Re: [Interest] Semi-OT: What could / should Elop / Nokia have done differently?
What -- in the face of the very real challenges Nokia faced -- would you have done? As I heard the Nokia as a company has a really bad inner structure with lots of duplications and fighting departments. So first: I would streamline it. Drop Symbian, put all resources to Qt and MeeGo. We know N9 is almost good enough. What could it be if it has all the support what went to the Symbian development?! And a follow-up question: Let's say you are appointed to replace Elop now. What -- given whatever water is already under the bridge, and in the face of the very real challenges Nokia faces now -- would you do now? Port Qt to WP8. It's technically possible, and even if MS doesn't want Qt in its app store, it can be used in the Ovi. And it can be the little difference what makes the Nokia phones unique and better than the rest of the WP world. tr3w On Fri, Jun 22, 2012 at 8:31 AM, Pau Garcia i Quiles pgqui...@elpauer.org wrote: Hi, IMHO they should have released a Qtopia (Qt 4-based) phone 6 months after acquiring Trolltech, then keep developoing Maemo and replace Qtopia with Maemo only when Maemo would be ready. That would have given them a lot of Qt developers and a lot of applications and an operating system more powerful than Symbian. On Thu, Jun 21, 2012 at 11:06 PM, K. Frank kfrank2...@gmail.com wrote: Hello List! Most of us have been following and talking about this whole Nokia / Microsoft thing. A couple of recent discussions on this list got me thinking about it again: [Interest] Is Nokia officially done with Qt? http://lists.qt-project.org/pipermail/interest/2012-June/002454.html [Interest] Qt on Windows Phone 8 http://lists.qt-project.org/pipermail/interest/2012-June/002703.html I would like to ask a related, but somewhat different question: Clearly Nokia and Elop were and are facing a big business challenge. What might they have done differently? I'm hoping to avoid comments like this or that company is bad / stupid / evil. It's easy enough to say that some folks did the wrong thing, but harder to say, okay, here's what they could have done differently. I think that it's arguably the case that: Nokia missed the iPhone revolution therefore faced a significant threat to their business therefore needed to make a dramatic (desperate?) move so they joined forces with Microsoft Now I like to hate on Microsoft as much as the next guy, and so on and so forth, but what might Elop have done differently? It's his job to try to save Nokia (or as much of Nokia as he can), and not his job to try to save Qt in particular. It's not like Nokia could have partnered with Apple. (Or maybe they could have. If somebody thinks that could have been the case, that's exactly the kind of discussion I'm looking for.) It's easy but not very helpful to say things like everybody's an idiot or so-and-so is a Microsoft tool or Nokia should have invented the iPhone before Apple did. I would like to approach this like a Harvard Business School case study: Let's say you were appointed CEO of Nokia instead of Elop back then. What -- in the face of the very real challenges Nokia faced -- would you have done? And a follow-up question: Let's say you are appointed to replace Elop now. What -- given whatever water is already under the bridge, and in the face of the very real challenges Nokia faces now -- would you do now? Thanks, and best regards. K. Frank ___ Interest mailing list Interest@qt-project.org http://lists.qt-project.org/mailman/listinfo/interest -- Pau Garcia i Quiles http://www.elpauer.org (Due to my workload, I may need 10 days to answer) ___ Interest mailing list Interest@qt-project.org http://lists.qt-project.org/mailman/listinfo/interest ___ Interest mailing list Interest@qt-project.org http://lists.qt-project.org/mailman/listinfo/interest
Re: [Interest] Semi-OT: What could / should Elop / Nokia have done differently?
