Re: [Full-disclosure] Operation Bring Peace To Machines : New Info
Sort of confirmation Morocco is the motherland for spammers + phishers On Sun, Feb 19, 2012 at 12:28 AM, adam wrote: > If by crazy, you mean a spammer: absolutely. > > On Sat, Feb 18, 2012 at 4:45 PM, Jerome Athias wrote: > >> >> Sorry, I am just crazy >> \x90 >> >> Sujet: RE: Vulnerability conceptual map (UNCLASSIFIED) Date : Sat, 18 >> Feb 2012 16:37:45 -0500 De : WOLFKIEL, JOSEPH L CIV DISA PEO-MA >>Répondre à : >> joseph.wolfk...@disa.mil Pour : Multiple recipients of list >> >> >> Classification: UNCLASSIFIED >> Caveats: NONE >> >> The NetD schemas were developed with that concept in mind. We had hoped to >> contribute the entire body of knowledge to the community and start building >> automated communications based on the schemas and the relationships they >> document. >> >> Using SCAP names and metadata tags was a key component and gave us some >> early quick wins. >> >> I'd love to come to community consensus on ontological models for threat, >> vulnerability, device, person, incident, event, workflow, etc that we could >> start incorporating into SCAP standards (starting with ARF and ASR). >> >> Joseph L. Wolfkiel >> Engineering Group Lead >> DISA PEO MA/IA52(301) 225-8820joseph.wolfk...@disa.mil >> >> >> -Original Message- >> From: scap-...@nist.gov [mailto:scap-...@nist.gov ] On >> Behalf Of Davidson II, Mark S >> Sent: Friday, February 17, 2012 7:55 AM >> To: Multiple recipients of list >> Subject: RE: Vulnerability conceptual map >> >> >> I think the core of the topic is turning information into action. You might >> have an ongoing attack, a vulnerability that needs to be patched, an >> exploitable configuration, or one of many other security risks. You will >> have varying degrees of information (as Kurt said) within each risk. >> >> Currently, an organization that can aggregate risk and threat information to >> a single point and have a human make a decision that is carried out in a >> timely manner is among the more mature organizations. Many organizations do >> not have all of their security information in a single place. Many >> organizations, once they make a security decision, have a difficult time >> implementing and communicating that decision. >> >> There's probably three areas of action: >> 1) Collect information and present it in a useful way >> 2) Make a decision based on that information >> 3) Carry out the decision >> >> #1 and #3 should be automated, and #2 should be where we spend most of our >> effort. SCAP and CM are within the domain of Collect/Present, and I think >> there have always been discussions about automating #3. Certain decisions in >> #2 can be automated once you have #1 and #3, but that's a ways away (in my >> opinion). >> >> Part of the difficulty of #3 is that networks will always be different. >> Network management technologies will always be different. Let's say for the >> sake of argument you want to block web traffic. How would you communicate >> that? You'd have to, at a minimum, communicate the following: >> inbound/outbound, applicable subnets/locations, & timeframe. Specifying a >> port may not be enough. What about web traffic over non-standard ports? Then >> you'd have to use an application aware firewall. Or, what if you are trying >> to contain a segment of the network that has a router as it's only access? >> You'd have to have a uniform language that could turn a thought "Block >> web traffic for sales - they got ANOTHER virus" into a command that must be >> usable by a variety of devices with functionality that may or may not >> overlap, all in a network whose topography cannot be known when that >> language is written. And you have to be able to 'remove' the block when you >> want. >> >> I guess that was just a long way of saying 'I agree'. There's a lot of work >> to be done and much of it is unexplored (at least from a shared knowledge >> perspective). >> >> -Mark >> >> -Original Message- >> From: scap-...@nist.gov [mailto:scap-...@nist.gov ] On >> Behalf Of Kurt Seifried >> Sent: Thursday, February 16, 2012 6:55 PM >> To: Multiple recipients of list >> Subject: Re: Vulnerability conceptual map >> >> >> On 02/16/2012 06:11 AM, Jerome Athias wrote: >> > For me, >> > >> > The problem: >> > we must quickly mitigate (and then remediate) vulnerabilities >> > >> > Existing scope: >> > we have actually (too much?) too complicated (and incomplete) standards >> > we have not-interoperable vulnerability tools >> > >> > My proposed solution: >> > we have to act quickly to deal with the problem >> > So the idea is to produce, and use an open, SIMPLIFIED, easy to >> > implement and use, standard >> > What i call IVIL v1.0 >> > >> > And I would like to explain, demonstrate and validate my solution >> >> I find this discussion interesting. As I see it for a vulnerability >> (e.g. a technical issue that can be exploited to gain access or elevate >> privilege) we have several options: >>
