Re: Blowhard Bradley Kuhn and his fraud

2011-02-03 Thread RJack

On 2/3/2011 10:59 AM, David Kastrup wrote:

RJack  writes:


On 2/2/2011 9:47 AM, RJack wrote:

Uh... buh bye SFC and Erik Andersen:

---Filed 02/01/11--- ANSWER OF PHOEBE MICRO, INC.


Uh, that's the reply of the defendant, not a court order.  Let's see
how much of it remains after being filtered through the judge before
starting to party...


Oh Yea of little faith!

That defendant reply agrees with all of my prior assertions in posts
concerning the  Best Buy Inc. debacle. Since my reasoning is infallible,
the end surely draws nigh.

Sincerely,
RJack :)

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Re: Utterly imbecile pinky communist Ninth Circuit 'judges' (Vernorscandalous ruling)

2011-02-03 Thread RJack

On 2/3/2011 11:24 AM, Alexander Terekhov wrote:


RJack wrote: [...]

All this ruling really says, is that Hoops as a counter-claimant
has the status of a plaintiff (not defendant) and carries the
burden of proof and must plead facts to establish ownership of the
copies in order to defeat a Motion to Dismiss.


I disagree. The court ruled:

"Hoops avers that it resold Adobe products it “purchased from third
party intermediary distributors,” Hoops Countercl. ¶ 8, but offers
no facts regarding under what terms these distributors obtained the
copies."

Some time ago I bought a BMW car from a nearby dealer. The car
includes tons of software and I even patched some of it (navigation
computer software originating from http://www.navteq.com/ GPS stuff).
Patching aside, I have no idea regarding "what terms these
distributors obtained the copies" of the software in my BMW car. And
now I'm being told that I can not sell my BMW car without permission
from bmw.com if I live in California... Luckily I don't live in the
Ninth Circuit...

regards, alexander.



Caveat Emptor. You should'a bought a Cadillac. When you buy a car
from a company whose chief shareholder is the federal government, you
don't have to worry about those lawsuits. He. He.

Sincerely,
RJack :)


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Re: Blowhard Bradley Kuhn and his fraud

2011-02-03 Thread David Kastrup
RJack  writes:

> On 2/3/2011 10:59 AM, David Kastrup wrote:
>> RJack  writes:
>>
>>> On 2/2/2011 9:47 AM, RJack wrote:
>>>
>>> Uh... buh bye SFC and Erik Andersen:
>>>
>>> ---Filed 02/01/11--- ANSWER OF PHOEBE MICRO, INC.
>>
>> Uh, that's the reply of the defendant, not a court order.  Let's see
>> how much of it remains after being filtered through the judge before
>> starting to party...
>
> Oh Yea of little faith!
>
> That defendant reply agrees with all of my prior assertions in posts
> concerning the  Best Buy Inc. debacle.

Given your track record, that should worry them.

> Since my reasoning is infallible, the end surely draws nigh.

Doubtless.

-- 
David Kastrup
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Re: Blowhard Bradley Kuhn and his fraud

2011-02-03 Thread RJack

On 2/3/2011 10:54 AM, RJack wrote:

On 2/2/2011 9:47 AM, RJack wrote:

Uh... buh bye SFC and Erik Andersen:

---Filed 02/01/11--- ANSWER OF PHOEBE MICRO, INC.

... [snip]

AFFIRMATIVE AND ADDITIONAL DEFENSES

Phoebe Micro, as and for affirmative and additional defenses, alleges
as follows:

1. The Complaint fails to state a claim on which relief can be
granted.

2. The GNU General Public License, Version 2, as alleged by
Plaintiffs, is not enforceable.

3. On information and belief, Plaintiffs are not proper parties.

4. Plaintiffs are not entitled to assert a claim for statutory
damages against Phoebe Micro under 17 U.S.C. § 504(c).



The attorney for PHOEBE MICRO is Andrew M. Kaver a single attorney firm.
http://www.kaverlaw.com/

It is glaringly obvious that Mr. Kaver has been in communication with
Robins, Kaplan, Miller & Ciresi, LLP
http://www.rkmc.com/David-Leichtman.htm

The era of the GPL license and "Free as in Freedom" software" and its
attempted subversion of the principles of open source coding is about to
end.

