Re: [Fis] _ Re: _ FIS discusion

[Loet Leydesdorff]

Dear colleagues, 

 

In my opinion, one can distinguish between the order of generation and emerging 
control. While consciousness (perhaps) arises from matter in terms of its 
generation, and language perhaps from movements, once these next-order systems 
levels have arisen, they tend to take over control and to reorganize the order 
within and among underlying systems levels. Language, for example, can further 
be developed into specialist languages, computer languages, etc., which affect 
(discipline) our behavior from above. The reduction of the complexity of 
language—used among other things to give meaning to events—to linguistic 
behavior by language carriers becomes then one research program among other 
research programs (e.g., Stan’s program to organize the world in terms of 
hierarchies).

 

One observes historical instantiations that may be organized along 
trajectories. Evolutionary, this generates variation and remains 
phenotypical/phenomenological. The selection mechanisms are not directly 
observable; they are specified by us in scholarly discourse and 
knowledge-based. Their specification sometimes provides more sophisticated 
(since theoretically informed) meaning to the same phenomena. The puzzle 
fascinating me is how this knowledge and information order transforms the 
underlying orders; first as feedback, but then increasingly as feedforward. 
Note that this does not de-legitimate the reductionists programs, but reduces 
their philosophical aspiration to one among possible research programs. 

 

Best,

Loet

 

  _  

Loet Leydesdorff 

Professor, University of Amsterdam
Amsterdam School of Communication Research (ASCoR)

  l...@leydesdorff.net ;  
 http://www.leydesdorff.net/ 
Associate Faculty,   SPRU, University of Sussex; 

Guest Professor   Zhejiang Univ., Hangzhou; 
Visiting Professor,   ISTIC, Beijing;

Visiting Professor,   Birkbeck, University of London; 

  
http://scholar.google.com/citations?user=ych9gNYJ&hl=en

 

From: Fis [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] On Behalf Of Alex Hankey
Sent: Sunday, May 01, 2016 1:09 AM
To: FIS Webinar
Cc: Maxine Sheets-Johnstone
Subject: [Fis] _ Re: _ FIS discusion

 

In Answer to Maxine's comments 

 

While I understand Maxine's concern that we remain a phenomenological 
orientation in these discussions, and am gratified that in places we do seem to 
be achieving that, I also feel that many of us are here to bring our own 
particular perspectives, whether in Maths (Louis), Physics (myself), or 
Philosophy (albeit with Pragmatist leanings - Soren Brier), and to leave the 
phenomenologists themselves (such as Maxine) to take what is of use and 
translate it more precisely into terms that phenomenologists will accept more 
readily. 

 

For myself, I often have to listen to ideas (or students' questions) from those 
not familiar with strict scientific technicalities, and then to answer them in 
a language chosen for to try and avoid them being swamped (blinded?) by 
science. 

 

At the same time, I would like to thank Maxine for the depth and clarity of her 
thoughts - particularly her comment, "The bodies we are not", which I read 
through Vedanta-tinged spectacles (!!), her wonderful quotes from Aristotle, 
which were for me an eye opener. 

 

With regard to the referenced article on 'How Consciousness arises in Matter" 
in the Journal  of Consciousness Studies, it is clear that the current 
discussion is less concerned with description and more with how biological 
systems can support the sense of agency that leads to organism movement(s) in 
response to various stimuli. 

 

Here at the 2016 Science of Consciousness Conference in Tucson, there have been 
marvellous presentations on behaviour of babies, and how to appreciate various 
levels (or strengths) of self-awareness of agency, and of what kinds of 
behaviour may be expected in the first year, or two or three years of life as 
the brain grows and synaptic connections develop different levels of complexity 
in different brain regions like the (pre) frontal, auditory and visual 
cortices. The more synaptic connections the more complex behaviours and the 
more refined movements become possible. But with babies, we are limited to 
descriptions from the outside, rather than narratives by the 'person' 
him/her-self. 

