Re: [Fis] The Travelers
I would agree with this. I also agree with Bob. And of course I agree with Stan. However I do think that the technical problems are rather more than Stan estimates. More on this later. I don't feel so good right now. John At 12:45 AM 2014-10-24, Guy A Hoelzer wrote: Dear Bob et al., I take semiotics as the science of meaning, which I separate from the science of information (information theory?). Along the line of your argument, meaningfulness would be exclusive to dynamical systems where agency, purpose, and self-interest have emerged. When such a system encounters a bit of physical information it might or might not apprehend the bit. It can only apprehend the bit if something about the system's dynamics is changed as a result of the encounter. It would only be meaningful to that system if it is a difference that makes a difference. In other words, if the change in the systems dynamics affects system function in some way, then that bit of information was meaningful to that system. The example of the gravitational pull of the sun on the earth can be considered in this framework. The first think I would say is that there are plenty of systems in and on the earth, but the planet itself does not necessarily constitute a system. A big rock floating in space does not imply an internal system that could apprehend or change dynamically in response to gravitational pull. On the other hand, dynamical geological processes within the earth, biological/ecological systems on the earth, or weather systems in the atmosphere might qualify; and these system could potentially apprehend and respond meaningfully to the suns gravitational pull. On the other hand, the information encountered as a result of exposure to the gravitational pull might be entirely transparent to (not detectable by) some of these systems. At least this is how I think about this interesting issue. Cheers, Guy Guy Hoelzer, Associate Professor Department of Biology University of Nevada Reno Phone: 775-784-4860 Fax: 775-784-1302 hoel...@unr.edu On Oct 23, 2014, at 7:13 AM, Bob Logan lo...@physics.utoronto.ca wrote: Dear Stan - could you clarify that last sentence of your = perhaps I misinterpreted it - are you saying that context in a purely physical abiotic situation is somehow related to interpretation and hence information. I apologize in advance if I mis-interpreted your remarks. In framing my advanced apology to you Stan, I inadvertently used the term mis-interpreted. This sparked the following idea: Mis-information is due to misinterpretation of the receiver whereas dis-informatio is due to the intended deception of the sender. A further thought about whether abiotic physical processes can be construed as information: Meaning and hence information can only exist for a system that has a purpose, a telos, or an end it wishes to achieve, i.e abiotc system such as a living organism or even a cell. So-called information with out meaning is only signals. And even there, to say that the sun's gravitational pull on the earth is a signal is to engage in anthropomorphic thinking. And to suggest that the sun's gravitational pull on the earth is information does not make sense because there is no way that anything can have meaning for the earth. The earth has no objective or purpose, Gaia hypothesis not withstanding, For us earthlings it is another matter. We have figured out that the sun exerts a gravitational pull on the earth and the statement to that effect has meaning for those able to grasp elementary physics but the gravitational pull is not information in itself only a description of that gravitational pull of the sun on the earth is information. Bob __ Robert K. Logan Prof. Emeritus - Physics - U. of Toronto Chief Scientist - sLab at OCAD http://utoronto.academia.edu/RobertKLogan www.physics.utoronto.ca/Members/logan www.researchgate.net/profile/Robert_Logan5/publications On 2014-10-23, at 9:27 AM, Stanley N Salthe wrote: Pedro wrote: PM: Regarding the theme of physical information raised by Igor and Joseph, the main problematic aspect of information (meaning) is missing there. One can imagine that as two physical systems interact, each one may be metaphorically attributed with meaning respect the changes experimented. But it is an empty attribution that does not bring any further interesting aspect. SS: I have advanced ( On the origin of semiosis. Cybernetics and Human Knowing 19 (3): 53-66. 2012 ) the idea that whenever context influences importantly any reaction which, even in the physical realm, might be viewed as an informational exchange, there is the forerunner of the interpretation of an interaction, Such a simple 'interpretation' (proto-interpretation) would then be the forerunner of meaning generation. When context importantly influences the outcome of a physical interaction, this brings a further interesting aspect beyond the purely physical. STAN ___ Fis
Re: [Fis] The Travellers
