Re: keys require a user-id

[Wiktor Kwapisiewicz via Gnupg-users]

On 15.05.2020 16:43, Andrew Gallagher wrote:
> The inputs to the WoT are the signatures and the ownertrust values, and
> the outputs are UID validities. "Key validity" is neither an input nor a
> meaningful output of the system. 

Key validity directly influences the "WARNING: This key is not certified
with sufficiently trusted signatures" message that I think is pretty
significant for end-users. If it wasn't meaningful it wouldn't be
printed in the --edit-key dialog.

> It is useful only as an intermediate

> step, together with the ownertrust, in the calculation of another UID's

> validity. The practical outworking of any validity calculation is not

> "Is this key valid?" but "Is this key valid for this UID?".

The argument could be reversed stating that "User ID validity is useful
only as an intermediate step to calculate key validity" and we wouldn't
draw any new knowledge from this. My original point was that key
validity exists.

Also: thanks for bringing my mental shortcut to technical correctness:

> It takes one fully trusted certifier (*), or three marginally trusted

> certifiers (*) on the *same UID*, for a UID to be considered valid.

This could of course be further refining by mentioning ownertrust or
that 0x11: Persona certifications do not contribute to this or that
trust signatures affect the algorithm or...

Kind regards,
Wiktor

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Re: keys require a user-id

[Wiktor Kwapisiewicz via Gnupg-users]

On 15.05.2020 15:21, Andrew Gallagher wrote:
> Ownertrust is per-key, but validity is per-UID.

Andrew there are two validity values:

$ gpg --edit-key andrewg
pub  rsa4096/FB73E21AF1163937
 created: 2013-07-02  expires: 2021-01-07  usage: SCA
-->  trust: unknown   validity: marginal <--- here (A)
sub  rsa4096/6B09069314549D4B
 created: 2013-07-02  expires: 2021-01-07  usage: E
sub  rsa4096/5C1EC404D5906629
 created: 2015-04-26  expires: 2021-01-07  usage: S
sub  rsa4096/85FDF561DA8C0C46
 created: 2015-04-26  expires: 2021-01-07  usage: A
[marginal] (1). Andrew Gallagher  <-- and here (B)
[marginal] (2)  Andrew Gallagher 

Value from (A) is calculated from User IDs (B).

When you sign someone else User ID it's not your User ID that is doing
the signing it it's your key that's why you need a key validity that's
separated from User ID (key validity is calculated from User ID validity).

Kind regards,
Wiktor

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Re: keys require a user-id

[Wiktor Kwapisiewicz via Gnupg-users]

Hi Ingo,

On 15.05.2020 14:35, Ingo Klöcker wrote:
> Because in GnuPG the validity of keys is bound to validity and owner trust of 
> UIDs. No UID -> invalid key. Why do you want to be able to import a key in 
> GnuPG that would be utterly unusable?

AFAIK key validity and owner trust are per key not per User ID.
Third-party signatures are made for key fingerprint and User ID but then
it takes one fully trusted UID (or 3 marginally by default) for the key
to be considered valid. And then if that valid key signs some other User
ID the process starts anew. For signing other keys only the primary key
is needed, not User IDs.

The distinction is important because it affects only the Web of Trust
and only in one way. That is if you owner-trusted that UID-less key it
could become trust introducer in your WoT. Also you could encrypt to
that key and verify signatures just fine (it just wouldn't display
anything meaningful).

Is this useful? I'm not sure, but wanted to point out this one detail.

Kind regards,
Wiktor

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Re: Checking multiple smart cards before asking for one

[Wiktor Kwapisiewicz via Gnupg-users]

Hi Valentin,

I believe this will work seamlessly in GnuPG 2.3.

You can track this ticket: https://dev.gnupg.org/T4695

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Wiktor

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Re: monkeysign removal from bullseye

[Wiktor Kwapisiewicz via Gnupg-users]

Hi Andrew,

On 22.03.2020 19:01, Andrew Gallagher wrote:

Come back to me when there is a fully scriptable interface to gpg.
Monkeysign abstracted away a*LOT*  of that pain.


Actually newer GnuPG already has a lot of interesting options. For key 
signing automation the most interesting one is "--quick-sign-key" that 
can sign a given UID in a key given by fingerprint.


Used like that:

https://github.com/wiktor-k/airsigner/blob/master/offline/sign-and-create-emails#L28

Monkeysign's README already notes that but OpenKeychain can also import 
and sign keys with its built-in QR code scanner. But that's probably not 
a direct replacement for monkeyscan.


Kind regards,
Wiktor

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Re: What are some threats against which OpenPGP smartcards are useful?

[Wiktor Kwapisiewicz via Gnupg-users]

Hi Christoph,

There is one feature of smartcards that's hard to reproduce otherwise: 
once you pull the smartcard out of the port the attacker can't use it. 
If they steal your private keys they can do as they please with it 
(until you revoke keys and users refresh your key... that can take some 
time). For example if they steal your private encryption subkey they'll 
be able to decrypt future communications with you. When you pull out the 
smartcard that's where the attack ends.


(One way or another someone having code execution privileges on your 
computer is bad.)


Additionally smartcards require PINs and lock the card after several 
tries. This is not possible with keys on USB drives.


These two things are really useful when using the same token on multiple 
devices (e.g. I use the same card on my laptop and phone).


Kind regards,
Wiktor

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Re: Different key pare for e-mail and signing code

[Wiktor Kwapisiewicz via Gnupg-users]

Hi John,

On 04.01.2020 09:53, john doe wrote:

My goal is to sign code and sign/encrypt e-mail but I'm not sure what's
the best way forward:
- One key pare for e-mail (sign/encrypt) and an other key pare for
signing code
- Finding a way to do what I want with only one key pare (multiple
signing subkeys and one encryption subkey)
- Am I missing something/better approach


There is no single answer to this question. Some people use one keypair 
for signing e-mails and software because it's simpler (especially if 
people have or use Web of Trust to validate keys).


Apache, for example, recommends using separate keypair for code signing 
with specific guidelines (such as having UID comment "CODE SIGNING KEY" 
[0]). I guess this is due to the fact that one rarely signs code but 
when they do it they use a different hardware token thus avoiding the 
risk of misuse of their frequently used key (e-mail signing).


OpenPGP lacks extended key usage flags so if an object is signed, it's 
not clear what was the intention of the signer and it's theoretically 
possible to trick someone into signing an e-mail (via auto-reply or so) 
that then could be misinterpreted as software [1].


Kind regards,
Wiktor

[0]: https://www.apache.org/dev/release-signing.html#key-comment

[1]: https://stackoverflow.com/q/35840196

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Re: Partial/fragmented decryption keys

[Wiktor Kwapisiewicz via Gnupg-users]

Hi,


I recall from the early days of PGP that there was a way to create a corporate 
key, fragmented into a certain number of potions, which would require some 
quorum to be able to perform decryption. I pored over the GnuPG documentation 
but could not find an equivalent. Perhaps I?m just getting the terminology 
wrong. Is this still possible in OpenPGP and therefore in GnuPG?


It is indeed not implemented in GnuPG.

In case you're curious on how does it work in Symantec PGP here's the 
description:


https://support.symantec.com/us/en/article.HOWTO42097.html

and a video tutorial: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q_Mpa8TOhU0

Symantec recommends this feature for "extremely high security keys" by 
which I guess they mean designated revoker key or additional decryption 
key. Their implementation seems to bring all private keys to one trusted 
computer to reconstruct the combined key.


As others mentioned there is a flag for marking an OpenPGP key as 
"split" in the spec so theoretically it could implemented in free software.


One project that's close is DKGPG but mind that it "should NOT be used 
in production environments". Check out the following links:


http://nongnu.org/dkgpg/

http://www.nongnu.org/libtmcg/kryptotag26_stamer_slides.pdf

Hope this helps!

Kind regards,
Wiktor

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Re: Slightly OT - mobile OpenPGP usage

[Wiktor Kwapisiewicz via Gnupg-users]

Hi Chris,

On 27.08.2019 17:52, Chris Narkiewicz via Gnupg-users wrote:

On 26/08/2019 19:47, Wiktor Kwapisiewicz via Gnupg-users wrote:

If one sets URL field on the
token then just plugging the token when OpenKeychain is opened is enough
to get the key ready-to-use.


Can you explain what kind of workflow do you mean here?


I mean you start OpenKeychain, touch the NFC token and get the import 
key screen (see attachment). This is very straightforward, no need to 
mess with passwords and secret key files.


OpenPGP software requires public keys but tokens don't store them so own 
public keys need to be transmitted somehow. Fortunately OpenPGP Card 
spec has a "URL of public key" field.


You can see/set the value this way:

$ gpg --card-edit

Reader ...: ...
Application ID ...: ...
Version ..: 2.1
Manufacturer .: Yubico
...
URL of public key : https://metacode.biz/@wiktor/openpgp/key
Login data ...: wiktor

This is in turn used by OpenKeychain (but also by gpg --card-edit and 
"fetch" subcommand) to download public parts.


Kind regards,
Wiktor


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Re: Slightly OT - mobile OpenPGP usage

[Wiktor Kwapisiewicz via Gnupg-users]

On 26.08.2019 19:37, Andrew Gallagher wrote:

Tangentially related - I've seen docs recommending having your portable 
keychain have a subkey for signing, and that keychain to lack the master secret 
key entirely ( and putting that one in an undisclosed secure location), with a 
different passphrase, etc. What are gnupg-users thoughts on that sort of setup?

With the advent of NFC and lightning hardware tokens, it will make more sense 
to use them for all devices, removing the need for nonstandard extensions 
entirely. There is a non-negligible cost for the hardware, but it is *much* 
more convenient and secure to plug a card or dongle into a new device than it 
is to transfer subkey bundles (which are still sensitive data, even without the 
primary key).


I agree. I'm using this kind of setup (offline master key and hardware 
tokens for subkeys) and it works very well. If one sets URL field on the 
token then just plugging the token when OpenKeychain is opened is enough 
to get the key ready-to-use.


Having multiple subkeys for multiple devices can be problematic in 
practice (e.g. GnuPG does not encrypt to all encryption subkeys or 
Autocrypt clients only export one signing subkey etc.)


W.r.t. NFC there is this minor detail:
https://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-users/2018-December/061375.html

But from the UX point of view it's very convenient.

Kind regards,
Wiktor

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Re: Storing custom signed data in the key

[Wiktor Kwapisiewicz via Gnupg-users]

Hi Tomasz,


what would be the most "canonical" way to store arbitrary, signed data
along the gpg key? And then: what is the programmatic way of extracting
said data?
(...)
sig!3N   KEYID 2019-08-17  User Example 
Signature notation: pub@signify=SIGNIFYKEY


Does it make sense? Is it a good idea? What would be a better way?


Yep, that definitely makes sense and notations are a good way to store 
additional data. The only problem here is how to get the notation values 
programmatically in a way that you know the self-signature is valid.


Sadly "gpg --list-options show-notations --with-colons --list-keys $KEY" 
does not print the notation output.


I did use OpenPGP.js to verify signature and extract notations for a 
small project of mine (https://metacode.biz/openpgp/proofs example here: 
https://metacode.biz/@wiktor ) but I understand you want to keep the 
dependencies to the minimum.


Maybe you could use GpgME, the docs look promising:

> The signature notations on a key signature are only available if the 
key was retrieved via a listing operation with the 
GPGME_KEYLIST_MODE_SIG_NOTATIONS mode enabled, because it can be 
expensive to retrieve all signature notations.


Source: 
https://www.gnupg.org/(es)/documentation/manuals/gpgme/Key-objects.html#Key-objects


One minor thing, you may want to adjust the notation name (key). RFC 
4880 advises e-mail-like key where the domain is a name you control. So 
for example "pub-sign...@debian.org" if you control "debian.org". 
Additionally it would be nice to have the e-mail redirect to a human in 
case someone sends the message there.


Kind regards,
Wiktor



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Re: "There's always light..........."

[Wiktor Kwapisiewicz via Gnupg-users]

On 16.08.2019 11:38, john doe wrote:

A better comment would be the URL where to download your public key.


Even better would be using "--sig-keyserver-url" to embed the URL in an 
appropriate packet.


Details here:
https://www.gnupg.org/documentation/manuals/gnupg/GPG-Esoteric-Options.html

Note that unless "honor-keyserver-url" is set in the config explicitly 
this is not used by default by GnuPG (see comments about 
"auto-key-retrieve" here: 
https://www.gnupg.org/documentation/manuals/gnupg/GPG-Configuration-Options.html 
).


And, if the key is available via WKD using "--sender $EMAIL" as GnuPG 
can fetch the missing key over WKD (using only --auto-key-retrieve).


Kind regards,
Wiktor



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Re: revoke last valid user ID

[Wiktor Kwapisiewicz via Gnupg-users]

On 22.07.2019 19:28, ilf wrote:

Is there a way to override this limitation?


I'd try adding one dummy User ID, revoke the rest, then delete that 
dummy User ID before it gets sent to the keyserver.


I guess you don't want to revoke the entire key...

Kind regards,
Wiktor

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Re: Essay on PGP as it is used today

[Wiktor Kwapisiewicz via Gnupg-users]

On 22.07.2019 11:26, Procopius via Gnupg-users wrote:


I searched and determined the author is unknown from from what I could see.


The author is Thomas H. Ptacek, here's contact info:

https://news.ycombinator.com/user?id=tptacek

FWIW he's known for criticizing crypto that he thinks is unnecessarily 
complex, such as PGP and DNSSEC. If you want you can browse through his 
comments to see that the article is mostly a comprehensive collection of 
his thoughts.