 

On 30 April 2016 at 10:37, Maxine Sheets-Johnstone  wrote:

To FIS colleagues,

First, an open-to-all response to Lou Kaufmann:

Thank you for your lengthy tutorial—some time back--but I wonder and am
genuinely puzzled given the “phenomenology-life sciences theme” why none
of the articles that I referenced were read and a response generated at least
in part on the basis of that reading in conjunction with your o

Re: [Fis] _ Re: _ Fwd: Vol 25, #32, Nature of Self

[Francesco Rizzo]

Cari Alex e Stan, Cari Tutti,
condivido pienamente l'espistemologica impostazione filosofico-scientifica
di Alex e la logico-matematica insiemistica e/o la "gerarchia della
sussunzione in evoluzione" di Stan. Comunque, il riduzionismo non appaga nè
paga.
Un abbraccio collettivo alla rete Fis.
Francesco

2016-05-01 0:38 GMT+02:00 Alex Hankey :

> It is good to see the discussion developing into deep considerations of
> the history (histories?) of the metaphysical understanding of the nature of
> the self, the soul, and the world(s) of experience, including the material
> universe in which it finds itself.
>
> I do not claim to have any great expertise in understanding Nagarjuna's
> approach, but we have to realise that both he and the great exponent of
> Vedanta, Adishankara, also known as Shankaracharya (meaning teacher of
> liberation), are said to have used almost identical formulations, albeit
> with a different emphasis. While Nagarjuna used the concept of emptiness as
> the foundation, Adishankara stayed within the traditional Vedic scheme
> where 'fullness' or completeness / wholeness is regarded as fundamental.
>
> While it is certainly true that to experience the 'self' clearly, all
> mental content has to allowed to settle down and fade away (one aspect of
> 'Chitta Vritti Nirodha', a definition of Yoga) the condition for
> maintaining that stably is that the subtle energy, prana (life-breath),
> should be enlivened fully, which is why the enlivenment (ayama) of prana
> i.e. pranaayama (normal spelling pranayama, in which the long 'a' is not
> explicitly emphasised) is a fundamental Yoga exercise, usually practised
> before meditation (Dhyana) practices in which the mind moves to its empty
> state (samadhi). As can be seen, increasing the prana (life-energy) to a
> state of fullness is thus an integral part of attaining a stable state of
> pure consciousness (samadhi).
>
> It is the fullness of the state of prana that stabilizes the mind from
> influences that might bring it out of samadhi. In particular, various
> emotions can block the flows of subtle energies (several websites explain
> this in detail e.g. Google on acupuncture meridians - emotions). Fullness
> of prana is thus considered equivalent to emotional stability, which
> requires balanced positive emotions and feelings.
>
> Both Nagarjuna and Adishankara are then concerned with how it is that
> all-that-exists emerges from the original absolute. Nagarjuna evidently
> shows that all things including all sentient beings have a 'dependent'
> existence - they do not exist in and of themselves. Adishankara on the
> other hand uses Vedic physics and metaphysics to trace how they emerge at
> various levels of perception. The essence of his argument is to show how
> the mental sensory apparatus came from the original source / Absolute, and
> thus how all objects of sensation can be traced back there.
>
> In modern terms, all things we have ever experientially encountered are
> quantum fields, and all quantum fields seem to have emerged from the Big
> Bang via the process of symmetry breaking at its source - the inflationary
> process. But symmetry breaking is an instability, and when one inspects the
> information states that that instability supports, they turn out to have a
> similar structure to O===>, the one proposed in the material that was
> distributed.
>
> I feel that the role and significance of instabilities in the physical
> world, particularly life processes, has not been adequately expounded and
> that we may only be beginning to understand them.
>
> I hope this helps.
>
> Alex
>
> On 30 April 2016 at 08:18, steven bindeman  wrote:
>
>> I hope the following passage I’ve written on Nagarjuna will be of use for
>> this discussion on the nature of self. The passage is from a manuscript
>> I’ve just completed on silence and postmodernism.
>>
>> Nagarjuna’s thinking is deeply conversant with silence and with the use
>> of paradox as well. For him, contradictory things are never “either/or,”
>> but are always “both/and.” Refusing to choose between opposing metaphysical
>> problems, he would recommend responding through silence instead. For an
>> example of his reductive reasoning process, consider the following:
>>
>> Whatever is dependently co-arisen
>> That is explained to be emptiness.
>> That, being a dependent designation,
>> Is itself the middle way.
>>
>> Something that is not dependently arisen
>> Such a thing does not exist.
>> Therefore a nonempty thing
>> Does not exist.
>>
>> Nagarjuna is criticizing the common paradoxical occurrence that when we
>> attribute abstract concepts (“something that does not dependently exist”)
>> like emptiness to the status of “reality” (like we do with the Platonic
>> forms), then they seem to be applicable to everything, while on the other
>> hand when we emphasize instead the individual uniqueness and particularity
>> of any one thing (“whatever is dependently co-arisen”), this emphasis

