Re: [FRIAM] What is an agent [was: Philosophy and Science}

[Nicholas Thompson]

Some examples I like to think about:

Waves arrange pebbles on a beach from small to large

A puddle maintains its temperature at 32 degrees as long as it has ice in
it.

The carotid sinus maintains the acidity of the blood by causing us to
breath more oxygen when it gets to acid.  (I hope I have that right.

An old-fashioned thermostat maintains the temperature of a house by
maintaining the level of a vial of mercury attached to a bi-metallic coil.

Russ, the objection would have with your definition is that it is
explanatory.   An explanatory  definition identifies a phenomenon with its
causes, bypassing  the phenomenon that raises the need for an explanation
in the first place?   What is the relation between agents and their
surroundings that makes them seem agentish?  Having answered that question,
your explanation now comes into play.

The thing about the above examples that makes them all seem agenty is that
they keep bringing the system back to the same place.  The thing about them
that makes them seem less agenty is that they have only one means to do so.
Give that thermostat a solar panel, and a heat pump, and an oil furnace and
have it switch from one to the other as circumstances vary, now the
thermostat becomes much more agenty.

Does that make any sense?  I think the nastiest problems here are (1)
keeping the levels of organization straight and (2) teasing out the
individual that is the agent.

Nick

On Fri, Jul 14, 2023 at 7:29 PM Russ Abbott  wrote:

> I'm not sure what "closure to efficient cause" means. I considered using
> as an example an outdoor light that charges itself (and stays off) during
> the day and goes on at night. In what important way is that different from
> a flashlight? They both have energy storage systems (batteries). Does it
> really matter that the garden light "recharges itself" rather than relying
> on a more direct outside force to change its batteries? And they both have
> on-off switches. The flashlight's is more conventional whereas the garden
> light's is a light sensor. Does that really matter? They are both tripped
> by outside forces.
>
> BTW, congratulations on your phrase *epistemological trespassing*!
>
> -- Russ
>
> On Fri, Jul 14, 2023 at 1:47 PM glen  wrote:
>
>> I'm still attracted to Rosen's closure to efficient cause. Your
>> flashlight example is classified as non-agent (or non-living ... tomayto
>> tomahto) because the efficient cause is open. Now, attach sensor and
>> effector to the flashlight so that it can flick it*self* on when it gets
>> dark and off when it gets bright, then that (partially) closes it. Maybe we
>> merely kicked the can down the road a bit. But then we can talk about
>> decoupling and hierarchies of scale. From the armchair, there is no such
>> thing as a (pure) agent just like there is no such thing as free will. But
>> for practical purposes, you can draw the boundary somewhere and call it a
>> day.
>>
>> On 7/14/23 12:01, Russ Abbott wrote:
>> > I was recently wondering about the informal distinction we make between
>> things that are agents and things that aren't.
>> >
>> > For example, I would consider most living things to be agents. I would
>> also consider many computer programs when in operation as agents. The most
>> obvious examples (for me) are programs that play games like chess.
>> >
>> > I would not consider a rock an agent -- mainly because it doesn't do
>> anything, especially on its own. But a boulder crashnng down a hill and
>> destroying something at the bottom is reasonably called "an agent of
>> destruction." Perhaps this is just playing with words: "agent" can have
>> multiple meanings.  A writer's agent represents the writer in
>> negotiations with publishers. Perhaps that's just another meaning.
>> >
>> > My tentative definition is that an agent must have access to energy,
>> and it must use that energy to interact with the world. It must also have
>> some internal logic that determines how it interacts with the world. This
>> final condition rules out boulders rolling down a hill.
>> >
>> > But I doubt that I would call a flashlight (with an on-off switch) an
>> agent even though it satisfies my definition.  Does this suggest that an
>> agent must manifest a certain minimal level of complexity in its
>> interactions? If so, I don't have a suggestion about what that minimal
>> level of complexity might be.
>> >
>> > I'm writing all this because in my search for a characterization of
>> agents I looked at the article on Agency <
>> https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/agency/> in the
>> /Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy./ I found that article almost a parody
>> of the "armchair philosopher." Here are the first few sentences from the
>> article overview.
>> >
>> > In very general terms, an agent is a being with the capacity to
>> act, and ‘agency’ denotes the exercise or manifestation of this capacity.
>> The philosophy of action provides us with a standard conception and a
>> 

