[liberationtech] Scramble.io, Round Two
Hi all, Just arrived in Seoul! I'm travelling this week, sorry for the delayed replies. Thanks for all the feedback. I'll try to answer all in one email: From: h0ost h...@mailoo.org Hi DC, Thanks for sharing this project. I'd like to install it on a server and play with it, but can't find an install doc. https://github.com/dcposch/scramble/blob/master/doc/how.md references a Quick Start, but I can't seem to find it. I'm sure I'm overlooking something, but thought I'd check first. Thanks. Host I hadn't published the Quick Start yet. My mistake. I'll try to correct that today, and I'll send out the URL. From: The Doctor dr...@virtadpt.net To: liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu [...] scramble.io does not play nicely with the Tor Browser Bundle: [...] Problematic. You're right. Unfortunately, this is tricky to fix! It's critical to security that the PGP key pair be generated on the client, and the server never sees the (plain) private key. To generate a key pair on the client, you need a secure random number generator. This is a new JS API that doesn't exist in older browsers, including the Tor Brower Bundle's version of Firefox :( So Scramble over Tor won't be solved until one of two things happens: * The Tor Browser Bundle upgrades to a more recent Firefox * Someone makes an easy-to-use Chromium+Tor bundle From: Griffin Boyce griffinbo...@gmail.com [...] It should give an option to continue anyway, tbh. See above---can't generate the key pair. Maybe I'll simply remove the Generate Account button on older browsers. When the secure RNG API is missing, you *could* log into an existing account, but can't create a new one. That feels a bit dirty, though. From: Nicolai nicolai-liberationt...@chocolatine.org Cool idea. This is also similar to CurveCP and DNSCurve. [...] But I think you meant to say the Base32 encoding of one's public key, not the hash, right? Nicolai Same format as Onion URLs: Base32 encoding of the first 80 bits of SHA1(PubKey) From: Tom Ritter t...@ritter.vg [...] I feel compelled to point out the precedence here. This is a problem known as Zooko's Triangle https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zooko's_triangle Yes! Out of security, decentralization, and short names, you can only pick two. So HTTPS gives you security and short names (eg paypal.com), at the cost of placing trust in a centralized system (the CAs). Scramble, SSH fingerprints, Onion URLs, and others make the opposite tradeoff: security+decentralization, but now your identifiers are hashes. I think the consistent lesson of Prism, Lavabit, Freedom Hosting, etc is that anything centralized is inherently vulnerable. Hence the choice. From: Ali-Reza Anghaie a...@packetknife.com To: liberationtech liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu [...] I'm conceptually really curious about various aspects but before I forget - this time - I'd like to ask two broader questions first: - Is this in any way an officially backed project in any way? Part of a thesis or what-not lets say? Nope. So far, this is just my weekend project over the past four or five weekends :) Several friends have helped me refine the ideas. So far I've written all the code. Hopefully that will change soon! https://github.com/dcposch/scramble From: Michael Rogers mich...@briarproject.org Hi DC, Thanks for the reply. Responses to your responses inline. ;-) [...] 80 bits may not be enough to defend against a well-funded adversary these days - that's one aspect of the Tor hidden services design that needs some love. https://blog.torproject.org/blog/hidden-services-need-some-love Interesting! I'll read about it more carefully. (Note that in the entire history of Bitcoin, the smallest hash a miner has found starts with less than 80 zero bits. So impersonating an Onion URL or Scramble address would take roughly more than the *total* computation done by all Bitcoin miners to date. I think this is quite good.) [...] What block cipher mode of operation do you use? If the mode of operation requires padding, what padding scheme do you use? Do you authenticate the ciphertext? If so, what MAC function do you use, and how do you derive the MAC key? OpenPGP.js defaults. I'll give you a better answer soon. (Re: authenticating the ciphertext: not yet, but I should. Messages and bodies are currently PGP RSA-encrypted messages, but not signed. When I fix that, sending mail will both encrypt and sign by default.) I just made a Github Issue for it so that we can have a permanent place for important details like that, better than the mailing list. https://github.com/dcposch/scramble/issues/13 Thanks again! I'm an engineer, not a cryptographer. Pointing out what I overlooked is very helpful for me. ... and finally, one message from a related thread: From: StealthMonger stealthmon...@nym.mixmin.net To: liberationtech liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu Subject: Re: [liberationtech] Why_can't_email_be_secure [...] All the problems
