Re: [PATCH v2] kexec: Do not verify the signature without the lockdown or mandatory signature
在 2020年06月18日 03:37, Andrew Morton 写道: > On Tue, 2 Jun 2020 12:59:52 +0800 Lianbo Jiang wrote: > >> Signature verification is an important security feature, to protect >> system from being attacked with a kernel of unknown origin. Kexec >> rebooting is a way to replace the running kernel, hence need be >> secured carefully. > > I'm finding this changelog quite hard to understand, > Thanks for your comment. I will improve the patch log and try to make it easily understand. >> In the current code of handling signature verification of kexec kernel, >> the logic is very twisted. It mixes signature verification, IMA signature >> appraising and kexec lockdown. >> >> If there is no KEXEC_SIG_FORCE, kexec kernel image doesn't have one of >> signature, the supported crypto, and key, we don't think this is wrong, > > I think this is saying that in the absence of KEXEC_SIG_FORCE and if > the signature/crypto/key are all incorrect, the kexec still succeeds, > but it should not. > When the KEXEC_SIG_FORCE is not enabled, even if kexec kernel image doesn't have the signature, or the key, etc, kexec should be still allowed to loaded, unless kexec lockdown is executed. >> Unless kexec lockdown is executed. IMA is considered as another kind of >> signature appraising method. >> >> If kexec kernel image has signature/crypto/key, it has to go through the >> signature verification and pass. Otherwise it's seen as verification >> failure, and won't be loaded. > > I don't know if this is describing the current situation or the > post-patch situation. > This is the current situation, and we'd like to change it so that kexec allows the kernel and initrd images to be loaded when they are not the lockdown or mandatory signature. >> Seems kexec kernel image with an unqualified signature is even worse than >> those w/o signature at all, this sounds very unreasonable. E.g. If people >> get a unsigned kernel to load, or a kernel signed with expired key, which >> one is more dangerous? >> >> So, here, let's simplify the logic to improve code readability. If the >> KEXEC_SIG_FORCE enabled or kexec lockdown enabled, signature verification >> is mandated. Otherwise, we lift the bar for any kernel image. > > I think the whole thing needs a rewrite. Start out by fully describing > the current situation. THen describe what is wrong with it, and why. > Then describe the proposed change. Or something along these lines. > > The changelog should also make clear the end-user impact of the patch. > In sufficient detail for others to decide which kernel version(s) > should be patched. Your recommendations will also be valuable - which > kernel version(s) do you think should be patched, and why? > Currently, kernel will always verify the signature without the lockdown or mandatory signature. This may prevent the kernel from loading the kernel and initrd images via the kexec_file_load() syscall. However, we'd like to allow to still load the images in such case rather than failure due to the signature verification issue. For example, at the stage of development and test, usually use a signature key to test whether the procedure of signature can work well as expected. Sometimes, the signing time may be expired, but still use the kernel with the old signature key to reproduce some problems in some automatic tests, which always caused the failure of loading images. Let's clean the logic of kernel code and allow to still load the kernel and initrd images without the lockdown or mandatory signature. Hope this helps. Thanks. Lianbo ___ kexec mailing list kexec@lists.infradead.org http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/kexec
Re: [PATCH v2] kexec: Do not verify the signature without the lockdown or mandatory signature