Re: [FRIAM] What is an agent [was: Philosophy and Science}

[David Eric Smith]

I have had a version of this problem for several years, because I want to start 
with small-molecule chemistry on early planets, and eventually talk about 
biospheres full of evolving actors.  I have wanted to have a rough category 
system for how many qualitative kinds of transitions I should need to account 
for, and to explain within ordinary materials by the action of random 
processes.  Just because I am not a(n analytical) philosopher, I have no 
ambition to shoehorn the universe into a system or suppose that my categories 
subsume all questions even I might someday care about, or that they are sure to 
have unambiguous boundaries.  I just want a kind of sketch that seems like it 
will carry some weight.  For now.

Autonomy: One early division to me would be between matter that responds 
“passively” to its environment moment-by-moment, and as a result takes on an 
internal state that is an effectively given function of the surroundings at the 
time, versus one that has some protection for some internal variables from the 
constant outside harassment, and a source of autonomous dynamics for those 
internal variables.  One could bring in words like “energy”, but I would rather 
not for a variety of reasons.  Often, though, when others do, I will understand 
why and be willing to go along with the choice.

Control: The category of things with autonomous internal degrees of freedom 
that have some immunity from the slings and arrows of the immediate 
surroundings is extremely broad.  Within it there could be very many different 
kinds of organizations that, if we lack a better word, we might call 
“architectures”.  One family of architectures that I recognize is that of 
control systems.  Major components include whatever is controlled (in chem-eng 
used to be called “the plant”), a “model” in the sense of Conant and Ashby, 
“sensors” to respond to the plant and signal the model, and “effectors” to get 
an output from the model and somehow influence the plant.  One could ask when 
the organization of some material system is well described by this control-loop 
architecture.  I think the control-loop architecture entails some degree of 
autonomy, else the whole system is adequately described by passive response to 
the environment.  But probably a sophist could find counterexamples.

One could ask whether having the control-loop architecture counts as having 
agency.  By discriminating among states of the world according to their 
relation to states indexed in the model, and then acting on the world (even by 
so little as acting on one’s own position in the world), one could be said to 
express some sort of “goal”, and in that sense to have “had” such a goal.  

Is that enough for agency?  Maybe.  Or maybe not.

Reflection: The controller’s model could, in the previous level, be anything.  
So again very broad.  Presumably a subset of control systems have models that 
incorporate some notion of a a “self”, so they could not only specifically 
model the conditions of the world, but also the condition of the self and of 
the self relative to the world, and then all of these variables become eligible 
targets for control actions.  

Conterfactuals and simulation: autonomy need not be limited to the receiving of 
signals and responding to them with control commands.  It could include 
producing values for counterfactual states within the controller’s model, of 
playing out representations of the consequences of control signals (another 
level of reflection, this time on the dynamics of the command loop), and then 
choosing according to a meta-criterion.  Here I have in mind something like the 
simulation that goes on in the tactical look-ahead in combinatorial games.  We 
now have a couple levels of representation between wherever the criteria are 
hard-coded and wherever the control signal (the “choice”) acts.  They are all 
still control loops, but it seems likely that control loops can have different 
enough major categories of design that there is a place for names for such 
intermediate layers of abstraction to distinguish some kinds as having them, 
from others that don’t.

How much internal reflective representation does one want to require to satisfy 
one or another concept of agency?  None of them, in particular?  A particular 
subset?

For different purposes I can see arguing for different answers, and I am not 
sure how many categories it will be broadly useful to recognize.

Eric


> On Jul 15, 2023, at 8:28 AM, Russ Abbott  wrote:
> 
> I'm not sure what "closure to efficient cause" means. I considered using as 
> an example an outdoor light that charges itself (and stays off) during the 
> day and goes on at night. In what important way is that different from a 
> flashlight? They both have energy storage systems (batteries). Does it really 
> matter that the garden light "recharges itself" rather than relying on a more 
> direct outside force to change its batteries? And they both have on-off 

Re: [FRIAM] What is an agent [was: Philosophy and Science}

[Russ Abbott]

I'm not sure what "closure to efficient cause" means. I considered using as
an example an outdoor light that charges itself (and stays off) during the
day and goes on at night. In what important way is that different from a
flashlight? They both have energy storage systems (batteries). Does it
really matter that the garden light "recharges itself" rather than relying
on a more direct outside force to change its batteries? And they both have
on-off switches. The flashlight's is more conventional whereas the garden
light's is a light sensor. Does that really matter? They are both tripped
by outside forces.