[Fis] _ Re: _ FIS discusion

[Alex Hankey]

In Answer to Maxine's comments

While I understand Maxine's concern that we remain a phenomenological
orientation in these discussions, and am gratified that in places we do
seem to be achieving that, I also feel that many of us are here to bring
our own particular perspectives, whether in Maths (Louis), Physics
(myself), or Philosophy (albeit with Pragmatist leanings - Soren Brier),
and to leave the phenomenologists themselves (such as Maxine) to take what
is of use and translate it more precisely into terms that phenomenologists
will accept more readily.

For myself, I often have to listen to ideas (or students' questions) from
those not familiar with strict scientific technicalities, and then to
answer them in a language chosen for to try and avoid them being swamped
(blinded?) by science.

At the same time, I would like to thank Maxine for the depth and clarity of
her thoughts - particularly her comment, "The bodies we are not", which I
read through Vedanta-tinged spectacles (!!), her wonderful quotes from
Aristotle, which were for me an eye opener.

With regard to the referenced article on 'How Consciousness arises in
Matter" in the Journal  of Consciousness Studies, it is clear that the
current discussion is less concerned with description and more with how
biological systems can support the sense of agency that leads to organism
movement(s) in response to various stimuli.

Here at the 2016 Science of Consciousness Conference in Tucson, there have
been marvellous presentations on behaviour of babies, and how to appreciate
various levels (or strengths) of self-awareness of agency, and of what
kinds of behaviour may be expected in the first year, or two or three years
of life as the brain grows and synaptic connections develop different
levels of complexity in different brain regions like the (pre) frontal,
auditory and visual cortices. The more synaptic connections the more
complex behaviours and the more refined movements become possible. But with
babies, we are limited to descriptions from the outside, rather than
narratives by the 'person' him/her-self.

On 30 April 2016 at 10:37, Maxine Sheets-Johnstone  wrote:

> To FIS colleagues,
>
> First, an open-to-all response to Lou Kaufmann:
>
> Thank you for your lengthy tutorial—some time back--but I wonder and am
> genuinely puzzled given the “phenomenology-life sciences theme” why none
> of the articles that I referenced were read and a response generated at
> least
> in part on the basis of that reading in conjunction with your own work.
>
> Is there some reason why they were not taken up, especially perhaps the
> article
> identified as being a critique of Godels’s incompleteness theorem from a
> phenomenological perspective? I would think that you and perhaps FIS
> persons
> generally would feel particularly inquisitive about that article. I would
> think
> too that people in FIS would be particularly inquisitive about the
> reference to
> Biological Cybernetics. Viewpoints that differ from one’s own are by some
> thought
> a waste of time, but for my part, I think they rightly broaden a
> discussion, which
> is not to say that entrenched or deeply held views are not solidly based,
> much less
> wrong, but that they have the possibility of being amplified through a
> consideration
> of the same topic from a different perspective.
>
> For example: Language did not arise deus ex machina, and it certainly did
> not arise
> in the form of graphs or writing, but in the form of sounding.  Awareness
> of oneself
> as a sound-maker is basic to what we identify as a ‘verbal language’.
> Moreover this
> awareness and the verbal language itself are both foundationally a matter
> of both
> movment and hearing. A recognition of this fact of life would seem to me
> to be of
> interest, even primordial interest, to anyone concerned with
> ‘SELF-REFERENCE', its
> essential nature and substantive origins.
>
> With respect to ‘substantive origins’, does it not behoove us to inquire
> as to the genesis
> of a particular capacity rather than take for granted that ‘this is the
> way things are and
> have always been’?. For example, and as pointed out elsewhere, the
> traditional conception
> of language being composed of arbitrary elements—-hence “symbols”--cannot
> be assumed with
> either epistemological or scientific impunity. Until the origin of verbal
> language is accounted
> for by reconstructing a particular lifeworld, there is no way of
> understanding how arbitrary
> sounds could come to be made  . . . let alone serve as carriers of
> assigned meaning.
> What is essential is first that arbitrary sounds be distinguished from
> non-arbitrary sounds,
> and second, that a paradigm of signification exist. Further, no creature
> can speak a language
> for which its body is unprepared. In other words, a certain
> sensory-kinetic body is essential
> to the advent of verbal language. In short, in the beginning, thinking
> moved along analogical
> lines rather than sym