Hi Atlant! Thank you for some of the history and your insightful comments. On Fri, Jun 22, 2012 at 7:41 AM, Atlant Schmidt aschm...@dekaresearch.com wrote: Dear all: In my opinion (informed by some time spent actually working for Nokia), Nokia's biggest problem was that their early, stunning success in mobile phones led them to develop a culture which was risk-averse. They were the largest manufacturer of mobile phones in the world so they would routinely conclude that what they were doing must be maximally right and any other approach would be less right. There were literally *THOUSANDS* of middle-level managers at Nokia who all had the authority to say NO! to new things and almost no one who was willing to say Yes!. E.g., ... Look, we're the largest mobile phone manufacturer in the world so we know what we're doing. If you don't like it, you can always go elsewhere. So eventually, I did. So did many other talented folks. So, eventually, did the customers. Not that I know anything about the internals of Nokia, but this all sounds very plausible. There have been plenty of big, successful companies that have run into trouble in the way you described. Nokia became unable to make revolutionary changes or even fast evolutionary changes. This was true even when the iPhone meteor hit the Nokia planet and the dinosaurs started having trouble breathing. In an interview I watched, Executive VP Mary McDowell characterized the iPhone as a toy. Not only could the leadership not react to the iPhone, they couldn't even see the magnitude of the impact. Then the Android comet came by as well... ... I believe Elop was brought in with the deliberate purpose of blowing up that culture of being entirely risk-averse and unwilling to change.** ... I'll buy that. I always surmised that Elop was brought in to be a dramatic remedy to a significant problem. Presumably Nokia leadership, or the board, or whatever recognized real problems and was attempting to address them. ... Now we've all speculated on whether Elop was just inept or a deliberate Trojan Horse, planted by Microsoft. Up until the cancellation of Meltemi (the Maemo/MeeGo child that was going to replace S40 in featurephones), I was willing to entertain the idea that Elop was just totally inept. But the cancellation of Meltemi, the last known internal competitor in the could be a smartphone space has driven me to accept that Elop's motives are not pure. What happens now? Well, Microsoft just Osborned Nokia again with their WinPhone8 announcement of non-support for everything Nokia has recently sold and everything they'll attempt to sell for the next few months. So at this point, I'd guess that Nokia burns through their cash and fails as a free-standing business. I don't think there's *ANYTHING* they can do to stop that now. No Android Hail Mary! phone, no waiting for Win8, nothing. Well, it sounds like you've answered my second question: What would you do if you were brought in now to replace Elop? Not to put words in your mouth, but it sounds like you are saying you wouldn't take the job, or you'd take it and go play golf, or something, or you'd take it and try to sell the patent portfolio. But you view it as too late to save Nokia, so there's no point in trying. That's fair. (Maybe right, maybe wrong, but fair.) But what about my first question? Suppose you had been brought in instead of Elop to lead Nokia back then. If I understand you correctly, you're saying that Nokia was already in a deep hole. What path would you have taken that you think could have worked? (Or do you think Nokia was already beyond salvation even at that point?) ... I think Apple should buy them for Nokia's IP portfolio. Apple won't do that, of course, because Apple would have a hard time getting regulatory approval. But they should. Instead, as Nokia's stock becomes worthless, I think they will simply fall into Microsoft's hands, almost by default. And the world will be a much poorer place for that; Nokia was a fine, moral corporation that made a good product for a while. If they'd let me run the place instead of Elop, they'd probably still be doing so. So what would you have done, and what would be Nokia's current recipe for success / relevancy? Atlant * Never mind that Symbian still built with (no exaggeration!) more than 7,000 warning messages from the compiler. Those warnings couldn't mean anything, right? (Ouch!) Thanks for your thoughts and your contribution to this little parlor game. Best. K. Frank ___ Interest mailing list Interest@qt-project.org http://lists.qt-project.org/mailman/listinfo/interest
Re: [Interest] Semi-OT: What could / should Elop / Nokia have done differently?
