[kid3] [Bug 422123] macOS pre-compiled binary release lacks code-signature or published hash

2020-05-27 Thread vbzfua
https://bugs.kde.org/show_bug.cgi?id=422123

--- Comment #2 from vbzfua  ---
Yes, the Apple DeveloperID/certificate situation is a real problem for FOSS
projects.

Many macOS projects do use GPG signatures as there is well maintained and
fairly mature GPG software available [1].  Some of the  FOSS projects providing
GPG signatures for their macOS binary archives are: Handbrake, Thunderbird,
Firefox, VeraCrypt, VLC, osxfuse, LibreOffice.

Would another option be to simply publish the sha256 of the binary archives
separately from the downloads, perhaps at kid3.kde.org ?



[1] https://gpgtools.org

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[kid3] [Bug 422123] macOS pre-compiled binary release lacks code-signature or published hash

2020-05-28 Thread vbzfua
https://bugs.kde.org/show_bug.cgi?id=422123

vbzfua  changed:

   What|Removed |Added

 Resolution|--- |FIXED
 Status|CONFIRMED   |RESOLVED

--- Comment #4 from vbzfua  ---
(In reply to Urs Fleisch from comment #3)

That looks like a reasonable way to ensure the integrity of the binary
releases.
Thanks for addressing the issue so quickly.
Marking status as: Resolved/Fixed.

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[kid3] [Bug 422123] New: macOS pre-compiled binary release lacks code-signature or published hash

2020-05-26 Thread vbzfua
https://bugs.kde.org/show_bug.cgi?id=422123

Bug ID: 422123
   Summary: macOS pre-compiled binary release lacks code-signature
or published hash
   Product: kid3
   Version: 3.8.x
  Platform: macOS Disk Images
OS: macOS
Status: REPORTED
  Severity: normal
  Priority: NOR
 Component: general
  Assignee: uflei...@users.sourceforge.net
  Reporter: vbz...@tutamail.com
  Target Milestone: ---

The binary release of the macOS kid3.app lacks an Apple DeveloperID
code-signature or a published hash value/detached signature for authentication
and integrity of the binary/dmg.

Using macOS code-signing and/or publishing a hash/detached signature would
allow end-users to verify the integrity of the app/dmg.

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