Re: Jacobsen v Katzer, 535 F.3d 1373 overruled by the US Ninth CircuitCourtof Appeals
Hyman Rosen wrote: [...] copyright infringement is a possible result of license violation. It is the nature of the license violations that determine this. Hyman, Blizzard argued exactly that way. And lost. http://iplaw.hllaw.com/2010/12/articles/copyright/ninth-circuit-concludes-that-violation-of-wow-tou-did-not-give-rise-to-copyright-infringement-claim/ As to Blizzard's copyright claims, the District Court summed up the allegations concisely: Blizzard alleges that users of WoW are licensees who are permitted to copy the copyrighted game client software only in conformance with the EULA and TOU, and that when users launch WoW using Glider, they exceed the license in the EULA and TOU and create infringing copies of the game client software. . . . MDY is liable for contributory copyright infringement, Blizzard claims, because it materially contributes to this direct infringement by Glider users. MDY allegedly does so by developing and selling Glider with the knowledge that Glider users will create infringing copies. . . . MDY is liable for vicarious copyright infringement, Blizzard asserts, because it has the ability to stop the Glider-caused infringing activity and derives a financial benefit from that activity. In defense, MDY argued that Glider users do not infringe Blizzard's copyright; rather, MDY argued that if users violate terms of the EULA and TOU, they are merely breaching a contract, not infringing a copyright. The District Court first re-stated established Ninth Circuit law that copying software to RAM constitutes copying under the Copyright Act. As a result, if a person is not authorized by the copyright holder (through a license) or by law (through section 117 [of the Copyright Act]) to copy the software to RAM, the person is guilty of copyright infringement because the person has exercised a right (copying) that belongs exclusively to the copyright holder. MDY argued that Glider users are licensed to copy the WoW game client software to RAM, which license they acquired by purchasing and loading the software onto their computers. But MDY asserted that provisions of the EULA and TOU that contain prohibitions such as the prohibition against use of bots are merely contractual terms not limitations on the scope of the license granted by Blizzard. As a result, MDY argued that although Blizzard may have breach of contract claims against Glider users, it did not have copyright infringement claims. The District Court disagreed in large part with MDY, concluding that the EULA granted a limited license to WoW players and that, read together, the EULA and TOU provided limits on the scope of the license granted by Blizzard. Thus WoW players who use Glider acted outside the scope of the limited license and therefore [c]opying the game client software to RAM while engaged in this unauthorized activity constitutes copyright infringement. . . . . The Ninth Circuit's Decision. . . . . As to the copyright infringement claims (alleging contributory and vicarious infringement), the Ninth Circuit first addressed the essential step defense of 17 U.S.C. 117(a)(1) and the question of whether WoW players are owners or licensees of the copies of the WoW software in their possession. Relying on its decision in Vernor, the Ninth Circuit concluded that WoW players are merely licensees of their copies of the WoW software and therefore neither they nor MDY were entitled to the essential step defense. As a result, when their computers copy WoW software into RAM, the players may infringe unless their usage is within the scope of Blizzard's limited license. The Ninth Circuit thus turned to an examination of the relevant portions of Blizzard's license (the TOU), namely, the portion prohibiting bots and unauthorized third-party software, to determine whether they were conditions, the breach of which constitute copyright infringement, or covenants, the breach of which give rise to only contract claims. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the provisions of the license at issue were covenants, the breach of which did not give rise to copyright infringement claims. Essentially, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the breach of a license agreement must implicate one of the exclusive rights of copyright to give rise to a copyright infringement claim: [W]e have held that the potential for infringement exists only where the licensee's action (1) exceeds the license's scope (2) in a manner that implicates one of the licensor's exclusive statutory rights. regards, alexander. -- http://gng.z505.com/index.htm (GNG is a derecursive recursive derecursion which pwns GNU since it can be infinitely looped as GNGNGNGNG...NGNGNG... and can be said backwards too, whereas GNU cannot.) ___ gnu-misc-discuss mailing list gnu-misc-discuss@gnu.org http://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/gnu-misc-discuss