Hi Atlant, This was quite a lot better than most of the pretty useless mails in this thread. (No, this isn't a subtle insult, I think you did pretty well.) But you're missing one important point: No CEO comes in and does what Elop did without a clear mandate from the board. He was hired specifically to introduce Windows Phone, not the other way around. He started around November and it was only about 9 working weeks later that the Windows Phone edition was announced. It's *impossible* that this decision was made after he was hired. Also, why on earth would they have hired him, if it wasn't because of his ties with MS? This was a board decision, not Elops. However, the execution of doing it was done so badly that it's hard to find comparisons. Tomi wrote that the burning platforms memo would be on MBA courses as an example of what you should never do. And indeed it was mentioned in one of my MBA courses this spring :) Bo. Den 22-06-2012 13:41, Atlant Schmidt skrev: Dear all: In my opinion (informed by some time spent actually working for Nokia), Nokia's biggest problem was that their early, stunning success in mobile phones led them to develop a culture which was risk-averse. They were the largest manufacturer of mobile phones in the world so they would routinely conclude that what they were doing must be maximally right and any other approach would be less right. There were literally *THOUSANDS* of middle-level managers at Nokia who all had the authority to say NO! to new things and almost no one who was willing to say Yes!. E.g., We want to change the way the browser zooms. Well I'm the manager in charge of blue things on the right side of the screen and I say you can't do that! But it's almost impossible to successfully zoom a web page so that it's readable. Look, we're the largest mobile phone manufacturer in the world so we know what we're doing. If you don't like it, you can always go elsewhere. So eventually, I did. So did many other talented folks. So, eventually, did the customers. Nokia became unable to make revolutionary changes or even fast evolutionary changes. This was true even when the iPhone meteor hit the Nokia planet and the dinosaurs started having trouble breathing. In an interview I watched, Executive VP Mary McDowell characterized the iPhone as a toy. Not only could the leadership not react to the iPhone, they couldn't even see the magnitude of the impact. Then the Android comet came by as well... Yes, Nokia was running the Maemo/MeeGo skunk works, and given just a little more time, that phone family was going to break out as the proper successor to Symbian, but Nokia's leadership's hearts weren't really in it; they were still certain that the next release of Symbian would bring back their glory days and let business carry on as it had been carrying on. Never mind that (for a while there before Anna) each release of Symbian was less reliable than the previous release; the *NEXT* one would surely be okay! After all, we've instituted new processes and controls to ensure that development was being done more slowly and carefully!* I believe Elop was brought in with the deliberate purpose of blowing up that culture of being entirely risk-averse and unwilling to change.** He decided that Nokia couldn't wait for another release of Symbian and so he wrote the burning platform memo. Unfortunately, he also torched Maemo/MeeGo with the same firebrand. In one fell swoop, he completely Osborned Nokia's smartphone business. Ahh, but we have featurephones and dumbphones! the leadership said. They'll carry us until Microsoft comes through for us! Unfortunately, the dumbphone and featurephone market lives and dies on manufacturing costs and Nokia, while good at that game, was being bested by the Shenzen manufacturers. So it has also seen its market share decay in that sector of the market as well. Now we've all speculated on whether Elop was just inept or a deliberate Trojan Horse, planted by Microsoft. Up until the cancellation of Meltemi (the Maemo/MeeGo child that was going to replace S40 in featurephones), I was willing to entertain the idea that Elop was just totally inept. But the cancellation of Meltemi, the last known internal competitor in the could be a smartphone space has driven me to accept that Elop's motives are not pure. What happens now? Well, Microsoft just Osborned Nokia again with their WinPhone8 announcement of non-support for everything Nokia has recently sold and everything they'll attempt to sell for the next few months. So at this point, I'd guess that Nokia burns through their cash and fails as a free-standing business. I don't think there's *ANYTHING* they can
Re: [Interest] Semi-OT: What could / should Elop / Nokia have done differently?