[Fis] _ Re: _ Fwd: Vol 25, #32, Nature of Self

[Alex Hankey]

It is good to see the discussion developing into deep considerations of the
history (histories?) of the metaphysical understanding of the nature of the
self, the soul, and the world(s) of experience, including the material
universe in which it finds itself.

I do not claim to have any great expertise in understanding Nagarjuna's
approach, but we have to realise that both he and the great exponent of
Vedanta, Adishankara, also known as Shankaracharya (meaning teacher of
liberation), are said to have used almost identical formulations, albeit
with a different emphasis. While Nagarjuna used the concept of emptiness as
the foundation, Adishankara stayed within the traditional Vedic scheme
where 'fullness' or completeness / wholeness is regarded as fundamental.

While it is certainly true that to experience the 'self' clearly, all
mental content has to allowed to settle down and fade away (one aspect of
'Chitta Vritti Nirodha', a definition of Yoga) the condition for
maintaining that stably is that the subtle energy, prana (life-breath),
should be enlivened fully, which is why the enlivenment (ayama) of prana
i.e. pranaayama (normal spelling pranayama, in which the long 'a' is not
explicitly emphasised) is a fundamental Yoga exercise, usually practised
before meditation (Dhyana) practices in which the mind moves to its empty
state (samadhi). As can be seen, increasing the prana (life-energy) to a
state of fullness is thus an integral part of attaining a stable state of
pure consciousness (samadhi).

It is the fullness of the state of prana that stabilizes the mind from
influences that might bring it out of samadhi. In particular, various
emotions can block the flows of subtle energies (several websites explain
this in detail e.g. Google on acupuncture meridians - emotions). Fullness
of prana is thus considered equivalent to emotional stability, which
requires balanced positive emotions and feelings.

Both Nagarjuna and Adishankara are then concerned with how it is that
all-that-exists emerges from the original absolute. Nagarjuna evidently
shows that all things including all sentient beings have a 'dependent'
existence - they do not exist in and of themselves. Adishankara on the
other hand uses Vedic physics and metaphysics to trace how they emerge at
various levels of perception. The essence of his argument is to show how
the mental sensory apparatus came from the original source / Absolute, and
thus how all objects of sensation can be traced back there.

In modern terms, all things we have ever experientially encountered are
quantum fields, and all quantum fields seem to have emerged from the Big
Bang via the process of symmetry breaking at its source - the inflationary
process. But symmetry breaking is an instability, and when one inspects the
information states that that instability supports, they turn out to have a
similar structure to O===>, the one proposed in the material that was
distributed.

I feel that the role and significance of instabilities in the physical
world, particularly life processes, has not been adequately expounded and
that we may only be beginning to understand them.

I hope this helps.