Kind regards,
Wiktor

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Re: [Sks-devel] Fwd [from schleuder dev team]: Signature-flooded keys: current situation and mitigation

[Wiktor Kwapisiewicz via Gnupg-users]

Hi Andrew,

On 18.07.2019 19:35, Andrew Gallagher wrote:

A key owner can (preferably automatically) create a “self-identity” on her 
primary key consisting of a well-known string that contains no personal 
information. To avoid breaking legacy search-by-id systems this string should 
be unique to the primary key. I suggest using 
“fpr:000”, where the zeros are replaced by the 
fingerprint of the key. The self-identity (and any revocations on it) can then 
be safely distributed by keystores that would otherwise refuse to distribute 
personal info.


Minor thing: I suggest using 
"openpgp4fpr:000" instead of "fpr". 
That'd make the User ID a valid URI as "openpgp4fpr" is an assigned URI 
Scheme, see:


https://www.iana.org/assignments/uri-schemes/uri-schemes.xhtml

Probably the cleanest solution (suggested by others) would be using 
direct key signature (0x1F) [0] and avoid User IDs entirely. Your 
suggestion Andrew has the benefit that it's immediately backwards 
compatible with software "in the wild".


[0]: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4880#section-5.2.1

Kind regards,
Wiktor



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Re: WKD: Publishing a key for multiple user IDs

[Wiktor Kwapisiewicz via Gnupg-users]

On 16.07.2019 12:16, Werner Koch via Gnupg-users wrote:

So if I have two email addresses/user IDs m...@my.org and m...@my.org
associated with the same key, I cannot just export the key and publish
it, right? I have to somehow publish two different ‘stripped’ public


Sight.  GnuPG handles this for you if your frontend uses gpg-wks-cleint
for this.  You can use this tool also to create a local copy of server
data structure and then sysc it up.


If you've got only gpg installed you can use export filters to prepare a 
stripped key:


$ gpg --export-options export-clean --export-filter keep-uid=mbox=$EMAIL 
--export $EMAIL


Hope this helps.

Kind regards,
Wiktor

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Arch Linux impacted by new defaults in 2.2.17

[Wiktor Kwapisiewicz via Gnupg-users]

Hello,

I just saw the following bug reported in Arch Linux repos:
https://bugs.archlinux.org/task/63147

with the title "[gnupg] 2.2.17 release is broken by design and breaks 
pacman".


It appears Arch's packages use Web of Trust for introducing new 
developers by adding 3 signatures out of 5 (or 6) marginally trusted 
Master Signing Keys: https://www.archlinux.org/master-keys/ and thus 
they depend on these signatures to be there.


Quoting the bug report:

By default, pacman itself will try to look up keys which it does not know about yet, and download them with the master key signatures in order to validate signed packages/repositories. 


Would deploying WKD on archlinux.org and making signatures with --sender 
preserve third-party-signatures that they depend on?


Kind regards,
Wiktor

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Re: WKD: mutt integration status (was: WKD documentation)

[Wiktor Kwapisiewicz via Gnupg-users]

On 10.07.2019 13:35, Bernhard Reiter wrote:

Am Mittwoch 10 Juli 2019 10:53:17 schrieb Wiktor Kwapisiewicz via Gnupg-users:

If you convince Mutt community that WKD is a good idea I can prepare the
patch for you.


As I'm not on the mutt development channels,
I'd prefer if someone else would do this.

Bernhard
ps.: Still I'm an very occasional mutt user.


I never used mutt before working on that change too ;)

Two patches are here (recreated from memory):
https://github.com/wiktor-k/mutt/commits/master

They do work as I've tested them in mutt using PGP: encrypt (y/e; the 
key was correctly fetched inside mutt).


If someone wants to take it over and propose it again on mutt-dev I 
don't mind (I don't care about credits so let's say it's released as 
public domain ;)).


There may be some error handling necessary. I've omitted it because if 
setting keylist_mode fails it's not catastrophic.


Kind regards,
Wiktor

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Re: WKD: mutt integration status (was: WKD documentation)

[Wiktor Kwapisiewicz via Gnupg-users]

Hi Bernhard,

On 10.07.2019 10:38, Bernhard Reiter wrote:

Am Dienstag 09 Juli 2019 20:51:41 schrieb Wiktor Kwapisiewicz via Gnupg-users:

Sure, take a look at the thread starting here:
http://lists.mutt.org/pipermail/mutt-dev/Week-of-Mon-20180702/000157.html

(The patch is not there but it's basically setting external locate
mechanism in gpgme so, except one bugfix that I also found, it would be
a one-liner).

Maybe this is actually worth trying to propose again, one argument that is
missing is the lost security by emails that are send unencrypted because
users cannot figure out how to get the pubkey of their recipients.



Sure, why not. Especially that now WKD is prevalent in e-mail clients 
that care about privacy (Mailpile, Enigmail...). There is additional 
argument in favor of WKD nowadays - WKD delivers non-flooded keys as 
it's the key owner that controls what's added to their key.


If you convince Mutt community that WKD is a good idea I can prepare the 
patch for you. As far as I remember it's very minimal and I'd be happy 
to work on it. Unless there is no chance that WKD will be merged. Then I 
don't want to waste my time :)


Nb. in the process of getting to know mutt-GnuPG integration I've seen 
more places that would need attention. For example the code is riddled 
with PKA integration code and from what I can see PKA is considered 
obsolete:


https://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-users/2018-October/061034.html

Kind regards,
Wiktor

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Re: WKD: more organisations using it (Re: WKD documentation)

[Wiktor Kwapisiewicz via Gnupg-users]

On 10.07.2019 10:22, Bernhard Reiter wrote:

You can also add Debian there and occrp.org (although the latter doesn't
have policy file :().

do you have something that can be publically referred to, or a contact person
I could ask that they are fine being listed in the wiki?



If you see the staff page:
https://www.occrp.org/staff

there is this person listed:
https://mastodon.social/@rysiek

I'd contact them.

For the record I don't know anyone there personally, I just checked one 
e-mail and saw they have WKD enabled (I do sometimes test random sites, 
hehe).


Kind regards,
Wiktor

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Re: WKD documentation (Re: Testing WKD setup?)

[Wiktor Kwapisiewicz via Gnupg-users]

Hi Bernhard,

On 09.07.2019 16:47, Bernhard Reiter wrote:

Once upon
a time I mailed random PGP-using people asking if they'd consider
setting it up and the feedback has been overwhelmingly positive.


Cool, if you receive answer, please help us to keep the list of supporting
organisations growing at https://wiki.gnupg.org/WKD
(We'd have to move it to a subpage soon.)


You can also add Debian there and occrp.org (although the latter doesn't 
have policy file :().


I think Linux distributions are particularly good target for WKD - they 
can manage their developer's keys. They use HTTPS and usually developers 
have e-mail aliases at the distro domain. Additionally now with GnuPG 
2.2.17 they can easily make first signature verification faster by 
utilizing Signer's UID packet (--sender option).


(As a side note, I did contact two distros with that in mind and one of 
them, I'll share this openly: Gentoo - did handle it in a very 
professional matter enabling WKD for developers in days and keeping me - 
an outsider - in the loop for the whole time. I'm still impressed by 
their execution!)



No problem! I actually also implemented WKD in a couple of projects in
three different languages (OpenKeychain, OpenPGP.js, initial support in
Mailpile,


Cool! Anything more you can share?


I'll think about it, this was just the most pleasant experiences I had 
in contributing (in no particular order!). I've got a small to-do list 
for project that I still want to contribute WKD support but sadly I'm 
out of time currently :-/



I did have a patch for mutt but they didn't like the idea :))


Do you have a link to your upstream submission? Maybe others users can help to
state their interest?


Sure, take a look at the thread starting here:
http://lists.mutt.org/pipermail/mutt-dev/Week-of-Mon-20180702/000157.html

(The patch is not there but it's basically setting external locate 
mechanism in gpgme so, except one bugfix that I also found, it would be 
a one-liner).


From what I can see Werner also planned to add that but I don't know 
how it ended up:


http://lists.mutt.org/pipermail/mutt-dev/Week-of-Mon-20181119/000246.html


Did you also give it to https://neomutt.org/?


Neomutt deferred to Mutt's mailing list, see:
https://github.com/neomutt/neomutt/issues/1282#issuecomment-411401300

On the bright side I've seen other TUI mail clients planning to add WKD 
support e.g. Aerc (homepage: https://aerc-mail.org/), author's opinion 
on WKD: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=20091100


Kind regards,
Wiktor

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Re: WKD documentation (Re: Testing WKD setup?)

[Wiktor Kwapisiewicz via Gnupg-users]

Hi Bernhard,

On 09.07.2019 15:02, Bernhard Reiter wrote:

Note that on Wiktor's page a few details are missing:
  * policy file is needed
  * directory listing strongly recommend to be off
  * minimum version of gpg that has --with-wkd (some versions don't).


Policy file is checked during WKD check (and I saw the original poster 
did set it up). Checking directory listing would be an interesting thing 
to add! (Although this would be only heuristic).


--with-wkd gpg version is definitely good thing to add, thanks for the idea!


BTW, last week we've updated
   https://wiki.gnupg.org/WKDHosting
with a how to use gpg-wks-client on Gnu and Windows systems
to create a flat file structure.


What I like in WKD most is that it's a super-simple standard. Once upon 
a time I mailed random PGP-using people asking if they'd consider 
setting it up and the feedback has been overwhelmingly positive. The 
only thing I needed was basically the local-part hash and actually 
that's what I built the checker for, to generate the URL in an easy way, 
even without GPG.


--with-wkd mentioned by Alyssa is what I used previously and it was good 
but ultimately I've become too lazy to use even that :)


As Phil mentioned the checker has not been updated to latest specs and 
gives warnings for issues that I think should be part of the spec (I 
mentioned them on the OpenPGP mailing list but did not receive any 
feedback from the I-D author).



Best Regards,
Bernhard
ps.: Thanks Wiktor for explaning WKD



No problem! I actually also implemented WKD in a couple of projects in 
three different languages (OpenKeychain, OpenPGP.js, initial support in 
Mailpile, I did have a patch for mutt but they didn't like the idea :)), 
so the I-D looks solid!


> I thought you'd be interested in the
> feedback. :)

Yep, thanks for the CC, I'm not subscribed to the ML at all times!

See you later!

Kind regards,
Wiktor

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Re: SKS and GnuPG related issues and possible workarounds

[Wiktor Kwapisiewicz via Gnupg-users]

On 05.07.2019 11:26, Peter Lebbing wrote:

PS: Before you blame archive.org: they respect robots exclusions and
wishes from individual site owners. It was keybase.io which allowed it
in the first place, although it may or may not have been a conscious
decision on their part.


To be honest I'd consider this a separate matter. Because if the data is 
deleted from site X but archive.org snapshots it it's archive.org that 
now processes your data, not site X.


Now, of course I do agree with your overall conclusion that the data is 
spread throughout the Internet anyway (through mailing lists, git logs 
etc.) but that doesn't mean that social sites shouldn't do their due 
diligence w.r.t. data deletion.


As for robots.txt not all archiving sites respect it:
https://www.archiveteam.org/index.php?title=Robots.txt

Kind regards,
Wiktor

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Re: SKS and GnuPG related issues and possible workarounds

[Wiktor Kwapisiewicz via Gnupg-users]

On 03.07.2019 17:33, Stefan Claas via Gnupg-users wrote:

Regarding my keybase presence, I can immediately close down my account
and my data and the data from my followers is removed, cool eh?


I did a small experiment and it seems that your data is permanently 
preserved in sigchains of all people that follow you. Even if you delete 
your account.


For example this is my account's sigchain:

https://keybase.io/_/api/1.0/sig/get.json?uid=ba0cc408d52c5965ac804448d36e1b19

I did create a dummy account and followed that.

The account is deleted now:
https://keybase.io/richard12384

But the data still remain in API of my sigchain (grep for the username).

I did try to clarify this with Keybase people but did not get the reply 
(maybe you'd have more luck in this).


Kind regards,
Wiktor

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Re: Your Thoughts

[Wiktor Kwapisiewicz via Gnupg-users]

On 03.07.2019 20:30, Alyssa Ross wrote:

Oh, interesting. Thank you for showing this to me. I had it in my head
that a "weak" signature would count as a marginal in the web of trust,
but I suppose I was wrong about that.

In that case, I agree that ask-cert-level doesn't make sense as a
default.


I spent far too much time reading various OpenPGP resources so if you 
don't mind two articles that I particularly like:)


https://www.linux.com/learn/pgp-web-trust-core-concepts-behind-trusted-communication

and

https://www.linuxfoundation.org/blog/2014/02/pgp-web-of-trust-delegated-trust-and-keyservers/

The information density when I read them was definitely high for me but 
such articles are unfortunately very rare in this ecosystem.


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Wiktor

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Re: SKS and GnuPG related issues and possible workarounds

[Wiktor Kwapisiewicz via Gnupg-users]

On 03.07.2019 11:06, Robert J. Hansen wrote:

Those two account for literally 99% of all use cases.  The vast majority
of OpenPGP is to verify package signatures; for the small fraction that
use it for email, Enigmail is the most dominant choice, with GpgOL a
close second.


Yes. It seems distros that I know of manually manage package signing 
keys so they wouldn't be vulnerable to this kind of attack:


https://blog.liw.fi/posts/2019/07/02/debian_and_the_sks_signature_flooding_attack/

(although it would be a chore as previously they could just --refresh-keys).

For something completely different: on gnupg-devel there was a 
discussion on using Web Key Directory first for fetching signing keys.