On Tue, 2 Jun 2020 12:59:52 +0800 Lianbo Jiang wrote: > Signature verification is an important security feature, to protect > system from being attacked with a kernel of unknown origin. Kexec > rebooting is a way to replace the running kernel, hence need be > secured carefully. I'm finding this changelog quite hard to understand, > In the current code of handling signature verification of kexec kernel, > the logic is very twisted. It mixes signature verification, IMA signature > appraising and kexec lockdown. > > If there is no KEXEC_SIG_FORCE, kexec kernel image doesn't have one of > signature, the supported crypto, and key, we don't think this is wrong, I think this is saying that in the absence of KEXEC_SIG_FORCE and if the signature/crypto/key are all incorrect, the kexec still succeeds, but it should not. > Unless kexec lockdown is executed. IMA is considered as another kind of > signature appraising method. > > If kexec kernel image has signature/crypto/key, it has to go through the > signature verification and pass. Otherwise it's seen as verification > failure, and won't be loaded. I don't know if this is describing the current situation or the post-patch situation. > Seems kexec kernel image with an unqualified signature is even worse than > those w/o signature at all, this sounds very unreasonable. E.g. If people > get a unsigned kernel to load, or a kernel signed with expired key, which > one is more dangerous? > > So, here, let's simplify the logic to improve code readability. If the > KEXEC_SIG_FORCE enabled or kexec lockdown enabled, signature verification > is mandated. Otherwise, we lift the bar for any kernel image. I think the whole thing needs a rewrite. Start out by fully describing the current situation. THen describe what is wrong with it, and why. Then describe the proposed change. Or something along these lines. The changelog should also make clear the end-user impact of the patch. In sufficient detail for others to decide which kernel version(s) should be patched. Your recommendations will also be valuable - which kernel version(s) do you think should be patched, and why? ___ kexec mailing list kexec@lists.infradead.org http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/kexec
Re: [PATCH v2] kexec: Do not verify the signature without the lockdown or mandatory signature
I just noticed that I forgot to add Eric Biederman in cc list, so sorry for this. Thanks. Lianbo 在 2020年06月02日 12:59, Lianbo Jiang 写道: > Signature verification is an important security feature, to protect > system from being attacked with a kernel of unknown origin. Kexec > rebooting is a way to replace the running kernel, hence need be > secured carefully. > > In the current code of handling signature verification of kexec kernel, > the logic is very twisted. It mixes signature verification, IMA signature > appraising and kexec lockdown. > > If there is no KEXEC_SIG_FORCE, kexec kernel image doesn't have one of > signature, the supported crypto, and key, we don't think this is wrong, > Unless kexec lockdown is executed. IMA is considered as another kind of > signature appraising method. > > If kexec kernel image has signature/crypto/key, it has to go through the > signature verification and pass. Otherwise it's seen as verification > failure, and won't be loaded. > > Seems kexec kernel image with an unqualified signature is even worse than > those w/o signature at all, this sounds very unreasonable. E.g. If people > get a unsigned kernel to load, or a kernel signed with expired key, which > one is more dangerous? > > So, here, let's simplify the logic to improve code readability. If the > KEXEC_SIG_FORCE enabled or kexec lockdown enabled, signature verification > is mandated. Otherwise, we lift the bar for any kernel image. > > Signed-off-by: Lianbo Jiang > --- > Changes since v1: > [1] Modify the log level(suggested by Jiri Bohac) > > kernel/kexec_file.c | 34 ++ > 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/kernel/kexec_file.c b/kernel/kexec_file.c > index faa74d5f6941..fae496958a68 100644 > --- a/kernel/kexec_file.c > +++ b/kernel/kexec_file.c > @@ -181,34 +181,19 @@ void kimage_file_post_load_cleanup(struct kimage *image) > static int > kimage_validate_signature(struct kimage *image) > { > - const char *reason; > int ret; > > ret = arch_kexec_kernel_verify_sig(image, image->kernel_buf, > image->kernel_buf_len); > - switch (ret) { > - case 0: > - break; > + if (ret) { > > - /* Certain verification errors are non-fatal if we're not > - * checking errors, provided we aren't mandating that there > - * must be a valid signature. > - */ > - case -ENODATA: > - reason = "kexec of unsigned image"; > - goto decide; > - case -ENOPKG: > - reason = "kexec of image with unsupported crypto"; > - goto decide; > - case -ENOKEY: > - reason = "kexec of image with unavailable key"; > - decide: > if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG_FORCE)) { > - pr_notice("%s rejected\n", reason); > + pr_notice("Enforced kernel signature verification > failed (%d).