This is indeed important, and I think Frege was on the right track on a number of issues. Peirce, however, did use the term 'information', but as far as I can see he presupposed intentionality. This doesn't help, unless the world is intentional all the way don3e, which strongly doubt. I think that the pivotal point is how does intentionality arise (or the weaker but still significant ententionality defined by Terry Deacon) from information. Peirce did not solve that issue, but presupposed itr. That is exactly what I am arguing is not satisfactory. John At 05:35 PM 2014-10-29, Krassimir Markov wrote: Dear Pedro and FIS Colleagues, For me it was amazing time to read exchanges about The travelers ! I was silent because for me is was stimulus brain storming discussion. I received a plenty of influences. Only one aspect there was not commented and let me now to this. For this purpose I will use a remarkable text from: [ Frege G. An extract from an undated letter, published in Frege's Philosophical and Mathematical Correspondence (ed.) Gottfried Gabriel, Hans Hermes. Friedrich Kanbartel. Christian Thiel, and Albert Veraart, Abridged for the English (edn.), by Brian MeGuinness, and Trans. Hans Kaal (Oxford: Blackwell. 1980), http://mind.ucsd.edu/syllabi/00-01/phil235/a_readings/frege_jourdain.html (accessed: 15.11.2012) ].: In a letter written to Philip Jourdain in 1914, Gottlob Frege had written: Let us suppose an explorer travelling in an unexplored country sees a high snow-capped mountain on the northern horizon. By making inquiries among the natives he learns that its name is 'Aphla'. By sighting it from different points he determines its position as exactly as possible, enters it in a map, and writes in his diary: 'Aphla is at least 5000 meters high'. Another explorer sees a snow-capped mountain on the southern horizon and learns that it is called Ateb. He enters it in his map under this name. Later comparison shows that both explorers saw the same mountain. Now the content of the proposition 'Ateb is Aphla' is far from being a mere consequence of the principle of identity, but contains a valuable piece of geographical knowledge. What is stated in the proposition 'Ateb is Aphla' is certainly not the same thing as the content of the proposition 'Ateb is Ateb'. Now if what corresponded to the name 'Aphla' as part of the thought was the reference of the name and hence the mountain itself, then this would be the same in both thoughts. The thought expressed in the proposition 'Ateb is Aphla' would have to coincide with the one in 'Ateb is Ateb', which is far from being the case. What corresponds to the name 'Ateb' as part of the thought must therefore be different from what corresponds to the name 'Aphla' as part of the thought. This cannot therefore be the reference which is the same for both names, but must be something which is different in the two cases, and I say accordingly that the sense of the name 'Ateb' is different from the sense of the name 'Aphla'. Accordingly, the sense of the proposition 'Ateb is at least 5000 meters high' is also different from the sense of the proposition 'Aphla is at least 5000 meters high'. Someone who takes the latter to be true need not therefore take the former to be true. An object can be determined in different ways, and every one of these ways of determining it can give rise to a special name, and these different names then have different senses; for it is not self-evident that it is the same object which is being determined in different ways. We find this in astronomy in the case of planetoids and comets. Now if the sense of a name was something subjective, then the sense of the proposition in which the name occurs, and hence the thought, would also be something subjective, and the thought one man connects with this proposition would be different from the thought another man connects with it; a common store of thoughts, a common science would be impossible. It would be impossible for something one man said to contradict what another man said, because the two would not express the same thought at all, but each his owns. For these reasons I believe that the sense of a name is not something subjective (crossed out: in one's mental life), that it does not therefore belong to psychology, and that it is indispensable. What is important in this example is : - The names Ateb and Aphla refer to different parts of the same natural object (mountain); - The position of the referred object (mountain) is fixed by any artificial system (geographical co-ordinates) which is another knowledge about the same object; - The names correspond one to another and both to the real object but without the explorers maps and diaries, it is impossible to restore the correspondence. In conclusion, let me remark that we really need knowledge maps to understand each other travelling in an unexplored reality. Such knowledge maps usually are called General Theories. Friendly
