[Fis] _ Re: _ Discussion

[Dr. Plamen L. Simeonov]

Dear Maxine, Lou, Pedro, Loet, John, Soeren and Colleagues,

first of all I wish to thank Maxine for providing a bit different
perspective upon the overall subject of the discussion theme, namely
phenomenology or better said “phenomenological philosophy” (since
“phenomenology” has acquired different meanings in the sciences in the
years). Despite that “action", as Pedro said, has been a widely discussed
topic, I think that Maxine’s note was meaning something else which deserves
attention and more thought.

On Tue, Apr 12, 2016 at 6:41 AM, Maxine Sheets-Johnstone 
wrote:

> To all colleagues,
>
> I hope I may voice a number of concerns that have arisen in the course
> of the ongoing discussions that are ostensibly about phenomenology and
> the life sciences.
>
> The concerns begin with a non-recognition of what is surely the ground
> floor of real-life, real-time realities, namely, animation, not in the
> sense of being alive or in opposition to the inanimate, but in the sense
> of motion, movement, kinetics. As Aristotle cogently remarked,
> “Nature is a principle of motion and change. . . . We must therefore see
> that we understand what motion is; for if it were unknown, nature too
> would be unknown” (Physics 200b12-14).
>
> Through and through--from animate organisms to an ever-changing world--
> movement is foundational to understandings of subject and world, and of
> subject/world relationships, and this whether subject and world are
> examined phenomenologically or scientifically. In short, movement is at
> the core of information and meaning, at the core of mind and consciousness,
> at the core of both gestural and verbal language, at the core of nervous
> system and organic functionings, at the core of molecular transformations,
> at the core of ellipses, electrons, gravity, waves, particles, and so on,
> and further, at the core of time, the concept, measurement, and meaning of
> time.
>
>
That the origins of meaning and purpose can be found in movement and life
is an interesting thought.
I think that this is what one could say about the ultimate goal of
Aristotle’s physics. It began being explained with the equations of Newton
about inanimate matter and finally landed at its origin ---  a curious loop
of recursion, reflection and self-reference --- with Schrödinger”s question
about what is life in the search of the lost purpose on the way to
explaining all kinds of movements.

All this is to remind us, that there are two kinds of knowledge (and
meaning): the incremental one with which most of us are accustomed, and
the“forked” one, similar to Everett’s split universes, providing a new
options for scrutinising, interpretation and understanding of the world we
live in. I think that this is the message which Maxine disseminates in this
forum. Maxine, please correct me if I am wrong. Understanding Husserl,
Heidegger and Marleau-Ponty is almost that difficult as understanding
quantum mechanics by non-specialists (as Alex Hankey told me in one of our
conversations), or Gödel by non-logicians and non-mathematicians. It is
difficult to follow the reasoning in each one of these domains, without
investing years of dedicated study, that only a few can afford in a single
life span. But that’s the reason why we have come together in this forum to
state opinions, ask questions and clarify remote subjects that are tough to
grasp alone.



> I enumerate below specifics with respect to what is essentially the
> foundational dynamic reality. The summary concerns are followed by
> references that document each concern.


These are indeed the concerns that motivated and moved human inquiry in the
era of the Greek philosophers, when theatre and mathematics were not that
far from each other. We need to come back to this kind of thinking and
understanding far-fetched stuff also by utilising our intuition, because
the roots of both science and the humanities are the same: our human
nature. Some folks from these remote fields, like Pauli and Jung, were able
to speak to each other. Others, despite being geniuses in their fields
remained stuck in them and could not follow a different viewpoint, and yet
they felt there is something beyond their own perspective and were longing
for it.

Anyway, I will stop here thanking Lou for his note on Gödel that reminded
us that this man has spent many years pondering on his theorems before
revealing them to the world. How many people are doing this today in our
publish-or-perish modern world of science?
It is not easy to acquire groundbreaking knowledge. Thanks to the
philosophers for reminding us of Kuhn’s work.

Have a nice week!

Plamen



> If further specifics are wanted or
> if specific articles are wanted, kindly contact m...@uoregon.edu
>
> (1). Instincts and/or feelings motivate animate organisms to move.
> Without such instincts or feelings there would be no disposition
> to move. An ‘animate organism’ would in truth be akin to a statue,
> a statue 

Re: [Fis] _ Re: _ Discussion

[Loet Leydesdorff]

Dear Lou and colleagues, 

 

The reasoning is very clear. Thank you.