Re: Jacobsen v Katzer, 535 F.3d 1373 overruled by the US Ninth CircuitCourtof Appeals
Hyman Rosen wrote: On 12/21/2010 9:48 AM, Alexander Terekhov wrote: that breach of a condition not to use bots doesn't violate the copyright act. Why do you think that a copyleft condition not to restrict users downstream should be treated any differently? Because the court itself said so: https://www.eff.org/files/MDY_opinion.pdf For instance, ToU § 4(D) forbids creation of derivative works Copyleft doesn't forbid creation of derivative works. You can create derivative works from copylefted works all you want. You can also copy verbatim. Copyleft does impose several WOW ToU-like covenants (with covenants itself having really nothing to do with the rights under 17 USC 106) for the case of subsequent distribution of copies of derivative works (ans/or copies verbatim). The distribution of copies made under the GPL (whether verbatim or with modifications) itself falls under 17 USC 109 and hence isn't a copyright infringement by definition of 17 USC 109. Go read it, silly. regards, alexander. -- http://gng.z505.com/index.htm (GNG is a derecursive recursive derecursion which pwns GNU since it can be infinitely looped as GNGNGNGNG...NGNGNG... and can be said backwards too, whereas GNU cannot.) ___ gnu-misc-discuss mailing list gnu-misc-discuss@gnu.org http://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/gnu-misc-discuss
Re: Jacobsen v Katzer, 535 F.3d 1373 overruled by the US Ninth CircuitCourtof Appeals
On 12/21/2010 10:45 AM, Alexander Terekhov wrote: Copyleft doesn't forbid creation of derivative works. You miss the point. The court has said that some violations of the terms of service are copyright violation, and some are not. The difference lies in whether the violating action is an infringement of the copyright holder's exclusive rights under the Copyright Act or not. 17 USC 109 The GPL allows copying and distribution only under its terms, and distinguishes between copies for personal use and distribution. It is a violation of copyright to distribute the former as the latter, and the first sale doctrine is not relevant to this - the infringing copy was not lawfully made under this title. ___ gnu-misc-discuss mailing list gnu-misc-discuss@gnu.org http://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/gnu-misc-discuss
Re: Jacobsen v Katzer, 535 F.3d 1373 overruled by the US Ninth CircuitCourtof Appeals
On 12/21/2010 10:56 AM, Alexander Terekhov wrote: Essentially, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the breach of a license agreement must implicate one of the exclusive rights of copyright to give rise to a copyright infringement claim: [W]e have held that the potential for infringement exists only where the licensee's action (1) exceeds the license's scope (2) in a manner that implicates one of the licensor's exclusive statutory rights. Yes, exactly. Copying and distributing outside the permissions granted by the GPL satisfies both of these. The court gave an example itself, of creating a derivative work. ___ gnu-misc-discuss mailing list gnu-misc-discuss@gnu.org http://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/gnu-misc-discuss
Re: Jacobsen v Katzer, 535 F.3d 1373 overruled by the US Ninth CircuitCourtof Appeals
Hyman Rosen wrote: [...] 17 USC 109 The GPL allows copying and distribution only under its terms, and distinguishes between copies for personal use and distribution. It is a violation of copyright to distribute the former as the latter, and the first sale doctrine is not relevant to this - the infringing copy was not lawfully made under this title. The US courts disagree with you Hyman. http://ftp.resource.org/courts.gov/c/F2/550/550.F2d.1180.76-1141.html In Wells the court granted defendant's motion for acquittal on eight counts of criminal infringement of the copyright of aerial survey maps owned by Edgar Tobin. Tobin had licensed 107 of his customers to manufacture reproductions of his maps for their own use. Defendant was charged with selling, without authorization, copies of Tobin's copyrighted maps. The pivotal issue was whether the copies sold by the defendant were copies which had been the subject of a first sale, thereby terminating their statutory protection: . . . If title has been retained by the copyright proprietor, the copy remains under the protection of the copyright law, and infringement proceedings may be had against all subsequent possessors of the copy who interfere with the copyright proprietor's exclusive right to vend the copyrighted work. If title has passed to a first purchaser, though, the copy loses the protection of the copyright law as discussed above. 176 F.Supp. at 633-634. The court found that there has been no showing on the record that the copies of the aerial survey maps were not published by a lawful licensee of the copyright proprietor or that title to these copies was retained at all times by the copyright proprietor. 