http://www.haiti-liberte.com/archives/volume4-46/How%20Washington%20and%20Big%20Oil%20Fought%20PetroCaribe%20in%20Haiti.asp

  *New WikiLeaked Cables Reveal:
How Washington and Big Oil Fought PetroCaribe in Haiti*


[image: ...]René Préval, who passed Haiti’s presidential sash to Joseph
Michel Martelly on May 14, was described by U.S. Ambassador to Haiti Janet
Sanderson as “Haiti’s indispensable man” in a Jun. 1, 2009 Embassy cable
released by WikiLeaks last December.

Sanderson judged him “still moderately popular, and likely the only
politician capable of imposing his will on Haiti - if so inclined.*” At the
same time, “dealing with Préval is a challenge, occasionally frustrating and
sometimes rewarding,”* she continued. *“He is wary of change and suspicious
of outsiders, even those who seek his success.”*

Préval’s suspicions about “outsiders” seeking his “success” turned out to be
justified. In two rounds of presidential and legislative elections held in
November and March, Washington aggressively intervened, pushing out of the
presidential run-off Jude Célestin, the candidate of Préval’s party Inite
(Unity), to replace him with Martelly, a neo-Duvalierist konpa singer who
vocally supported the 1991 and 2004 coups d’état against former president
Jean-Bertrand Aristide.

Now the U.S. has even challenged the legislative races which would have
given Inite virtual control of the Parliament, and hence approval of the
President-designated Prime Minister, Haiti’s most powerful executive post.
With U.S. support, challenges were brought against Inite victories in 17
Deputy and two Senate races. The Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) ruled
in favor of only 15 challenges, leaving four seats with the original Inite
winners. The U.S. is not even letting this mild, partial impertinence go,
yanking the U.S. travel visas of six of the CEP’s eight members.

How did Haiti’s “indispensable man” become so dispensable? Why has
Washington so brazenly intervened in Haiti’s elections to limit the power of
Préval’s party and oust Inite’s presidential candidate from the run-off?

Clues to the answer lie in secret U.S. Embassy cables which the
transparency- advocacy group WikiLeaks has provided to Haïti Liberté. The
cables reveal that the U.S. was primarily irked by Préval’s dealings with
Cuba and Venezuela, where the former Haitian president was unable “to resist
displaying some show of independence or contrariness in dealing with
[Venezuelan president Hugo] Chavez,” as Sanderson griped in a 2007 cable.

U.S. dismay began when Préval signed – the very day of his inauguration – a
deal to join Venezuela’s PetroCaribe alliance, under which Haiti would buy
oil paying only 60% to Venezuela up front with the remainder payable over 25
years at 1% interest. The leaked U.S. Embassy cables provide a fascinating
look at how Washington sought to discourage, scuttle and sabotage the
PetroCaribe deal despite its unquestionable benefits, under which the
Haitian government “ would save USD 100 million per year from the delayed
payments,” as the Embassy itself recognized in a 2006 cable.

A review of PetroCaribe’s genesis and the Embassy’s response to it provides
a window into understanding why the U.S. has been so forceful in backing the
U.S.-centric Martelly team over Préval’s two-timing sector.

[image: ...]*Venezuelan Trial Balloon Shot Down*

Venezuela first offered a Petro- Caribe deal to Haiti under the de facto
government of Prime Minister Gérard Latortue, whom Washington installed in
March 2004 after the Feb. 29 coup against Aristide. *“The government of
Venezuela planned to send a negotiating team to Haiti (exact time
undetermined) to negotiate a deal to sell oil at a preferential rate via
PetroCaribe,” Embassy Chargé d’affaires Timothy Carney (the Charge) reported
in an Oct. 19, 2005 cable. “Upon returning from a recent trip to Venezuela,
Minister of Culture and Communication, Magali Comeau Denis told the Charge
she was bringing Venezuelan oil back to Haiti with her.”*

Prior to that trip, Carney “and Econ Counselor [his economic counselor] had
spoken to acting Prime Minister Henri Bazin who said that the Interim
Government of Haiti [IGOH] was looking for concessional terms for oil
purchases from Mexico and Nigeria --but not Venezuela, he was quick to
emphasize,” Carney continued. “In a follow-up conversation, Charge
reiterated the negatives of such a deal with Venezuela. Bazin listened and
understood the message,” that Washington would be unhappy about any oil deal
with Venezuela.

