Re: [Fis] Revisiting... --From Dieter Gernert
(herewith a very interesting text received off-line from a newcomer to our list --welcome Dieter!---Pedro) -- 1. For many years I highly estimate the work of Michael Conrad -- whom I never could see or hear in person. So the study was restricted to reading some papers, and to store them as a separate file. I am very glad for the references to more recent work. 2. Before making any comment on the transmitted text, I must admit that I do not have sufficient knowledge on biology to give convincing remarks. 3. Modern physics must necessarily be physics at the Planck scale. I do not know whether in this moment there is a sufficient, explicit physics at the Planck scale such that one build up on this basis. Anyway, it must be a theory of processes, not of particles. 4. Anti-entropy or negentropy are children of the classical Shannon-Weaver theory, which is incorrectly (only due to a certain historical development) called information theory. There are specific (narrow, local) situations in biology where Shannon-Weaver is sufficient. But in the general case -- and for a modern, futuristic theory -- it can really be doubted whether Shannon-Weaver (here it is always meant: together with extensions and ramifications) will be sufficient. It seems to me that the comprehensive theory is needed, which (again for historical reasons) is named theory of pragmatic information. This is not opposed to Shannon-Weaver, but the latter is included as a special case (one can state conditions under which Sh.-W. will be adequate for a situation). An overview (including the historical development) can be found: Gernert, D., Pragmatic information: historical development and general overview. Mind and Matter, vol. 4 no. 2 (2006) 141-167. Here I am really only a reporter and historian -- I did not make concrete contributions. The article can be downloaded (google dieter gernert). 5. For any concept setting out to connect the manifest and the unmanifest a mathematical structure is required which permits us to describe the manifest and the nonmanifest and the interaction between both realms, or more precisely: conditions for an influence to occur in a single situation. It seems to me that one can do this along the lines sketched in my paper: Gernert, D., Formal treatment of systems with a hidden organizing structure, with possible applications to physics. Int. J. of Computing Anticipatory Systems 16 (2004) 114-124. It will become inevitable to use a vector space on the basis C (the algebraic field of complex numbers). Best candidates in this moment are C^3 and C^4 (such that we have 6- or 8-parametric manifolds -- not 6 or 8 dimensions!). Equally important is a measure for the similarity between complex structures. To both issues I published proposals, and if there will be better ones, I shall quickly adopt them. 6. Models like particle/anti-particle pair production is a matter of the underlying physical structure; it will not contribute to explain the interaction or non-interaction between two complex structures. Any answer to the question interaction between these two or not? must take into account the entire structure of those two. 7. I do not believe that consciousness has something to do with rather elementary processes like the unmasking mentioned in the text. From the viewpoint of a research strategy one can put off this question and first try to understand the processes. Kindest regards, Dieter Gernert Professor of Computer Science Technical University of Munich ___ fis mailing list fis@listas.unizar.es https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
Re: [Fis] FW: Fluc replies - more
Quoting Pedro C. Marijuan pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es: About the formalism to deal with entropies: How does the treatment of entropies by Michael in his Adaptability Theory --extended by the fluctuon model into the microphysical realm-- relate with the contemporary quantum information theory, and the qubits stuff? Given that it was initially conceived from the ecological perspective, can it be connected with Bob Ulanowicz's conceptualization of energy flow and diversity (and his tentative variational principle?) The paper by Kevin on Biological adaptibilities and quantum entyropies (BioSystems 64, 2002, 33-41) is an excellent portal for this question. I must confess to all that I have never read Michael's work on fluctuons. In 1984, however, I was honored to review Michael's book, Adaptability for Mathematical Biosciences (69:153-154). I have lost an ecopy of the review, but I remember expressing much sympathy for Michaels discourse on the use of conditional entropy to quantify adaptability. My one note of reserve about the work was that Michael made no effort to explain how one could put numbers on his formulae. I was trained as an engineer not to discuss anything to which one could not attach a measurement (a stricture I have since come to ignore. [Stan Salthe says that if you can attach a number to a concept, it's too simple to merit discussion!]:) Nevertheless, Michael's work helped motivate my attempts to quantitatively describe the relationship between efficiency and reliability, or between adaptation and adaptability, as I put it in my contribution to the 2002 Memorial issue to Michael (BioSystems 64:1322 [2002]). For me this question came to somewhat of an empirical resolution, once I had abandoned the notion that ecosystems always developed to increase their adaptation and looked at the data, which said that real ecosystems actually crowded into a narrow window of vitality. (See Fig. 5 on p92 of Int. J. of Design Nature and