So "gpg --auto-key-retrieve --verify HOWTO.txt.sig HOWTO.txt" would get 
the key from sixdemonbag.org instead of keyservers thus retrieving good, 
non-flooded key. The change is tracked at https://dev.gnupg.org/T4595


Kind regards,
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Re: distributing pubkeys: autocrypt, hagrid, WKD

[Wiktor Kwapisiewicz via Gnupg-users]

Hi Konstantin,

On 02.07.2019 21:40, Konstantin Ryabitsev wrote:
Most subkey changes that I am aware of are not due to people's old 
subkeys expiring, but because they add new ones for reasons like 
migrating between smartcard solutions or just being nerdy and picking a 
new ECC-based subkey.


When this happens, a maintainer who tries to verify a signed pull 
request will have the operation fail, so they need to have a way to 
force-refresh the developer's key.


Do you mean something simpler than [0]:

gpg --auto-key-locate clear,wkd,nodefault --locate-key torva...@kernel.org

?

Trying key lookup over WKD if the subkey is missing locally (but primary 
key is present) would be a good idea. I've seen some really weird errors 
in that case [1].


If the primary key used short expiration [2] the refresh would be 
automatic but not many people like to prolong expirations every couple 
of months.


Kind regards,
Wiktor

[0]: https://dev.gnupg.org/T2917#115978

[1]:
https://www.reddit.com/r/tails/comments/9rchgi/tails_3101_error_cant_check_signature_no_public/

[2]: 
https://blogs.gentoo.org/mgorny/2018/08/13/openpgp-key-expiration-is-not-a-security-measure/


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Re: New keyserver at keys.openpgp.org - what's your take?

[Wiktor Kwapisiewicz via Gnupg-users]

On 01.07.2019 14:36, Andrew Gallagher wrote:

OpenPGP already has the "keyserver" field which is rarely used. It is
supposedly a hint to clients to tell them to prefer a particular
keyserver, but it could also be used as a hint to the keyservers
themselves, to tell them where the master copy of any public key can be
sourced.


This sounds like a really good idea.

This way only one place would have to be updated by the user and 
keyservers would automatically refresh key data themselves.


I did suggest something like that but using WKD for Hagrid:

https://gitlab.com/hagrid-keyserver/hagrid/issues/55#note_181162712

but your suggestion Andrew is more generic (key can be put on any HTTP 
host anywhere).


Kind regards,
Wiktor

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Re: Your Thoughts

[Wiktor Kwapisiewicz via Gnupg-users]

On 01.07.2019 23:08, Juergen Bruckner via Gnupg-users wrote:

Well that not pretty "in the wild" but its pretty new:
The Austrian Parliament and some parts of the Austria Government have
released a website [1] where the PGP-Keys of Members of the Parliament
and other people in the government are collected on one place.

[1] https://gvkeys.at/


That's interesting.

All keys have the same comment in User ID field (random key):

$ gpg -k D81FE9F91ED6AA9F
pub   rsa4096 2018-03-26 [SCEA] [expires: 2023-03-25]
  B5601EA2ABE3CDD51765B6F9D81FE9F91ED6AA9F
uid   [marginal] Nikolaus Berlakovich (Offizieller Schlüssel der 
REPUBLIK ÖSTERREICH https://gvkeys.at) 



And they all are just one primary key (no subkeys) with all capabilities.

Email addresses use the same domain "parlament.gv.at" so it would be a 
perfect place to deploy WKD for these keys :)


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Wiktor

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Re: Your Thoughts

[Wiktor Kwapisiewicz via Gnupg-users]

On 02.07.2019 00:58, Alyssa Ross wrote:

For example, why isn't ask-cert-level a default?


For an alternative view on ask-cert-level see also:

https://debian-administration.org/users/dkg/weblog/98

I do agree that no two people use gpg in the same way.

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Wiktor

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Re: SKS Keyserver Network Under Attack

[Wiktor Kwapisiewicz via Gnupg-users]

Hi Alyssa,

On 02.07.2019 00:43, Alyssa Ross wrote:

The impression I got was that they're very optimistic about their
ability to handle traffic to their server -- they were happy to have a
distro make the switch, and will be changing the defaults in Enigmail
and OpenKeychain very soon, as I understand it.


I did work on one scheme that uses OpenPGP and I did some extensive 
tests even before keys.openpgp.org was announced and in terms of 
reliability it's day vs night compared to SKS.


Hagrid, as far as understand it, serves keys from static files so it by 
design has good performance. SKS on the other hand requires caches in 
front of the server and, in my tests, it was frequent that an old 
version persisted in the cache long after I updated a key.


No such issues on keys.openpgp.org, gpg --send-key and the new updated 
key is immediately available with no time outs or delays.



It is a real shame that a decentralized Hagrid isn't really possible,
though, at least to my understanding. It's quite the limitation for
GnuPG.


Decentralized non-identity information hagrid could still be possible. 
It's just a question over which protocol to synchronize this kind of data.


Kind regards,
Wiktor

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Re: New keyserver at keys.openpgp.org - what's your take?

[Wiktor Kwapisiewicz via Gnupg-users]

Hi Konstantin,

On Fri Jun 14, 2019 at 11:19 AM Konstantin Ryabitsev wrote:
> 1. implement the regular --send-key --recv-key api

This is already implemented.

> 2. when accepting a --send-key, check to make sure at least one of the 
> uid's matches an allow-list of identities (for example, from a dump of 
> all authors/committers in linux.git)

I guess this could be implemented as a white-list of e-mails.

I hope you don't mind but I've mentioned this use-case on their issue
tracker:

https://gitlab.com/hagrid-keyserver/hagrid/issues/55#note_181698023

> 3. perform email verification using the matching identity from #2

If filtering would be implemented this would also work as is.

> 4. store all key data without stripping out 3rd-party signatures

As far as I understood the Hagrid keyserver developers they're not
against 3rd-party signatures per se, just don't like the idea of anyone
appending data to keys. The answer on the FAQ seems quite open:

https://keys.openpgp.org/about/faq#third-party-signatures

> I guess it would be easy enough to hack that into hagrid, but that would 
> mean a hard fork and I'd avoid that at all costs.

I think it would be useful to bring it to Hagrid developers (either on
the issue tracker, via e-mail or #hagrid on IRC). From my experience
they're listening to feedback :)

Have a nice evening!

Kind regards,
Wiktor

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Re: New keyserver at keys.openpgp.org - what's your take?

[Wiktor Kwapisiewicz via Gnupg-users]

Hi Oscar,

On 14.06.2019 10:12, Oscar Carlsson via Gnupg-users wrote:
I'm generally curious on your opinions on the latest new keyserver, this 
time running a new software than the normal keyservers.


It's definitely faster and more responsive. That was my personal pain 
point when interacting with SKS. For example I'm working on a small 
thing that fetches keys from keyservers. I push my modified key, fetch 
it from SKS and... nope, no changes are visible (because of nginx 
caching). Then a different, old set of data is visible. Then timeout. 
Etc. keys.openpgp.org just works. I push data and it's available.


They seem to have a different model which minimize the amount of 
information available, to be compliant with GDPR and friends. Do you 
think there are any downsides to this?


Storing endless amounts of data without any kind of verification was a 
bad idea. Maybe SKS was designed in good old times when no-one would try 
to take advantage of it but in 2019 validating e-mail address is bare 
minimum a service such as this should do.


The current shortcoming is stripping third-party signatures. So Web of 
Trust wouldn't work (for good reasons described in the FAQ [0]). For 
some people this may be surprising.


[0]: https://keys.openpgp.org/about/faq#third-party-signatures

For the record I don't think keys.openpgp.org is in any way 
revolutionary as it is now. It's a bare minimum keyserver that OpenPGP 
needed for a long time. Fortunately the team behind it has more ideas 
that could only improve the overall image and UX of OpenPGP in the wider 
community.


Kind regards,
Wiktor

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Re: Adding notations with quick commands

[Wiktor Kwapisiewicz via Gnupg-users]

Hi Markus,

On 09.06.2019 14:16, Markus Reichelt wrote:

in a similar fashion to what --quick-* commands already do for other actions
(e.g. --quick-add-uid).


  --set-notation maybe?


Yes, but as far as I understand --set-notation is only a modifier that 
needs to be used with another command (e.g. --quick-sign-key).


I tried using it with my own fingerprint twice but it didn't succeed:

$ gpg -u F470E50DCB1AD5F1E64E08644A63613A4D6E4094 --set-notation 
t...@example.com= --quick-sign-key 
F470E50DCB1AD5F1E64E08644A63613A4D6E4094
"Test McTestington " was already signed by key 
4A63613A4D6E4094

Nothing to sign with key 4A63613A4D6E4094
gpg: Key not changed so no update needed.

Kind regards,
Wiktor

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Re: ProtonMail and Anonymity

[Wiktor Kwapisiewicz via Gnupg-users]

Hi Kirill,

On 09.06.2019 08:57, Kirill Peskov wrote:

It uses OpenPGP protocol, but quite a twisted way. And they're not
OpenPGP-compliant, because they're not able to encrypt mails leaving
their domain.


What do you mean by that? There is an option to add OpenPGP key of a 
"foreign" contact and send to other e-mail providers just like any oter 
OpenPGP mail.


From what I've seen on OpenPGP mailing list they're also planning to 
have Web Key Directory key discovery so that I'll be easier to encrypt 
to people outside ProtonMail



Any webmail by itself cannot be secure, because provider
can always send you 'modified' browser applet and steal your private key
and some day — the passphrase.


Yes, that's a problem. Still, who would discover a compromised Enigmail 
plugin (that autoupdates too), or even GnuPG? As the code is quite 
complex and in some cases there are many intermediaries (distro 
maintainers) it's not quite obvious what code are you running exactly.


As for webpages there is also this interesting plugin:
https://stosb.com/blog/signed-web-pages/

Kind regards,
Wiktor

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Adding notations with quick commands

[Wiktor Kwapisiewicz via Gnupg-users]

Hello,

Is there a way to add notation to own key's User IDs with a quick command?

I'm looking for an alternative to this set of actions:

 1. gpg --edit-key $KEY
 2. notation
 3. x...@example.com=test
 4. save

in a similar fashion to what --quick-* commands already do for other 
actions (e.g. --quick-add-uid).


Context: I'm working on a small scheme that will rely on notations and 
I'd like to make instructions for people as simple as possible.


Thank you in advance!

Kind regards,
Wiktor

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Re: A question about WKD

[Wiktor Kwapisiewicz via Gnupg-users]

On 01.01.2019 13:19, Stefan Claas wrote:
> Hi Wiktor and all,
> 
> since my current WKD key is a temporary key i would like to know
> for best practice the following:
> 
> In a couple of days i will receive my Kanguru Defender 3000 USB stick
> and then i will create a new key pair and put it on the stick, along
> with other things. This key will then also be signed by Governikus.
> 
> Because WKD currently does not cover revocation certs i would like
> to know how to continue. Should i upload then my revoked temp
> key to SKS or should i simply replace the keys. If possible i would
> like to avoid SKS usage in the future.
> 
> Does GnuPG detects when i use a new WKD pub key, once i signed
> a new message?

Stefan,

Revoke your current key locally and generate a new one, now export both binary
keys (that includes revocation) to a file. Place it in .well-known/openpgpkey/hu
overwriting the old file.

Now, when GnuPG does --locate-key it will fetch both keys, revoke your old one
and add the new one.

If someone already has your old key GnuPG will do the fetch automatically when
the old key expires (you didn't use expiry as far as I can see so it won't
happen automatically).

One can still "force" the WKD refresh using:

$ gpg --auto-key-locate clear,wkd,nodefault --locate-key s...@300baud.de

I just tested this all with some dummy key on my end and it worked just fine...
hope it works on your end too.

As for signing, if you specify signing key using "e-mail notation" GnuPG will
embed Signer's UID packet and when the recipient uses --auto-key-retrieve it
will grab your key using WKD instead of keyservers. But I didn't test what would
happen if the old key is already present in the keyring that doesn't match the
signature, probably nothing.

(You can inspect this file with pgpdump if you want to see the packet:
$ curl https://metacode.biz/.well-known/security.txt | pgpdump
)

Happy New Year!

Kind regards,
Wiktor

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Re: NIST 800-57 compatible unattended encryption?

[Wiktor Kwapisiewicz via Gnupg-users]

Hello,

> On Wed, Jan 02, 2019 at 04:02:03PM +1100, gn...@raf.org wrote:
>> For some dumb reason I think I was hoping that the RSA
>> algorithm wasn't really used to encrypt all the data. I
>> thought it was probably used to encrypt a per-file
>> randomly-generated symmetric key which was then used to
>> encrypt the file (and was encrypted along with the
>> file) because it could be faster. But I think I'm
>> confusing it with network protocols like TLS.
>>
>> Is that what happens with RSA in gpg? [Probably not]
> 
> Actually yes, that’s exactly what happens. The data (in your
> case, the contents of your file) is symmetrically encrypted using
> a randomly generated “session key”, and *that* key is
> asymmetrically encrypted using the RSA public key.

Yep, to see this behind-the-scenes thing in action check out
"--show-session-key" and "--override-session-key" options. Described here:

https://www.gnupg.org/documentation/manuals/gnupg/GPG-Esoteric-Options.html

Kind regards,
Wiktor

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Re: A question about WKD

[Wiktor Kwapisiewicz via Gnupg-users]

On 29.12.2018 20:50, Stefan Claas wrote:
>> I did a small proof-of-concept checker for small deployments, that you may 
>> find
>> useful: https://metacode.biz/openpgp/web-key-directory
> That is very interesting! I checked Werner's, yours and my key.
> 
> With yours everything is fine, with Werner's there is one issue and
> with mine the same issue as with Werner's and also it says with my key that
> it is ASCII armored, which is not the case because i exported as binary.