\n", ret); > return ret; > } > > - /* If IMA is guaranteed to appraise a signature on the kexec > + /* > + * If IMA is guaranteed to appraise a signature on the kexec >* image, permit it even if the kernel is otherwise locked >* down. >*/ > @@ -216,17 +201,10 @@ kimage_validate_signature(struct kimage *image) > security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_KEXEC)) > return -EPERM; > > - return 0; > - > - /* All other errors are fatal, including nomem, unparseable > - * signatures and signature check failures - even if signatures > - * aren't required. > - */ > - default: > - pr_notice("kernel signature verification failed (%d).\n", ret); > + pr_debug("kernel signature verification failed (%d).\n", ret); > } > > - return ret; > + return 0; > } > #endif > > ___ kexec mailing list kexec@lists.infradead.org http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/kexec
Re: [PATCH v2] kexec: Do not verify the signature without the lockdown or mandatory signature
On 06/02/20 at 12:59pm, Lianbo Jiang wrote: > Signature verification is an important security feature, to protect > system from being attacked with a kernel of unknown origin. Kexec > rebooting is a way to replace the running kernel, hence need be > secured carefully. > > In the current code of handling signature verification of kexec kernel, > the logic is very twisted. It mixes signature verification, IMA signature > appraising and kexec lockdown. > > If there is no KEXEC_SIG_FORCE, kexec kernel image doesn't have one of > signature, the supported crypto, and key, we don't think this is wrong, > Unless kexec lockdown is executed. IMA is considered as another kind of > signature appraising method. > > If kexec kernel image has signature/crypto/key, it has to go through the > signature verification and pass. Otherwise it's seen as verification > failure, and won't be loaded. > > Seems kexec kernel image with an unqualified signature is even worse than > those w/o signature at all, this sounds very unreasonable. E.g. If people > get a unsigned kernel to load, or a kernel signed with expired key, which > one is more dangerous? > > So, here, let's simplify the logic to improve code readability. If the > KEXEC_SIG_FORCE enabled or kexec lockdown enabled, signature verification > is mandated. Otherwise, we lift the bar for any kernel image. > > Signed-off-by: Lianbo Jiang Looks good to me. Acked-by: Baoquan He > --- > Changes since v1: > [1] Modify the log level(suggested by Jiri Bohac) > > kernel/kexec_file.c | 34 ++ > 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/kernel/kexec_file.c b/kernel/kexec_file.c > index faa74d5f6941..fae496958a68 100644 > --- a/kernel/kexec_file.c > +++ b/kernel/kexec_file.c > @@ -181,34 +181,19 @@ void kimage_file_post_load_cleanup(struct kimage *image) > static int > kimage_validate_signature(struct kimage *image) > { > - const char *reason; > int ret; > > ret = arch_kexec_kernel_verify_sig(image, image->kernel_buf, > image->kernel_buf_len); > - switch (ret) { > - case 0: > - break; > + if (ret) { > > - /* Certain verification errors are non-fatal if we're not > - * checking errors, provided we aren't mandating that there > - * must be a valid signature. > - */ > - case -ENODATA: > - reason = "kexec of unsigned image"; > - goto decide; > - case -ENOPKG: > - reason = "kexec of image with unsupported crypto"; > - goto decide; > - case -ENOKEY: > - reason = "kexec of image with unavailable key"; > - decide: > if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG_FORCE)) { > - pr_notice("%s rejected\n", reason); > + pr_notice("Enforced kernel signature verification > failed (%d).\n", ret); > return ret; > } > > - /* If IMA is guaranteed to appraise a signature on the kexec > + /* > + * If IMA is guaranteed to appraise a signature on the kexec >* image, permit it even if the kernel is otherwise locked >* down. >*/ > @@ -216,17 +201,10 @@ kimage_validate_signature(struct kimage *image) > security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_KEXEC)) > return -EPERM; > > - return 0; > - > - /* All other errors are fatal, including nomem, unparseable > - * signatures and signature check failures - even if signatures > - * aren't required. > - */ > - default: > - pr_notice("kernel signature verification failed (%d).\n", ret); > + pr_debug("kernel signature verification failed (%d).\n", ret); > } > > - return ret; > + return 0; > } > #endif > > -- > 2.17.1 > ___ kexec mailing list kexec@lists.infradead.org http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/kexec