Ecodynamics 4(2):83-96 [2009].) The enigma remains as to why the ratio of organization:complexity so tightly favors the value (1/e)? Regarding fluctuations in the quantum vacuum, I have my doubts as to how far up the scale they reach. (I also have grave doubts about coupling gravitation with quantum phenomena, as the Planck constant and the gravitational constant differ by some *43* orders of magnitude! An engineer would *never* touch such a disparity! Apparently, Hawking gave up on it as well, even though I doubt he's ever been exposed to dimensional analysis. :) There are some physicists who claim that the coherence domains such as one sees among collections of molecules of water (which apparently are kept in coherence by signals propagated in the quantum vacuum by phasings that can propagate there faster than the speed of light) apply to the brain and even to ecosystems! (See Ecological Modelling 220: 18651869 [2009].) I think this hypothesis is wrong. The dimensions of the brain and certainly those of the ecosystem are simply too far removed from the quantum level to entertain such a thought. (Again, my engineer's familiarity with dimensional analysis suggests such infesability.) That doesn't mean that an analogous scenario isn't at work in the brain, however. Typically, brain synapses function on the time scale of tenths of a second. While this might seem fast to the lay person, it is far too slow to explain any synchrony. One doesn't have to go down to the quantum level, however, to find a phenomenon that might be capable of synchronizing brain activity. To synchronize a set of processes, it is not necessary that the communication be of high amplitude. It can be rather faint. The means of synchrony must, however, act very quickly with respect to the phenomenon being synchronized. Well, when a synapse fires it creates a weak electromagnetic field. Although weak, there are usually many, many other synapses in the vicinity that could receive this weak signal. I.e., the local electromagnetic field could reasonably serve to synchronize brain behavior at a larger scale than the synapse. It should be possible to observe the brain acting in synchrony as a *macroscopic* coherence domain. Such coherence would agree with our common notions of consciousness. When we are conscious, we are aware of many things at the same time -- even our own brain activity. When part of the brain becomes dysfunctional, it cannot participate in the coherence domain -- ergo the loss of recognition by a patient with aphasia of, say, the left arm as belonging to him/her. Well, I digress! These thoughts rattle around in my brain (incoherently? :), and I welcome the opportunity to put them into writing. The best to all, Bob - Robert E. Ulanowicz| Tel: +1-352-378-7355 Arthur R.
Re: [Fis] Fluc replies - more. Reply to Gordana
FW: Fluc replies - moreDear Gordana and All, Gordana's note is very useful, as I think it makes possible a further discussion of what is at the heart of information. The following, partially negative comments, should be seen only as an attempt to get closer to that heart. 1. Floridi indeed claims that reality is an informational structure, but if the reality of information - its structure and constitutive elements - has not been defined, we are in full tautology. If there are really fluctuons down there (the theme of this discussion), this may have consequences for all of our theories, mine included. 2. This judgment is confirmed :-) by the citations: a) One can agree (I do) with Floridi's interpretation of reality as the totality of structures interacting with one another, but we still do not know what a structure is, ontologically, and there is a caesura with the implication for information; b) Referring to physicists who say that reality is fundamentally informational is begging the question at issue. 3. It is not quite accurate to say that Floridi's Levels of Organization (LoOs) give access to an ontological side that will enable us to see an informational reality for two reasons: a) we have not established that reality is primarily informational nor what this might mean (see above); b) LoOs, to quote Floridi do support an ontological approach, according to which systems for analysis (my emphasis) are supposed to have a structure in themselves de re, which is allegedly captured and uncovered by its description. For example, levels of communication, of decision processing and of information flow can all be presented as specific instances that can be analyzed in terms of LoOs. However, I submit that we are still dealing, here, with epistemological constructions. 4. It is not necessarily true that an ontological informational structures should be seen in conjunction (sic) with computational processes. Let us consider, quite seriously, that there is a /disjunction/ between ontological informational structures and computational processes. 