Alex

On 30 April 2016 at 08:18, steven bindeman  wrote:

> I hope the following passage I’ve written on Nagarjuna will be of use for
> this discussion on the nature of self. The passage is from a manuscript
> I’ve just completed on silence and postmodernism.
>
> Nagarjuna’s thinking is deeply conversant with silence and with the use of
> paradox as well. For him, contradictory things are never “either/or,” but
> are always “both/and.” Refusing to choose between opposing metaphysical
> problems, he would recommend responding through silence instead. For an
> example of his reductive reasoning process, consider the following:
>
> Whatever is dependently co-arisen
> That is explained to be emptiness.
> That, being a dependent designation,
> Is itself the middle way.
>
> Something that is not dependently arisen
> Such a thing does not exist.
> Therefore a nonempty thing
> Does not exist.
>
> Nagarjuna is criticizing the common paradoxical occurrence that when we
> attribute abstract concepts (“something that does not dependently exist”)
> like emptiness to the status of “reality” (like we do with the Platonic
> forms), then they seem to be applicable to everything, while on the other
> hand when we emphasize instead the individual uniqueness and particularity
> of any one thing (“whatever is dependently co-arisen”), this emphasis makes
> it impossible to  categorize its likeness with other things. Nagarjuna’s
> point is that the abstract concept of emptiness and the concrete nature of
> any particular empty thing are in fact codependent. He calls this
> codependency “Conditioned Arising.” His “middle way” resolves the paradox
> by viewing neither the abstract idea nor the concrete thing as having a
> separate reality — both instead are characterized as “‘thought
> constructions’ founded on experience

[Fis] _ Fwd: _ FIS discusion

[Louis H Kauffman]

> Dear Professor Sheets-Johnstone,
> It would be best if we keep our discussion to the contents of our letters 
> rather than assume that we each have read all of the other’s work.
> In my case I was banned from this forum for two weeks for too many mailings. 
> Right now I am at a conference and I have not counted if I am over the limit 
> for this week.
> I will comment in text below on your letter.
> Best,
> Lou Kauffman
> 
>> On Apr 30, 2016, at 1:37 PM, Maxine Sheets-Johnstone  
>> wrote:
>> 
>> To FIS colleagues,
>> 
>> First, an open-to-all response to Lou Kaufmann:
>> 
>> Thank you for your lengthy tutorial—some time back--but I wonder and am
>> genuinely puzzled given the “phenomenology-life sciences theme” why none
>> of the articles that I referenced were read and a response generated at least
>> in part on the basis of that reading in conjunction with your own work.
>> 
>> Is there some reason why they were not taken up, especially perhaps the 
>> article
>> identified as being a critique of Godels’s incompleteness theorem from a
>> phenomenological perspective? I would think that you and perhaps FIS persons
>> generally would feel particularly inquisitive about that article. I would 
>> think
>> too that people in FIS would be particularly inquisitive about the reference 
>> to
>> Biological Cybernetics. Viewpoints that differ from one’s own are by some 
>> thought
>> a waste of time, but for my part, I think they rightly broaden a discussion, 
>> which
>> is not to say that entrenched or deeply held views are not solidly based, 
>> much less
>> wrong, but that they have the possibility of being amplified through a 
>> consideration
>> of the same topic from a different perspective.
> 
> I for one, would appreciate your concise summary of your critique of Goedel.
>> 
>> For example: Language did not arise deus ex machina, and it certainly did 
>> not arise
>> in the form of graphs or writing, but in the form of sounding.  
> 
> Yes! And Goedelian work depends crucially on formalized written language. 
> Even mathematicians who formalize much less realize that Goedel does not 
> apply to their work as they create new language. (I for one am in this camp.)
> 
>> Awareness of oneself
>> as a sound-maker is basic to what we identify as a ‘verbal language’. 
>> Moreover this
>> awareness and the verbal language itself are both foundationally a matter of 
>> both
>> movment and hearing. A recognition of this fact of life would seem to me to 
>> be of
>> interest, even primordial interest, to anyone concerned with 
>> ‘SELF-REFERENCE', its
>> essential nature and substantive origins.
> 
> Thus self-reference is essential in the stability of our voice.
>> 
>> With respect to ‘substantive origins’, does it not behoove us to inquire as 
>> to the genesis
>> of a particular capacity rather than take for granted that ‘this is the way 
>> things are and
>> have always been’?.
> 
> Indeed! And it is essential to anyone would engages in design or invention.
> 
>> For example, and as pointed out elsewhere, the traditional conception
>> of language being composed of arbitrary elements—-hence “symbols”--cannot be 
>> assumed with
>> either epistemological or scientific impunity. Until the origin of verbal 
>> language is accounted
>> for by reconstructing a particular lifeworld, there is no way of 
>> understanding how arbitrary
>> sounds could come to be made  . . . let alone serve as carriers of assigned 
>> meaning.
>> What is essential is first that arbitrary sounds be distinguished from 
>> non-arbitrary sounds,
>> and second, that a paradigm of signification exist. Further, no creature can 
>> speak a language
>> for which its body is unprepared. In other words, a certain sensory-kinetic 
>> body is essential
>> to the advent of verbal language. In short, in the beginning, thinking moved 
>> along analogical
>> lines rather than symbolic ones, hence along the lines of iconicity rather 
>> than along arbitrary
>> lines.
> 
> Yes! And this is utterly the case for anyone who hopes to do creative 
> mathematics. It is not a body of symbols fixed in stone.
> For many of us, geometry and topology is a key to getting back to the senses. 
> And then again, we have other issues. For example the behaviour of polarizing 
> material moves toward 
> quantum experience and the logic of that experience is not Boolean but 
> quantum. We live in domains of extended bodily experience.
> 
> I should also say that if we look at our actual experiences in using and 
> learning to use “symbols” such as learning again and again about writing and 
> the underlying creativity of that, we find that this ‘form drawing’ is as 
> rich a domain for phenomenology as is auditory speech and indeed linked with 
> deeply. One of the reasons I speak of Laws of Form is because in continually 
> learning that, one is thrown again and again into examining the act of 
> drawing and thereby creating a symbol system where each symbol (perhaps a 