 

(…)

At this point the being has attained linguistic self-reference. The being can 
say “I am the meta-name of my own naming process.”

This nexus or fixed point of self-reference can occur naturally in a being that 
has sufficient ability to distinguish, name and create.

 

It seems to me that as language arises from interhuman interactions, it takes 
over as the agent of change. One is called by a name which is then codified by 
that name.

 

This distinction is important because languages can be further differentiated 
and codified. Thomas Kuhn, for example, gives the example of “atom” having a 
meaning codified in some area of physics differently from physical chemistry. 
While we tend to call you “Lou”, the bureaucracy will call you “Louis”, and 
your wife may call you with yet another variant. These different names may 
enable you to enrich your “I”, without loosing a self-reference. I would call 
this self-reference with the additional degree of freedom for calling itself 
consciousness. Without consciousness, the name is only a semiotic “actant”. 
(Perhaps, a dog is a good example.)

 

The issue is important because once constructed, the codes guide the meaning 
(e.g., “atom”) at the supra-individual level. The control at individual level 
is only consciousness, including one’s own (idiosyncratic) degree of 
meta-reflexive freedom. From the perspective of communication, the latter 
provides the variation; in scholarly discourse, for example, knowledge claims 
are submitted. In other words, the epistemological grounding is to be found in 
the “inter” of inter-subjectivity. This goes against our (neo-liberal and 
enlightenment) intuition that agency grounds existence. The priority of 
understanding the communication tends to move the order among the sciences to a 
post-enlightenment one: a sociological epistemology becomes the center with the 
option to be operationalized in a sociology of scientific communication.

 

The additional degree of freedom in consciousness moreover enables us to 
participate selectively in the different domains. Latour called this 
“infra-reflexivity”. The selections shape our identity. The sciences are 
infra-reflexive to the extent that one can intervene across disciplinary 
language games; i.e., in other jargon. 

 

Best.

#Loet 

 

 

In this way, I convince myself that there is nothing special about 
self-reference. It arises naturally in observing systems. And I convince myself 
that self-reference is central to an organized and reflective cognition. Even 
though it is empty to say that “I am the one who says I.” this emptiness 
becomes though language an organizing center for our explorations of our own 
world and the worlds of others. The beauty of “I am the one who says I.” is 
that it is indeed a vacuous reference. Anyone can take it on. The “I” can refer 
to any observing system sophisticated enough to give it meaning.

 

My example should be expanded into a discussion of the role and creation of 
meaning in observing systems, but I shall stop here.

 

I am interested in how Soren Brier will react to these, perhaps seen as 
indirect, remarks on mind and meaning.

I take thought and the realm of discrimination as the start of epistemology and 
I do not regard the immediate apparent objects of our worlds as anything but 
incredibly decorated entities

appearing after a long history of indicative shift. What is their original 
nature? It is empty. Emptiness is form and form is emptiness. The form we take 
to exist arises from framing nothing.

 

Now, I caution you in replying to please read carefully what I have written 
here.

I will not reply directly to the discussion for another week or so.

 

Best,

Lou Kauffman

P.S. The indicative shift is precisely the formalism in back of the workings of 
Goedel’s Theorem.

See “Categorical Pairs and the Indicative Shift”, 
http://arxiv.org/pdf/1102.2048.pdf

 

 

 

On Apr 11, 2016, at 11:41 PM, Maxine Sheets-Johnstone  wrote:

 

To all colleagues,

I hope I may voice a number of concerns that have arisen in the course
of the ongoing discussions that are ostensibly about phenomenology and
the life sciences.

The concerns begin with a non-recognition of what is surely the ground
floor of real-life, real-time realities, namely, animation, not in the
sense of being alive or in opposition to the inanimate, but in the sense
of motion, movement, kinetics. As Aristotle cogently remarked,
“Nature is a principle of motion and change. . . . We must therefore see
that we understand what motion is; for if it were unknown, nature too
would be unknown” (Physics 200b12-14).

Through and through--from animate organisms to an ever-changing world--
movement is foundational to understandings of subject and world, and of
subject/world relationships, and this whether subject and world are
examined phenomenologically or scientifically. In