BTW, congratulations on your phrase *epistemological trespassing*!

-- Russ

On Fri, Jul 14, 2023 at 1:47 PM glen  wrote:

> I'm still attracted to Rosen's closure to efficient cause. Your flashlight
> example is classified as non-agent (or non-living ... tomayto tomahto)
> because the efficient cause is open. Now, attach sensor and effector to the
> flashlight so that it can flick it*self* on when it gets dark and off when
> it gets bright, then that (partially) closes it. Maybe we merely kicked the
> can down the road a bit. But then we can talk about decoupling and
> hierarchies of scale. From the armchair, there is no such thing as a (pure)
> agent just like there is no such thing as free will. But for practical
> purposes, you can draw the boundary somewhere and call it a day.
>
> On 7/14/23 12:01, Russ Abbott wrote:
> > I was recently wondering about the informal distinction we make between
> things that are agents and things that aren't.
> >
> > For example, I would consider most living things to be agents. I would
> also consider many computer programs when in operation as agents. The most
> obvious examples (for me) are programs that play games like chess.
> >
> > I would not consider a rock an agent -- mainly because it doesn't do
> anything, especially on its own. But a boulder crashnng down a hill and
> destroying something at the bottom is reasonably called "an agent of
> destruction." Perhaps this is just playing with words: "agent" can have
> multiple meanings.  A writer's agent represents the writer in
> negotiations with publishers. Perhaps that's just another meaning.
> >
> > My tentative definition is that an agent must have access to energy, and
> it must use that energy to interact with the world. It must also have some
> internal logic that determines how it interacts with the world. This final
> condition rules out boulders rolling down a hill.
> >
> > But I doubt that I would call a flashlight (with an on-off switch) an
> agent even though it satisfies my definition.  Does this suggest that an
> agent must manifest a certain minimal level of complexity in its
> interactions? If so, I don't have a suggestion about what that minimal
> level of complexity might be.
> >
> > I'm writing all this because in my search for a characterization of
> agents I looked at the article on Agency <
> https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/agency/> in the
> /Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy./ I found that article almost a parody
> of the "armchair philosopher." Here are the first few sentences from the
> article overview.
> >
> > In very general terms, an agent is a being with the capacity to act,
> and ‘agency’ denotes the exercise or manifestation of this capacity. The
> philosophy of action provides us with a standard conception and a standard
> theory of action. The former construes action in terms of intentionality,
> the latter explains the intentionality of action in terms of causation by
> the agent’s mental states and events.
> >
> > _
> > _
> > That seems to me to raise more questions than it answers. At the same
> time, it seems to limit the notion of /agent/ to things that can have
> intentions and mental models.  (To be fair, the article does consider the
> possibility that there can be agents without these properties. But those
> discussions seem relatively tangential.)
> >
> > Apologies for going on so long. Thanks, Frank, for opening this can of
> worms. And thanks to the others who replied so far.
> >
> > __-- Russ Abbott
> > Professor Emeritus, Computer Science
> > California State University, Los Angeles
> >
> >
> >
> > On Fri, Jul 14, 2023 at 8:33 AM Frank Wimberly  > wrote:
> >
> > Joe Ramsey, who took over my job.in  the Philosophy
> Department at Carnegie Mellon, posted the following on Facebook:
> >
> > I like Neil DeGrasse Tyson a lot, but I saw him give a spirited
> defense of science in which he oddly gave no credit to philosophers at all.
> His straw man philosopher is a dedicated *armchair* philosopher who spins
> theories without paying attention to scientific practice and contributes
> nothing to scientific understanding. He misses that scientists themselves
> are constantly raising obviously philosophical questions and are often
> ill-equipped to think about them clearly. What is the correct
> 

Re: [FRIAM] What is an agent [was: Philosophy and Science}

[glen]

I'm still attracted to Rosen's closure to efficient cause. Your flashlight 
example is classified as non-agent (or non-living ... tomayto tomahto) because 
the efficient cause is open. Now, attach sensor and effector to the flashlight 
so that it can flick it*self* on when it gets dark and off when it gets bright, 
then that (partially) closes it. Maybe we merely kicked the can down the road a 
bit. But then we can talk about decoupling and hierarchies of scale. From the 
armchair, there is no such thing as a (pure) agent just like there is no such 
thing as free will. But for practical purposes, you can draw the boundary 
somewhere and call it a day.