5. On the question of it 'or' bit, I suggest that bits are the simplest, most abstract elements of information, constitutive of its lowest semantic level. Its are something more, for example, as Kevin Kirby said, fluctuons can perfectly well be looked at as its, given their apparent interactive characteristics. Understanding the relationship (one or more ?) between information and matter/energy may be easier if we consider that we might be talking about the same thing from two perspectives. Cheers, Joseph - Original Message - From: Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic To: Kevin Kirby ; fis@listas.unizar.es Sent: Wednesday, September 29, 2010 1:38 PM Subject: Re: [Fis] Fluc replies - more Dear Kevin, Dear all! What I was thinking about, referring to Floridi's Informational Structural Realism is his claim that reality is an informational structure A preferable alternative is provided by an informational approach to structural realism, according to which knowledge of the world is knowledge of its structures. The most reasonable ontological commitment turns out to be in favour of an interpretation of reality as the totality of structures dynamically interacting with each other. Floridi [11] p. 151. http://www.mdpi.com/1099-4300/12/4/878/pdf I could have referred to physicists Zeilinger, Lloyd, or Vedral and number of other authors who would say that reality fundamentally is informational. Now, the question of objective vs. subjective levels (levels of organization vs. levels of abstraction). One may be interested in the first place in the epistemological aspect and then focus on what an agent can see from that informational reality. On the other hand one may put the focus on the ontological side and ask what informational reality an agent can see. Those two things are closely related. I agree with you that if we only focus on levels of abstraction we will miss something, as LOA only reflect epistemological side. Besides epistemology we need ontology, which is reflected in Levels of organization LOO. What I find interesting is the interplay of epistemological and ontological informational structures. Those informational structures should be seen in conjunction with computational processes. All of that is also closely connected to the question of it or bit, or the relationships between information and matter/energy. Present FIS discussion shows that there is an interest and a lot of things to do in order to elucidate our current understanding of the relationship. I would like to kindly invite you to contribute to the following special issue of the journal Information: . http://www.mdpi.com/journal/information/special_issues/matter/ With best regards, Gordana From: fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] On
Re: [Fis] Revisiting... --From Dieter Gernert
Hi all, I have been enjoying the current discussion and appreciate Dieter’s focus on process. I am an evolutionary biologist, not a physicist, but I would like to suggest one way in which some of the views expressed in different posts might be reconciled. From a simplistic point of view, I think it is fair to posit that spatial pattern (e.g., the existence of particles) is manifested information, and that pattern is generated by process (e.g., particle interaction). Process itself can also be viewed as information in the form of temporal pattern. Pattern and process are inextricably linked in self-organizing dissipative systems, which represent a special class of “its”. Other kinds of “its” include artifacts of dissipative system dynamics, which stumble from one local entropy peak to another under thermodynamic constraints. Of course, particulate artifacts can also be swept up in other thermodynamic cascades, including those exploited by other dissipative systems. The Prigogine notion of dissipative systems provides a compelling case, in my view, for including both pattern and process in generic treatments of information. Regards, Guy -- Dr. Guy A. Hoelzer Department of Biology, MS 314 University of Nevada Reno Reno, NV 89557 On 9/29/10 3:38 AM, Pedro Clemente Marijuan Fernandez pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es wrote: (herewith a very interesting text received off-line from a newcomer to our list --welcome Dieter!---Pedro) -- 1. For many years I highly estimate the work of Michael Conrad – whom I never could see or hear in person. So the study was restricted to reading some papers, and to store them as a separate file. I am very glad for the references to more recent work. 2. Before making any comment on the transmitted text, I must admit that I do not have sufficient knowledge on biology to give convincing remarks. 3. Modern physics must necessarily be physics at the Planck scale. I do not know whether in this moment there is a sufficient, explicit physics at the Planck scale such that one build up on this basis. Anyway, it must be a theory of processes, not of particles. 4. Anti-entropy or negentropy are children of the classical Shannon-Weaver theory, which is incorrectly (only due to a certain historical development) called information theory. There are specific (narrow, local) situations in biology where Shannon-Weaver is sufficient. But in the general case – and for a modern, futuristic theory – it can really be doubted whether Shannon-Weaver (here it is always meant: together with extensions and ramifications) will be sufficient. It seems to me that the comprehensive theory is needed, which (again for historical reasons) is named theory of pragmatic information. This is not opposed to Shannon-Weaver, but the latter is included as a special case (one can state conditions under which Sh.-W. will be adequate for a situation). An overview (including the historical development) can be found: Gernert, D., Pragmatic information: historical development and general overview. Mind and Matter, vol. 4 no. 2 (2006) 141-167. Here I am really only a reporter and historian – I did not make concrete contributions. The article can be downloaded (google dieter gernert). 