Ha, I didn't emphasize the "proof of concept" enough :)

Thanks for the "test samples", I'll use them to improve the tool!

Kind regards,
Wiktor

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Re: A question about WKD

[Wiktor Kwapisiewicz via Gnupg-users]

On 29.12.2018 15:48, Stefan Claas wrote:
> Hi all,
> 
> is it also possible to add manually more pub keys to WKD
> or do i have to install WKS for that purpose?
> 
> I ask, because in case i like to add more users to my
> mail server.

Just create more files in .well-known/openpgpkey/hu directory.

I didn't follow how you set it up initially but you can grab the file name
(hash) using this command:

$ gpg --with-wkd -k KEY

Substitute KEY with key ID or an email, etc.

For example  for me it prints the following line of hash:

gebusffkx9g581i6ch4t3ewgwd6dc...@metacode.biz

If you export binary key to .well-known/openpgpkey/hu and name it
"gebusffkx9g581i6ch4t3ewgwd6dctmp" (no quotes, no extension, just like that)
then it would work.

WKS is not needed. Actually WKS is only when you want users to manage their keys
using their e-mail client. I know other people that manage WKD differently, e.g.
Gentoo has a strict set of known keys and they update their WKD directory with a
cron job (so developers update the key on keyservers and WKD is automatically
refreshed).

I did a small proof-of-concept checker for small deployments, that you may find
useful: https://metacode.biz/openpgp/web-key-directory

Kind regards,
Wiktor

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Re: A question about WKD

[Wiktor Kwapisiewicz via Gnupg-users]

On 26.12.2018 10:39, Stefan Claas wrote:
> Hi all,
> 
> hope you all had a nice Christmas!
> 
> I have set up WKD on my VPS, in order to learn more about it and get now
> the following error:
> 
> gpg --encrypt -r s...@300baud.de OpenSSL.txt
> gpg: error retrieving 's...@300baud.de' via WKD: Not trusted
> gpg: s...@300baud.de: skipped: Not trusted
> gpg: OpenSSL.txt: encryption failed: Not trusted
> 
> I assume that dirmngr is downloading my cert and thinks it
> is not trusted. However, my site uses a popular Comodo cert.
> 
> Any ideas what is going on here and how to fix this?

It works "on my end" too (GnuPG 2.2.12 on Linux).

Did you try fetching some "well-known" WKD people? E.g.:

$ gpg --auto-key-locate clear,wkd,nodefault --locate-key w...@gnupg.org

My first guess would also be a bad certificate bundle but when I try using "bad"
domains from this list https://badssl.com the error is:

gpg: error retrieving 't...@expired.badssl.com' via WKD: General error
gpg: error reading key: General error

Rather than "not trusted" (maybe you could try experimenting with these domains
to see if the error is different).

There is also "--debug lookup" flag, and "-vvv":

$ gpg -vvv --debug lookup --auto-key-locate clear,wkd,nodefault --locate-key 
EMAIL

Maybe that'd print something useful?

Do you have anything "exotic" in .gnupg/gpg.conf?

Kind regards,
Wiktor

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Re: Keyring management with multiple smart cards

[Wiktor Kwapisiewicz via Gnupg-users]

On 17.12.2018 03:28, Louis Opter wrote:
> Where is the procedure to remove shadow files documented? I found this to be
> confusing to do, hence why I favored different subkeys for different 
> smartcards.

Uhm, this is kind of internal GnuPG details so I guess it's not documented 
anywhere.

But it's something like this:

$ gpg --with-keygrip -K

You get keygrip from one of your subkeys and look for a file named the same in
~/.gnupg/private-keys-v1.d. Removing, well, just use "rm" (or "mv" just in 
case;).

Note that this is implementation detail so it may change in the future.

> Thank you very much for your feedback Wiktor!

No problem, one thing I forgot to mention - as far as I know RFC 4880 (OpenPGP)
doesn't precise which encryption subkey to use and some implementations (e.g.
OpenKeychain) use all valid encryption subkeys (so a scheme of using one
encryption subkey per token would work).

Kind regards,
Wiktor

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Re: Keyring management with multiple smart cards

[Wiktor Kwapisiewicz via Gnupg-users]

Hi Louis,

I have a very similar setup.

After working with several different options and encountering the same problems
as you have (GPG does not encrypt to all encryption subkeys, not possible to
have the same subkeys on different smartcards) I observed the following facts:

1. I use one smartcard as a primary device so T2291 isn't that critical, if that
one fails I can just remove shadow files and --card-status a new card, it will
work. That doesn't happen frequently so manual removal of shadow file is not a
big problem (but it would be nice if the shadow files supported multiple card
serial numbers!).

2. As GnuPG does not encrypt to all encryption subkeys you *need* to have the
same encryption subkeys on different smartcards anyway, but it's not a problem
in practice because of 1.

So, load the same encryption subkey on all devices and in case your main one is
lost just remove the corresponding shadow file (this can be dangerous if you
don't know what you're doing e.g. using private keys generated locally on 
GnuPG).

One signing subkey per smartcard is fine as they're bound to the same primary
key (but if you're not using expiration users can get some interesting behavior
like [1]).

Hope this helps!

Kind regards,
Wiktor

[1]: https://www.reddit.com/r/tails/comments/9rchgi/

On 14.12.2018 23:37, Louis Opter wrote:
> Hello,
> 
> I have a certify-only master keypair in an air-gapped machine. I only
> use that machine to create subkeys and sign other people keys. The
> subkeys are copied onto smartcards which I use in daily life.
> 
> Assuming that smartcards aren't indestructible and can be lost I always
> have a backup smartcard handy. Because you can't really share a subkey
> with multiple smartcards [1], I took the approach of generating subkeys
> for each smartcard. This means that I have multiple sign/enc/auth
> subkeys that are used in lockstep, but I have a single $GNUPGHOME and
> it is really easy for me to use any of my smartcards: data that I care
> about is encrypted for all the smartcards and all the smartcards are
> authorized for ssh logins.
> 
> On the other hand, having multiple sign subkeys doesn't really make
> sense to publish data (e.g: software releases). Moreover my ring of enc
> subkeys is not useable for people who are trying to communicate with me:
> it's not really reasonable to ask people to encrypt data for all my
> subkeys, and GPG is designed to use the most recent key for the
> requested (sign/enc/auth) usage anyway.
> 
> To alleviate that problem I was wondering if it was possible to create
> another sign/enc subkey and publish (to keyservers) that subkey only?
> (along with my master public key of course).
> 
> In other words I would have two views of the same keyring: one with all
> my subkeys for my own use with my smartcards, and one for use by other
> people with only my master key and my sign/enc subkey so that there is
> no ambiguity on the subkey to use when communicating with me or
> verifying my signatures.
> 
> I hope this intelligible and I am curious about how other people
> approached that problem.
> 
> Thank you & have a nice week-end,
> 
> [1] https://dev.gnupg.org/T2291
> 


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Re: Keyserver access changes in GnuPG

[Wiktor Kwapisiewicz via Gnupg-users]

On 12.12.2018 22:35, Andrew Luke Nesbit wrote:
> My subkeys expired on Monday, 10/12/2018.  I've updated my subkeys with
> a new expiration date (in one year).  I'm considering NOT uploading the
> new public keys to the keyservers.  Rather, I will distribute them using
> other channels, such as downloading from my personal website or sneakernet.
> 
> Should I issue and publish a revocation certificate?  Will this cause
> problems considering that I'm still using the same master key?

I don't think revocation is necessary if the private subkeys are still safe.

It may be just inconvenient for people that want to contact you / verify your
signatures to see your subkeys expired and when they "gpg --refresh-keys" (as
they always do) your key would still be expired with no apparent way of
proceeding. If I saw something like that I'd think the key is abandoned.

If you had HTTPS on your site I'd recommend Web Key Directory as this downloads
keys from your site *and* refreshes expired keys from your site too 
automatically.

Kind regards,
Wiktor

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Re: Setup encrypted email

[Wiktor Kwapisiewicz via Gnupg-users]

On 12.12.2018 13:29, Nikos - FlexIT wrote:
> Hello
> 
>  
> 
> Can I setup encrypted emails completely free with gpg? I am using Microsoft
> outlook 2016.
> 
> Can you please inform me how I can do it?

Hi Nicos,

Check out Gpg4Win and one of its components: GpgOL - an add-in for Outlook:
https://www.gpg4win.org/screenshots.html

Kind regards,
Wiktor

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Keyserver access changes in GnuPG

[Wiktor Kwapisiewicz via Gnupg-users]

Hello all,

I recently saw a message from one of Fedora's maintainers:

> Coming soon to Fedora30 (rawhide), gnupg v1.4.x renamed to gnupg1. Also 
> dropping keyserver support at Werner's suggestion since upstream plans to 
> disable that soon.

Source: https://infosec.exchange/@bcl/101195051788828345

Does anyone know anything about dropping keyserver support in GnuPG? That seems
a little bit radical but maybe I've missed something...

Thanks in advance!

Kind regards,
Wiktor

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Re: Smart cards

[Wiktor Kwapisiewicz via Gnupg-users]

On 11.12.2018 19:11, Damien Goutte-Gattat via Gnupg-users wrote:
> On Tue, Dec 11, 2018 at 12:35:57PM +0100, Alessandro Vesely wrote:
>> Is it possible to get OpenPGP functionality on one of those
>> contactless cards?
> 
> I know of at least one NFC-enabled OpenPGP card, the "Fidesmo
> Card" [1].
> 
> I never tested it, but from what I remember when I delved into
> their site, the OpenPGP feature of that card is provided by the
> same JavaCard applet than the one used in the Yubikey NEO. Which
> means, among other things, that it does not implement version 3 of
> the OpenPGP Card specification (so, no ECC keys), and does not
> support RSA keys larger than 2048 bits.

I'm using Fidesmo and it works fine with OpenKeychain, and also through USB NFC
reader with GnuPG. The note about keys is correct, no ECC, RSA only up to 2048 
bits.

There are two ways of getting 4096 bits with NFC as far as I'm aware: Yubikey 5
and Cotech Card. The latter I've never seen in real life but given that this is
from the same people that created OpenKeychain I believe it's legit :)

[0]: https://www.yubico.com/product/yubikey-5-nfc/

[1]: https://www.cotech.de/docs/hw-supported-hardware/

Most hardware that supports ECC either supports it only in PIV applet (so not
applicable to OpenPGP) or doesn't use tamper-resistant hardware (depending on
one's threat model this may or may not be OK).

On 11.12.2018 19:51, Alessandro Vesely wrote:
> Fidesmo looks better, except for its depending on the Fidesmo Card App Store.

You don't need the store if you buy the card with OpenPGP (or PGP as they call
it) applet preinstalled. This store is only needed to customize what is in the
card, once PGP is installed you don't need it as Fidesmo PGP speaks standard
protocol.

Disclaimer: I'm not affiliated with any of these companies but I got the Fidesmo
card for free for contributing to OpenKeychain [2].

[2]: https://www.openkeychain.org/pr-incentive

Kind regards,
Wiktor

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Re: Garbled data in keyservers

[Wiktor Kwapisiewicz via Gnupg-users]

On 10.12.2018 17:32, Stefan Claas wrote:
> Yes, it seems it would be a good start. However, if unwanted data can then be 
> still
> submitted remains to bee seen, because what if anonymous email services would 
> use
> DKIM too?

Well it depends on the implementation. In current keyserver model everyone can
append signatures to everyone's keys because the design assumed that it's good
that other people can certify your key and didn't predict "trollwot".

But it's technically possible to accept key signatures for a key only from the
key owner. Of course implementing that in SKS would take a lot of work.

Then if someone used anonymous e-mail service they could update only their keys.

If you consider that a risk then the software shouldn't accept foreign keys at
all as e-mail verification won't solve the SPAM problem in general. That is also
a benefit of WKD because everyone takes care of their own keys and no one has to
volunteer to host other people's stuff.

> As per Werner's suggestion to make only the fingerprint available for 
> (Web/API) searches,
> is also a thing, because like i previously said a list of fingerprints for 
> example can still be

This would solve some problems but not others. I think Web Key Directory (for
people controlling their domains) coupled with Autocrypt (for everyone else)
already solves a large number of use cases people need key servers. The only
real problem that keyservers are good at is storing revocations in a way that is
hard to delete.

But if that is so "maybe we need just a revocation server" as someone said on
the OpenPGP Email Summit 2018 (https://wiki.gnupg.org/EmailSummit2018Notes).

Kind regards,
Wiktor

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Re: Garbled data in keyservers

[Wiktor Kwapisiewicz via Gnupg-users]

Hi, 

I use an address I control, but the email was not even sent so I guess the 
error happened before the key hit the network.

