_*Steps to a theory of reference significance in information
*_*FIS discussion paper by Terrence W. Deacon (2015)*
This is the link to download the whole paper:
https://www.dropbox.com/s/v5o8pwx3ggmmmnb/FIS%20Deacon%20on%20information%20v2.pdf?dl=0
/The mere fact that the same mathematical expression - Σ pi log pi
occurs both in statistical
mechanics and in information theory does not in itself establish any
connection between these
fields. This can be done only by finding new viewpoints from which
thermodynamic entropy and
information-theory entropy appear as the same concept. /(Jaynes 1957,
p. 621)
/What I have tried to do is to turn information theory upside down to
make what the
engineers call 'redundancy' [coding syntax ] but I call 'pattern' into
the primary
phenomenon. . . . “/ (Gregory Bateson, letter to John Lilly on his
dolphin research, 10/05/1968)
*Introduction*
In common use and in its etymology the term ‘information’ has always
been associated with
concepts of reference and significance—that is to say it is about
something for some use. But
following the landmark paper by Claude Shannon in 1948 (and later
developments by Wiener,
Kolmogorov, and others) the technical use of the term became almost
entirely restricted to refer
to signal properties of a communication medium irrespective of reference
or use. In the
introduction to this seminal report, Shannon points out that although
communications often have
meaning, “These semantic aspects of communication are irrelevant to the
engineering problem”
which is to provide a precise engineering tool to assess the
computational and physical demands
of the transmission, storage, and encryption of communications in all forms.
The theory provided a way to precisely measure these properties as well
as to determine
limits on compression, encryption, and error correction. By a sort of
metonymic shorthand this
quantity (measured in bits) came to be considered synonymous with the
meaning of
‘information’ (both in the technical literature and in colloquial use in
the IT world) but at the cost
of inconsistency with its most distinctive defining attributes.
This definition was, however, consistent with a tacit metaphysical
principle assumed in the
contemporary natural sciences: the assertion that only material and
energetic properties can be
assigned causal power and that appeals to teleological explanations are
illegitimate. This
methodological framework recognizes that teleological explanations
merely assign a locus of
cause but fail to provide any mechanism, and so they effectively mark a
point where explanation
ceases. But this stance does not also entail a denial of the reality of
teleological forms of
causality nor does it require that they can be entirely reduced to
intrinsic material and energetic
properties.
Reference and significance are both implicitly teleological concepts in
the sense that they
require an interpretive context (i.e. a point of view) and are not
intrinsic to any specific physical
substrate (e.g. in the way that mass and charge are). By abstracting the
technical definition of
information away from these extrinsic properties Shannon provided a
concept of information that
could be used to measure a formal property that is inherent in all
physical phenomena: their
organization. Because of its minimalism, this conception of information
became a precise and
widely applicable analytic tool that has fueled advances in many fields,
from fundamental
physics to genetics to computation. But this strength has also has
undermined its usefulness in
fields distinguished by the need to explain the non-intrinsic properties
associated with
information. This has limited its value for organismal biology where
function is fundamental, for
the cognitive sciences where representation is a central issue, and for
the social sciences where
normative assessment seem unavoidable. So this technical redefinition of
information has been
both a virtue and a limitation.
The central goal of this essay is to demonstrate that the previously set
aside (and presumed
nonphysical) properties of reference and significance (i.e. normativity)
can be re-incorporated
into a rigorous formal analysis of information that is suitable for use
in both the physical (e.g.
quantum theory, cosmology, computation theory) and semiotic sciences
(e.g. biology, cognitive
science, economics). This analysis will build on Shannon’s formalization
of information, but will
extend it to explicitly model its link to the statistical and
thermodynamic properties of its
physical context and to the physical work of interpreting it. It is
argued that an accurate analysis
of the non-intrinsic attributes that distinguish information from mere
physical differences is not
only feasible, but necessary to account for its distinctive form of
causal efficacy.
Initial qualitative and conceptual steps toward this augmentation of
information theory