176 F.Supp. at 633. Since the Tobin license did not specify that title to the reproduced maps was to remain in Tobin, title to the maps belonged to the licensees who, under the first sale doctrine, were free to resell the maps. The court concluded: Lacking the protection of the copyright law, there can be no infringement, and defendant should be acquitted. 176 F.Supp. at 634. Since the GPL does not specify that title to the copies made is to be retained by the copyright proprietor, title to the copies belongs to the licensees who, under the 17 USC 109, is free to distribute the copies without the authority of the copyright owner. See the light now silly Hyman? regards, alexander. -- http://gng.z505.com/index.htm (GNG is a derecursive recursive derecursion which pwns GNU since it can be infinitely looped as GNGNGNGNG...NGNGNG... and can be said backwards too, whereas GNU cannot.) ___ gnu-misc-discuss mailing list gnu-misc-discuss@gnu.org http://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/gnu-misc-discuss
Re: Jacobsen v Katzer, 535 F.3d 1373 overruled by the US Ninth CircuitCourtof Appeals
On 12/21/2010 11:16 AM, Alexander Terekhov wrote: The US courts disagree with you Hyman. No, they do not. http://ftp.resource.org/courts.gov/c/F2/550/550.F2d.1180.76-1141.html United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. March 28, 1977. ... While the copyright laws protect the right of the copyright proprietor to vend his work, that right is not absolute, but is subject to the first sale doctrine as stated in 17 U.S.C. § 27. That statute provides in pertinent part: (B)ut nothing in this title shall be deemed to forbid, prevent, or restrict the transfer of any copy of a copyrighted work the possession of which has been lawfully obtained. 17 USC 27 is no longer the law; the Copyright Act of 1976 went into effect on January 1, 1978, after the above ruling, and the first sale doctrine now reads differently. Rather than allowing resale of works lawfully obtained 17 USC 109 allows resale of works lawfully made under this title and that is an entirely different kettle of fish, as Omega vs. Costco demonstrated. A copy made for personal use but then distributed has not been lawfully made. ___ gnu-misc-discuss mailing list gnu-misc-discuss@gnu.org http://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/gnu-misc-discuss
Re: Jacobsen v Katzer, 535 F.3d 1373 overruled by the US Ninth CircuitCourtof Appeals
On 12/21/2010 11:23 AM, Alexander Terekhov wrote: How the manner of *not* providing source code could ever implicate one of the licensor's exclusive statutory rights? Manner of copying is within the exclusive rights of the copyright holder. For example, authors may sell hardcover publication rights to one publisher and paperback rights to another and eBook rights to a third. If any of these were to publish in a format other than the agreed one, they would be infringing copyright. The GPL very carefully lays out its restrictions so that they are all part of the act of copying, so that violating its terms is copyright infringement. ___ gnu-misc-discuss mailing list gnu-misc-discuss@gnu.org http://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/gnu-misc-discuss
Re: Jacobsen v Katzer, 535 F.3d 1373 overruled by the US Ninth CircuitCourtof Appeals
On 12/21/2010 11:55 AM, Alexander Terekhov wrote: In sum, the legislative history of Section 109(a) reveals that the phrase lawfully made under this title clarifies what constitutes a first sale for purposes of the first sale doctrine This is false, at least as held by the Ninth Circuit and upheld by the Supreme Court; lawfully made under this title means exactly that, a copy made as permitted by this law. Omega vs. Costco resulted in first sale not applying to imported items because they were made in a foreign country, and thus not made under this title. You may continue to believe that this change is immaterial to the outcome of Wells, but I already know what your opinion is worth. ___ gnu-misc-discuss mailing list gnu-misc-discuss@gnu.org http://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/gnu-misc-discuss
Re: Jacobsen v Katzer, 535 F.3d 1373 overruled by the US Ninth CircuitCourtof Appeals
Hyman Rosen wrote: [...] The GPL very carefully lays out its restrictions so that they are all part of the act of copying . . . An act of providing the source code is part of the act of copying? Take your meds Hyman. regards, alexander. -- http://gng.z505.com/index.htm (GNG is a derecursive recursive derecursion which pwns GNU since it can be infinitely looped as GNGNGNGNG...NGNGNG... and can be said backwards too, whereas GNU cannot.) ___ gnu-misc-discuss mailing list gnu-misc-discuss@gnu.org http://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/gnu-misc-discuss
Re: Jacobsen v Katzer, 535 F.3d 1373 overruled by the US Ninth CircuitCourtof Appeals