[Fis] _ FIS discusion

[Maxine Sheets-Johnstone]

To FIS colleagues,

First, an open-to-all response to Lou Kaufmann:

Thank you for your lengthy tutorial—some time back--but I wonder and am
genuinely puzzled given the “phenomenology-life sciences theme” why none
of the articles that I referenced were read and a response generated at 
least

in part on the basis of that reading in conjunction with your own work.

Is there some reason why they were not taken up, especially perhaps the 
article

identified as being a critique of Godels’s incompleteness theorem from a
phenomenological perspective? I would think that you and perhaps FIS 
persons
generally would feel particularly inquisitive about that article. I 
would think
too that people in FIS would be particularly inquisitive about the 
reference to
Biological Cybernetics. Viewpoints that differ from one’s own are by 
some thought
a waste of time, but for my part, I think they rightly broaden a 
discussion, which
is not to say that entrenched or deeply held views are not solidly 
based, much less
wrong, but that they have the possibility of being amplified through a 
consideration

of the same topic from a different perspective.

For example: Language did not arise deus ex machina, and it certainly 
did not arise
in the form of graphs or writing, but in the form of sounding.  
Awareness of oneself
as a sound-maker is basic to what we identify as a ‘verbal language’. 
Moreover this
awareness and the verbal language itself are both foundationally a 
matter of both
movment and hearing. A recognition of this fact of life would seem to me 
to be of
interest, even primordial interest, to anyone concerned with 
‘SELF-REFERENCE', its

essential nature and substantive origins.

With respect to ‘substantive origins’, does it not behoove us to inquire 
as to the genesis
of a particular capacity rather than take for granted that ‘this is the 
way things are and
have always been’?. For example, and as pointed out elsewhere, the 
traditional conception
of language being composed of arbitrary elements—-hence 
“symbols”--cannot be assumed with
either epistemological or scientific impunity. Until the origin of 
verbal language is accounted
for by reconstructing a particular lifeworld, there is no way of 
understanding how arbitrary
sounds could come to be made  . . . let alone serve as carriers of 
assigned meaning.
What is essential is first that arbitrary sounds be distinguished from 
non-arbitrary sounds,
and second, that a paradigm of signification exist. Further, no creature 
can speak a language
for which its body is unprepared. In other words, a certain 
sensory-kinetic body is essential
to the advent of verbal language. In short, in the beginning, thinking 
moved along analogical
lines rather than symbolic ones, hence along the lines of iconicity 
rather than along arbitrary
lines. See the extensive writings of linguistic anthropologist Mary 
LeCron Foster and
Sheets-Johnstone’s The Roots of Thinking, Chapter 6, "On the Origin of 
Language." Foster's
finely documented analyses show that the meaning of the original sound 
elements of language
was the analogue of their articulatory gestures. Similarly, in my own 
analysis, I start not with
symbols or symbolic thought but at the beginning, namely, with a 
sensory-kinetic analysis of the

arbitrary and the non-arbitrary.