5. For any concept setting out to connect the manifest and the unmanifest a mathematical structure is required which permits us to describe the manifest and the nonmanifest and the interaction between both realms, or more precisely: conditions for an influence to occur in a single situation. It seems to me that one can do this along the lines sketched in my paper: Gernert, D., Formal treatment of systems with a hidden organizing structure, with possible applications to physics. Int. J. of Computing Anticipatory Systems 16 (2004) 114-124. It will become inevitable to use a vector space on the basis C (the algebraic field of complex numbers). Best candidates in this moment are C^3 and C^4 (such that we have 6- or 8-parametric manifolds – not 6 or 8 dimensions!). Equally important is a measure for the similarity between complex structures. To both issues I published proposals, and if there will be better ones, I shall quickly adopt them. 6. Models like particle/anti-particle pair production is a matter of the underlying physical structure; it will not contribute to explain the interaction or non-interaction between two complex structures. Any answer to the question interaction between these two or not? must take into account the entire structure of those two. 7. I do not believe that consciousness has something to do with rather elementary processes like the unmasking mentioned in the text. From the viewpoint of a research strategy one can put off this question and first try to understand the processes. Kindest regards, Dieter Gernert Professor of Computer Science Technical University of Munich
Re: [Fis] Fluc replies - more. Reply to Gordana
dear Joseph I very much agree with your views and criticisms of Floridi's tautologies. One main problem I have with Floridi is that he does not distinguish between ontology and metaphysics (in the Heideggerian sense of these terms). This leads to the question of trying to identify the nature of it which is, I guess, another term for what metaphysics called beings (or das Seiende im German, i.e. everything that is). Metaphysics is the project of trying to fix the nature of beings in their being (or on he on as Aristotle said). But this is exactly the problem, that in every intent to fix this is (or it) there is always an AS. In other words, we have no possibility of taking a metahistorical and meta-physical (our of the world in which we are involved as being-in-the-world) position and overview forms AS being only this and not that. Neither through levels of abstraction (LoA) which is the classic method of metaphysics since Plato, nor through levels of communication nor... On the other hand, what we say when we say that it is AS this and this (including the digital perspective when we say that it AS bit) is one possible perspective. The fluctuation of AS co-rresponds to the fluctuation of its. To say that reality is fundamentally this or that is to repeat the ambitions of metaphysics. best regards Rafael Dear Gordana and All, Gordana's note is very useful, as I think it makes possible a further discussion of what is at the heart of information. The following, partially negative comments, should be seen only as an attempt to get closer to that heart. 1. Floridi indeed claims that reality is an informational structure, but if the reality of information - its structure and constitutive elements - has not been defined, we are in full tautology. If there are really fluctuons down there (the theme of this discussion), this may have consequences for all of our theories, mine included. 2. This judgment is confirmed :-) by the citations: a) One can agree (I do) with Floridi's interpretation of reality as the totality of structures interacting with one another, but we still do not know what a structure is, ontologically, and there is a /caesura /with the implication for information; b) Referring to physicists who say that reality is fundamentally informational is begging the question at issue. 3. It is not quite accurate to say that Floridi's Levels of Organization (LoOs) give access to an ontological side that will enable us to see an informational reality for two reasons: a) we have not established that reality is primarily informational nor what this might mean (see above); b) LoOs, to quote Floridi do support an ontological approach, according to which systems /for analysis /(my emphasis) are supposed to have a structure in themselves /de re/, which is allegedly captured and uncovered by its description. For example, levels of communication, of decision processing and of information flow can all be presented as specific instances that can be analyzed in terms of LoOs. However, I submit that we are still dealing, here, with epistemological constructions. 4. It is not necessarily true that an ontological informational structures should be seen in conjunction (sic) with computational processes. Let us consider, quite seriously, that there is a //disjunction// between ontological informational structures and computational processes. 5. On the question of it 'or' bit, I suggest that bits are the simplest, most abstract elements of information, constitutive of its lowest semantic level. Its are something more, for example, as Kevin Kirby said, fluctuons can perfectly well be looked at as its, given their apparent interactive characteristics. Understanding the relationship (one or more ?) between information and matter/energy may be easier if we consider that we might be talking about the same thing from two perspectives. Cheers, Joseph - Original Message - *From:* Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic mailto:gordana.dodig-crnko...@mdh.se *To:* Kevin Kirby mailto:ki...@nku.edu ; fis@listas.unizar.es mailto:fis@listas.unizar.es *Sent:* Wednesday, September 29, 2010 1:38 PM *Subject:* Re: [Fis] Fluc replies - more Dear Kevin, Dear all! What I was thinking about, referring to Floridi's Informational Structural Realism is his claim that reality is an informational structure /A preferable alternative is provided by an informational approach to structural realism, according to which knowledge of the world is knowledge of its structures. The most reasonable ontological commitment turns out to be in favour of an interpretation of reality as the totality of structures dynamically interacting with each other. /Floridi [11] p. 151. http://www.mdpi.com/1099-4300/12/4/878/pdf I could have referred to physicists Zeilinger, Lloyd, or Vedral and number of other authors who would say that reality