Hyman Rosen wrote: [...] 17 USC 27 is no longer the law; the Copyright Act of 1976 went into effect on January 1, 1978, after the above ruling, and the first sale doctrine now reads differently. Rather than allowing resale of works lawfully obtained 17 USC 109 allows resale of works lawfully made under this title and that is an entirely different kettle of fish, as Omega vs. Costco demonstrated. See Staff of House Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., Copyright Law Revision Part 5: 1964 Revision Bill with Discussion Comments 66 (Comm.Print 1965) (Barbara Ringer, member of the Copyright Office's General Revision Steering Committee, stating: The basic purpose of [Section 109(a)] is to make clear that full ownership of a lawfully-made copy authorizes its owner to dispose of it freely, and that this privilege does not extend to copies obtained otherwise than by sale or other lawful disposition. In other words, if you obtain a copy by loan or by rental, you are not free to dispose of it freely or to use it in any way you see fit.). The words under this title were added to ensure that the Copyright Act itself would be the guide for determining the validity of a sale. See H.R.Rep. No. 1476, at 79, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5693 (To come within the scope of section 109(a), a copy or phonorecord must have been `lawfully made under this title,' though not necessarily with the copyright owner's authorization. For example, any resale of an illegally `pirated' phonorecord would be an infringement, but the disposition of a phonorecord made under the compulsory licensing provisions of section 115 would not.); S.Rep. No. 473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 72 (1975) (containing essentially the same language); H.R.Rep. No. 83, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 38 (1967) (same); S.Rep. No. 982, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 123 (1974) (same). In sum, the legislative history of Section 109(a) reveals that the phrase lawfully made under this title clarifies what constitutes a first sale for purposes of the first sale doctrine The phrase essentially means that the copy is not infringing, either because it was made with the permission of the copyright owner (i.e. under license) or it falls within one of the exceptions to the copyright owner's reproduction rights. If one has permission to make lawful copies, one does not need any additional permission to distribute those copies to the public. 17 USC 109 applies to anyone who is the owner of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title. You can become the lawful owner of a copy by license, operation of law (17 USC 115), gift or similar things that are not a sale of material object. A copy made for personal use but then distributed has not been lawfully made. http://ftp.resource.org/courts.gov/c/F2/550/550.F2d.1180.76-1141.html In Wells the court granted defendant's motion for acquittal on eight counts of criminal infringement of the copyright of aerial survey maps owned by Edgar Tobin. Tobin had licensed 107 of his customers to manufacture reproductions of his maps for their own use. Defendant was charged with selling, without authorization, copies of Tobin's copyrighted maps. The pivotal issue was whether the copies sold by the defendant were copies which had been the subject of a first sale, thereby terminating their statutory protection: . . . If title has been retained by the copyright proprietor, the copy remains under the protection of the copyright law, and infringement proceedings may be had against all subsequent possessors of the copy who interfere with the copyright proprietor's exclusive right to vend the copyrighted work. If title has passed to a first purchaser, though, the copy loses the protection of the copyright law as discussed above. 176 F.Supp. at 633-634. The court found that there has been no showing on the record that the copies of the aerial survey maps were not published by a lawful licensee of the copyright proprietor or that title to these copies was retained at all times by the copyright proprietor. 176 F.Supp. at 633. Since the Tobin license did not specify that title to the reproduced maps was to remain in Tobin, title to the maps belonged to the licensees who, under the first sale doctrine, were free to resell the maps. The court concluded: Lacking the protection of the copyright law, there can be no infringement, and defendant should be acquitted. 176 F.Supp. at 634. Since the GPL does not specify that title to the copies made is to be retained by the copyright proprietor, title to the copies belongs to the licensees who, under the 17 USC 109, is free to distribute the copies without the authority of the copyright owner. See the light now silly Hyman? regards, alexander. -- http://gng.z505.com/index.htm (GNG is a derecursive recursive derecursion which pwns GNU since it can be infinitely looped as GNGNGNGNG...NGNGNG... and can be said backwards too, whereas GNU cannot.)