Kind regards,
Wiktor 

Dnia December 10, 2018 2:56:54 PM UTC, Damien Goutte-Gattat 
 napisał(a):
>On Mon, Dec 10, 2018 at 02:25:08PM +0100, Wiktor Kwapisiewicz via
>Gnupg-users wrote:
>> On 09.12.2018 20:48, Stefan Claas wrote:
>> > Mind you in the 90's PGP key servers accepted also email and Usenet
>> > submissions, if i remember correctly. The keyword was then simple
>> > the word "add" in the subject line of an email.
>>
>> [...]
>>
>> I didn't manage to get it running though ("gpg: keyserver send
>failed: No
>> keyserver available"), probably it depends on some package that I
>don't have
>> locally.
>
>As far as I know, most keyservers nowadays no longer accepts key
>submission by e-mail. Those that still support the e-mail
>interface only do so to allow *querying* the keyserver, not
>*adding* any key; that is, they only support the INDEX and the GET
>commands, not the ADD command.
>
>
>- Damien

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Re: Garbled data in keyservers

[Wiktor Kwapisiewicz via Gnupg-users]

On 09.12.2018 20:48, Stefan Claas wrote:
> Mind you in the 90's PGP key servers accepted also email and Usenet
> submissions, if i remember correctly. The keyword was then simple
> the word "add" in the subject line of an email.
>
> 

That's an interesting idea, it seems GnuPG has some support for sending keys via
e-mail.

From the "--keyserver" option documentation [0]:

> This is the server that --receive-keys, --send-keys, and --search-keys will
> communicate with to receive keys from, send keys to, and search for keys on.
> (...) The scheme is the type of keyserver: "hkp" for the HTTP (or compatible)
> keyservers, "ldap" for the LDAP keyservers, or *"mailto" for the Graff email
> keyserver*. 
I didn't manage to get it running though ("gpg: keyserver send failed: No
keyserver available"), probably it depends on some package that I don't have
locally.

By the way validation of keys sent from e-mail would require DKIM as it's easy
to spoof "From" (that's why most solutions send verification e-mails to the
e-mail address instead of receiving it).

Kind regards,

Wiktor

[0]:
https://www.gnupg.org/documentation/manuals/gnupg/GPG-Configuration-Options.html

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Re: Garbled data in keyservers

[Wiktor Kwapisiewicz via Gnupg-users]

On 09.12.2018 20:03, Stefan Claas wrote:
> To bad that Werner's WKD is not widely adopted from email
> service providers...

Just for the record but it is adopted by e-mail service providers that are
interested in OpenPGP (like ProtonMail and Posteo.de, see
https://wiki.gnupg.org/WKD).

As for "e-mail service providers" like Gmail or Yahoo that obviously is not
going to happen (unless one uses Google Suite with custom domain, etc.)

Kind regards,

Wiktor

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Re: Garbled data in keyservers

[Wiktor Kwapisiewicz via Gnupg-users]

>> But that "little program" would have to download the entire dump and
>> provide search feature itself, making it non-trivial for most users.
> I don't think so...
>
> https://github.com/yakamok/keyserver-fs

Yes:

> WARNING: this may break easily and is intended for use only on linux

> *Notice:* This Program is very slow to add data to the gpg pubkey so dont plan
on super large files.

I don't think a lot of users use this or would use this. It's more convenient
and easier to store data somewhere else (pastebins?).

Also, storing blobs is not a unique problem of keyservers, one can store it in
Certificate Transparency logs by issuing certs from Let's Encrypt or in Bitcoin
blockchain or even X.509 timestamping services. It would be slow and
inefficient, that's why practically no-one misuses it.

Kind regards,

Wiktor

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Re: Garbled data in keyservers

[Wiktor Kwapisiewicz via Gnupg-users]

On 06.12.2018 10:24, Stefan Claas wrote:
> As long as we have the option to add additional UID's  to a key my
> thinking was, after reading the links from Yegor, that one appends
> arbitrary data to a key and provides a link, at some other place, to
> that key, in the form of URL://keyserver/keyid_or_fp.
>
> People then would only need a little program to dearmor and
> extract the data from that key UID's.

But that "little program" would have to download the entire dump and provide
search feature itself, making it non-trivial for most users.

Sometimes raising a bar a little would solve most of the problem.

(And then there are talks about removing UIDs from key servers, but that's a
different matter).

Kind regards,

Wiktor

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Re: Garbled data in keyservers

[Wiktor Kwapisiewicz via Gnupg-users]

Hi Claudio,

You may find these SKS issues relevant:

https://bitbucket.org/skskeyserver/sks-keyserver/issues/41
https://bitbucket.org/skskeyserver/sks-keyserver/issues/57
https://bitbucket.org/skskeyserver/sks-keyserver/issues/60

I'm not able to comment on the specifics of search implementation in SKS 
though...

Kind regards,
Wiktor

On 05.12.2018 10:31, Claudio Canavese wrote:
> Hi everyone,
> I'm experiencing a strange behavior when looking for my email address on
> many keyserver web interfaces: I get al lot of garbled output from a key
> of someone else.
>
> I can't find and answer in this mailing list archives, so I decided to
> ask directly. Forgive me if it's a silly question.
>
> How to test this:
> 1) pick any keyserver, I tried  https://pgp.mit.edu/ ,
> https://keyserver.ubuntu.com/ , http://pool.sks-keyservers.net
> 2) search any key but mine by email: works? Well, so it was for me
> 3) now try with this email address
>
> On pool.sks-keyservers.net eveything works well while on other
> keyservers I get 47Mb of garbled data from Yegor Timoshenko key, which I
> never signed and I don't know exactly why it's included in search
> results. I had to use wget to download the web page since any browser
> will crash.
>
> Is this a bug I should submit somewhere? 
> Can a key break the html output of a keyserver?
>
>
> Thanks you for your time ;-)
>
>
> --
> CoD
>
>
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Re: WoT question - policy

[Wiktor Kwapisiewicz via Gnupg-users]

On 16.11.2018 00:40, Dirk Gottschalk via Gnupg-users wrote:
> There's documentation about the trustdb. I read it a while ago, but not
> entirely. You can also set the amount of needed signatures for the
> trust calculations and so on. Then comes the trust deepness into play.
> I also have to read further because I want to "abuse" GnuPG for an
> email controlled bot system inside a bigger company as part of the
> security concept. The commands shall be encrypted and signed and some
> function should be usable by "unknown" users with the needed trust
> level and so on.

For people interested these two articles by Konstantin Ryabitsev go into details
of how things are calculated:

https://www.linux.com/learn/pgp-web-trust-core-concepts-behind-trusted-communication

https://www.linuxfoundation.org/blog/2014/02/pgp-web-of-trust-delegated-trust-and-keyservers/

In may be initially hard to digest but the amount of knowledge these articles
are packed is unparalleled, and, actually there are no other resources on this
subject I could find (GnuPG manual has a description but IMHO Konstantin's more
clear).

As for the sigs, sig1 are ignored in GnuPG by default, everything else has the
same value. So if Stefan's friends trust his key fully, all keys he's signed
will be equally valid.

On the other matter I doubt anyone would have a serious problem by signing
someone else's key regardless of circumstances. Signing documents, maybe, as
that would qualify as an Advanced Electronic Signature but signing (certifying)
keys? They are technically similar but that's all.

Kind regards,
Wiktor

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Re: WoT question - policy

[Wiktor Kwapisiewicz via Gnupg-users]

On 13.11.2018 17:54, Stefan Claas wrote:
> Hi all,
> 
> i thought about creating a key certification policy, for my key,
> and like to know your opinions. 
> 
> 
> 
> I have read in the past several policies, but i like to avoid
> id-card / online video/chat etc. because i am not able
> to distinguish between a real or a fake id, when doing so.
> 
> Therefore i thought to use a postcard/letter method.
> 
> Any critics are very welcome!

Sounds interesting, would the post office check the ID of the person claiming
the letter?

It reminds me of someone's method that utilized small bank transfers (I can't
find the source though :( ).

Why not issue generic certifications instead of sig2 and sig3? There are some
arguments against them: https://debian-administration.org/users/dkg/weblog/98

Kind regards,
Wiktor

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Re: GPG on Android

[Wiktor Kwapisiewicz via Gnupg-users]

Hi,

> On Monday 5 November 2018 at 7:59:05 AM, in
> , Wiktor
> Kwapisiewicz via Gnupg-users wrote:-
> 
> 
>>> Could a pincard be connected via micro USB? And
>>> made to work?
> 
> Or by NFC. For example, [0]
> 
> [0] <https://www.grepular.com/An_NFC_PGP_SmartCard_For_Android>

Yes, personally I'm using the Fidesmo card as it fits nicely in the wallet 
(credit card format).

But if having 4096-bit RSA keys is important Yubikey 5C is also an option.

Kind regards,
Wiktor

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Re: Support for RSA keys > 4096 bits

[Wiktor Kwapisiewicz via Gnupg-users]

Hi Nicolas,

There is also this site that may be of interest:

https://www.keylength.com/

As for your question, actually that was answered in GnuPG FAQ:

https://www.gnupg.org/faq/gnupg-faq.html#default_rsa2048

Kind regards,
Wiktor

On 07.11.2018 07:53, Nicholas Papadonis wrote:
> For those interested, link to the NIST document:
> 
> https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-57pt1r4.pdf
> 
> On Wed, Nov 7, 2018 at 1:50 AM Nicholas Papadonis
> mailto:nick.papadonis...@gmail.com>> wrote:
> 
> I read in NIST 800-57 Part 1 Rev. 4 pg 53 that RSA keys length of
> 15360 bits is equivalent to a 256 bit AES symmetric key.  I also
> read in other documentation that NIST recommends such key lengths to
> protect data beyond 2030.  As email may be retained for many years
> it would seem appropriate to secure such communications with a
> larger key.
> 
> Does this data agree with security experts?  Is there a reason why
> GnuPG limits RSA key length to 4096 bits?
> 
> Thank you,
> Nicholas
> 
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Re: encrypt linux backup folder using gpg

[Wiktor Kwapisiewicz via Gnupg-users]

On 06.11.2018 10:42, Francesco Ariis wrote:
> Hello Kaushal,
> 
> On Tue, Nov 06, 2018 at 11:25:47AM +0530, Kaushal Shriyan wrote:
>> I am using CentOS 7.5 Linux OS in my setup. I have compressed a folder
>> using tar utility tar czvf backupfolder.tar.gz backupfolder. Is there a way
>> to encrypt backupfolder.tar.gz using gpg? Are there any best practices to
>> use gpg application to encrypt the data. Any help will be highly
>> appreciated and i look forward to hearing from you.
> 
> in Debian is there a small utility (`gpg-zip`, found in the `devscripts`
> package) which does just that. Maybe it's packaged in CentOS too!
> -F

Maybe that's too simple but what about just:

  gpg --encrypt --recipient $YOU backupfolder.tar.gz

Of course after generating the key (gpg --gen-key).

Best practices:
  - use most recent GnuPG,
  - you can generate keys on another computer (offline?) and export just
public parts to the one that does encryption,
  - you can move decryption keys to a hardware token.

Kind regards,
Wiktor

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Re: OpenPGP key verification + legal framework

[Wiktor Kwapisiewicz via Gnupg-users]

On 05.11.2018 21:37, Viktor wrote:
>> Sending an encrypted e-mail additionally verifies that the user controls
>> the key in question.
> 
> But you can easily send email with any address in 'from' field.
> It does not mean you really control this email address.

Maybe there is a small misunderstanding here. I meant sending an e-mail
*to* the registering person encrypted using *their* OpenPGP key. This
way it can be read *only* by them even if they are using "insecure
e-mail system" :)

(there is also a minor point that properly deploying DMARC will protect
from spoofing "From" field on major mail providers)

Kind regards,
Wiktor

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Re: OpenPGP key verification + legal framework

[Wiktor Kwapisiewicz via Gnupg-users]

On 05.11.2018 20:28, Viktor wrote:
> 
> We use the rule, that userID should contain user's fist and last name
> exactly as in passport, and only one email - the same as used for login.
> So we can verify it's really your email.

Have you considered an alternative approach to email verification? For
example just sending an e-mail (probably encrypted) with a one-time
verification link?

That way non-Google users wouldn't be excluded. (Actually this approach
would work for Google and non-Google users alike).

Sending an encrypted e-mail additionally verifies that the user controls
the key in question.

Kind regards,
Wiktor

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Re: OpenPGP key verification + legal framework

[Wiktor Kwapisiewicz via Gnupg-users]

On 05.11.2018 15:21, Viktor wrote:
> Dear All,
> 
> (...)
>
> I would be very interested to hear feedback, criticism and suggestions
> on our project. And also to establish contacts with people interested in
> cooperation.
Looks interesting.

But the language on the registration dialog [0] seems a little bit
unsettling:

> user personal data provided for key verification stored for forever
and can not be deleted or removed by user's request.

Maybe it would also be a good idea to provide a list of locations of
Notaries before registration. I'd like to see if there is one nearby, if
not, there is not much benefit for me to register (at least now).

Kind regards,
Wiktor

[0]: https://cryptonomica.net/#!/registration

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Re: GPG on Android

[Wiktor Kwapisiewicz via Gnupg-users]

On 03.11.2018 19:13, Juergen BRUCKNER wrote:
> Hello Masha,
> (...)
> You need to install the additional Flipdog CryptoPlugin[3] on your
> device, where you import and manage the keys.
> You have to create the keys for example on a desktop computer and import
> it to your android device and into the CryptoPlugin.

I just tried Flipdog CryptoPlugin. It couldn't import my key from
keyservers (thrown an exception on import) nor could it import some
other random keys I tried (e.g. 80615870F5BAD690333686D0F2AD85AC1E42B367).

Is it still developed? The last version seems to be from 2015...

Kind regards,
Wiktor

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Re: GPG on Android

[Wiktor Kwapisiewicz via Gnupg-users]

On 04.11.2018 22:55, Roland wrote:
> Hello list,
> 
> I share the wish for encrypted email on Android, but I am afraid of
> storing a secret key on my android phone. (theft, hacking, loss, etc)
> 
> How do you feel about that?
> 
> Could a pincard be connected via micro USB? And made to work?