Husserl wrote that "each free act [i.e., an act involving reason] has 
its comet’s tail of Nature.”
In effect, living meanings are, from a phenomenological perspective, 
historically complex phenomena.
They have a natural history that, in its fullest sense, is bound not 
both ontogenetically
and phylogenetically. Like living forms, living meanings hold—-and have 
held—-possibilities
of further development, which is to say that they have evolved over time 
and that investigations
of their origin and historical development tell us something fundamental 
about life in general and
human life, including individual human lives, in particular. WITH 
RESPECT TO ORIGINS AND HISTORICALLY

COMPLEX PHENOMENA, consider the following examples:

Information is commonly language-dependent whereas meaning is not.
We come into the world moving; we are precisely not stillborn.
We humans all learn our bodies and learn to move ourselves.
Movement forms the I that moves before the I that moves forms movement.
Infants are not pre-linguistic; language is post-kinetic.
Nonlinguistic corporeal concepts ground fundamental verbal concepts.


To all FIS colleagues re Alex Hankey's presentation:

I thought at first that we might be talking past each other because it 
was my understanding
that this 4-part discussion was about phenomenology and the life 
sciences. What this means to
me is that we conjoin real-life, real-time first-person experience, thus 
methodologically
anchored phenomenological analyses, with real-life-real-time 
third-person experience, thus
methodologically anchored empirical analyses. With this last 
conversation between Rafael and
Alex, the terrain seems t

[Fis] _ Fwd: Vol 25, #32, Nature of Self

[steven bindeman]

I hope the following passage I’ve written on Nagarjuna will be of use for this 
discussion on the nature of self. The passage is from a manuscript I’ve just 
completed on silence and postmodernism.

Nagarjuna’s thinking is deeply conversant with silence and with the use of 
paradox as well. For him, contradictory things are never “either/or,” but are 
always “both/and.” Refusing to choose between opposing metaphysical problems, 
he would recommend responding through silence instead. For an example of his 
reductive reasoning process, consider the following: 

Whatever is dependently co-arisen
That is explained to be emptiness.
That, being a dependent designation,
Is itself the middle way.

Something that is not dependently arisen
Such a thing does not exist.
Therefore a nonempty thing
Does not exist.

Nagarjuna is criticizing the common paradoxical occurrence that when we 
attribute abstract concepts (“something that does not dependently exist”) like 
emptiness to the status of “reality” (like we do with the Platonic forms), then 
they seem to be applicable to everything, while on the other hand when we 
emphasize instead the individual uniqueness and particularity of any one thing 
(“whatever is dependently co-arisen”), this emphasis makes it impossible to  
categorize its likeness with other things. Nagarjuna’s point is that the 
abstract concept of emptiness and the concrete nature of any particular empty 
thing are in fact codependent. He calls this codependency “Conditioned 
Arising.” His “middle way” resolves the paradox by viewing neither the abstract 
idea nor the concrete thing as having a separate reality — both instead are 
characterized as “‘thought constructions’ founded on experience.’ As such, they 
are not absolutely real or absolutely unreal. …This middle path could thus be 
adopted in understanding all forms of experience, whether they be linguistic, 
social, political, moral, or religious.”

Another way of approaching an understanding of the middle way has to do with 
recognizing it as constituting a resolution of the identity/difference problem. 
 According to standard Buddhist doctrine the most dangerous false view possible 
is the belief in a permanent, independent self (also commonly referred to as 
the concept of identity). This notion of self is symptomatic of our deepest 
fears, concerning things like death and the possibility of our personal 
nonexistence. The concept of difference, which is the other side of the 
problem, is the belief that nothing is real; it also asserts the absence of all 
identities. This position would lead to the most mundane things becoming 
unintelligible. Nagarjuna’s solution to this problem is his assertion that 
neither identity nor difference is real. Both notions, when seen properly, are 
“empty” of self-essence. They can exist only together and not separately. 
Nagarjuna’s way of resolving this problem, by pointing to the interdependency 
of identity and difference, is remarkably similar to the one proposed by 
Merleau-Ponty many years later.

