Dear Karl,
Thank you for your letter. I will think about the model that you present there.
I submit that quantum theory does not go beyond the bounds of language. It is
the metaphors that we use for objects that come into question.
As you can see from my “Nutshell”, there are specific observations that can be
described and labeled as |e1>,|e2>,… corresponding to events that scientists
can agree upon in ordinary language.
The quantum state is a formal sum with complex coefficients of these |ek> as
POSSIBILITIES. What evolves in time without observation is the structure of
this collection/superposition of possibilities.
It does not confuse possibility with actuality then the model has clarity.
Of course it is a mystery why this model works as well as it does!
Best,
Lou K.
> On Mar 26, 2016, at 1:23 PM, Karl Javorszky wrote:
>
> Dear Lou,
>
>
>
> Thanks for the invitation to elaborate on the concept of quantum and how it
> connects to Wittgenstein’s taboo words and information.
>
> We may have problems understanding the concept of a quantum because the idea
> appears to be non-expressible by rational, logical speech. The grammar of
> logical sentences creates constraints on what can be said intelligibly (as
> Wittgenstein has pointed out). We can discuss the present King of France
> (even if there is no such thing there, in Russell’s example) because the
> grammar allows us to speak of places and things. The essence of rational
> speech is that it is consistent. We cannot speak exactly of things that may
> or may not be there, that may or not may have properties. Specifically, we
> cannot speak of unique, individual concepts, which we cannot contrast to such
> other concepts which we know.
>
> Let me show you what the natural numbers offer as a possible definition of
> such a concept that is transcending some logical categories.
>
> a) Preparation
>
> We do an accounting exercise on some numbers. (For some numerical reasons, it
> is best to speak of a collection that has 16 distinguishing categories on two
> kinds of objects: that is, we have (a,b) appearing as tuplets (1,1), (1,2),
> (2,2), (1,3), (2,3), (3,3), (1,4), (2,4), …, (16,16), that is altogether 136
> elements of a set.) These we sort on some aspects. Then we re-sort them into
> a different sorting order, based on some different aspects of (a,b). What we
> register is the properties of the cycle each element in included in during a
> reorder.
>
> b) Action
>
> We pick 1,2,3,… of the elements and discuss if, and if yes, in which and how
> many altogether, cycles these elements can be included while contemporaneous.
> Contemporaneous means “free of logical contradictions, is the case,
> consistent, assigning a place to an element” in spoken language, in the
> deictic language of numbers and tables it means that there is an empty cell
> in a White or True Table we can write this element into.
>
> We also mark in a separate Dark, Black or Negative Table (like a Bad Bank or
> a No-Fly List) all those cycles that are presently not playable, because of
> the element(s) being included in a cycle that cannot run concurrently with
> those that are in the Black Table.
>
> For the sake of accounting completeness, we also create a Grey Table, our
> Basic Table of Ignorance, wherein are initially included all cycles,
> wherefrom we move cycles either to the Possible or to the Not Possible
> Tables.
>
> As we pick an element, we assign it a place. At first, it is irrelevant,
> which order we assume to be the case. As we progress, the presence of
> elements will have generated a series of facts and/or assumptions which
> restrict the ways of either how we can place the element or how we can choose
> the order we wish to maintain. One may be reminded of variants of Go, Sudoku
> or the like.
>
> c) Evaluation
>
> We can formulate our observations in an assertive, but as well also in a
> negating way of describing the same state of the word. We can observe that
> the element e is on place p in order o, but as well we can observe that this
> deviates from order not-o, where either element e would be on place not-p, or
> on place p would be an element not-e. As at least elements e and not-e are
> numerically comparable (we know the extent of difference between (3,4) and
> (5,7)), so there is hope that this and the linear distance differences
> between places p and not-p allow constructing a measure for the distance
> between orders o and not-o.
>
> The contents of the Grey and Dark Tables are as descriptive of what we have
> done as the contents of our Positive Registry of Actions. We not only do talk
> about what Wittgenstein has said one should better leave alone, but we split
> the background to that what we talk about, that what is the case, into one
> part that is definitely false and one part, that which is simply unknown.
> That what Wittgenstein has delineated as the background