, I'd have dismissed any member of the Group Executive Board who said but we're the world's largest manufacturer of mobile phones; we don't need to do that! (whatever that was that day). Atlant -Original Message- From: interest-bounces+aschmidt=dekaresearch@qt-project.org [mailto:interest-bounces+aschmidt=dekaresearch@qt-project.org] On Behalf Of K. Frank Sent: Friday, June 22, 2012 8:50 AM To: Qt-interest Subject: Re: [Interest] Semi-OT: What could / should Elop / Nokia have done differently? Hi Atlant! Thank you for some of the history and your insightful comments. On Fri, Jun 22, 2012 at 7:41 AM, Atlant Schmidt aschm...@dekaresearch.com wrote: Dear all: In my opinion (informed by some time spent actually working for Nokia), Nokia's biggest problem was that their early, stunning success in mobile phones led them to develop a culture which was risk-averse. They were the largest manufacturer of mobile phones in the world so they would routinely conclude that what they were doing must be maximally right and any other approach would be less right. There were literally *THOUSANDS* of middle-level managers at Nokia who all had the authority to say NO! to new things and almost no one who was willing to say Yes!. E.g., ... Look, we're the largest mobile phone manufacturer in the world so we know what we're doing. If you don't like it, you can always go elsewhere. So eventually, I did. So did many other talented folks. So, eventually, did the customers. Not that I know anything about the internals of Nokia, but this all sounds very plausible. There have been plenty of big, successful companies that have run into trouble in the way you described. Nokia became unable to make revolutionary changes or even fast evolutionary changes. This was true even when the iPhone meteor hit the Nokia planet and the dinosaurs started having trouble breathing. In an interview I watched, Executive VP Mary McDowell characterized the iPhone as a toy. Not only could the leadership not react to the iPhone, they couldn't even see the magnitude of the impact. Then the Android comet came by as well... ... I believe Elop was brought in with the deliberate purpose of blowing up that culture of being entirely risk-averse and unwilling to change.** ... I'll buy that. I always surmised that Elop was brought in to be a dramatic remedy to a significant problem. Presumably Nokia leadership, or the board, or whatever recognized real problems and was attempting to address them. ... Now we've all speculated on whether Elop was just inept or a deliberate Trojan Horse, planted by Microsoft. Up until the cancellation of Meltemi (the Maemo/MeeGo child that was going to replace S40 in featurephones), I was willing to entertain the idea that Elop was just totally inept. But the cancellation of Meltemi, the last known internal competitor in the could be a smartphone space has driven me to accept that Elop's motives are not pure. What happens now? Well, Microsoft just Osborned Nokia again with their WinPhone8 announcement of non-support for everything Nokia has recently sold and everything they'll attempt to sell for the next few months. So at this point, I'd guess that Nokia burns through their cash and fails as a free-standing business. I don't think there's *ANYTHING* they can do to stop that now. No Android Hail Mary! phone, no waiting for Win8, nothing. Well, it sounds like you've answered my second question: What would you do if you were brought in now to replace Elop? Not to put words in your mouth, but it sounds like you are saying you wouldn't take the job, or you'd take it and go play golf, or something, or you'd take it and try to sell the patent portfolio. But you view it as too late to save Nokia, so there's no point in trying. That's fair. (Maybe right, maybe wrong, but fair.) But what about my first question? Suppose you had been brought in instead of Elop to lead Nokia back then. If I understand you correctly, you're saying that Nokia was already in a deep hole. What path would you have taken that you think could have worked? (Or do you think Nokia was already beyond salvation even at that point?) ... I think Apple should buy them for Nokia's IP portfolio. Apple won't do that, of course, because Apple would have a hard time getting regulatory approval. But they should. Instead, as Nokia's stock becomes worthless, I think they will simply fall into Microsoft's hands, almost by default. And the world will be a much poorer place for that; Nokia was a fine, moral corporation that made a good product for a while. If they'd let me run the place instead of Elop, they'd probably still be doing so. So what would you have done, and what would be Nokia's current recipe for success / relevancy? Atlant * Never mind
Re: [Interest] Semi-OT: What could / should Elop / Nokia have done differently?
On 06/22/2012 03:27 PM, Atlant Schmidt wrote: I was very fond of the strategy that I*THOUGHT* was emerging within Nokia: Use Symbian to hold the fort until Maemo/MeeGo was ready for prime time. I think this was what Vanjoki was advocating. Unfortunately he lost the CEO race to Elop and then resigned. Two small steps they should do now: 1. Get Qt on Windows Phone 8. 2. Get Qt on future Asha line.These are the feature phones that were supposed to evolve to Meltemi. Even without Meltemi they probably could be made to run Qt. Nokia still has lots of hardware know how that should be worth something, not to mention networks. It will be interesting to see the WP8 phones they should introduce this fall. So I'd wager that Nokia will survive, but as a much smaller company. /Harri ___ Interest mailing list Interest@qt-project.org http://lists.qt-project.org/mailman/listinfo/interest
Re: [Interest] Semi-OT: What could / should Elop / Nokia have done differently?