Sincerely,
RJack :)









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Re: Blowhard Bradley Kuhn and his fraud

2011-02-03 Thread RJack

On 2/2/2011 9:47 AM, RJack wrote:

Uh... buh bye SFC and Erik Andersen:

---Filed 02/01/11---
ANSWER OF PHOEBE MICRO, INC.

... [snip]

AFFIRMATIVE AND ADDITIONAL DEFENSES

Phoebe Micro, as and for affirmative and additional defenses, alleges as
follows:

1. The Complaint fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted.

2. The GNU General Public License, Version 2, as alleged by Plaintiffs,
is not enforceable.

3. On information and belief, Plaintiffs are not proper parties.

4. Plaintiffs are not entitled to assert a claim for statutory damages
against Phoebe Micro under 17 U.S.C. § 504(c).


Sincerely,
RJack :)
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Re: Blowhard Bradley Kuhn and his fraud

2011-02-03 Thread David Kastrup
RJack  writes:

> On 2/2/2011 9:47 AM, RJack wrote:
>
> Uh... buh bye SFC and Erik Andersen:
>
> ---Filed 02/01/11---
> ANSWER OF PHOEBE MICRO, INC.

Uh, that's the reply of the defendant, not a court order.  Let's see how
much of it remains after being filtered through the judge before
starting to party...

-- 
David Kastrup
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Re: Utterly imbecile pinky communist Ninth Circuit 'judges' (Vernorscandalous ruling)

2011-02-03 Thread Alexander Terekhov

RJack wrote:
[...]
> All this ruling really says, is that Hoops as a counter-claimant has the
> status of a plaintiff (not defendant) and carries the burden of proof
> and must plead facts to establish ownership of the copies in order to
> defeat a Motion to Dismiss.

I disagree. The court ruled:

"Hoops avers that it resold Adobe products it “purchased from third
party intermediary distributors,” Hoops Countercl. ¶ 8, but offers no
facts regarding under what terms these distributors obtained the
copies."

Some time ago I bought a BMW car from a nearby dealer. The car includes
tons of software and I even patched some of it (navigation computer
software originating from http://www.navteq.com/ GPS stuff). Patching
aside, I have no idea regarding "what terms these distributors obtained
the copies" of the software in my BMW car. And now I'm being told that I
can not sell my BMW car without permission from bmw.com if I live in
California... Luckily I don't live in the Ninth Circuit...

regards,
alexander.

-- 
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(GNG is a derecursive recursive derecursion which pwns GNU since it can 
be infinitely looped as GNGNGNGNG...NGNGNG... and can be said backwards 
too, whereas GNU cannot.)
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Re: Utterly imbecile pinky communist Ninth Circuit 'judges' (Vernor scandalous ruling)

2011-02-03 Thread RJack

On 2/3/2011 8:16 AM, Alexander Terekhov wrote:

Stupidity rules in the Ninth Circuit:

"IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF
CALIFORNIA ADOBE SYSTEMS INCORPORATED, Plaintiff, v. ANTHONY
KORNRUMPF, a/k/a TONY KORNRUMPF; and HOOPS ENTERPRISE, LLC,
Defendants. / HOOPS ENTERPRISE, LLC, Counter-Claimant, v. ADOBE
SYSTEMS INCORPORATED, Counter-Defendant, and SOFTWARE AND INFORMATION
INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION, Third-Party Defendant. / No. C 10-02769 CW
ORDER GRANTING ADOBE SYSTEMS INCORPORATED AND SOFTWARE& INFORMATION
INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION’S MOTION TO DISMISS HOOPS ENTERPRISE, LLC’S
CLAIMS (Docket No. 34) Plaintiff



First Sale Doctrine

A copyright holder has the exclusive right to “distribute copies . .
. of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of
ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending.” 17 U.S.C. § 106(3). The
first sale doctrine enables an “‘owner of a particular copy’ of a
copyrighted work to sell or dispose of his copy without the copyright
owner’s authorization.” Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102, 1107
(9th Cir. 2010) (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 109(a)). The doctrine “does not
apply to a person who possesses a copy of the copyrighted work
without owning it, such as a licensee.” Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1107
(citing 17 U.S.C. § 109(d)).