Re: [Full-disclosure] Operation Bring Peace To Machines : New Info
If by crazy, you mean a spammer: absolutely. On Sat, Feb 18, 2012 at 4:45 PM, Jerome Athias wrote: > > Sorry, I am just crazy > \x90 > > Sujet: RE: Vulnerability conceptual map (UNCLASSIFIED) Date : Sat, 18 > Feb 2012 16:37:45 -0500 De : WOLFKIEL, JOSEPH L CIV DISA PEO-MA >Répondre à : > joseph.wolfk...@disa.mil Pour : Multiple recipients of list > > > Classification: UNCLASSIFIED > Caveats: NONE > > The NetD schemas were developed with that concept in mind. We had hoped to > contribute the entire body of knowledge to the community and start building > automated communications based on the schemas and the relationships they > document. > > Using SCAP names and metadata tags was a key component and gave us some early > quick wins. > > I'd love to come to community consensus on ontological models for threat, > vulnerability, device, person, incident, event, workflow, etc that we could > start incorporating into SCAP standards (starting with ARF and ASR). > > Joseph L. Wolfkiel > Engineering Group Lead > DISA PEO MA/IA52(301) 225-8820joseph.wolfk...@disa.mil > > > -Original Message- > From: scap-...@nist.gov [mailto:scap-...@nist.gov ] On > Behalf Of Davidson II, Mark S > Sent: Friday, February 17, 2012 7:55 AM > To: Multiple recipients of list > Subject: RE: Vulnerability conceptual map > > > I think the core of the topic is turning information into action. You might > have an ongoing attack, a vulnerability that needs to be patched, an > exploitable configuration, or one of many other security risks. You will have > varying degrees of information (as Kurt said) within each risk. > > Currently, an organization that can aggregate risk and threat information to > a single point and have a human make a decision that is carried out in a > timely manner is among the more mature organizations. Many organizations do > not have all of their security information in a single place. Many > organizations, once they make a security decision, have a difficult time > implementing and communicating that decision. > > There's probably three areas of action: > 1) Collect information and present it in a useful way > 2) Make a decision based on that information > 3) Carry out the decision > > #1 and #3 should be automated, and #2 should be where we spend most of our > effort. SCAP and CM are within the domain of Collect/Present, and I think > there have always been discussions about automating #3. Certain decisions in > #2 can be automated once you have #1 and #3, but that's a ways away (in my > opinion). > > Part of the difficulty of #3 is that networks will always be different. > Network management technologies will always be different. Let's say for the > sake of argument you want to block web traffic. How would you communicate > that? You'd have to, at a minimum, communicate the following: > inbound/outbound, applicable subnets/locations, & timeframe. Specifying a > port may not be enough. What about web traffic over non-standard ports? Then > you'd have to use an application aware firewall. Or, what if you are trying > to contain a segment of the network that has a router as it's only access? > You'd have to have a uniform language that could turn a thought "Block > web traffic for sales - they got ANOTHER virus" into a command that must be > usable by a variety of devices with functionality that may or may not > overlap, all in a network whose topography cannot be known when that language > is written. And you have to be able to 'remove' the block when you want. > > I guess that was just a long way of saying 'I agree'. There's a lot of work > to be done and much of it is unexplored (at least from a shared knowledge > perspective). > > -Mark > > -Original Message- > From: scap-...@nist.gov [mailto:scap-...@nist.gov ] On > Behalf Of Kurt Seifried > Sent: Thursday, February 16, 2012 6:55 PM > To: Multiple recipients of list > Subject: Re: Vulnerability conceptual map > > > On 02/16/2012 06:11 AM, Jerome Athias wrote: > > For me, > > > > The problem: > > we must quickly mitigate (and then remediate) vulnerabilities > > > > Existing scope: > > we have actually (too much?) too complicated (and incomplete) standards > > we have not-interoperable vulnerability tools > > > > My proposed solution: > > we have to act quickly to deal with the problem > > So the idea is to produce, and use an open, SIMPLIFIED, easy to > > implement and use, standard > > What i call IVIL v1.0 > > > > And I would like to explain, demonstrate and validate my solution > > I find this discussion interesting. As I see it for a vulnerability > (e.g. a technical issue that can be exploited to gain access or elevate > privilege) we have several options: > > 1) fix it with a software update (which generally relies upon a > vendor(s) shipping an update) > 2) use a workaround (like change file permissions, disable the specific > component that is affected, etc.) > 3) disable the entire thing t
