An unofficial history of 1961
Frederick Noronha
fredericknoron...@gmail.com
Six decades or almost two generations after of the dramatic
end of Portuguese rule in Goa, differing perspectives are
beginning to emerge from the ones which so far dominated the
narrative. Given the sudden, unpleasant and contested end of
that chapter in Goa's history, the polarised versions of the
past are not surprising.
Of late, the BJP has been critical of Nehru's policy on Goa.
A well noticed (but so far, less reviewed) book now comes
from the pen of Valmiki Faleiro, journalist and author, who
incidentally cut his teeth in the media in The Navhind Times
of the 1970s.
One can read this book at different levels. Five
top military personnel have offered "advance praise
for the book" (p.ii). Published by Vintage-Penguin
Random House, the book's subtitle reads: "The
Complete Story of Nationalism and Integration". In
ten chapters, it offers a brief and racy ride
through Goa's history (Ch 1), and then devotes the
next three to the buildup to the Indian action in
1961, or Liberation.
Three further chapters (Ch 5-7) deal with the military
operations, while the last three give a breakup of how things
changed, and the "fallacies" in understanding Goa then. An
annexure lists and introduces (via thumbnail sketches in
words) Goans who served in the Indian Army and Catholic Goan
freedom fighters. Both respond, obviously, to times when
religion often gets confused with patriotism.
Faleiro comes up with interesting details. An overview of
Goan history, the politics behind December 1961, or what
opponents of Lisbon's rule in Goa were doing in the crucial
years and even months before the Indian Army marched in.
The strength of his book comes from its details. This
ironically could also be a weakness; the reader outside Goa
could be hit by simply too many details. Likewise, Faleiro's
writing style is at times journalistic and at other times
well footnoted, almost academic. While the former makes for
an interesting read, the lack of footnoting or due
attributions in some sections makes one wonder about
accuracy, verifiability or where the citations came from.
But, the author's knowledge of Portuguese has surely helped.
With the passing of time, some of the young military-men of
the 1960s have since risen to senior posts, crossed their
80s, and have been filling in details (through their writing
in Portugal) which we had not heard of earlier. Recent
memoirs in Goa (such as Suresh Kanekar, Prabhakar Sinari and
Adv Fernando Jorge Colaco) have also helped the narrative.
A detailed section on Indian Defence Minister Krishna Menon's
interest in wanting to contest the Bombay elections in early
1962, and how this influenced the history of Goa, is
particularly well tackled. This has been mentioned in the
past, but there's a lot of interesting detail here.
For a reader in Goa, the attempt to write about
1961 from military, political, social perspectives
can be interesting. Some of this material lies
scattered across many memoirs, books, magazines,
unclassified archives, websites and other sources.
Yet, coming across it in one place can help to
understand the bigger picture.
Details about Goan military-men and
freedom-fighters, whom we otherwise hear of just as
abstract names, fills in our understanding.
Likewise, it might be intriguing to a reader of
today to learn about 1961's military operations
passing through Borim (code name: 'Dall Moth'),
Dabolim ('Rat Din'), Vasco da Gama ('Prem Pujari'),
Old Goa ('Madhu Bala'), Mardol ('Coca Cola'),
Mangeshi ('Sabji Mandi'), Banastarim ('Baby Girl'),
Panjim ('French Toast').
The role of Goa's first military Governor Candeth (connected
to Krishna Menon, his father's pupil) and Handoo are
discussed in fair detail.
We get an understanding into other complex issues of the time
-- the role of Henry the Navigator (now being reassessed);
the impact of the Dutch blockade to "emasculate Goa"; the
multiple freedom fighter groups in Goa (almost a
dozen-and-half).
One can at times disagree with some of Faleiro's
interpretations. He suggests (p.15) that Goans could rise
well in the Indian Army, but in colonial Goa they could at
best climb to being Tenente Coronel (Lt Col). But those who
rose in the former did so mainly after the sudden departure
of the British, post 1947, so the comparison might not be fair.
He argues that "Portuguese lethargy and a lack of foresight
to create a self-sufficient society ...largely caused the
Goan Catholic to disperse all over the world... like the
Biblical lost tribes". Were self-sufficient societies the
goal in colonial times? Has that been attained in Goa even
now? Considering some attainments by Goans