Re: [Fis] Revisiting... --From Dieter Gernert
Dear Guy, I, too , was enthused by Dieter's emphasis on process, although I don't quite share your concern about neglecting structural pattern. As an ecologist, I spent my career studying *patterns of processes*, i.e., networks of ecological interactions. Furthermore the information embodied in the pattern of processes is quite amenable to quantification. A process-first ontology would view particles and their related structures as outcomes of configurations of processes. Such was a major thrust of my process view of evolution, as espoused in my last book, A Third Window. The chief benefit of a process-based narrative of evolution is that one can consistently view evolution going forward. The particle-law conventional metaphysic always entails a great deal of backtracking. Doubtless, many of you will disagree, but that's part of the fun of FIS! The best to all, Bob U. Quoting Guy A Hoelzer hoel...@unr.edu: Hi all, I have been enjoying the current discussion and appreciate Dieter´s focus on process. I am an evolutionary biologist, not a physicist, but I would like to suggest one way in which some of the views expressed in different posts might be reconciled. From a simplistic point of view, I think it is fair to posit that spatial pattern (e.g., the existence of particles) is manifested information, and that pattern is generated by process (e.g., particle interaction). Process itself can also be viewed as information in the form of temporal pattern. Pattern and process are inextricably linked in self-organizing dissipative systems, which represent a special class of its. Other kinds of its include artifacts of dissipative system dynamics, which stumble from one local entropy peak to another under thermodynamic constraints. Of course, particulate artifacts can also be swept up in other thermodynamic cascades, including those exploited by other dissipative systems. The Prigogine notion of dissipative systems provides a compelling case, in my view, for including both pattern and process in generic treatments of information. Regards, Guy -- Dr. Guy A. Hoelzer Department of Biology, MS 314 University of Nevada Reno Reno, NV 89557 On 9/29/10 3:38 AM, Pedro Clemente Marijuan Fernandez pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es wrote: (herewith a very interesting text received off-line from a newcomer to our list --welcome Dieter!---Pedro) -- 1. For many years I highly estimate the work of Michael Conrad - whom I never could see or hear in person. So the study was restricted to reading some papers, and to store them as a separate file. I am very glad for the references to more recent work. 2. Before making any comment on the transmitted text, I must admit that I do not have sufficient knowledge on biology to give convincing remarks. 3. Modern physics must necessarily be physics at the Planck scale. I do not know whether in this moment there is a sufficient, explicit physics at the Planck scale such that one build up on this basis. Anyway, it must be a theory of processes, not of particles. 4. Anti-entropy or negentropy are children of the classical Shannon-Weaver theory, which is incorrectly (only due to a certain historical development) called information theory. There are specific (narrow, local) situations in biology where Shannon-Weaver is sufficient. But in the general case - and for a modern, futuristic theory - it can really be doubted whether Shannon-Weaver (here it is always meant: together with extensions and ramifications) will be sufficient. It seems to me that the comprehensive theory is needed, which (again for historical reasons) is named theory of pragmatic information. This is not opposed to Shannon-Weaver, but the latter is included as a special case (one can state conditions under which Sh.-W. will be adequate for a situation). An overview (including the historical development) can be found: Gernert, D., Pragmatic information: historical development and general overview. Mind and Matter, vol. 4 no. 2 (2006) 141-167. Here I am really only a reporter and historian - I did not make concrete contributions. The article can be downloaded (google dieter gernert). 5. For any concept setting out to connect the manifest and the unmanifest a mathematical structure is required which permits us to describe the manifest and the nonmanifest and the interaction between both realms, or more precisely: conditions for an influence to occur in a single situation. It seems to me that one can do this along the lines sketched in my paper: Gernert, D., Formal treatment of systems with a hidden organizing structure, with possible applications to physics. Int. J. of Computing Anticipatory Systems 16 (2004) 114-124. It will become inevitable to use a
Re: [Fis] Fluc replies - more. Reply to Gordana
Dear FIS,
the discussion here is excitingly interesting from the standpoint of formal
logic. The points that one may comment on regard:
tautology
structure
totality of structures interacting with one another
epistemological constructions
relationship between matter/energy
perspectives of descriptions
philosophic relativity
to name but a few.
