Re: [homenet] [Captive-portals] [Int-area] [EXTERNAL] Re: Evaluate impact of MAC address randomization to IP applications

[Peter Yee]

On 29/09/2020 12:03, Stephen Farrell wrote:

> More on-topic, I do think MAC address randomisation has a role to play for 
> WiFi as it does for BLE, but yes there is a lack of guidance as to how to 
> implement and deploy such techniques well. It's a bit tricky though as it's 
> fairly OS dependent so maybe not really in scope for the IETF?
> (For the last 3 years I've set a possible student project in this space, but 
> each time a student has considered it, it turned out "too hard";-)

As I mentioned previously, IEEE 802.11 is looking into this area, both from an 
operational perspective and from a privacy perspective. New IEEE 802.11 
amendments (IEEE 802.11bh and IEEE 802.11bi, if approved) are being discussed. 
The (very) high-level documents describing each can be found at [1] and [2]. I 
would be happy to convey input to IEEE 802.11 regarding either document, 
particularly in regards to layers 3 and above. Without wishing to open up a can 
of worms about meeting fees, I will note that IEEE 802.11 is currently not 
charging for its online meetings, so if anyone wishes to take part in the 
random MAC address discussions directly, the next meeting will be held in early 
November. The RCM Study Group met yesterday morning (Americas) and will meet 
again in two weeks. See [3].

-Peter

[1] 
https://mentor.ieee.org/802.11/dcn/20/11-20-0742-04-0rcm-proposed-par-draft.docx
[2] 
https://mentor.ieee.org/802.11/dcn/20/11-20-0854-06-0rcm-par-proposal-for-privacy.pdf
[3] https://mentor.ieee.org/802.11/dcn/20/11-20-0995-10-0rcm-rcm-sg-agenda.pptx



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Re: [homenet] [Captive-portals] [Int-area] Evaluate impact of MAC address randomization to IP applications

[Peter Yee]

Michael,

I believe that the address randomization (Private Address) can be 
turned off in iOS 14, but it seems to be a manual operation per ESSID only.

That said, IEEE 802.11 has a Random and Changing MAC Addresses Study 
Group that has just requested the creation of two new projects under IEEE 
802.11 (subject to the usual approval by the management layers above it). One 
will deal with operational issues that arise from random addresses and how they 
can be alleviated, if possible. The other will look more closely at privacy in 
IEEE 802.11, since MAC address randomization was a first stab at privacy, but 
it leaves many other privacy-defeating vectors unaddressed.

The Wi-Fi Alliance has the Device Provisioning Protocol (Wi-Fi 
Certified Easy Connect 
(https://www.wi-fi.org/discover-wi-fi/wi-fi-easy-connect)), which may be of use 
in environments where traditional on-boarding methods are not available, such 
as for headless or IoT devices.

-Peter

-Original Message-
From: Captive-portals [mailto:captive-portals-boun...@ietf.org] On Behalf Of 
Michael Richardson
Sent: Tuesday, September 22, 2020 1:40 PM
To: captive-port...@ietf.org; homenet@ietf.org; int-a...@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [Captive-portals] [Int-area] Evaluate impact of MAC address 
randomization to IP applications


Damn. Spelt captive-portal without the s again.  Reposting, sorry for 
duplicates.
I hate when WG names and list names do not match, and that we can't have 
aliases.
And I think that reply-to gets filtered.

Archived-At: 

To: int-a...@ietf.org, captive-por...@ietf.org, homenet@ietf.org
From: Michael Richardson 
Date: Tue, 22 Sep 2020 16:34:33 -0400

This thread was started today on the INTAREA WG ML.

While I don't object to a BOF, I don't know where it goes.
What I see is that much of this problem needs to be resolved through increased 
use of 802.1X: making WPA-Enterprise easier to use and setup, this changing 
core identity from MAC Address to IDevID.

My understanding is that Apple intends to randomize MAC every 12 hours, even on 
the same "LAN" (ESSID), and that they will just repeat the WPA
authentication afterwards to get back on the network.   If the per-device
unique policy (including CAPPORT authorization) can be tied to the device 
better, than the MAC address based "physical" exception can be updated.

But, WPA-PSK doesn't work, because it does not, in general, distinguish between 
different devices.

It can be made to work if every device is given a unique PSK, and there are 
some successful experiments doing exactly that.  Mostly it just works, but the 
challenge is communicating the unique PSK through an unreliable human.
BRSKI can certainly do this, and it can leverage that unencrypted ESSID present 
at most hospitality locations to get onto the encrypted WPA-Enterprise.  Or 
BRSKI-TEEP, or some other BRSKI-EAP method.  The unencrypted SSID is not going 
away at those locations.

Thus QR-code based methods are best, yet those do not work for many IoT
devices.   EMU's EAP-NOOB can help in certain cases, but we, as a community
need be clear on what direction we want to go.  One answer is that IoT devices 
have little reason to randomize their MAC if they are not generally ported.


On 2020-09-22 3:49 p.m., Lee, Yiu wrote:
> Hi team,
>
> We proposed a BoF. The agenda is in
> https://github.com/jlivingood/IETF109BoF/blob/master/109-Agenda.md and 
> the proposal is in 
> https://github.com/jlivingood/IETF109BoF/blob/master/BoF-Proposal-2020
> 0918.md. You can also find the draft here 
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-lee-randomized-macaddr-ps-01.
>
> At this stage, we are looking for inputs for more use cases and 
> interests of working together in this domain. Please post your 
> comments in the mailing list.
>
> Thanks
>


--
Michael Richardson. o O ( IPv6 IøT consulting )
   Sandelman Software Works Inc, Ottawa and Worldwide


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