Re: Jacobsen v Katzer, 535 F.3d 1373 overruled by the US Ninth CircuitCourtof Appeals
Hyman Rosen wrote: [...] exactly that, a copy made as permitted by this law. Omega vs. Costco resulted in first sale not applying to imported items Yeah. http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=41f6d942-54be-48f4-a3a7-b766881d6ebd During the Costco oral arguments, the Court seemed skeptical of both sides positions on whether the first sale statute9 (Section 109) implicitly included a territoriality requirement, repeatedly asking the lawyers to point out where in the text or legislative history support could be found for their respective arguments. The Justices appeared to agree that reading Section 109 to include a territoriality requirement would effectively incentivize foreign outsourcing or manufacturing outside the United States, and Congress certainly would not have enacted Section 109 with such an intent what earthly sense would it make to prefer goods that are manufactured abroad over those manufactured in the U.S. (J. Ginsburg). On December 13, 2010 the Court issued a per curiam order affirming the Ninth Circuits ruling against Costco. This order was issued because the court split 4 to 4 on the question and so by rule the lower court opinion was affirmed by an equally divided court. This division resulted after Justice Kagan had recused herself because she had participated as Solicitor General in submitting a brief to the Court urging it to not take the case because the decision of the Ninth Circuit was correct. In effect, the Supreme Courts action left the Ninth Circuits ruling against Costco undisturbed (i.e., the exhaustion doctrine is subject to a territoriality requirement), but it provided no clarification or further precedent to guide lower courts and interested parties. Thus, the conflicting views about the territorial scope of the exhaustion doctrine remain unsettled (at least outside of the Ninth Circuit). http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=c0ff7670-6b42-4846-990a-fa753b0c0cf9 Supreme Court does not answer copyright exhaustion question in Costco Haynes and Boone LLP Thomas Kelton, Jeff Becker, Purvi J. Patel, Lisa Garono and David A. Bell USA December 17 2010 Earlier this week, the US Supreme Court issued a split decision and failed to resolve whether copyrighted materials legally made abroad can be imported into the U.S. and sold without the express permission of the copyright owner. See Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Omega S.A., 562 U.S. __ (2010). In other words, it is still up to the nations circuit courts to decide whether the first sale doctrine extinguishes the rights of a copyright holder when the goods are made outside of the U.S. The case came to the Court from the 9th Circuit, which ruled that copyrighted materials made abroad cannot be imported into the U.S. and sold without the express permission of the copyright owner. See Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 541 F.3d 982 (9th Cir. 2008). After the split decision at the Supreme Court, the 9th Circuits decision remains good law within the 9th Circuits jurisdiction, but no nationwide precedent is set. Other circuit courts have yet to weigh in on the issue. The 9th Circuits decision and the Supreme Courts decision are referred to collectively herein as the Costco cases. The Costco cases have important ramifications, not only within the 9th Circuit. Grey market importers may find themselves subject to successful infringement suits, especially when selling goods within the 9th Circuit. From the other vantage point, the Costco cases provide an important avenue for copyright holders, such as brand-name manufacturers, to keep grey market goods out of the country. Furthermore, because the 9th Circuit includes the entire west coast, the Costco cases deal a blow to much of the nations grey market activity. Copyright holders and grey market importers can expect the same question to come before other circuit courts in the coming years. Interestingly, the Costco cases treat foreign-manufactured goods preferentially in comparison to domestically-manufactured goods. In other words, a lawful first sale does not extinguish a copyright holders rights when the goods are made abroad; however, the same is not true for goods produced domestically. Thus, copyright holders gain a slight advantage by manufacturing goods abroad. History The Supreme Court addressed a similar issue in 1998. See Quality King Distributors Inc., v. L'anza Research International Inc., 523 U.S. 135 (1998). In the Quality King decision, the goods in issue were made in the U.S., exported abroad by the copyright holder, and then re-imported into the U.S. by the defendant without the copyright holders permission. The Supreme Court held that the first sale doctrine extinguished the rights of the copyright holder. In Quality King, the Court specifically refused to consider a fact pattern including foreign-manufactured goods. In the present case, Omega made and sold its watches in Switzerland legally. A third party
Re: Jacobsen v Katzer, 535 F.3d 1373 overruled by the US Ninth CircuitCourtof Appeals