Yes, it works with OpenKeychain. I've personally used Yubikey 4 with
USB-A to USB-C adapter, with USB-A to micro USB adapter, Yubikey 4C and
a Fidesmo card but much more types of tokens are supported [0].

There is an added benefit that the same exact token can be used with
GnuPG and OpenKeychain seamlessly.

Kind regards,
Wiktor

[0]: https://github.com/open-keychain/open-keychain/wiki/Security-Tokens

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Re: GPG on Android

[Wiktor Kwapisiewicz via Gnupg-users]

On 03.11.2018 17:04, Yagthara Aghhay-Boor wrote:
> Hello Group,
> 
> I'm very new to GPG and email encryption and looking for a app to use
> gpg and signed email on my android devices.
> Can you recommend me a email app to use with pgp on Android?

Hi,

I recommend using OpenKeychain [0] with K9-Mail. I'm using this combo
for a long time and never had any real problems.

OpenKeychain also supports hardware OpenPGP tokens [1], this makes the
key setup *very* easy on a new phone (not to mention that Termbot can be
added to the mix to login to remote server via SSH keys derived from
OpenPGP Authentication keys).

Kind regards,
Wiktor

[0]: https://www.openkeychain.org/

[1]: https://github.com/open-keychain/open-keychain/wiki/Security-Tokens


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Re: Slightly OT - i need the proper wording for a signed document

[Wiktor Kwapisiewicz via Gnupg-users]

On 02.11.2018 15:35, Dirk Gottschalk wrote:
> I prefer GPG. And no, GPG does not lack timestamping, a timestamp is
> included in every signature.

Signature creation date is not the same as timestamping. As for why you
may consider the problem of validating signatures made by revoked keys.
Without timestamping this kind of signature is inherently insecure (as
the compromised key could be used by the attacker to created a backdated
signature).

For example Authenticode uses timestamping [0] so that old signatures
can still be considered valid even when the key expires or is revoked later.

Adding something comparable to OpenPGP was discussed [1] on OpenPGP ML
recently and previously [2].

Kind regards,
Wiktor

[0]:
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-US/windows/desktop/SecCrypto/time-stamping-authenticode-signatures

[1]: https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/openpgp/current/msg09092.html

[2]: https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/openpgp/current/msg07136.html

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Re: Slightly OT - i need the proper wording for a signed document

[Wiktor Kwapisiewicz via Gnupg-users]

On 02.11.2018 10:53, Stefan Claas wrote:
> Simply one can use a time stamping service, based on blockchain
> technology. I can then time stamp the .pdf. and put also a
> statement in the .pdf that the file is timestamped and don't must
> worry in the future if one MITM would try (and why?) to alter my
> documents.

PDFs can be also timestamped when signing with standard RFC 3161 [0]
timestamping service.

Here's one example:

https://support.globalsign.com/customer/en/portal/articles/2361790-add-timestamp-server---adobe-acrobat

But there are numerous free RFC 3161 timestamping services.

Of course that's not the same as blockchain, but it's already supported
by numerous tools (like Adobe Acrobat).

Kind regards,
Wiktor

[0]: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3161

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Re: Slightly OT - i need the proper wording for a signed document

[Wiktor Kwapisiewicz via Gnupg-users]

On 01.11.2018 11:19, stefan.cl...@posteo.de wrote:
> And this is the problem i have since 1994/95... For me signatures
> made with PGP / GnuPG have no weight, for several reasons, except
> those made from Governikus and maybe CT Magazine signed keys.

I, for one, like the OpenPGP's approach of "choose your own trust
model". Someone will trust Governikus, someone will trust random
internet people, someone will marginally trust them or a selected set of
people they think are trustworthy. (By the way too bad that Governikus
doesn't add Policy URLs to their signatures [0], it would be easier to
read about their procedures for people that don't know them).

Of course, this comes at the expense of user friendliness but there are
already easier trust alternatives in GnuPG (e.g. TOFU).

On 01.11.2018 16:09, Dirk Gottschalk via Gnupg-users wrote:> This isn't
the Problem at alöl. X.509 is a really good standard. I use
> it mysqld really often for signing PDFs or some other things. 

Do you mean X.509 is technically good or just more widely supported in
software than OpenPGP? For me there are only few cases where X.509
infrastructure has something that OpenPGP lacks (e.g. timestamping).

Kind regards,
Wiktor

[0]:
https://keyserver.ubuntu.com/pks/lookup?op=vindex=0xAFCDE102C7FAAD6E

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Re: --refresh-keys for WKD

[Wiktor Kwapisiewicz via Gnupg-users]

On 22.10.2018 17:40, Werner Koch wrote:
> BTW, the recent GPA release uses the above command line when you give a
> mail address in the Server->Retrieve_key dialog.

Is there a small bug in recent GPA (0.10.0)? I looked up:
 "test-...@metacode.biz" and got "No keys were found" but when I clicked
"details" I got the correct "key imported" GnuPG log details. Sure
enough the key is imported. (the key is available only through WKD).

Kind regards,
Wiktor

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Re: --refresh-keys for WKD

[Wiktor Kwapisiewicz via Gnupg-users]

Hello,

> I recently experimented with key distribution via WKD. Is there an
> equivalent to `--refresh-keys` for key servers? How do I fetch key
> updates (signatures, revocations, ...) via WKD?

If the key was fetched via WKD and it is expired it will be refreshed
using WKD too (see: https://dev.gnupg.org/T2917 ).

You can "force" it via:

 gpg --auto-key-locate clear,nodefault,wkd --locate-key u...@example.com

The entire thread here talks about this issue and I think you may find
it interesting:

https://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-devel/2018-June/033812.html

Kind regards,
Wiktor

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Re: Question about specifics of --locate-key option

[Wiktor Kwapisiewicz via Gnupg-users]

Thank you Werner, "--debug lookup" output is a lot more verbose.

The output is a lot different in both cases, in this case it detects MAIL:

$ gpg --debug lookup --locate-key ""
gpg: enabled debug flags: lookup
gpg: DBG: keydb_search: 1 search descriptions:
gpg: DBG: keydb_search   0: MAIL: ''
gpg: DBG: keydb_search: searching keybox (resource 0 of 1)
gpg: DBG: keydb_search: searched keybox (resource 0 of 1) => EOF
gpg: secmem usage: 0/32768 bytes in 0 blocks

Direct e-mail prints SUBSTR:

$ gpg --debug lookup --locate-key "test-...@metacode.biz"
gpg: enabled debug flags: lookup
gpg: DBG: keydb_search: 1 search descriptions:
gpg: DBG: keydb_search   0: SUBSTR: 'test-...@metacode.biz'
gpg: DBG: keydb_search: searching keybox (resource 0 of 1)
gpg: DBG: keydb_search: searched keybox (resource 0 of 1) => EOF
gpg: DBG: keydb_search: 1 search descriptions:
gpg: DBG: keydb_search   0: FPR: '74EC 8D3D A82A 79DA A25D  F10C 6BA5
5ED8 3ABA E1BB'
gpg: DBG: keydb_search: searching keybox (resource 0 of 1)
gpg: DBG: keydb_search: searched keybox (resource 0 of 1) => EOF
gpg: DBG: keydb_search: 1 search descriptions:
gpg: DBG: keydb_search   0: FPR20: '74EC 8D3D A82A 79DA A25D  F10C 6BA5
5ED8 3ABA E1BB'
gpg: DBG: keydb_search: searching keybox (resource 0 of 1)
gpg: DBG: keydb_search: searched keybox (resource 0 of 1) => Success
gpg: DBG: finish_lookup: checking key 3ABAE1BB (one)(req_usage=0)
gpg: DBG:   using key 3ABAE1BB
gpg: key 6BA55ED83ABAE1BB: public key "Test WKD Key
" imported
...

Using a broken input (in this case a space after e-mail) also triggers
SUBSTR:

$ gpg --debug lookup --locate-key "test-...@metacode.biz "
gpg: enabled debug flags: lookup
gpg: DBG: keydb_search: 1 search descriptions:
gpg: DBG: keydb_search   0: SUBSTR: ''
gpg: DBG: keydb_search: searching keybox (resource 0 of 1)
gpg: DBG: keydb_search: searched keybox (resource 0 of 1) => EOF
gpg: secmem usage: 0/32768 bytes in 0 blocks

(if the key was previously in keyring it would display it, it won't use
WKD in that case - correctly).

I've tested this on both GnuPG 2.2.8 and 2.2.10, on a clean keyring
(inside a docker Alpine container).

Is it possible that only SUBSTR lookups that look like an e-mail trigger
WKD unlike MAIL matches?

Thank you for your time!

Kind regards,
Wiktor

On 15.10.2018 19:38, Werner Koch wrote:
> On Mon, 15 Oct 2018 15:21, gnupg-users@gnupg.org said:
>> This, as it turns out, does not trigger WKD. Removing "<" and ">" sure
>> enough does the trick and the key is found.
> 
> The gnupg internal function to extract the addrspec is
> mailbox_from_userid and its test program t-mbox-utils.c has these
> vectors:
> /* input */   /* Output, NULL = invalid */
>   { "Werner Koch ", "w...@gnupg.org" },
>   { "", "w...@gnupg.org" },
>   { "w...@gnupg.org", "w...@gnupg.org" },
>   { "w...@gnupg.org ", NULL },
>   ...
> 
> Whis indicates that it should work.  By adding a "--debug lookup" to the
> gpg invocation you might be abale to see more.
> 
> 
> Salam-Shalom,
> 
>Werner
> 


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Re: Question about specifics of --locate-key option

[Wiktor Kwapisiewicz via Gnupg-users]

Oh, I forgot to mention that this is the commit adding "<" and ">" to
Evolution:

https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/evolution-data-server/commit/5d8b92c622f6927b253762ff9310479dd3ac627d

And the commit message:

> Enclose email addresses in brackets to ensure an exact
> match, as per the gpg man page:
> 
> HOW TO SPECIFY A USER ID
> 
>...
> 
>By exact match on an email address.
>   This is indicated by enclosing the email address in the
>   usual way with left and right angles.

This references the following guide:
https://www.gnupg.org/documentation/manuals/gnupg/Specify-a-User-ID.html

It seems as if the guide suggested wrapping e-mail addresses with "<"
and ">".

Kind regards,
Wiktor

On 15.10.2018 15:21, Wiktor Kwapisiewicz wrote:
> Hello,
> 
> I have a question about specifics of --locate-key option, that is how
> does it decide which lookup mechanism will additionally be called if a
> local key is not present.
> 
> A little bit of context - I was checking how Evolution works with GnuPG
> and whether it would locate key through WKD if it's missing locally. I
> found out that even though it passes the e-mail address to -r option
> (encrypt/recipient) WKD doesn't work. A more careful look revealed that
> they pass e-mail address wrapped in "<" and ">".
> 
> Sample call:
> 
>   gpg2 --verbose --no-secmem-warning --no-greeting --no-tty --batch
> --yes --status-fd=61 --encrypt --armor --always-trust -u
> u...@example.com -r  --output -
> 
> This, as it turns out, does not trigger WKD. Removing "<" and ">" sure
> enough does the trick and the key is found.
> 
> My question is: is there a documented behavior of how --locate-key
> algorithm will process it's input? Or is it implementation-defined?
> (currently I see it must be an exact e-mail address with no leading,
> trailing characters). The man page description seems to leave it as
> unspecified.
> 
> Thank you for your time!
> 
> Kind regards,
> Wiktor
> 


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Question about specifics of --locate-key option

[Wiktor Kwapisiewicz via Gnupg-users]

Hello,

I have a question about specifics of --locate-key option, that is how
does it decide which lookup mechanism will additionally be called if a
local key is not present.

A little bit of context - I was checking how Evolution works with GnuPG
and whether it would locate key through WKD if it's missing locally. I
found out that even though it passes the e-mail address to -r option
(encrypt/recipient) WKD doesn't work. A more careful look revealed that
they pass e-mail address wrapped in "<" and ">".

Sample call:

  gpg2 --verbose --no-secmem-warning --no-greeting --no-tty --batch
--yes --status-fd=61 --encrypt --armor --always-trust -u
u...@example.com -r  --output -

This, as it turns out, does not trigger WKD. Removing "<" and ">" sure
enough does the trick and the key is found.

My question is: is there a documented behavior of how --locate-key
algorithm will process it's input? Or is it implementation-defined?
(currently I see it must be an exact e-mail address with no leading,
trailing characters). The man page description seems to leave it as
unspecified.

Thank you for your time!

Kind regards,
Wiktor

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Re: Decryption troubles

[Wiktor Kwapisiewicz via Gnupg-users]

Hello,

There are two encryption keys as far as I can see (more complete key in
attachment). Probably one of them was added but the secret key has been
lost (during migration? I don't know).

I've suggested checking which one works for them and revoking the other,
and then publishing the key to keyservers (that was some time ago,
that's how I've got this key with two E keys).

By the way of two encryption keys, I liked your idea:

"+  0x04 - This key may be used as an additional decryption subkey (ADSK)."