“Notwithstanding its distinctive name, the doctrine applies not only
when a copy is first sold, but when a copy is given away or title is
otherwise transferred without the accouterments of a sale.” UMG
Recordings v. Augusto, ___ F.3d ___, 2011 WL 9399, at *3 (9th Cir.)
(citations omitted). However, “not every transfer of possession of a
copy transfers title.” Id. at *4. For instance, in the context of
computer software, “copyright owners may create licensing
arrangements so that users acquire only a license to use the
particular copy of software and do not acquire title that permits
further transfer or sale of that copy without the permission of the
copyright owner.” Id.

In Vernor, a declaratory judgment action, the Ninth Circuit addressed
the resale of copyrighted software on eBay. 621 F.3d at 1103. There,
Vernor sought a declaration that he did not infringe the copyright of
Autodesk, a software company. Id. Vernor had purchased copies of
Autodesk’s software from Cardwell/Thomas& Associates (CTA), one of
Autodesk’s direct customers, and then attempted to resell them on
eBay. Id. CTA had obtained the copies under a software license
agreement, which imposed significant restrictions on their transfer
and use. Id. at 1104. Based on this agreement, the Ninth Circuit
rejected Vernor’s assertion of the first sale doctrine, concluding
that neither he nor CTA were owners of the particular copies. Id. at
. The court reasoned that CTA was only a licensee and that
Autodesk retained title to the software. Id.

Here, Hoops does not plead any facts to suggest that it owned any of
the particular copies of Adobe software that it resold or that it
obtained the copies from entities that had owned them. Nor does Hoops
allege that Adobe ever sold, gave away or transferred title to the
particular copies of the software at issue. Hoops avers that it
resold Adobe products it “purchased from third party intermediary
distributors,” Hoops Countercl. ¶ 8, but offers no facts regarding
under what terms these distributors obtained the copies. Although it
maintains that these copies did not infringe “Adobe’s right of
reproduction,” id., Hoops says nothing about Adobe’s right of
distribution, to which the first sale doctrine applies.

In lieu of addressing these defects, Hoops offers an unpersuasive
argument that it has not sold Adobe’s copyrighted work but rather
sold discs containing copies of that work. This attempted distinction
illuminates the flaw in Hoops’s theory. Adobe does not allege that
Hoops unlawfully transferred ownership of Adobe’s copyrighted
software. It alleges that Hoops and Kornrumpf sold copies of Adobe’s
software in violation of Adobe’s exclusive distribution right. To
avail itself of the first sale doctrine, Hoops must demonstrate that
it owned the copies of the Adobe software it resold; it is irrelevant
whether Hoops owned the discs on which the copies were stored. A
copyright attaches to an original work of authorship, not the
particular medium in which it was initially fixed.

Hoops appears to argue that Vernor is distinguishable because that
case involved a license agreement. However, Hoops’s allegations are
not sufficient to determine whether Vernor is analogous; as noted
above, Hoops offers no insight into the circumstances under which it
obtained the copies of Adobe software.

Finally, Hoops alleges that Adobe and SIIA misuse Adobe’s copyrights
because their conduct attempts to hamper competition by eliminating
the secondary market of copies of Adobe software. However, because
Hoops has not established that it, or any other re-seller, sold
copies subject to the first sale doctrine, this allegation is
unavailing. It is 

Re: UMG vs. Augusto: first sale wins

2011-02-03 Thread Alexander Terekhov
http://www.iplitigationupdate.com/blog.aspx?entry=1173

"Sending Promotional Music CDs Constitutes “First Sale” for Copyright
Protection Purposes

Januar 28, 2011 | Posted by Karin Scherner Aldama | Print this page 

The Ninth Circuit recently held that a copyright owner’s unsolicited
mailing of promotional music CDs to, for 
example, music critics and radio disc jockeys constituted a sale of the
discs to their recipients for purposes of the Copyright Act’s first sale
doctrine, 17 U.S.C. § 109(a). UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Augusto, __ F.3d
__, No. 08-55998, 2011 WL 9399 (9th Cir. Jan. 4, 2011).