Re: [Fis] The Travellers
Dear Pedro, Dear Sören, Please let me call the attention of both of you to Sören's article in Biosemiotics of 24 May 2012 What Does it Take to Produce Interpretation? Informational, Peircean and Code-Semiotic Views on Biosemiotics. Judging from the abstract, this article criticizes at least some points in Peircean pragmaticist semiotic theory based on simulataneous types of evolution. It is this balance - that one cannot accept the precepts of Peircean semiotics automatically as science - that has been missing in the discussion. Thus Stjernfelt's book, /Natural Propositions/ while showing the movement of Peirce's thought toward greater realism, confirms over and over that it is a narrow window of proposition and argument involving a fundamental reliance on propositional truth in reasoning. I for one cannot see that it enables us to attain idealized and general objectives in ... arts, science, politics. technology and other large human endeavors. Stjernfelt sees propositions throughout nature, not only in language, but he then subjects them to the reductionist framework of a Peircean logic still based on a binary, linguistic truth-functionality confirmed by mathematics. I would like to suggest that what Pedro may be calling for is something like an /inverse semiotics/, based on theories of information which reflect the dynamics of existence, in which the primary truth is the truth of reality, and secondarily that of signs which can be captured in propositions. Thanks to all, Joseph - Original Message - From: Pedro C. Marijuan pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es To: fis@listas.unizar.es Cc: Søren Brier sb@cbs.dk Sent: Thursday, October 30, 2014 2:28 PM Subject: Re: [Fis] The Travellers Dear FIS colleagues, I am responding to a mail from Soeren (below) that, curiously, was retained by the list filter. Sorry, but some parts of his message are written in a rather arrogant tone that does not match the unconditionally polite style of our exchanges. This is a pluralistic list and quite different positions may be defended, always within appropriate scholarly bounds. First, my comment on semiotics was as it was --not with the exaggeration introduced by Soeren. Looking in positive, it is interesting that in the 80's I also started a PhD thesis on the parallel evolution of neuroanatomy and behavior, with a pretty strong ethological content, but stopped it as I could not converge to any relevant outcome. Instead I moved downwards, and started the informational study of the cell and the evolution of biological information processing... Later on the approach pleased Michel Conrad, and the rest is part of fis history. About my physicalist conception of signaling and biological information, I think the two recent papers in BioSystems (On prokaryotic Intelligence... and On eukaryotic Intelligence...) represent an original view that can enrich the current system biology debates on signaling bases of intelligence--or not!, people will tell. To keep the explanation short, the way cellular life has channeled the energy flow (eg, Morowitz, 1968) versus the channeling of the information flow contains lessons for the further deployment of biological and social complexity. In particular, the cellular processual distinction between metabolite and signal looks fascinating, in human terms it is like reading the newspaper vs, eating a sandwich (it can be found in my recent paper of fis-Moscow, journal Information)... Not far from these views, engineer Adrian Bejan (2012) has recently proposed a constructal law based on the circulation needs of the energy flow in nature and society--could we devise a parallel or complementary scheme for the information flow? Actually Bejan's attempt covers it but rather poorly, at least compared with the depth of the energetic part. In part, I am frustrated that we have been living the most momentous changes in the social history of information and at fis have been able to say very little about. Rather than struggling to achieve the true, monolithic, universal theory of information, shouldn't we aspire to frame a convivial multi-disciplinary space where plenty of both APPLIED and theoretical research on informational entities can be developed and cross-fertilize? And this is my Second of the week. Best regards ---Pedro Søren Brier wrote: Dear Pedro This is a wonderful mail revealing all sorts of theoretical views and philosophy of science prejudices. This one takes the price: Semiotics could be OK for the previous generation--something attuned to our scientific times is needed now. The conclusion is that semiotics is not something new and advanced but old-fashioned and outdated !!! The Peircean biosemioticians are fooling themselves ! They are not scientific. This is a crucial discussion that many of us have with Marcello Barbieri on a somewhat different theoretical platform. But he is wonderfully clear and