[Full-disclosure] Operation Bring Peace To Machines : New Info
Sorry, I am just crazy \x90 Sujet: RE: Vulnerability conceptual map (UNCLASSIFIED) Date : Sat, 18 Feb 2012 16:37:45 -0500 De :WOLFKIEL, JOSEPH L CIV DISA PEO-MA Répondre à :joseph.wolfk...@disa.mil Pour : Multiple recipients of list Classification: UNCLASSIFIED Caveats: NONE The NetD schemas were developed with that concept in mind. We had hoped to contribute the entire body of knowledge to the community and start building automated communications based on the schemas and the relationships they document. Using SCAP names and metadata tags was a key component and gave us some early quick wins. I'd love to come to community consensus on ontological models for threat, vulnerability, device, person, incident, event, workflow, etc that we could start incorporating into SCAP standards (starting with ARF and ASR). Joseph L. Wolfkiel Engineering Group Lead DISA PEO MA/IA52 (301) 225-8820 joseph.wolfk...@disa.mil -Original Message- From: scap-...@nist.gov [mailto:scap-...@nist.gov] On Behalf Of Davidson II, Mark S Sent: Friday, February 17, 2012 7:55 AM To: Multiple recipients of list Subject: RE: Vulnerability conceptual map I think the core of the topic is turning information into action. You might have an ongoing attack, a vulnerability that needs to be patched, an exploitable configuration, or one of many other security risks. You will have varying degrees of information (as Kurt said) within each risk. Currently, an organization that can aggregate risk and threat information to a single point and have a human make a decision that is carried out in a timely manner is among the more mature organizations. Many organizations do not have all of their security information in a single place. Many organizations, once they make a security decision, have a difficult time implementing and communicating that decision. There's probably three areas of action: 1) Collect information and present it in a useful way 2) Make a decision based on that information 3) Carry out the decision #1 and #3 should be automated, and #2 should be where we spend most of our effort. SCAP and CM are within the domain of Collect/Present, and I think there have always been discussions about automating #3. Certain decisions in #2 can be automated once you have #1 and #3, but that's a ways away (in my opinion). Part of the difficulty of #3 is that networks will always be different. Network management technologies will always be different. Let's say for the sake of argument you want to block web traffic. How would you communicate that? You'd have to, at a minimum, communicate the following: inbound/outbound, applicable subnets/locations,& timeframe. Specifying a port may not be enough. What about web traffic over non-standard ports? Then you'd have to use an application aware firewall. Or, what if you are trying to contain a segment of the network that has a router as it's only access? You'd have to have a uniform language that could turn a thought "Block web traffic for sales - they got ANOTHER virus" into a command that must be usable by a variety of devices with functionality that may or may not overlap, all in a network whose topography cannot be known when that language is written. And you have to be able to 'remove' the block when you want. I guess that was just a long way of saying 'I agree'. There's a lot of work to be done and much of it is unexplored (at least from a shared knowledge perspective). -Mark -Original Message- From: scap-...@nist.gov [mailto:scap-...@nist.gov] On Behalf Of Kurt Seifried Sent: Thursday, February 16, 2012 6:55 PM To: Multiple recipients of list Subject: Re: Vulnerability conceptual map On 02/16/2012 06:11 AM, Jerome Athias wrote: For me, The problem: we must quickly mitigate (and then remediate) vulnerabilities Existing scope: we have actually (too much?) too complicated (and incomplete) standards we have not-interoperable vulnerability tools My proposed solution: we have to act quickly to deal with the problem So the idea is to produce, and use an open, SIMPLIFIED, easy to implement and use, standard What i call IVIL v1.0 And I would like to explain, demonstrate and validate my solution I find this discussion interesting. As I see it for a vulnerability (e.g. a technical issue that can be exploited to gain access or elevate privilege) we have several options: 1) fix it with a software update (which generally relies upon a vendor(s) shipping an update) 2) use a workaround (like change file permissions, disable the specific component that is affected, etc.) 3) disable the entire thing temporarily or permanently. For example by turning it off, restricting access to a limited subset of users, replacing it with something else, etc. 4) accept the risk and continue on (e.g. denial of service attacks, have a re-mediation routine to deal with it such as restarting it). actually if anyone else has other main