On 7/14/23 12:01, Russ Abbott wrote:

I was recently wondering about the informal distinction we make between things 
that are agents and things that aren't.

For example, I would consider most living things to be agents. I would also 
consider many computer programs when in operation as agents. The most obvious 
examples (for me) are programs that play games like chess.

I would not consider a rock an agent -- mainly because it doesn't do anything, especially on its 
own. But a boulder crashnng down a hill and destroying something at the bottom is reasonably called 
"an agent of destruction." Perhaps this is just playing with words: "agent" can 
have multiple meanings.  A writer's agent represents the writer in negotiations with publishers. 
Perhaps that's just another meaning.

My tentative definition is that an agent must have access to energy, and it 
must use that energy to interact with the world. It must also have some 
internal logic that determines how it interacts with the world. This final 
condition rules out boulders rolling down a hill.

But I doubt that I would call a flashlight (with an on-off switch) an agent 
even though it satisfies my definition.  Does this suggest that an agent must 
manifest a certain minimal level of complexity in its interactions? If so, I 
don't have a suggestion about what that minimal level of complexity might be.

I'm writing all this because in my search for a characterization of agents I looked at the 
article on Agency  in the 
/Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy./ I found that article almost a parody of the 
"armchair philosopher." Here are the first few sentences from the article overview.

In very general terms, an agent is a being with the capacity to act, and 
‘agency’ denotes the exercise or manifestation of this capacity. The philosophy 
of action provides us with a standard conception and a standard theory of 
action. The former construes action in terms of intentionality, the latter 
explains the intentionality of action in terms of causation by the agent’s 
mental states and events.

_
_
That seems to me to raise more questions than it answers. At the same time, it 
seems to limit the notion of /agent/ to things that can have intentions and 
mental models.  (To be fair, the article does consider the possibility that 
there can be agents without these properties. But those discussions seem 
relatively tangential.)

Apologies for going on so long. Thanks, Frank, for opening this can of worms. 
And thanks to the others who replied so far.

__-- Russ Abbott
Professor Emeritus, Computer Science
California State University, Los Angeles



On Fri, Jul 14, 2023 at 8:33 AM Frank Wimberly mailto:wimber...@gmail.com>> wrote:

Joe Ramsey, who took over my job.in  the Philosophy 
Department at Carnegie Mellon, posted the following on Facebook:

I like Neil DeGrasse Tyson a lot, but I saw him give a spirited defense of 
science in which he oddly gave no credit to philosophers at all. His straw man 
philosopher is a dedicated *armchair* philosopher who spins theories without 
paying attention to scientific practice and contributes nothing to scientific 
understanding. He misses that scientists themselves are constantly raising 
obviously philosophical questions and are often ill-equipped to think about 
them clearly. What is the correct interpretation of quantum mechanics? What is 
the right way to think about reductionism? Is reductionism the right way to 
think about science? What is the nature of consciousness? Can you explain 
consciousness in terms of neuroscience? Are biological kinds real? What does it 
even mean to be real? Or is realism a red herring; should we be pragmatists 
instead? Scientists raise all kinds of philosophical questions and have 
ill-informed opinions about them. But *philosophers* try to answer
them, and scientists do pay attention to the controversies. At least the 
smart ones do.



--
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[FRIAM] What is an agent [was: Philosophy and Science}

[Russ Abbott]

I was recently wondering about the informal distinction we make between
things that are agents and things that aren't.

For example, I would consider most living things to be agents. I would also
consider many computer programs when in operation as agents. The most
obvious examples (for me) are programs that play games like chess.

I would not consider a rock an agent -- mainly because it doesn't do
anything, especially on its own. But a boulder crashnng down a hill and
destroying something at the bottom is reasonably called "an agent of
destruction." Perhaps this is just playing with words: "agent" can have
multiple meanings.  A writer's agent represents the writer in
negotiations with publishers. Perhaps that's just another meaning.

My tentative definition is that an agent must have access to energy, and it
must use that energy to interact with the world. It must also have some
internal logic that determines how it interacts with the world. This final
condition rules out boulders rolling down a hill.