Well, from a management perspective, Elop's actions (castrating Nokia to just Symbian and WP) and then the announcement by MS n WP8, is I think a ploy to beat up Nokia's stock price (now well under $3, when all this drama started it was over $8) for a cheap MS acquisition via stock. Nokia should still be riding high on that $10b that MS gave them. From an engineering perspective, Nokia should have ported Qt to Android as a first-class SDK for Android, then pushed Qt app development on Android, which would have eased transition by consumers and developers to Meego or the Linux flavor of the day. Additionally, they could partner with RIM and or Samsung to create a third software ecosystem (I'm not including WP, because WP had no ecosystem back then) After Android was in the bag (or while, when NOK still had employees) target iOS and do the same thing there. One SDK to rule them all, one SDK to bring them to Nokia. NOK could have stolen the app development thunder and become a leader, usurping Apple and Android. People don't care what their phone runs on, they care about what their phone runs (app wise). With Ovi store, Nokia could have also opened app stored for desktop apps, and immediately targeted the two largest markets - the combined desktop markets (OSX, Win, ... and yes Lin) and the mobile markets (iOS, Android). Nokia, even without an OS, could have won the mobile market because it's all about winning developers. And if you write an app, and then publish it, and reach the Linux desktop user that has a Android phone, well that's two potential sales right there. The revenues of the 6(!) platform app store would have really raked it in for Nokia, and they'd never have to ship a phone. Qt was the key to becoming relevant. But with the firings Elop has castrated Nokia and forced the company to suckle the teat of Microsoft, until MS takes them in for pennies on the dollar. I often think that if ex-Qt engineers got together and did the work that should have been done by Nokia, they could still be a serious disruption int he market place. With their own app store, I think it would be damn profitable, and easily so. From: Atlant Schmidt aschm...@dekaresearch.com To: 'Bo Thorsen' b...@fioniasoftware.dk; interest@qt-project.org interest@qt-project.org Sent: Friday, June 22, 2012 9:32 AM Subject: Re: [Interest] Semi-OT: What could / should Elop / Nokia have done differently? Bo: But you're missing one important point: No CEO comes in and does what Elop did without a clear mandate from the board. He was hired specifically to introduce Windows Phone, not the other way around. I don't disagree with you at all. Nokia was already a very Microsoft-friendly company while I was still there (as evidenced by how well their phones worked with PCs and how badly they worked with Macs) and I wouldn't be surprised to find the Board acted as you have hypothesized. Atlant -Original Message- From: interest-bounces+aschmidt=dekaresearch@qt-project.org [mailto:interest-bounces+aschmidt=dekaresearch@qt-project.org] On Behalf Of Bo Thorsen Sent: Friday, June 22, 2012 8:52 AM To: interest@qt-project.org Subject: Re: [Interest] Semi-OT: What could / should Elop / Nokia have done differently? Hi Atlant, This was quite a lot better than most of the pretty useless mails in this thread. (No, this isn't a subtle insult, I think you did pretty well.) But you're missing one important point: No CEO comes in and does what Elop did without a clear mandate from the board. He was hired specifically to introduce Windows Phone, not the other way around. He started around November and it was only about 9 working weeks later that the Windows Phone edition was announced. It's *impossible* that this decision was made after he was hired. Also, why on earth would they have hired him, if it wasn't because of his ties with MS? This was a board decision, not Elops. However, the execution of doing it was done so badly that it's hard to find comparisons. Tomi wrote that the burning platforms memo would be on MBA courses as an example of what you should never do. And indeed it was mentioned in one of my MBA courses this spring :) Bo. This e-mail and the information, including any attachments, it contains are intended to be a confidential communication only to the person or entity to whom it is addressed and may contain information that is privileged. If the reader of this message is not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any dissemination, distribution or copying of this communication is strictly prohibited. If you have received this communication in error, please immediately notify the sender and destroy the original message. Thank you. Please consider the environment before printing this email. ___ Interest mailing list Interest@qt
Re: [Interest] Semi-OT: What could / should Elop / Nokia have done differently?
Harri: I think this was what Vanjoki was advocating. Unfortunately he lost the CEO race to Elop and then resigned. I agree with that assessment. Two small steps they should do now: 1. Get Qt on Windows Phone 8. I doubt Microsoft wants that or would allow it (although I'd love to be proven wrong). 2. Get Qt on future Asha line. These are the feature phones that were supposed to evolve to Meltemi. Even without Meltemi they probably could be made to run Qt. I think I disagree with that. There were attempts to port Qt to S40 and the conclusion was that there wasn't enough hardware there to make it work well. I don't know how much more powerful the current Asha phones (still S40, right?) are compared to the ca. 2010 S40 phones, but given that the sales price continues to be driven down, they can't be that much more powerful and probably still wouldn't successfully support Qt, desirable though that goal might be. Atlant -Original Message- From: interest-bounces+aschmidt=dekaresearch@qt-project.org [mailto:interest-bounces+aschmidt=dekaresearch@qt-project.org] On Behalf Of Harri Pasanen Sent: Friday, June 22, 2012 10:46 AM To: interest@qt-project.org Subject: Re: [Interest] Semi-OT: What could / should Elop / Nokia have done differently? On 06/22/2012 03:27 PM, Atlant Schmidt wrote: I was very fond of the strategy that I*THOUGHT* was emerging within Nokia: Use Symbian to hold the fort until Maemo/MeeGo was ready for prime time. I think this was what Vanjoki was advocating. Unfortunately he lost the CEO race to Elop and then resigned. Two small steps they should do now: 1. Get Qt on Windows Phone 8. 2. Get Qt on future Asha line.These are the feature phones that were supposed to evolve to Meltemi. Even without Meltemi they probably could be made to run Qt. Nokia still has lots of hardware know how that should be worth something, not to mention networks. It will be interesting to see the WP8 phones they should introduce this fall. So I'd wager that Nokia will survive, but as a much smaller company. /Harri ___ Interest mailing list Interest@qt-project.org http://lists.qt-project.org/mailman/listinfo/interest This e-mail and the information, including any attachments, it contains are intended to be a confidential communication only to the person or entity to whom it is addressed and may contain information that is privileged. If the reader of this message is not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any dissemination, distribution or copying of this communication is strictly prohibited. If you have received this communication in error, please immediately notify the sender and destroy the original message. Thank you. Please consider the environment before printing this email. ___ Interest mailing list Interest@qt-project.org http://lists.qt-project.org/mailman/listinfo/interest
Re: [Interest] Semi-OT: What could / should Elop / Nokia have done differently?