Steve Bindeman

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Re: [Fis] Fwd: Vol 25, #32, Nature of Self

[Stanley N Salthe]

Lou, Alex -- Here is another use of set theoretical brackets (the
subsumption hierarchy in evolution):  {  ? -> {physical world -> {material
world -> {biological world -> {social world }

STAN

On Sat, Apr 30, 2016 at 2:14 AM, Louis H Kauffman  wrote:

> On Pedro’s recommendation, I am forwarding this exchange to the list.
> Best,
> Lou
>
> Begin forwarded message:
>
> *From: *Louis H Kauffman 
> *Subject: **Re: Vol 25, #32, Nature of Self*
> *Date: *April 29, 2016 at 12:12:26 PM EDT
> *To: *Alex Hankey 
> *Cc: *"Pedro C. Marijuan" 
>
> Dear Alex,
> In set theory, the empty set can be regarded as ‘framing nothing’.
> Thus it is denoted by an empty container {  }.
> The properties of the container are not relevant, only that ‘it’ manages
> the act of containment.
> “We therefore take the form of distinction for the form.”
> From there, one generates all the multiplicities in mathematics by further
> acts of framing.
> {  }
> { { } }
> { { }, { { } } }
> ad infinitum.
> If we said this in LOF it would be essentially the same, but parsimonious
> in that the comma as an extra distinction would not be needed.
> If A is a set, then {A} is another set obtained by the act of framing. We
> see it all as ‘framing nothing’ when the sets are traced back to their
> empty origins as in
> the layers of an onion. Some layering might have to be traced back forever
> alas as in {…}. This is why set theorists are not happy to have
> sets that are members of themselves at the foundation. Nevertheless, in
> order to have language at all, self-reference is necessary. In LOF the mark
> < > is seen to be a distinction and to refer to a distinction and so refers
> to itself.
> At that point one realizes that in the form, the mark and the reader or
> writer or observer are identical. Tat tvam asi.
> Best,
> Lou
>
> On Apr 29, 2016, at 5:47 AM, Alex Hankey  wrote:
>
> RE 1 Louis Kauffman: Emptiness is form and form is emptiness. The form we
> take to exist arises from framing nothing.
>
> RE 2: The objects of our thought and perception are so laden with the
> names and symbols that have been shifted to them, that their ?original
> nature? is nearly invisible.
>
> ME 1: Many philosophers of the East, such as Nagarjuna and Adishankara
> agree that when one realizes that the real 'Self' has no form (and no
> history of change) that this frees the embodied soul from being trapped in
> forms that get reincarnated in time. It is the Ultimate Liberating
> Realization!
>
> The Maharishi International University mathematician, Michael Weinless,
> formerly an Asst Prof at Harvard, was correspondingly fond of RusselL's
> distinction between ϕ and [ϕ].
>
> Is this the same as what you are referring to, the 'framing of nothing'?
>
> ME(2): I suspect that the cognitions of a fully enlightened person is
> acutely aware of the additional nonsense that has surrounded the original
> simplicity in such cases.
>
> E.G. In the webinar, I became acutely aware of many layers of academic
> comment / prejudice etc. that surround almost every seemingly innocent
> discussion question.
>
> --
> Alex Hankey M.A. (Cantab.) PhD (M.I.T.)
> Distinguished Professor of Yoga and Physical Science,
> SVYASA, Eknath Bhavan, 19 Gavipuram Circle
> Bangalore 560019, Karnataka, India
> Mobile (Intn'l): +44 7710 534195
> Mobile (India) +91 900 800 8789
> 
>
> 2015 JPBMB Special Issue on Integral Biomathics: Life Sciences,
> Mathematics and Phenomenological Philosophy
> 
>
>
>
>
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