so a discretion and
confidentiality, also in a legal sense, is expected.
I can also be of assistance, if a translation is undertaken.
Karl
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RE: [Fis] Re: fis Digest, Vol 501, Issue 5

2007-02-07 Thread Stanley N. Salthe
Replying to LOET, who said:

Dear colleagues,I agree with most of what is said, but it does not
apply to  social systems because these -- and to a lesser extent also
psychological ones  -- operate differently from the hierarchical
formations that are generated  naturally. That is why we oppose nature
to culture in the semantics:  cultural (and social) systems enable us to
model the systems under study and  this changes the hierarchical order. I
understand that Maturana et al. argue  that the next-order systems always
model the lower-order ones, but then the word  model is used
metaphorically. The model (e.g., the biological) model enables  us to
reconstruct the system(s) under study to such an extent that we are able
to intervene in these systems, e.g. by using a technology. This inverts
the  hierarchy.   Thus, let me write in Stan's notation: biological
{psychological {social}} -- or is this precisely the opposite order, Stan?
 S: The hierarchy is not inverted. {psychological {social}} states
both that the social realm arises out of, and is a refinement of, the
psychological, AND that the social regulates/ interprets/ controls/
contextualizes the psychological.  It is likely that there are opposing
opinions on this relationship, as some might have it be reversed.  This
decision rides on the question of whether psychology existed prior to
sociality in the biological realm.  And THAT depends upon definitions of
sociality.  I myself weakly favor the way Loet put it -- {biological
{psychological {social}}}, but I could likely be persuaded to acccept
instead {biological {social {psychological}}}.

 --  then our scientific models enable us to change nature, for example,
by building  dykes like in Holland and thus we get: {social {biological}
since the ecological changes can also be planned in advance.
 S: This is in line with the standard view that the social realm is
higher than the biological, and regulates/ interprets/ controls/
contextualizes the biological, AND the lower levels down to the physical as
well.  The relations, {physical constraints (material/chemical constraints
{biological constraints {sociocultural constraints, are transitive from
the higher levels.  Loet's example is not significantly different from
beavers making a dam to create a pond.  Note that this applies only to
those aspects of lower integrative levels that come under the purvue of a
particular social system.

While lower-order systems are able to entertain a model of  the next-lower
ones -- and even have to entertain a model -- human language  enables us
not only to exchange these models, but also to study them and to  further
codify them.
 S: I believe Loet is using lower-order here incorrectly for the
specification hierarchy formalism, which is {lower order {higher order}}.

The further codification sharpens the knife with which we  can cut into
the lower-level ones. We are not constrained to the next-order  lower
level, but we can freely move through the hierarchy and develop different
specialties accordingly (chemistry, biology, etc.).
 S: This again is true of the specification hierarchy, which, as a
subsumptive hierarchy, is, as I say above, transitive from the higher
levels down.

Scientists are able to  adjust the focus of the lense. This is a cultural
achievement which was  generated naturally, but once in place also had the
possibility to distinguish  between genesis and validity. No lower-level
systems can raise and begin to  answer this question.
 S: I have no reason, based in the hierarchy, to disagree with this.
This is why we must erect a sociocultursal level in the hierarchy.

And doubling reality into a semantic domain that can  operate relatively
independently of the underlying (represented) layer increases  the
complexity which can be absorbed with an order of  magnitude.   The issue
is heavily related to the issue of modernity as a  specific form of social
organization. While tribes (small groups) can still be  considered using
the natural metaphor, and high cultures were still organized
hierarchically (with the emperor or the pope at the top), modern social
systems  set science free to pursue this reconstruction in a
techno-economic evolution.  All that is solid, will melt into air
(Marx). Because of our biological body,  we are part of nature, but our
minds are entrained in a cultural dynamics at the  supra-individual level
(culture) which feeds back and at some places is able  increasingly to
invert the hierarchy.
 S: Again, true -- that is why we must erect a sociocultursal level in
the hierarchy!

Then STEVEN said:
I must disagree with the notion that there is any real separation of
nature and culture. There are things that can be known that do not exist -
as a general category that includes culture - but culture does not stand
alone - it's right up there with irrational numbers and televisions. 
The force of natural ethics (inevitable behaviors) is mediated by