Formal logic addresses all these points and introduces a neutral web of
well-defined concepts, the relations of which allow quite exact definitions
of the above terms.
We find empistemologically clear and well-defined explanations for these
terms by taking recourse to the words of a formal language (in the sense of
Wittgenstein), namely to the natural numbers. We may be in the situation of
those of our forefathers who have felt that there is a comprehensive
explanation to spatial arrangements they observed but lacked the exact
understanding of the words height, distance, angle and so forth. I
don't know who proposed using simple calculations regarding the sides of
triangles to arrive at trigonometry, but the principles that can be read off
the tables of trigonometry demonstrate that numbers do have a use outside of
mathematics, too.
The concepts of sinus and cosinus and tangent etc. could be understood
after one has seen how these concepts are generated by simple numeric
procedures.
Please allow me to propose for general usage some tables based on natural
numbers. The concepts can prove to be well usable and versatile, after one
has seen how the concepts are generated.
The Table to be introduced into this discussion is quite simple, in fact not
more complicated (from the level of its intellectual principles) as dividing
the lengths of sides of triangles. It uses following novelties in the
dealings with natural numbers:
1) we discuss the instances of a+b=c for values of a,b 1..16;
1.1. This yields 136 cases of additions, from 1+1=2 to 16+16=32
1.1.1 we alsways assume a=b
2) we concentrate on the symmetry of a and b, that is on u=b-a;
2.1 u can be in the range of 0 to 15
3) we generate measures for the relation of u to a and b
3.1. we build k=u-a
3.2. we build k+u=t
3.2.1 we make an addition ((b-a)-a)+(b-a)=2b-3a
3.3. we build -u=a-b
3.3.1 we do this for reasons of commutativity
3.4. we build q=-u-b
3.5. we build w=q+(-u)
3.5.1. we make an addition ((-u-b)+(-u))=((a-b-b)+(a-b))=2a-3b
3.6. we thus have 4 additions:
3.6.1. a+b=c
3.6.2. k+u=t =((b-a)-a)+(b-a)=2b-3a
3.6.3. q+(-u)=w =((-u-b)+(-u))=((a-b-b)+(a-b))=2a-3b
3.6.4. reading column 3 down we see c+t=-w=(a+b)+(2b-3a)= -
(2a+3b)=3b-2a
3.7. we propose to investigate, which of the 4 additions is generally
relevant in each case of a,b
3.8. we call the terms a,b,c,k,u,t,q,w, and and measure s=17-{a+b|c}
aspects of a+b=c
4. we introduce the conept of order
4.1. we order the set of 136 additions by sorting them
4.1.1. we use the procedure sort() from excel or any other software to do
so
4.2. we sort the collection on two of the aspects
4.2.1. we have then 72 sorting orders, 9 aspects once as 1st, 8 aspects once
as 2nd sorting key
4.3. each case of a+b has then a specific sequential place in the sequence
1..136
5. we re-sort from sorting order alpha,beta into sorting order gamma.delta
5.0.1. alpha,beta,gamma,delta are any of the 9 aspects
5.0.2. alpha#beta, gamma#delta
5.1. we investigate the place changes of the individual cases of a+b
5.2. those cases that move together we call a thread
5.2.1. the term thread may possibly be the concept behind the word
string used in Physics
5.3. some resorts yield no changes, some do
5.3.1. those resorts that yield no changes we call the structure
5.4. there are resorts that offer themselves as unit resorts
6. The unit resorts allow constructing two Euclid spaces
6.1. the two Euclid spaces differ slightly
6.2. the two Euclid spaces can be merged into one Euclid space
6.2.1. in this merged space one loses either the position's exactitude or
the extent's exactitude
6.2.2. the differences of the two Eulid spaces may well be the concept
behind the word information
7. there are several - but by no means an infinite number of - realities of
orders' consequences
7.1. the terms relevance and importance of ordering concepts can easily
be defined.
8. The term logical archetype is defined by those standard rearrangements
that are geometrically representable in an Euclid space
8.1. the term logical archetype may well be the concept behind the words
chemical element.
This is of course only a very cursory introduction. The idea is new but it
seems to be quite useful to contribute to a discussion within FIS. The usage
of this kind of approach to words is, that one may well point out: this is
what I mean as I say 'structure' or 'information' or 'ordering principle'.
Exact science has to be rooted in solid logic, where the words one uses do
have a clear and unmistakable definition. Nothing is better suited to be