Kind regards,
Wiktor

On 11.10.2018 11:05, Werner Koch wrote:
> On Wed, 10 Oct 2018 20:33, siem...@cleanfuels.nl said:
> 
>> gpg: decryption failed: No secret key
> 
> Well, you don't have the secret key (aka private key) to decrypt the
> message.
> 
> 
>> sec   rsa2048 2009-09-27 [SCA]
>>   A5F3C219AB2601BEC1BCE4F2AEEC5E2ED87628F5
> [..]
>> ssb   rsa2048 2009-09-27 [E]
>> ssb#  rsa2048 2017-03-18 [E]
> 
> That last key _seems_ to be used.  On the keyserver I only found the
> first subkey and thus I can't be sure.  Use
> 
> gpg --with-subkey-fingerprint -K 
> 
> to also show the fingerprints of subkeys.  However, that subkey has been
> taken offline and that can be the reason why you see the "No secret key"
> 
>> sec>  rsa2048 2017-03-18 [SC]
>>   FA8FD0825931914AD032F6A40E92D34261B68C62
>>   Card serial no. = 0005 47CF
>> uid   [ unknown] Roland Siemons 
>> ssb>  rsa2048 2017-03-18 [A]
>> ssb>  rsa2048 2017-03-18 [E]
> 
> 
> May it be that the last key is the same subkey as the one above?
> 
> 
> Shalom-Salam,
> 
>Werner
> 
> 
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hZXhKNgT8MUEUDEqFGMbv8N/SArVXodAdK9K7IHJ52UuyShacnsAww2IZh8qnR2T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Re: Get notation value through --with-colons interface

[Wiktor Kwapisiewicz via Gnupg-users]

On 09.10.2018 15:08, Andre Heinecke wrote:
> gpg --with-colons --list-options show-sig-subpackets=\"20,26\" \
>   --list-sigs 6C8857E0D8E8F074

Wow, that was exactly what I needed!

Thank you Andre!

For the record, once I knew it I found some resources about the format:

https://lists.gt.net/gnupg/devel/31529
https://dev.gnupg.org/source/gnupg/browse/master/doc/DETAILS;b6275f3bda8edff34274c5b921508567f491ab9c$337
and, of course:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4880#section-5.2.3.16

Kind regards,
Wiktor

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Get notation value through --with-colons interface

[Wiktor Kwapisiewicz via Gnupg-users]

Hello,

I'm wondering if there is a way to programmatically access notations on
self-certifications?

I see them through --list-options show-notations:

  gpg --list-options show-notations --list-sigs 6C8857E0D8E8F074 | grep
notation

but adding --with-colons to that command unfortunately filters out
notations.

Is there any way to access it via API-like interface?

I'm mostly interested in a particular notation key on last
self-certification signature of my primary UID.

Thank you in advance for help!

Kind regards,
Wiktor

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Re: Where to put "export-pka" output in DNS?

[Wiktor Kwapisiewicz via Gnupg-users]

Hi Kees,

> I want to make use of PKA, I saw a few blogs [1] where they did this in
> TXT DNS records. However, this seems to not work anymore. When I issue
> `gpg2 --export-options export-pka --export $keyid` I get an output. But
> it's unclear where I should put this output in DNS. A TXT record? Or a
> CERT record [2]? Something else? I would like to hear some comments
> about this.
> 
> The TXT record method has my preference since I do not have CERT records
> at my registrar. Is there some official documentation about this?

Yes, it's a TXT record, such as this (for u...@example.com):

user._pka.example.com.  TXT
"v=pka1;fpr=D2063054549295F3349037FFFBBE5A30624BB249;uri=http://example.com/key.asc;

see examples here:
http://www.gushi.org/make-dns-cert/HOWTO.html

Note that if you have your own domain and HTTPS set up it would be
better to utilize the Web Key Directory, that is enabled by default in
modern GnuPG and used by some e-mail clients automatically
(thunderbird/enigmail, outlook/gpgol).

Export your binary key (gpg --export u...@example.com > key.gpg) and get
the hash (gpg --list-keys --with-wkd u...@example.com) and copy your key
to https://example.com/.well-known/openpgpkey/hu/$hash, replace
example.com and $hash with your values. Then "gpg --locate-key
u...@example.com" will then download the key from your web server).

More details here: https://wiki.gnupg.org/WKD

Kind regards,
Wiktor

> 
> [1] https://keyserver.mattrude.com/guides/public-key-association/
> [2] https://slxh.nl/blog/2016/pgp-and-dns/
> 
> 
> --
> Kind regards,
> Kees de Jong  |  OpenPGP fingerprint: 0x0E45C98AB51428E6
> 
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Re: [INTERNET] Re: converting gpg files into PEM and certification change confusion

[Wiktor Kwapisiewicz via Gnupg-users]

Hi Jen,

On 27.09.2018 22:43, Mead, Jennifer wrote:
> Hi Wiktor,
> 
> On this page https://developers.yubico.com/yubikey-val/Installation.html
> 
> Step 7
> You will need to place the private key in 
> /etc/ssl/private/api.example.com-key.pem and the certificate chain in 
> /etc/ssl/private/api.example.com-chain.pem.

Yes, then this is only related to SSL keys used by the server and
doesn't have anything to do with your OpenPGP/GPG keys.

They are a completely separate set of keys, and this looks like a
standard HTTPS setup. You can get some guides by searching for "ssl
apache". Generally the procedure is to generate new pair of keys,
generate CSR, then use the CSR to buy an SSL certificate. CA will
provide you with their certificate chain.

You can get a free certificate from Let's Encrypt, they are valid for 3
months.

Kind regards,
Wiktor

> 
> regards,
> Jen
> 
> From: Wiktor Kwapisiewicz 
> Sent: Thursday, September 27, 2018 1:34 PM
> To: Mead, Jennifer
> Cc: gnupg-users@gnupg.org
> Subject: [INTERNET] Re: converting gpg files into PEM and certification 
> change confusion
> 
> ** STOP. THINK. External Email **
> 
> --
> 
> Hi Jen,
> 
> Could you provide links to the documentation that mentions the
> "certificate chain"?
> 
> I went through these docs but didn't find the exact match:
> https://developers.yubico.com/yubikey-val/
> https://developers.yubico.com/yubikey-ksm/
> 
> PEM format contains X.509 certificates, as used by TLS and S/MIME, not
> OpenPGP ones. Likewise openssl is used to work with X.509 certs,
> /etc/ssl/certs/ca-bundle.crt contains X.509 certs too.
> 
> Maybe the certs that you mention are for HTTPS server?
> 
> X.509 and OpenPGP are not compatible directly, although both can use
> same cryptographic primitives (like RSA keys).
> 
> Kind regards,
> Wiktor
> 
> On 27.09.2018 20:07, Mead, Jennifer wrote:
>> Hi folks, new to gpg and thid forum,
>>
>>
>> I have used keys for many years, but not in a mangement role.  Now I am
>> installing Yubikey KSM and Validation server.  I thought I understood it
>> well enough but apparently that is not true.  While working on the
>> validation piece I was requested to convert my certificate chain into a
>> pem file and place it where all the parts and pieces of yubikey can get
>> to it via the web.  My first what??? moment.  Like what is the
>> certificate chain?  I did some research and even though it is mentioned
>> quite often by others I have not been able to assert which file that
>> actuall is.  Here is what is in my .gnupg directory:
>>
>> .   gpg.conf
>> .#lk0x23dd010.changed.16771  .note.swp  pubring.gpg
>> random_seed  S.gpg-agent
>> ..  .#lk0x10c18a0.changed.32015
>> note   private-keys-v1.d
>> pubring.gpg~  secring.gpg  trustdb.gpg
>>
>>
>> key was created as such:
>>
>> gpg --gen-key
>> chose: (2) DSA and Elgamal
>> Key is valid for? (0) 0
>> input name,email,user-id and passphrase
>> gpg: key 1234WXYZ marked as ultimately trusted
>> public and secret key created and signed.
>>
>> then it spit out that it was checked the trustdb returned these types:
>> uid
>> pub
>> sub
>>
>> I then took those keys and turned them into yubikey format and loaded
>> them into a db.  I thought all was said and done (LOL).
>>
>> So I think one of those files is my supposed "certificate chain"... not
>> sure.  Maybe I have not created the chain?
>>
>> When I try to convert a file (pubring, secring, trustdb) they all end with:
>>
>> [root@cswks99 .gnupg]# openssl dsa -in ~/.gnupg/trustdb.gpg -outform pem
>> read DSA key
>> unable to load Private Key
>> 140528619882384:error:0906D06C:PEM routines:PEM_read_bio:no start
>> line:pem_lib.c:707:Expecting: ANY PRIVATE KEY
>> unable to load Key
>> [root@cswks99 .gnupg]# openssl dsa -in ~/.gnupg/secring.gpg -outform pem
>> read DSA key
>> unable to load Private Key
>> 140648490235792:error:0906D06C:PEM routines:PEM_read_bio:no start
>> line:pem_lib.c:707:Expecting: ANY PRIVATE KEY
>> unable to load Key
>>
>>
>> 1) I am not sure that (2) DSA and Elgamal will work with the above
>> command, it seems like two alogrythms and not one (Elgamal is there
>> too).  Is that the problem?  Or do I need an intermediary format to
>> accomplish this?  What the heck am I doing wrong.  I do have two certs
>> on my server as follows:
>>
>> /etc/ssl/certs/ca-bundle.trust.crt
>> /etc/ssl/certs/ca-bundle.crt
>>
>> perhaps they are related?  I don't remember what step created them.
>> This is all very confusing to me and I need some gental nudges in the
>> right direction.  Sorry for being such a newbie and not really getting
>> any of this.  Any help is greatly appreciated.
>>
>>
>> Regards,
>>
>> Jen
>>
>>
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>> http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
>>
> 
> 
> --

Re: converting gpg files into PEM and certification change confusion

[Wiktor Kwapisiewicz via Gnupg-users]

Hi Jen,

Could you provide links to the documentation that mentions the
"certificate chain"?

I went through these docs but didn't find the exact match:
https://developers.yubico.com/yubikey-val/
https://developers.yubico.com/yubikey-ksm/

PEM format contains X.509 certificates, as used by TLS and S/MIME, not
OpenPGP ones. Likewise openssl is used to work with X.509 certs,
/etc/ssl/certs/ca-bundle.crt contains X.509 certs too.

Maybe the certs that you mention are for HTTPS server?

X.509 and OpenPGP are not compatible directly, although both can use
same cryptographic primitives (like RSA keys).

Kind regards,
Wiktor

On 27.09.2018 20:07, Mead, Jennifer wrote:
> Hi folks, new to gpg and thid forum,
> 
> 
> I have used keys for many years, but not in a mangement role.  Now I am
> installing Yubikey KSM and Validation server.  I thought I understood it
> well enough but apparently that is not true.  While working on the
> validation piece I was requested to convert my certificate chain into a
> pem file and place it where all the parts and pieces of yubikey can get
> to it via the web.  My first what??? moment.  Like what is the
> certificate chain?  I did some research and even though it is mentioned
> quite often by others I have not been able to assert which file that
> actuall is.  Here is what is in my .gnupg directory:
> 
> .   gpg.conf  
> .#lk0x23dd010.changed.16771  .note.swp  pubring.gpg  
> random_seed  S.gpg-agent
> ..  .#lk0x10c18a0.changed.32015 
> note   private-keys-v1.d 
> pubring.gpg~  secring.gpg  trustdb.gpg
> 
> 
> key was created as such:
> 
> gpg --gen-key
> chose: (2) DSA and Elgamal
> Key is valid for? (0) 0
> input name,email,user-id and passphrase
> gpg: key 1234WXYZ marked as ultimately trusted
> public and secret key created and signed.
> 
> then it spit out that it was checked the trustdb returned these types:
> uid
> pub
> sub
> 
> I then took those keys and turned them into yubikey format and loaded
> them into a db.  I thought all was said and done (LOL).
> 
> So I think one of those files is my supposed "certificate chain"... not
> sure.  Maybe I have not created the chain?
> 
> When I try to convert a file (pubring, secring, trustdb) they all end with:
> 
> [root@cswks99 .gnupg]# openssl dsa -in ~/.gnupg/trustdb.gpg -outform pem
> read DSA key
> unable to load Private Key
> 140528619882384:error:0906D06C:PEM routines:PEM_read_bio:no start
> line:pem_lib.c:707:Expecting: ANY PRIVATE KEY
> unable to load Key
> [root@cswks99 .gnupg]# openssl dsa -in ~/.gnupg/secring.gpg -outform pem
> read DSA key
> unable to load Private Key
> 140648490235792:error:0906D06C:PEM routines:PEM_read_bio:no start
> line:pem_lib.c:707:Expecting: ANY PRIVATE KEY
> unable to load Key
> 
> 
> 1) I am not sure that (2) DSA and Elgamal will work with the above
> command, it seems like two alogrythms and not one (Elgamal is there
> too).  Is that the problem?  Or do I need an intermediary format to
> accomplish this?  What the heck am I doing wrong.  I do have two certs
> on my server as follows:
> 
> /etc/ssl/certs/ca-bundle.trust.crt
> /etc/ssl/certs/ca-bundle.crt
> 
> perhaps they are related?  I don't remember what step created them. 
> This is all very confusing to me and I need some gental nudges in the
> right direction.  Sorry for being such a newbie and not really getting
> any of this.  Any help is greatly appreciated.
> 
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Jen
> 
> 
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Re: Monitoring queries to gpg-agent?

[Wiktor Kwapisiewicz via Gnupg-users]

> This is reminding me of a message Werner wrote[1] last year that
> pinentry will show some context of the reason it is prompting. So this
> functionality might be in the works. I assume you are prompted by a
> pinentry to push the button?

I'm using a similar setup. Pinentry only appears when the actual PIN is
needed (once to unlock the card, and on each signature if that option is
enabled). It *does not* appear when there is a need to "push the
button", one just have to mind the flashing light of the button.

This feature is described here:

https://developers.yubico.com/PGP/Card_edit.html#_yubikey_4_touch

And it seems there is a mention of "User Interaction Flag" Data Object
in OpenPGP Card spec:

https://openpgpcard.org/resources/openpgp-card-3.3.pdf (search for "User
Interaction Flag") so in theory pinentry, or some other prompt, could be
displayed to the user.