UMG brought copyright infringement claims against Augusto, who had
obtained from third parties promotional CDs distributed by UMG and then
offered those CDs for auction on the Internet. UMG argued that the
original recipients of its CDs only obtained a license because the CDs
generally contained promotional statements indicating that they were
“licensed to the intended recipient for personal use only,” and that
their acceptance “constitute[s] an agreement to comply with the terms of
the license.” Id. at *1. The promotional statements also prohibited the
transfer or resale of the CDs. Augusto argued against the claims on the
basis of the first sale doctrine. That doctrine provides that the lawful
owner of a lawful copy of a CD can sell or otherwise dispose of that
copy as he pleases, without the consent of the copyright owner. 17
U.S.C. § 109(a). The district court granted summary judgment for
Augusto, and UMG appealed.

In upholding the district court’s grant of summary judgment for Augusto,
the Ninth Circuit concluded that the original recipients obtained
ownership of and title to the CDs, and thus the first sale doctrine
applied. The Ninth Circuit based its conclusion on an evaluation of “all
the circumstances of the CDs’ distribution.” UMG, 2011 WL 9399, at *4.
Of particular importance were the following factors: (1) The CDs were
unsolicited and dispatched without any prior arrangement with their
intended recipients in regard to what would happen to the individual
CDs; (2) “The CDs [were] not numbered, and no attempt [was] made to keep
track of where particular copies [were] or what use [was] made of them,”
so that UMG retained no control over the copyrighted material; and (3)
The promotional statements on the CDs did not create a license because
there was no evidence that any of the original recipients ever agreed to
enter into a license agreement, and acceptance of a license cannot be
assumed “when the recipient makes no response at all.” Id. at *4, *6.
Based on these factors, the court concluded that “UMG dispatched the CDs
in a manner that permitted their receipt and retention by the recipients
without the recipients accepting the terms of the promotional
statements. UMG’s transfer of unlimited possession in the circumstances
present here effected a gift or sale within the meaning of the first
sale doctrine.” Id. at 7.

In reaching its conclusion, the court emphasized the differences between
the circumstances in this case and those at issue in cases involving
software licenses. Specifically, the court focused on the fact that
software users order and pay for copies of software and implied that it
was also relevant that software vendors typically control how the
copyrighted software can be used. Id. at *6-7. Effective software
licenses are thus distinguishable from the ineffective licenses that UMG
tried to create.

Augusto had also argued against UMG’s claims based on the Unordered
Merchandise Statute, 39 U.S.C. § 3009, which allows recipients of
unordered merchandise to dispose of that merchandise as they see fit.
The court found that Augusto could not invoke that statute directly
because, by its terms, it applied only to the CDs’ original recipients.
Nonetheless, the court concluded that the Unordered Merchandise Statute
supported its conclusion that the mailing of the CDs effected a sale and
not a license because the statute renders recipients of unordered
merchandise, such as the CDs at issue, owners of that merchandise. UMG,
2011 WL 9399, at *5.

Lesson Learned: The unsolicited mailing of copyrighted material without
any control over what subsequently happens to that material constitutes
a first sale. Unless the recipients agree to enter into a license, a
first sale occurs even if the material is accompanied by a promotional
statement seeking to create a license, because acceptance of such a
license cannot be assumed without the recipient’s confirmation of
acceptance. Consequently, after receipt of unsolicited copyrighted
materials, recipients can dispose of that material as they see fit, and
the copyright holder cannot control or prevent that disposition."



regards,
alexander.

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be infinitely looped as GNGNGNGNG...NGNGNG... and can be said backwards 
too, whereas GNU cannot.)
_

Re: Utterly imbecile pinky communist Ninth Circuit 'judges' (Vernor scandalous ruling)

2011-02-03 Thread Alexander Terekhov
Stupidity rules in the Ninth Circuit:

"IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
ADOBE SYSTEMS INCORPORATED,
Plaintiff,
v.
ANTHONY KORNRUMPF, a/k/a TONY
KORNRUMPF; and HOOPS ENTERPRISE, LLC,
Defendants.
/
HOOPS ENTERPRISE, LLC,
Counter-Claimant,
v.
ADOBE SYSTEMS INCORPORATED,
Counter-Defendant,
and
SOFTWARE AND INFORMATION INDUSTRY
ASSOCIATION,
Third-Party Defendant.
/
No. C 10-02769 CW
ORDER GRANTING
ADOBE SYSTEMS
INCORPORATED AND
SOFTWARE &
INFORMATION
INDUSTRY
ASSOCIATION’S
MOTION TO DISMISS
HOOPS ENTERPRISE,
LLC’S CLAIMS
(Docket No. 34)
Plaintiff