If I ran Nokia for a year I would analyze which mobile OS(s) is/are dominating the markets I want to penetrate. Obviously iOS is proprietary so unless I want to write Apps for iStuff I have to look at Android and Windows (mostly Android). It is possible that it would be best to make Android phones for the U.S., Windows phones for Asia, and Meego or Symbian phones for Europe. Marketing analyses would answer the questions. I may be wrong, but it does not appear to me that Nokia made its product decisions for the right reasons. What I would not do is worry too much about looking different than Samsung, HTC, or any other vendor. Make the primary question, How can sell the most phones at a profit? rather than How can I differentiate myself from Samsung. What's wrong with getting a chunk of the success that Samsung has had? At one time, Motorola had the lion's share of the cell phone market. Then they got the Iridium bug. I remember seeing the commercial of a guy walking at the north pole answering his satellite phone. The question that popped into my mind was, How many people are in this picture? Just how big is the market for $3,000 phones that cost $2.50/minute to use? Can you really get a return on a $2 billion investment? Nokia, I think, made a similar mistake. How many people in the world are out shopping for Windows based phones? If the answer isn't most of them, then why build Windows based phones? Is the tech that much better? Can you build them a lot cheaper than Android? If the answer is no, then choose a different OS. Karl On 2012-06-21 15:06, K. Frank wrote: Hello List! Most of us have been following and talking about this whole Nokia / Microsoft thing. A couple of recent discussions on this list got me thinking about it again: [Interest] Is Nokia officially done with Qt? http://lists.qt-project.org/pipermail/interest/2012-June/002454.html [Interest] Qt on Windows Phone 8 http://lists.qt-project.org/pipermail/interest/2012-June/002703.html I would like to ask a related, but somewhat different question: Clearly Nokia and Elop were and are facing a big business challenge. What might they have done differently? I'm hoping to avoid comments like this or that company is bad / stupid / evil. It's easy enough to say that some folks did the wrong thing, but harder to say, okay, here's what they could have done differently. I think that it's arguably the case that: Nokia missed the iPhone revolution therefore faced a significant threat to their business therefore needed to make a dramatic (desperate?) move so they joined forces with Microsoft Now I like to hate on Microsoft as much as the next guy, and so on and so forth, but what might Elop have done differently? It's his job to try to save Nokia (or as much of Nokia as he can), and not his job to try to save Qt in particular. It's not like Nokia could have partnered with Apple. (Or maybe they could have. If somebody thinks that could have been the case, that's exactly the kind of discussion I'm looking for.) It's easy but not very helpful to say things like everybody's an idiot or so-and-so is a Microsoft tool or Nokia should have invented the iPhone before Apple did. I would like to approach this like a Harvard Business School case study: Let's say you were appointed CEO of Nokia instead of Elop back then. What -- in the face of the very real challenges Nokia faced -- would you have done? And a follow-up question: Let's say you are appointed to replace Elop now. What -- given whatever water is already under the bridge, and in the face of the very real challenges Nokia faces now -- would you do now? Thanks, and best regards. K. Frank ___ Interest mailing list Interest@qt-project.org http://lists.qt-project.org/mailman/listinfo/interest ___ Interest mailing list Interest@qt-project.org http://lists.qt-project.org/mailman/listinfo/interest