But I doubt that I would call a flashlight (with an on-off switch) an agent
even though it satisfies my definition.  Does this suggest that an agent
must manifest a certain minimal level of complexity in its interactions? If
so, I don't have a suggestion about what that minimal level of complexity
might be.

I'm writing all this because in my search for a characterization of agents
I looked at the article on Agency
 in the *Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy.* I found that article almost a parody of the
"armchair philosopher." Here are the first few sentences from the article
overview.

In very general terms, an agent is a being with the capacity to act, and
‘agency’ denotes the exercise or manifestation of this capacity. The
philosophy of action provides us with a standard conception and a standard
theory of action. The former construes action in terms of intentionality,
the latter explains the intentionality of action in terms of causation by
the agent’s mental states and events.


That seems to me to raise more questions than it answers. At the same time,
it seems to limit the notion of *agent* to things that can have intentions
and mental models.  (To be fair, the article does consider the possibility
that there can be agents without these properties. But those discussions
seem relatively tangential.)

Apologies for going on so long. Thanks, Frank, for opening this can of
worms. And thanks to the others who replied so far.

-- Russ Abbott
Professor Emeritus, Computer Science
California State University, Los Angeles



On Fri, Jul 14, 2023 at 8:33 AM Frank Wimberly  wrote:

> Joe Ramsey, who took over my job.in the Philosophy Department at Carnegie
> Mellon, posted the following on Facebook:
>
> I like Neil DeGrasse Tyson a lot, but I saw him give a spirited defense of
> science in which he oddly gave no credit to philosophers at all. His straw
> man philosopher is a dedicated *armchair* philosopher who spins theories
> without paying attention to scientific practice and contributes nothing to
> scientific understanding. He misses that scientists themselves are
> constantly raising obviously philosophical questions and are often
> ill-equipped to think about them clearly. What is the correct
> interpretation of quantum mechanics? What is the right way to think about
> reductionism? Is reductionism the right way to think about science? What is
> the nature of consciousness? Can you explain consciousness in terms of
> neuroscience? Are biological kinds real? What does it even mean to be real?
> Or is realism a red herring; should we be pragmatists instead? Scientists
> raise all kinds of philosophical questions and have ill-informed opinions
> about them. But *philosophers* try to answer them, and scientists do pay
> attention to the controversies. At least the smart ones do.
>
> ---
> Frank C. Wimberly
> 140 Calle Ojo Feliz,
> Santa Fe, NM 87505
>
> 505 670-9918
> Santa Fe, NM
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> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
> Fridays 9a-12p Friday St. Johns Cafe   /   Thursdays 9a-12p Zoom
> https://bit.ly/virtualfriam
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Re: [FRIAM] Philosophy and Science

[Frank Wimberly]

>I do suspect that the practice and vocation of philosophy is being altered
in the face of things like the development of Category Theory and now LLMs


One of Joe Ramsey's colleagues, Steve Awodey, is working on a reformulation
of the foundations of mathematics based on category theory.


---
Frank C. Wimberly
140 Calle Ojo Feliz,
Santa Fe, NM 87505

505 670-9918
Santa Fe, NM

On Fri, Jul 14, 2023, 12:03 PM Steve Smith  wrote:

> I like the term "epistemic trespass" and generally agree with the idea
> glen promotes in that regard.
>
> My direct experience with *many* experimentalists trained and
> self-selected as physicists or chemists or materials scientists was that
> many of them were excellent engineers, computer systems developers,
> programmers, even mech/elec/hydro/pneumo-techs...   but *mainly* because
> those skills/disciplines were in directs support of what they were trying
> to do and it was a useful shortcut/leverage to be able to do all those
> things for themselves rather than wait for the availability of specialists
> in those areas and then communicate their needs.   Only a *few* theorists
> seemed to have these skills because, perhaps they rarely *needed* that kind
> of support, though some had avocations or hobbies that exercised those
> skills.  I would hazard that more of the theoreticians were more deeply
> interested in the mathematics and philosophical embeddings that their
> avowed day-work implied.  The experimentalists *might* be interested
> (and/or facile) in those things but to some extent by constitution,
> self-selection, utilitarianism were less engaged.
>
> I am glad that Tyson is out there "spreading the faith" to some extent,
> but it doesn't surprise me that he might give philosophers the brush-back
> unthoughtfully.   I feel like Sabine  Hossenfelder, in her very subtle
> style may have done the same thing but with a straight face rather than a
> big grin, even though much of her science-communication is smack dab in the
> middle (IMO) of these epistimic boundaries which is where (IMO) the best
> stuff resides.   I was recently put off by Paul Hawkin's need to
> deprecate/dismiss any talk (or thought?) about consciousness in deference
> to the presumably more formally defineable "intelligence", but I also
> understand that one good way to make progress on technical things is to
> downscope until your reach does not exceed your grasp (by much) and
> Hawkin's experience as a tech entreprenuer (Palm Pilot) suggests that he is
> more better served by staying closer to the engineering and tech end of the
> (multi-dimensional?) spectrum than the philosophical one.   I also
> understand that as one moves out into the yet-more-abstract of philosophy
> and mathematics and semiotics (for example) they seem more likely to be
> laced with BS (and perhaps often are?)... but that ambiguity/difficulty is
> part of what makes it worth spending time in (IMO again).
>
> Not only do we not like our various sacred-cows skewered by others we
> don't even like them being called by unfamiliar names, until you realize
> those names *might* be "terms of endearment"?
>
> I am not familiar with Hawking or Mlodinow's assertions but it triggers my
> associative memory to Russell and Whitehead's  (and others) assertions
> around* Principia Mathematica*.  Or the (yet more) classic* "God is Dead*
> - Neitchze 1882 V. *Neitchze is dead* - God 1900".I do suspect that
> the practice and vocation of philosophy is being altered in the face of
> things like the development of Category Theory and now LLMs ...  in the
> common CS vernacular, *it is not deprecated but is being refactored*?
> On 7/14/23 11:02 AM, glen wrote:
>
> This merely seems like triggered gatekeeping to me. Yeah, sure, working
> philosophers have skills and behaviors working [insert your favorite other
> clique] don't have. But, if it's not already obvious, especially to anyone
> who's had ANY contact with organizations like the SFI, epistemic
> trespassing can be wildly productive. We're all bad at things we're not
> good at. >8^D I haven't seen the Tyson rant that seems to have triggered
> Ramsey. But *leaving someone out* of your cf list is NOT a snub ... despite
> what the hip-and-trendy might claim. It's merely evidence that any
> presentation is limited in space and time. My guess is that if you listen
> to Tyson with a little generosity, you'd hear him make sounds sympathetic
> to the expertise of the peri-science cliques.
>
> Now, Hawking and Mlodinow's explicit claim that philosophy is dead ...
> now, that's a different story.
>
> On 7/14/23 08:33, Frank Wimberly wrote:
>
> Joe Ramsey, who took over my job.in   the
> Philosophy Department at Carnegie Mellon, posted the following on Facebook:
>
> I like Neil DeGrasse Tyson a lot, but I saw him give a spirited defense of
> science in which he oddly gave no credit to philosophers at all. His straw
> man philosopher is a dedicated *armchair* 

Re: [FRIAM] Philosophy and Science

[Steve Smith]

I like the term "epistemic trespass" and generally agree with the idea 
glen promotes in that regard.


My direct experience with *many* experimentalists trained and 
self-selected as physicists or chemists or materials scientists was that 
many of them were excellent engineers, computer systems developers, 
programmers, even mech/elec/hydro/pneumo-techs... but *mainly* because 
those skills/disciplines were in directs support of what they were 
trying to do and it was a useful shortcut/leverage to be able to do all 
those things for themselves rather than wait for the availability of 
specialists in those areas and then communicate their needs.   Only a 
*few* theorists seemed to have these skills because, perhaps they rarely 
*needed* that kind of support, though some had avocations or hobbies 
that exercised those skills.  I would hazard that more of the 
theoreticians were more deeply interested in the mathematics and 
philosophical embeddings that their avowed day-work implied.  The 
experimentalists *might* be interested (and/or facile) in those things 
but to some extent by constitution, self-selection, utilitarianism were 
less engaged.


