Re: [Leaf-devel] ES3 suggestion

2001-06-03 Thread Charles Steinkuehler

> 1.  First, when it refreshes, I'm not sure that
> it flushes the rules *and* the portfw's/autofw's.
> I could be wrong here, but I think it only flushes
> the ipchains rules and doesn't touch what was
> previously setup with ipmasqadm.

I'll check this.

> 2.  Given the increased popularity of ISPs giving out
> RFC-1918 private addresses with DHCP and then static
> NAT'ing them, I think part of the firewall setup which
> blocks the RFC-1918 address specifically should be
> dropped.

While I still think the private IP's should be blocked by default, there
should be an easy way to disable a particular range, and documentation on
the fact that this might be required.  I'll add a way to do this in the new
firewall scripts.

> 3.  Many of the trojan's I've read about use blind-attacks
> where a response from the target isn't needed. So the
> attacker can spoof the return IP address, and they
> often choose from the reserve-address range (and use
> the "eleet" port of 31337). Anyhow. as per CIAC alert
> K-032, I think the following reserved address traffic
> should be blocked explicitly:
>
> $IPCHAINS -A input -i $IF_EXT -b -s 0.0.0.0/8 -j DENY
> $IPCHAINS -A input -i $IF_EXT -b -s 224.0.0.0/4 -j DENY
> $IPCHAINS -A input -i $IF_EXT -b -s 240.0.0.0/5 -j DENY

The above IP's are already blocked...

> $IPCHAINS -A input -i $IF_EXT -b -s 169.254.0.0/16 -j DENY
> $IPCHAINS -A input -i $IF_EXT -b -s 192.0.2.0/24 -j DENY
> $IPCHAINS -A input -i $IF_EXT -b -s 248.0.0.0/5 -j DENY

I'll check into blocking these IP's as well...

> 4.  Lastly, at the end of the setup script, some "noise
> blocker" rules should be stuck in. This helps eliminate
> log file buildup (and the risk of resulting tooth
> decay...). Since they're at the very end, they not
> interfering with normal op's that would have been setup
> earlier.
>
> $IPCHAINS -A input -i $IF_EXT -d 0.0.0.0/0 137 -p tcp -j DENY
> $IPCHAINS -A input -i $IF_EXT -d 0.0.0.0/0 137 -p udp -j DENY
> $IPCHAINS -A input -i $IF_EXT -d 0.0.0.0/0 138 -p tcp -j DENY
> $IPCHAINS -A input -i $IF_EXT -d 0.0.0.0/0 138 -p udp -j DENY
> $IPCHAINS -A input -i $IF_EXT -d 0.0.0.0/0 67 -p udp -j DENY

The above are already blocked w/o logging (along with a few more netbios
ports: 135 & 139)...

> $IPCHAINS -A input -i $IF_EXT -d 0.0.0.0/0 68 -p udp -j DENY
> $IPCHAINS -A input -i $IF_EXT -d 255.255.255.255 -j DENY

Again, I'll look into blocking these IP's as well...

> That's it. Please let me know what you think. Of
> course, I'd be willing to do the dirty work of editing the
> scripts and tar'ing them up for the inclusion in the new
> release. Just wanted to be sure the above has enough perceived
> value.

I need to fold my extended V1.0 & V1.1 functionality together with my latest
proxy-arp DMZ scripts, so I can make the mods, but pointers to any RFC's or
other docs that refer to the new subnet ranges you think should be blocked
would be helpful...

Charles Steinkuehler
http://lrp.steinkuehler.net
http://c0wz.steinkuehler.net (lrp.c0wz.com mirror)


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[Leaf-devel] ES3 suggestion

2001-06-02 Thread Scott C. Best

Charles:

Heya. Since you suggested some enhancements to ES3
before it's released, I wanted to suggest some of my own.
Little things, in specific regard to the firewall setup
scripts. My intent is to eliminate some of the FAQ support
questions that come up on the list.

1.  First, when it refreshes, I'm not sure that
it flushes the rules *and* the portfw's/autofw's.
I could be wrong here, but I think it only flushes
the ipchains rules and doesn't touch what was
previously setup with ipmasqadm.

2.  Given the increased popularity of ISPs giving out
RFC-1918 private addresses with DHCP and then static
NAT'ing them, I think part of the firewall setup which
blocks the RFC-1918 address specifically should be 
dropped.

3.  Many of the trojan's I've read about use blind-attacks
where a response from the target isn't needed. So the
attacker can spoof the return IP address, and they
often choose from the reserve-address range (and use
the "eleet" port of 31337). Anyhow. as per CIAC alert
K-032, I think the following reserved address traffic
should be blocked explicitly:

$IPCHAINS -A input -i $IF_EXT -b -s 0.0.0.0/8 -j DENY
$IPCHAINS -A input -i $IF_EXT -b -s 169.254.0.0/16 -j DENY
$IPCHAINS -A input -i $IF_EXT -b -s 192.0.2.0/24 -j DENY
$IPCHAINS -A input -i $IF_EXT -b -s 224.0.0.0/4 -j DENY
$IPCHAINS -A input -i $IF_EXT -b -s 240.0.0.0/5 -j DENY
$IPCHAINS -A input -i $IF_EXT -b -s 248.0.0.0/5 -j DENY

4.  Lastly, at the end of the setup script, some "noise
blocker" rules should be stuck in. This helps eliminate
log file buildup (and the risk of resulting tooth 
decay...). Since they're at the very end, they not 
interfering with normal op's that would have been setup 
earlier.

$IPCHAINS -A input -i $IF_EXT -d 255.255.255.255 -j DENY
$IPCHAINS -A input -i $IF_EXT -d 0.0.0.0/0 137 -p tcp -j DENY
$IPCHAINS -A input -i $IF_EXT -d 0.0.0.0/0 137 -p udp -j DENY
$IPCHAINS -A input -i $IF_EXT -d 0.0.0.0/0 138 -p tcp -j DENY
$IPCHAINS -A input -i $IF_EXT -d 0.0.0.0/0 138 -p udp -j DENY
$IPCHAINS -A input -i $IF_EXT -d 0.0.0.0/0 67 -p udp -j DENY
$IPCHAINS -A input -i $IF_EXT -d 0.0.0.0/0 68 -p udp -j DENY


That's it. Please let me know what you think. Of 
course, I'd be willing to do the dirty work of editing the 
scripts and tar'ing them up for the inclusion in the new 
release. Just wanted to be sure the above has enough perceived
value.

cheers,
Scott


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