To drive the point home, “Econ Counselor met with a contact at the Finance
Ministry October 13 who confirmed that the IGOH has no plans to participate
in any PetroCaribe deal,” Carney explained. “He added that our message to
Bazin had an impact: Bazin had seen a draft of comments to be made by
Haiti’s representative to the IMF [International Monetary Fund] that
included a vague reference to someday purchasing oil at concessional prices
from Venezuela, and Bazin had the sentence deleted, the only change he made
on the text.” This was the kind of ultra-servile response Washington
expected from a puppet regime in Haiti.

*But Carney understood that Venezuela had not really expected to strike a
deal with Latortue’s de facto government. “We suspect that the recent
efforts by Venezuela here are designed more to get the issue on the agenda,
and that Chavez’s strongest efforts will come after the elections, when a
new Haitian government is inaugurated in February 2006,” Carney concluded.*

In a Nov. 7, 2005 cable, Carney noted that “the pressure is still on the
IGOH to strike a deal with Venezuela” as “organizations that have organized
demonstrations in the past against high prices in Haiti have publicly called
on the IGOH to accept Venezuela’s offer to negotiate on a concessional
deal.” However Bazin reassured the Embassy that “Haiti was far from any
agreement with Venezuela” and “instead discussions were ongoing with the
Government of Mexico to obtain a special deal from them on petroleum
imports.” (Dominican Foreign Minister Morales Troncoso told the DR’s U.S.
Ambassador and visiting Western Hemisphere Affairs Deputy Assistant
Secretary Patrick Duddy that “President Fox of Mexico was proposing a ‘Plan
Puebla Panama’ to counter Chavez’s ‘Petrocaribe’,” reported a Jan. 23, 2006
cable from the Santo Domingo Embassy.)

*As Préval Comes In, Troubles Emerge*

Haiti’s presidential election did not take place until Feb. 7, 2006, and it
was won by René Préval. Even before his May 14, 2006 inauguration, Préval
clearly was anxious to allay Washington’s worries that he might lean towards
its South American challengers. *“He wants to bury once and for all the
suspicion in Haiti that the United States is wary of him,” Ambassador
Sanderson, then newly appointed, reported in a Mar. 26, 2006 cable. “He is
seeking to enhance his status domestically and internationally with a
successful visit to the United States.” This was so important that “Préval
has declined invitations to visit France, Cuba, and Venezuela in order to
visit Washington first,” Sanderson approvingly noted.*

The new Haitian president went to great lengths to dispel the notion that he
had any political sympathies for Latin America’s socialist regimes. *“Préval
has close personal ties to Cuba, having received prostate cancer treatment
there, but has stressed to the Embassy that he will manage relations with
Cuba and Venezuela solely for the benefit of the Haitian people, and not
based on any ideological affinity toward those governments.”*

But in April, shortly after his Washington visit, Préval traveled to Havana;
the result confirmed Washington’s fears. *“President-elect Préval announced
to the press April 18 that Haiti will soon join Venezuelan President Hugo
Chavez’s energy initiative, PetroCaribe,” Sanderson reported in an April 19,
2006 cable. “Préval made the announcement after returning from a five-day
trip to Cuba, where he discussed the subject of Petrocaribe with the
Venezuelan Ambassador to Cuba.” But Sanderson made clear that the Embassy –
her “Post” – would not give up without a fight.*

*“Post will continue to pressure Préval against joining PetroCaribe,” she
wrote. “Ambassador will see Préval’s senior advisor Bob Manuel today. In
previous meetings, he has acknowledged our concerns and is aware that a deal
with Chavez would cause problems with us.”*

In a cable nine days later, Sanderson recognized that Préval was under
*“increasing
pressure to produce immediate and tangible changes in Haiti’s desperate
situation.” She also noted that “Préval has privately expressed some disdain
toward Chavez with Emboffs [Embassy officials], and delayed accepting
Chavez’ offer to visit Venezuela until after he had visited Washington and
several other key Haitian partners. Nevertheless, the chance to score
political points [with the Haitian people] and generate revenue he can
control himself proved too good an opportunity to miss.”*

Embassy cables always flag “independence” as this one decried Préval’s being
able to “generate revenue he can control himself .” Sanderson went on to
warn that Préval could “redirect the 40% that would have been spent on fuel
to ‘special presidential’ development projects” and “we are wary of the
creation of a special presidential fund.... We will encourage Préval to
channel the money through existing programs,” meaning those which the State
Department’s U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) had funded
and therefore controlled.