I am glad that Tyson is out there "spreading the faith" to some extent, 
but it doesn't surprise me that he might give philosophers the 
brush-back unthoughtfully.   I feel like Sabine  Hossenfelder, in her 
very subtle style may have done the same thing but with a straight face 
rather than a big grin, even though much of her science-communication is 
smack dab in the middle (IMO) of these epistimic boundaries which is 
where (IMO) the best stuff resides.   I was recently put off by Paul 
Hawkin's need to deprecate/dismiss any talk (or thought?) about 
consciousness in deference to the presumably more formally defineable 
"intelligence", but I also understand that one good way to make progress 
on technical things is to downscope until your reach does not exceed 
your grasp (by much) and Hawkin's experience as a tech entreprenuer 
(Palm Pilot) suggests that he is more better served by staying closer to 
the engineering and tech end of the (multi-dimensional?) spectrum than 
the philosophical one.   I also understand that as one moves out into 
the yet-more-abstract of philosophy and mathematics and semiotics (for 
example) they seem more likely to be laced with BS (and perhaps often 
are?)... but that ambiguity/difficulty is part of what makes it worth 
spending time in (IMO again).


Not only do we not like our various sacred-cows skewered by others we 
don't even like them being called by unfamiliar names, until you realize 
those names *might* be "terms of endearment"?


I am not familiar with Hawking or Mlodinow's assertions but it triggers 
my associative memory to Russell and Whitehead's  (and others) 
assertions around/Principia Mathematica/.  Or the (yet more) 
classic/"God is Dead/ - Neitchze 1882 V. /Neitchze is dead/ - God 
1900".    I do suspect that the practice and vocation of philosophy is 
being altered in the face of things like the development of Category 
Theory and now LLMs ...  in the common CS vernacular, /it is not 
deprecated but is being refactored/?


On 7/14/23 11:02 AM, glen wrote:
This merely seems like triggered gatekeeping to me. Yeah, sure, 
working philosophers have skills and behaviors working [insert your 
favorite other clique] don't have. But, if it's not already obvious, 
especially to anyone who's had ANY contact with organizations like the 
SFI, epistemic trespassing can be wildly productive. We're all bad at 
things we're not good at. >8^D I haven't seen the Tyson rant that 
seems to have triggered Ramsey. But *leaving someone out* of your cf 
list is NOT a snub ... despite what the hip-and-trendy might claim. 
It's merely evidence that any presentation is limited in space and 
time. My guess is that if you listen to Tyson with a little 
generosity, you'd hear him make sounds sympathetic to the expertise of 
the peri-science cliques.


Now, Hawking and Mlodinow's explicit claim that philosophy is dead ... 
now, that's a different story.


On 7/14/23 08:33, Frank Wimberly wrote:
Joe Ramsey, who took over my job.in  the Philosophy 
Department at Carnegie Mellon, posted the following on Facebook:


I like Neil DeGrasse Tyson a lot, but I saw him give a spirited 
defense of science in which he oddly gave no credit to philosophers 
at all. His straw man philosopher is a dedicated *armchair* 
philosopher who spins theories without paying attention to scientific 
practice and contributes nothing to scientific understanding. He 
misses that scientists themselves are constantly raising obviously 
philosophical questions and are often ill-equipped to think about 
them clearly. What is the correct interpretation of quantum 
mechanics? What is the right way to think about reductionism? Is 
reductionism the right way to think about science? What is the nature 
of consciousness? Can you explain consciousness in terms of 

Re: [FRIAM] Philosophy and Science

[glen]

This merely seems like triggered gatekeeping to me. Yeah, sure, working 
philosophers have skills and behaviors working [insert your favorite other clique] 
don't have. But, if it's not already obvious, especially to anyone who's had ANY 
contact with organizations like the SFI, epistemic trespassing can be wildly 
productive. We're all bad at things we're not good at. >8^D I haven't seen the 
Tyson rant that seems to have triggered Ramsey. But *leaving someone out* of your 
cf list is NOT a snub ... despite what the hip-and-trendy might claim. It's merely 
evidence that any presentation is limited in space and time. My guess is that if 
you listen to Tyson with a little generosity, you'd hear him make sounds 
sympathetic to the expertise of the peri-science cliques.

Now, Hawking and Mlodinow's explicit claim that philosophy is dead ... now, 
that's a different story.