Kind regards,
Wiktor

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Re: Monitoring queries to gpg-agent?

[Wiktor Kwapisiewicz via Gnupg-users]

> This is reminding me of a message Werner wrote[1] last year that
> pinentry will show some context of the reason it is prompting. So this
> functionality might be in the works. I assume you are prompted by a
> pinentry to push the button?

I'm using a similar setup. Pinentry only appears when the actual PIN is
needed (once to unlock the card, and on each signature if that option is
enabled). It *does not* appear when there is a need to "push the
button", one just have to mind the flashing light of the button.

This feature is described here:

https://developers.yubico.com/PGP/Card_edit.html#_yubikey_4_touch

And it seems there is a mention of "User Interaction Flag" Data Object
in OpenPGP Card spec:

https://openpgpcard.org/resources/openpgp-card-3.3.pdf (search for "User
Interaction Flag") so in theory pinentry, or some other prompt, could be
displayed to the user.

Kind regards,
Wiktor

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Re: Utilizing facts of homedir organization (was: Exact definition of token S/N field for --with-colons)

[Wiktor Kwapisiewicz via Gnupg-users]

On 24.09.2018 02:09, Andrew Luke Nesbit wrote:
> This is using the contents of `~/.gnupg/private-keys-v1.d/` as an API.
> If this is *not* part of the API, then what *is* the official
> recommendation for generating subkeys?

I'm not in a position to suggest "official" recommendations but one
alternative that doesn't touch .gnupg is using secondary computer
(offline, air-gapped if possible) to store secret keys and either:

1) "keytocard" them or
2) --export-secret-keys one by one.

Kind regards,

Wiktor

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Re: Subkeys

[Wiktor Kwapisiewicz via Gnupg-users]

Hi Roland,

I don't know if you have some specific questions but the Debian wiki
page about Subkeys is nice: https://wiki.debian.org/Subkeys

tl;dr version is primary/subkey setup lets you have your primary key
completely offline and use subkeys for daily work. If something bad
happens to a subkey (e.g. compromise) you can use primary key to revoke it.

There are 4 flags for key usage: C - Certify (for primary keys), S -
signing, E - encryption and A - authentication (e.g. SSH).

Kind regards,
Wiktor

> Dear GnuPG
> 
> As a user of GPG4Win, is there any explanation in the compendium about
> the meaning and use of subkeys (I cannot find anything about that matter
> in the The Gpg4win Compendium 3.0.0)
> 
> Best regards,
> 
> 
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Re: Gnupg-users Digest, Vol 180, Issue 3

[Wiktor Kwapisiewicz via Gnupg-users]

On 04.09.2018 10:29, Roland Siemons (P) wrote:
> Remains:
> How can I see what is on the smartcard?

gpg --card-status

> How can I copy files to the smartcard?

You can't copy generic files, smartcard contains only private keys (gpg
--edit-key X, keytocard) and a small amount of data objects (gpg
--card-edit, admin, url/lang/name).

Note that keytocard *moves* key to card, meaning the local copy of the
private key will be deleted. If you don't want that (e.g. encryption
key) either have a copy or *don't* save after keytocard command.

The card can store only 3 keys: one signature, one encryption and one
authentication key.

Kind regards,

Wiktor

On 04.09.2018 10:29, Roland Siemons (P) wrote:
> @ Dirk Gottschalk: Thanks for very effective response to my first question!
> 
> Remains:
> How can I see what is on the smartcard?
> How can I copy files to the smartcard?
> 
> I studied the GnuPG Smartcard How-To
> (www.gnupg.org/howtos/card-howto/en/smartcard-howto.html), but that is
> entirely linux oriented. Whereas I am working on a win7 system.
> 
> HOWEVER, by trial and error, I found out that the same commands work on
> the command line terminal of Win7. I shall test it further.
> 
> Best regards,
> 
> Roland
> 
> 
> On 04/09/2018 09:52, gnupg-users-requ...@gnupg.org wrote:
>> Send Gnupg-users mailing list submissions to
>>  gnupg-users@gnupg.org
>>
>> To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit
>>  http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
>> or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to
>>  gnupg-users-requ...@gnupg.org
>>
>> You can reach the person managing the list at
>>  gnupg-users-ow...@gnupg.org
>>
>> When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific
>> than "Re: Contents of Gnupg-users digest..."
>>
>>
>> Today's Topics:
>>
>>1. Re: revocation troubles & smartcard troubles (Dirk Gottschalk)
>>2. AW: How to fix "ERROR key_generate 3355453" / "GENKEY'
>>   failed: IPC call has been cancelled" (Fiedler Roman)
>>3. Re: AW: How to fix "ERROR key_generate 3355453" / "GENKEY'
>>   failed: IPC call has been cancelled" (Peter Lebbing)
>>4. Re: AW: How to fix "ERROR key_generate 3355453" / "GENKEY'
>>   failed: IPC call has been cancelled" (Werner Koch)
>>5. AW: How to fix "ERROR key_generate 3355453" / "GENKEY'
>>   failed: IPC call has been cancelled" (Fiedler Roman)
>>
>>
>> --
>>
>> Message: 1
>> Date: Mon, 03 Sep 2018 18:41:29 +0200
>> From: Dirk Gottschalk 
>> To: gnupg-users@gnupg.org
>> Subject: Re: revocation troubles & smartcard troubles
>> Message-ID: 
>> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
>>
>> As long as you did not publish reports revocation, delete the key and 
>> re-import it without the revocation cert. 
>>
>> Am 3. September 2018 17:03:19 MESZ schrieb "Roland Siemons (P)" 
>> :
>>> Dear GnuPG,
>>>
>>> I am already using GnuPG for a long time. But try to improve my
>>> understanding of and working with it.
>>> I became a member of Free Software Foundation Europe, and got a
>>> smartcard. I wanted to use it.
>>>
>>> And that is where the trouble started:
>>> I intended to copy all my personal keys to the smart card.
>>> In Kleopatra, I selected "Tools/Manage smartcards"
>>> Then I selected "Import a certificate from a file", and selected files
>> >from my laptop.
>>> I was under the impression that I was copying files to the smartcard.
>>> By doing so, I not only selected my private key but also my revocation
>>> key (because, why should I enable a thief of my laptop to revoke my
>>> key?).
>>> And then it appeared that I had revoked my entire key pair. Unintended!
>>> Apparently, under smartcard management, I was not at all copying files
>>> to the smartcard. Apparently, I was doing something else. Did I at all
>>> copy files to the smartcard?
>>>
>>> Questions:
>>> Can I UNrevoke that key?
>>> How can I see what is on the smartcard?
>>> How can I copy files to the smartcard?
>>>
>>> I studied the GnuPG Smartcard How-To
>>> (www.gnupg.org/howtos/card-howto/en/smartcard-howto.html), but that is
>>> entirely linux oriented.
>>> I am working on a win7 system.
>>>
>>> Can anyone help me further?
>>>
>>> Thanks!
>>>
>>> Roland
>>
>>
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Re: Timestamping signed documents or detached signature files

[Wiktor Kwapisiewicz via Gnupg-users]

Thank you very much for the additional infos and links, i will read them
all.


Oh, I forgot to mention that timestamping using blockchains is actually 
very easy, for example I timestamped my key's fingerprint:


https://keyserver.ubuntu.com/pks/lookup?fingerprint=on=0x653909A2F0E37C106F5FAF546C8857E0D8E8F074=vindex

(look for timestamp+bitcoin-transact...@metacode.biz 
afcb092c5ca6409526d18ae9cf22d3b55d37e723eb1b74e3f84f7e6b052a162a)


And you can check out the transaction here:
https://blockexplorer.com/api/tx/afcb092c5ca6409526d18ae9cf22d3b55d37e723eb1b74e3f84f7e6b052a162a

(look for "OP_RETURN 653909a2f0e37c106f5faf546c8857e0d8e8f074" that is 
my key's fingerprint).


If you convert "time": 1507539820 seconds from there to date you'll get 
something like 2017-10-09T09:03:40.000Z.


OpenTimestamps (I think) uses Merkle trees to minimize fees but the 
downside is that the hash is not directly embedded in the blockchain and 
you need the extra files to reconstruct the tree root.


Have a nice day!

Kind regards,
Wiktor

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Re: Timestamping signed documents or detached signature files

[Wiktor Kwapisiewicz via Gnupg-users]

Hi Stefan,

> Maybe you find this little info useful too, because i have not seen
> this topic discussed here yet. I'm aware that there is or was an
> old Timestamping Service in England available, but i thought
> that the blockchain is cool.

Yep, this is definitely cool.

I don't know if you've seen it but there is also a helper script for 
timestamping git commits:


https://github.com/opentimestamps/opentimestamps-client/blob/master/doc/git-integration.md

And one minor note, that it's actually possible to (ab)use X.509 
timestamping servers for OpenPGP because they just timestamp any hash 
that you give them (see e.g. [0]). You could embed the TimeStampResp [1] 
in a signature notation (assuming you would timestamp file hash, not the 
signature itself, of course).


Another interesting tidbit, RFC 4880 contains a Timestamp signature flag 
(0x40 [2]) and a way to nest signatures, that could be used to provide 
timestamping or notary services [3].


Kind regards,
Wiktor

[0]: https://tsa.safecreative.org/

[1]: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3161#section-2.4.2

[2]: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4880#section-5.2.1

[3]: 
https://gnupg.org/ftp/people/neal/an-advanced-introduction-to-gnupg/an-advanced-introduction-to-gnupg.pdf 
section 4.5.1


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Re: Using gnupg to crypt credentials used by application to access a database server

[Wiktor Kwapisiewicz via Gnupg-users]

If you use a smartcard there is a hack in scdaemon which allows to work
without a PIN.


Another alternative to an unlocked smartcard would be to use the TPM as 
the key would be non-exportable and bound to just one machine.


There was a series of patches to add TPM keys support but I don't know 
if it was merged:


https://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-devel/2018-January/033350.html

Kind regards,
Wiktor

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Re: Verifying signatures with critical notations

[Wiktor Kwapisiewicz via Gnupg-users]

Is it possible?


Yes.  Please create a feature request at dev.gnupg.org


The FR has been created: https://dev.gnupg.org/T4060

Thank you!

Kind regards,
Wiktor

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Verifying signatures with critical notations

[Wiktor Kwapisiewicz via Gnupg-users]

Hello,

Is it possible to verify a signature with critical notations that I 
recognize?


I created the signature with:

  echo x | gpg --sign --sig-notation !t...@metacode.biz=node-1 > f.sig

Now when I pass this file to gpgme_op_verify I get only summary 
GPGME_SIGSUM_RED and status GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE (with source GPGME).


That's obviously correct as the notation is critical and not recognized 
but I don't see a function to mark "t...@metacode.biz=node-1" as a 
recognized notation for verification purposes.


Is it possible?

Thank you in advance!

Kind regards,
Wiktor

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Re: Choice of ECC curve on usb token

[Wiktor Kwapisiewicz via Gnupg-users]

Hi Damien,


I was referring to the discussion around RSA vs. ECC in
https://crypto.stackexchange.com/questions/60392/choice-of-ecc-curve-on-usb-token/60394#60394

I read several texts of people preferring RSA over ECC.


That's an excellent answer, thanks for posting this!

I've came up with the same exact answer when deciding on the key type 
for my primary key (I used RSA 4096).


As for subkeys: they can fortunately be rotated so you can use anything 
(ECC, and if it's broken, rotate the key, [0]; RSA 2048 if 4096 is too 
slow; just mind the key expiry dates).


There is one argument brought in favor of ECC in context of OpenPGP - 
that you could share the primary public keys directly, instead of 
fingerprints, but that in my opinion protects only against the hash 
function being broken, as the primary public key cannot (usually) be 
used alone (one needs the subkeys and signatures).


Kind regards,
Wiktor

[0]: as a side note I haven't seen tamper resistant devices with ECC, 
e.g. YubiKey supports NIST curves via PIV applet but not OpenPGP one :(


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Re: gpg show default / effective options

[Wiktor Kwapisiewicz via Gnupg-users]

Wow, that is exactly what I needed.

I will walk through them soon and report any problems directly to you.

Thanks Werner!

Kind regards,
Wiktor

W dniu 26.06.2018 o 21:04, Werner Koch pisze:

On Tue, 26 Jun 2018 12:31, gnupg-users@gnupg.org said:


Is it possible to print default or effective options used by GnuPG?


You can run

   gpgconf --list-options gpg

which prints the options and their current values in a format described
in the gpgconf man page.  Frontends like Kleopatra and GPA use this to
provide a GUI page with options.

However, this does only include a subset of all options.  In theory the
man page should list the actual defaults but I am pretty sure that
some(tm) are missing.  If you find such flaws, please let me know and
I'll add them to the docs.


Salam-Shalom,

Werner



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gpg show default / effective options

[Wiktor Kwapisiewicz via Gnupg-users]

Hello,

Is it possible to print default or effective options used by GnuPG?

I'm in the process of slimming down gpg.conf and see that many options 
are either redundant (because gpg uses them by default) or no-ops.


I would like to see which options are used to safely remove obsolete 
settings.


While it is kind-of possible to infer defaults from the source (e.g. 
[0]) I wondered if there is a command that would print all settings that 
are default or effective at the moment.


Thank you in advance!

Kind regards,
Wiktor

[0]: 
https://dev.gnupg.org/source/gnupg/browse/master/g10/gpg.c;592deeddb9bf4ae9b3e236b439e2f39644eb6d46$2403


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