In April 2006 cable, we see Sanderson hint at an observation that she would
make almost a year later, that *“Préval and company may be overselling their
irritation toward Chavez for our benefit, but Préval has consistently voiced
wariness of Chavez in conversations with Emboffs going back to the early
stages of the presidential campaign in 2005.”*

On the surface, Préval feigned ignorance of the hemispheric conflict between
the U.S. and Venezuela. “One journalist asked Préval when he returned from
Caracas if there would be ‘*consequences’ for Haiti building links with
Venezuela, which Washington increasingly sees as a regional threat,” wrote
the weekly Haïti Progrés in May 2006. “‘The problems between the United
States and Venezuela are problems that those two countries have to resolve
themselves,’ Préval responded. ‘It does not affect Haiti in any way.’”*

This was patently untrue. In a May 15, 2006 cable reviewing the
nowinaugurated president, Sanderson noted that “despite U.S. discomfort with
his links to Cuba and Venezuela, Préval seems determined to mine those
relationships for what he can obtain.” This “pragmatism” would become the
essence of U.S. dissatisfaction with Préval.

*Big Oil Fights PetroCaribe in Haiti*

On May 14, 2006, immediately after his inauguration, Préval summoned the
press to a room in the Palace where he ostensibly signed the Petro- Caribe
agreement with Venezuelan Vice President Jose Vincente Rangel *(“Apparently,
the signing... at the inauguration on May 14 was ceremonial... and the first
shipment was a grant, not a part of the loan agreement,*” Sanderson wrote
later in an August cable.)

But it would be almost two years before PetroCaribe oil would begin flowing
into Haiti, due to a myriad of political and logistical obstacles. The first
hurdle was that Venezuela needed to give the petroleum to a state-owned oil
company, which Haiti doesn’t have. So it was proposed that the oil be given
to Electricité d’Haïti (EDH), the state-owned power company.

Michel Guerrier, the director of Haiti’s only domestic oil distribution
company, Dinasa or National (which is owned by Haiti’s richest man, Gilbert
Bigio), told the Embassy’s Economic Officer *“one possibility is that
PetroCaribe will sell the oil to Haiti’s National Electricity Company ...
which will then sell to the four oil companies operating in Haiti: Texaco,
Esso (a.k.a. Exxon), National (formally Shell), and [French-owned] Total,”
explains a May 12, 2006 cable. Guerrier also said that PetroCaribe “is a
great deal for the Haitian government” and “speculated that the government,
in order to retain total control over the supply of the oil market (they
already control the price), may put an end to the non- PetroCaribe
oil-bearing ship which arrives every three weeks.”*

Sanderson predictably opposed to the idea, calling EDH *“an inefficient and
corrupt public entity” while recognizing that “filtering oil through EDH
could ensure enough fuel to power the electricity plants, without relying on
the oil companies as a costly back-up plan.” Not surprisingly, all three
foreign oil companies also opposed the Haitian government’s plan. Sanderson
reported in a May 17, 2006 cable that “Dinasa, which supplies to Haiti’s
domestic oil company, National, is the only voice in the oil business to
endorse Préval’s proposal to have EDH control the oil supply. The other
international oil companies are increasingly concerned -- both Texaco and
Esso will meet with the Ambassador in the near future -- that they will have
to buy their oil from the GOH [Government of Haiti].” On behalf of the oil
companies and against the obvious benefits for Haiti, Sanderson said “we
will continue to raise our concerns about the Petro- Caribe deal with the
highest levels of government...”*

In a June 1 cable, Sanderson reported that “Haitians have noted... that
electricity in Port-au-Prince has improved since Préval’s inauguration with
6 to 8 hours a day, usually late at night until morning in residential
areas,” but the Embassy continued to oppose the Venezuelan oil delivery.

In a July 7 cable, she said that Dinasa President Edouard Baussan told her
that “the three international oil companies in Haiti feel uninformed about
Haiti’s PetroCaribe plan and are wary of how PetroCaribe will affect their
operations.” Baussan did not know that “separately, the Ambassador met with
representatives of ExxonMobil and Texaco [owned by Chevron],” as Sanderson
explained to Washington. *“Both companies were concerned and curious about
how Préval planned to implement Petro- Caribe.” Sanderson finished with some
wishful thinking: “PetroCaribe seems stalled indefinitely, and it is
possible that Haiti will not move forward with the agreement. The first and
so far only ship, which was a minor victory for Venezuela’s Caribbean
campaign and a tangible sign from Préval to his constituents that he will
bring change, may mark both the beginning and the end of PetroCaribe in
Haiti.”*

*Venezuelan Oil Starts to Flow*

However, it was not to be the end, as the Embassy was to quickly learn.
Three weeks later, on July 28, Sanderson had to write that “the Petro-
Caribe petroleum ... has finally hit the local market. The Haitian
Government (GOH) is selling the entire shipment, including the diesel
(initially intended

*Continue in page(12)  (please go to our electronic edition and navigate to
page 12)*


[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]



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