On 7/14/23 08:33, Frank Wimberly wrote:

Joe Ramsey, who took over my job.in  the Philosophy Department 
at Carnegie Mellon, posted the following on Facebook:

I like Neil DeGrasse Tyson a lot, but I saw him give a spirited defense of science in which he oddly gave no credit to philosophers at all. His straw man philosopher is a dedicated *armchair* philosopher who spins theories without paying attention to scientific practice and contributes nothing to scientific understanding. He misses that scientists themselves are constantly raising obviously philosophical questions and are often ill-equipped to think about them clearly. What is the correct interpretation of quantum mechanics? What is the right way to think about reductionism? Is reductionism the right way to think about science? What is the nature of consciousness? Can you explain consciousness in terms of neuroscience? Are biological kinds real? What does it even mean to be real? Or is realism a red herring; should we be pragmatists instead? Scientists raise all kinds of philosophical questions and have ill-informed opinions about them. But *philosophers* try to answer them, 
and scientists do pay attention to the controversies. At least the smart ones do.



--
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Re: [FRIAM] Philosophy and Science

[Nicholas Thompson]

That is indeed a nifty quote, frank.  Thanks for posting it.

I spaced out and came late to Thuram.  Stephen and had a really
enlightening (for me)  conversation..

Well into my second reading of MCarthy's Stella Maris.

N

On Fri, Jul 14, 2023 at 11:33 AM Frank Wimberly  wrote:

> Joe Ramsey, who took over my job.in the Philosophy Department at Carnegie
> Mellon, posted the following on Facebook:
>
> I like Neil DeGrasse Tyson a lot, but I saw him give a spirited defense of
> science in which he oddly gave no credit to philosophers at all. His straw
> man philosopher is a dedicated *armchair* philosopher who spins theories
> without paying attention to scientific practice and contributes nothing to
> scientific understanding. He misses that scientists themselves are
> constantly raising obviously philosophical questions and are often
> ill-equipped to think about them clearly. What is the correct
> interpretation of quantum mechanics? What is the right way to think about
> reductionism? Is reductionism the right way to think about science? What is
> the nature of consciousness? Can you explain consciousness in terms of
> neuroscience? Are biological kinds real? What does it even mean to be real?
> Or is realism a red herring; should we be pragmatists instead? Scientists
> raise all kinds of philosophical questions and have ill-informed opinions
> about them. But *philosophers* try to answer them, and scientists do pay
> attention to the controversies. At least the smart ones do.
>
> ---
> Frank C. Wimberly
> 140 Calle Ojo Feliz,
> Santa Fe, NM 87505
>
> 505 670-9918
> Santa Fe, NM
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> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
> Fridays 9a-12p Friday St. Johns Cafe   /   Thursdays 9a-12p Zoom
> https://bit.ly/virtualfriam
> to (un)subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/
> archives:  5/2017 thru present
> https://redfish.com/pipermail/friam_redfish.com/
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>
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[FRIAM] Philosophy and Science

[Frank Wimberly]

Joe Ramsey, who took over my job.in the Philosophy Department at Carnegie
Mellon, posted the following on Facebook:

I like Neil DeGrasse Tyson a lot, but I saw him give a spirited defense of
science in which he oddly gave no credit to philosophers at all. His straw
man philosopher is a dedicated *armchair* philosopher who spins theories
without paying attention to scientific practice and contributes nothing to
scientific understanding. He misses that scientists themselves are
constantly raising obviously philosophical questions and are often
ill-equipped to think about them clearly. What is the correct
interpretation of quantum mechanics? What is the right way to think about
reductionism? Is reductionism the right way to think about science? What is
the nature of consciousness? Can you explain consciousness in terms of
neuroscience? Are biological kinds real? What does it even mean to be real?
Or is realism a red herring; should we be pragmatists instead? Scientists
raise all kinds of philosophical questions and have ill-informed opinions
about them. But *philosophers* try to answer them, and scientists do pay
attention to the controversies. At least the smart ones do.

---
Frank C. Wimberly
140 Calle Ojo Feliz,
Santa Fe, NM 87505

505 670-9918
Santa Fe, NM
-. --- - / ...- .- .-.. .. -.. / -- --- .-. ... . / -.-. --- -.. .
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Fridays 9a-12p Friday St. Johns Cafe   /   Thursdays 9a-12p Zoom 
https://bit.ly/virtualfriam
to (un)subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
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archives:  5/2017 thru present https://redfish.com/pipermail/friam_redfish.com/
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