First Sale Doctrine

A copyright holder has the exclusive right to “distribute
copies . . . of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other
transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending.” 17 U.S.C.
§ 106(3). The first sale doctrine enables an “‘owner of a
particular copy’ of a copyrighted work to sell or dispose of his
copy without the copyright owner’s authorization.” Vernor v.
Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102, 1107 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting 17
U.S.C. § 109(a)). The doctrine “does not apply to a person who
possesses a copy of the copyrighted work without owning it, such as
a licensee.” Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1107 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 109(d)).

“Notwithstanding its distinctive name, the doctrine applies
not only when a copy is first sold, but when a copy is given away
or title is otherwise transferred without the accouterments of a
sale.” UMG Recordings v. Augusto, ___ F.3d ___, 2011 WL 9399, at
*3 (9th Cir.) (citations omitted). However, “not every transfer of
possession of a copy transfers title.” Id. at *4. For instance,
in the context of computer software, “copyright owners may create
licensing arrangements so that users acquire only a license to use
the particular copy of software and do not acquire title that
permits further transfer or sale of that copy without the
permission of the copyright owner.” Id.

In Vernor, a declaratory judgment action, the Ninth Circuit
addressed the resale of copyrighted software on eBay. 621 F.3d at
1103. There, Vernor sought a declaration that he did not infringe
the copyright of Autodesk, a software company. Id. Vernor had
purchased copies of Autodesk’s software from Cardwell/Thomas &
Associates (CTA), one of Autodesk’s direct customers, and then
attempted to resell them on eBay. Id. CTA had obtained the copies
under a software license agreement, which imposed significant
restrictions on their transfer and use. Id. at 1104. Based on
this agreement, the Ninth Circuit rejected Vernor’s assertion of
the first sale doctrine, concluding that neither he nor CTA were
owners of the particular copies. Id. at . The court reasoned
that CTA was only a licensee and that Autodesk retained title to
the software. Id.

Here, Hoops does not plead any facts to suggest that it owned
any of the particular copies of Adobe software that it resold or
that it obtained the copies from entities that had owned them. Nor
does Hoops allege that Adobe ever sold, gave away or transferred
title to the particular copies of the software at issue. Hoops
avers that it resold Adobe products it “purchased from third party
intermediary distributors,” Hoops Countercl. ¶ 8, but offers no
facts regarding under what terms these distributors obtained the
copies. Although it maintains that these copies did not infringe
“Adobe’s right of reproduction,” id., Hoops says nothing about
Adobe’s right of distribution, to which the first sale doctrine
applies.

In lieu of addressing these defects, Hoops offers an
unpersuasive argument that it has not sold Adobe’s copyrighted work
but rather sold discs containing copies of that work. This
attempted distinction illuminates the flaw in Hoops’s theory.
Adobe does not allege that Hoops unlawfully transferred ownership
of Adobe’s copyrighted software. It alleges that Hoops and
Kornrumpf sold copies of Adobe’s software in violation of Adobe’s
exclusive distribution right. To avail itself of the first sale
doctrine, Hoops must demonstrate that it owned the copies of the
Adobe software it resold; it is irrelevant whether Hoops owned the
discs on which the copies were stored. A copyright attaches to an
original work of authorship, not the particular medium in which it
was initially fixed.

Hoops appears to argue that Vernor is distinguishable because
that case involved a license agreement. However, Hoops’s
allegations are not sufficient to determine whether Vernor is
analogous; as noted above, Hoops offers no insight into the
circumstances under which it obtained the copies of Adobe software.

Finally, Hoops alleges that Adobe and SIIA misuse Adobe’s
copyrights because their conduct attempts to hamper competition by
eliminating the secondary market of copies of Adobe software.
However, because Hoops has not established that it, or any other
re-seller, sold copies subject to the first sale doctrine, this
allegation is unavailing. It is not a misuse of copyright to
dismantle a market