On Tuesday, August 30, 2005 23:59:16 -0400 Jeff Aitken [EMAIL PROTECTED]
wrote:
Assuming I've got that part right, here's the part that's got me
confused. In step #2, the AS generates a session key that will be
used by the client during all future communication with the TGS;
i.e., this is the key with which the client will encrypt future
service ticket requests. However, if the KDC that granted the TGT
to the client fails, and the client sends a service ticket request
to a different KDC, how does that second KDC validate the client?
Unless I'm missing something, the second KDC doesn't have a copy of
the session key that the client uses to encrypt the request, so he
shouldn't be able to decrypt it successfully.
The TGT is just like any other ticket; it contains information encrypted in
the service's secret key, including a session key. The TGS, then, is a
single service potentially distributed over multiple machines (KDC's).
Each machine providing that service has a copy of the service key, and thus
can decrypt the ticket, which is provided by the client with every request.
Except for a short-lived replay cache, the KDC itself is essentially
stateless. It doesn't remember anything about tickets it has issued.
-- Jeffrey T. Hutzelman (N3NHS) [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sr. Research Systems Programmer
School of Computer Science - Research Computing Facility
Carnegie Mellon University - Pittsburgh, PA
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