On 12/21/2010 11:59 AM, Alexander Terekhov wrote: An act of providing the source code is part of the act of copying? It's part of the act of copying and distributing. You must either convey the source code with the binary, or convey an offer of the source code. Failing to do either infringes on the copyright; failing to honor the offer infringes on a contract. ___ gnu-misc-discuss mailing list gnu-misc-discuss@gnu.org http://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/gnu-misc-discuss
Re: Jacobsen v Katzer, 535 F.3d 1373 overruled by the US Ninth CircuitCourtof Appeals
Hyman Rosen wrote: On 12/21/2010 11:59 AM, Alexander Terekhov wrote: An act of providing the source code is part of the act of copying? It's part of the act of copying and distributing. You must Distributing a copy lawfully made under 17 USC by its owner is an act under 17 USC 109 and it doesn't require the copyright permission at all. Trying to blender these two distinct acts is intellectually dishonest, Hyman. regards, alexander. -- http://gng.z505.com/index.htm (GNG is a derecursive recursive derecursion which pwns GNU since it can be infinitely looped as GNGNGNGNG...NGNGNG... and can be said backwards too, whereas GNU cannot.) ___ gnu-misc-discuss mailing list gnu-misc-discuss@gnu.org http://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/gnu-misc-discuss
Re: Jacobsen v Katzer, 535 F.3d 1373 overruled by the US Ninth CircuitCourtof Appeals
On 12/21/2010 12:35 PM, Alexander Terekhov wrote: Distributing a copy lawfully made under 17 USC by its owner is an act under 17 USC 109 and it doesn't require the copyright permission at all. Distributing a copy that was made under a personal use license infringes copyright because lawfully made under this title includes the restrictions on use. To realize this, imagine the clearer situation of someone setting up a bank of machines to record an over-the-air broadcast and then selling the recordings. ___ gnu-misc-discuss mailing list gnu-misc-discuss@gnu.org http://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/gnu-misc-discuss
Re: Jacobsen v Katzer, 535 F.3d 1373 overruled by the US Ninth CircuitCourtof Appeals
On 12/21/2010 12:06 PM, Hyman Rosen wrote: On 12/21/2010 11:59 AM, Alexander Terekhov wrote: An act of providing the source code is part of the act of copying? It's part of the act of copying and distributing. You must either convey the source code with the binary, or convey an offer of the source code. Failing to do either infringes on the copyright; failing to honor the offer infringes on a contract. Hyman, Will you NEVER, EVER be able to understand the difference between a *scope of use* restriction on one of the 17 USC sec. 106 exclusive rights: ... An unlicensed use of the copyright is not an infringement unless it conflicts with one of the specific exclusive rights conferred by the copyright statute. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S., at 154-155.; SONY CORP. OF AMER. v. UNIVERSAL CITY STUDIOS, INC., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). Accordingly, if an unlicensed use of a copyrighted work does not conflict with an exclusive right conferred by the statute, it is no infringement of the holder's rights. No license is required by the Copyright Act, for example, to sing a copyrighted lyric in the shower.;Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151,154 (1975). Consistent with this approach, we have held that the potential for infringement exists only where the licensee’s action (1) exceeds the license’s scope (2) in a manner that implicates one of the licensor’s exclusive statutory rights.; MDY INDUSTRIES v. BLIZZARD ENTERTAINMENT (9th Cir 2010). ... and a contract *condition precedent*: .. A condition precedent is an act or event that must occur before a duty to perform a promise arises. AES P.R., L.P. v. Alstom Power, Inc., 429 F. Supp. 2d 713, 717 (D.Del. 2006) (citing Delaware state law); see also Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 224. Conditions precedent are disfavored because they tend to work forfeitures. AES, 429 F. Supp. 2d at 717 (internal citations omitted). Wherever possible, equity construes ambiguous contract provisions as covenants rather than conditions.; MDY INDUSTRIES v. BLIZZARD ENTERTAINMENT (9th Cir 2010). .. Alexander and I attempted to explain multiple times that the Federal Circuit was wrong in Jacobsen v. Katzer. You should really find an easier topic than law to comment about. I'm afraid the subtleties of the law are too difficult for you. The GPL license is D.O.A. in a federal court under both federal copyright and state contract law for more reasons than you will ever be able to grasp. Hyman, give up reading the law and try reading something that you can understand. Sincerely, RJack :) ___ gnu-misc-discuss mailing list gnu-misc-discuss@gnu.org http://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/gnu-misc-discuss
Re: Jacobsen v Katzer, 535 F.3d 1373 overruled by the US Ninth CircuitCourtof Appeals
RJack u...@example.net writes: Alexander and I attempted to explain multiple times that the Federal Circuit was wrong in Jacobsen v. Katzer. You should really find an easier topic than law to comment about. I'm afraid the subtleties of the law are too difficult for you. The subtleties of the law are interpreted _relevantly_ by the courts, not Alexander and you. -- David Kastrup ___ gnu-misc-discuss mailing list gnu-misc-discuss@gnu.org http://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/gnu-misc-discuss