Re: [PATCH v2] kexec: Do not verify the signature without the lockdown or mandatory signature
On 06/02/20 at 12:59pm, Lianbo Jiang wrote: > Signature verification is an important security feature, to protect > system from being attacked with a kernel of unknown origin. Kexec > rebooting is a way to replace the running kernel, hence need be > secured carefully. > > In the current code of handling signature verification of kexec kernel, > the logic is very twisted. It mixes signature verification, IMA signature > appraising and kexec lockdown. > > If there is no KEXEC_SIG_FORCE, kexec kernel image doesn't have one of > signature, the supported crypto, and key, we don't think this is wrong, > Unless kexec lockdown is executed. IMA is considered as another kind of > signature appraising method. > > If kexec kernel image has signature/crypto/key, it has to go through the > signature verification and pass. Otherwise it's seen as verification > failure, and won't be loaded. > > Seems kexec kernel image with an unqualified signature is even worse than > those w/o signature at all, this sounds very unreasonable. E.g. If people > get a unsigned kernel to load, or a kernel signed with expired key, which > one is more dangerous? > > So, here, let's simplify the logic to improve code readability. If the > KEXEC_SIG_FORCE enabled or kexec lockdown enabled, signature verification > is mandated. Otherwise, we lift the bar for any kernel image. > > Signed-off-by: Lianbo Jiang > --- > Changes since v1: > [1] Modify the log level(suggested by Jiri Bohac) > > kernel/kexec_file.c | 34 ++ > 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/kernel/kexec_file.c b/kernel/kexec_file.c > index faa74d5f6941..fae496958a68 100644 > --- a/kernel/kexec_file.c > +++ b/kernel/kexec_file.c > @@ -181,34 +181,19 @@ void kimage_file_post_load_cleanup(struct kimage *image) > static int > kimage_validate_signature(struct kimage *image) > { > - const char *reason; > int ret; > > ret = arch_kexec_kernel_verify_sig(image, image->kernel_buf, > image->kernel_buf_len); > - switch (ret) { > - case 0: > - break; > + if (ret) { > > - /* Certain verification errors are non-fatal if we're not > - * checking errors, provided we aren't mandating that there > - * must be a valid signature. > - */ > - case -ENODATA: > - reason = "kexec of unsigned image"; > - goto decide; > - case -ENOPKG: > - reason = "kexec of image with unsupported crypto"; > - goto decide; > - case -ENOKEY: > - reason = "kexec of image with unavailable key"; > - decide: > if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG_FORCE)) { > - pr_notice("%s rejected\n", reason); > + pr_notice("Enforced kernel signature verification > failed (%d).\n", ret); > return ret; > } > > - /* If IMA is guaranteed to appraise a signature on the kexec > + /* > + * If IMA is guaranteed to appraise a signature on the kexec >* image, permit it even if the kernel is otherwise locked >* down. >*/ > @@ -216,17 +201,10 @@ kimage_validate_signature(struct kimage *image) > security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_KEXEC)) > return -EPERM; > > - return 0; > - > - /* All other errors are fatal, including nomem, unparseable > - * signatures and signature check failures - even if signatures > - * aren't required. > - */ > - default: > - pr_notice("kernel signature verification failed (%d).\n", ret); > + pr_debug("kernel signature verification failed (%d).\n", ret); > } > > - return ret; > + return 0; > } > #endif > > -- > 2.17.1 > Acked-by: Dave Young Thanks Dave ___ kexec mailing list kexec@lists.infradead.org http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/kexec
Re: [PATCH v2] kexec: Do not verify the signature without the lockdown or mandatory signature
On Tue, Jun 02, 2020 at 12:59:52PM +0800, Lianbo Jiang wrote: > So, here, let's simplify the logic to improve code readability. If the > KEXEC_SIG_FORCE enabled or kexec lockdown enabled, signature verification > is mandated. Otherwise, we lift the bar for any kernel image. > > Signed-off-by: Lianbo Jiang Reviewed-by: Jiri Bohac -- Jiri Bohac SUSE Labs, Prague, Czechia ___ kexec mailing list kexec@lists.infradead.org http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/kexec