Re: [liberationtech] Announcing Scramble.io
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 On 08/23/2013 06:22 PM, Tom Ritter wrote: $ dig ns chocolatine.org +short uz5qry75vfy162c239jgx7v2knkwb01g3d04qd4379s6mtcx2f0828.ns.chocolatine.org. uz5cjwzs6zndm3gtcgzt1j74d0jrjnkm15wv681w6np9t1wy8s91g3.ns.chocolatine.org. I feel compelled to point out the precedence here. This is a problem known as Zooko's Triangle: ... This was a problem (sort of) early in the days of instant messaging, when IM handles tended away from memorability as they grew in popularity. Letting users set local aliases for IM buddies helped with that. Automatic addition to a local address book + buddy aliasing seems like a potential solution. - -- The Doctor [412/724/301/703] [ZS] Developer, Project Byzantium: http://project-byzantium.org/ PGP: 0x807B17C1 / 7960 1CDC 85C9 0B63 8D9F DD89 3BD8 FF2B 807B 17C1 WWW: https://drwho.virtadpt.net/ What the hell has happened here? --Peter Watts -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: GnuPG v2.0.20 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Thunderbird - http://www.enigmail.net/ iEYEARECAAYFAlIczygACgkQO9j/K4B7F8GqKgCfRzcqZlknBGz6mmqepNfyZEf3 YlwAoNbl82GJbCUzltzwATlii9pF332R =aC+/ -END PGP SIGNATURE- -- Liberationtech is a public list whose archives are searchable on Google. Violations of list guidelines will get you moderated: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech. Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu.
Re: [liberationtech] BitMessage crackdown
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 On 08/23/2013 06:55 PM, Randolph D. wrote: http://www.chronicles.no/2013/08/bitmessage-crackdown.html In other words, one person ran a phishing expedition against BitMessage users. - -- The Doctor [412/724/301/703] [ZS] Developer, Project Byzantium: http://project-byzantium.org/ PGP: 0x807B17C1 / 7960 1CDC 85C9 0B63 8D9F DD89 3BD8 FF2B 807B 17C1 WWW: https://drwho.virtadpt.net/ What the hell has happened here? --Peter Watts -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: GnuPG v2.0.20 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Thunderbird - http://www.enigmail.net/ iEYEARECAAYFAlIcz40ACgkQO9j/K4B7F8HHrgCeOWNnlUTloJanhjvYO3PYmesx HUoAoLKF7pnQDZ/ZiEfGsbBmrjcFJ+Zu =PQ14 -END PGP SIGNATURE- -- Liberationtech is a public list whose archives are searchable on Google. Violations of list guidelines will get you moderated: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech. Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu.
[liberationtech] SMS questions
I have colleagues living in a small country, far, far away with a history of rigged elections who want to put in place a system for collecting information using SMS. The local government keeps shutting down the systems that they put in place. I think I understand their needs and wants. SMS is really not my strong point. If anyone with an understanding of SMS, SMS web interfaces, and/or related security issues would be willing to point me in the right direction (or discuss potential issues) I (and by extension they) would be grateful. The alternative is for me to dedicate my excess cycles to researching those issues from scratch, which sounds time consuming. They kind of need help in the near future. -Richard -- Liberationtech is a public list whose archives are searchable on Google. Violations of list guidelines will get you moderated: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech. Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu.
Re: [liberationtech] SMS questions
How about a customized version of Mobile Martus? Best, Eric OpenPGP: 0x1AF7E6F2 ● Skype: oneota ● XMPP/OTR: bere...@jabber.ccc.de ● Silent Circle: +1 312 614-0159 -Original Message- From: liberationtech-boun...@lists.stanford.edu [mailto:liberationtech- boun...@lists.stanford.edu] On Behalf Of Richard Brooks Sent: Tuesday, August 27, 2013 09.36 To: liberationtech Subject: [liberationtech] SMS questions I have colleagues living in a small country, far, far away with a history of rigged elections who want to put in place a system for collecting information using SMS. The local government keeps shutting down the systems that they put in place. I think I understand their needs and wants. SMS is really not my strong point. If anyone with an understanding of SMS, SMS web interfaces, and/or related security issues would be willing to point me in the right direction (or discuss potential issues) I (and by extension they) would be grateful. The alternative is for me to dedicate my excess cycles to researching those issues from scratch, which sounds time consuming. They kind of need help in the near future. -- Liberationtech is a public list whose archives are searchable on Google. Violations of list guidelines will get you moderated: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech. Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu.
Re: [liberationtech] SMS questions
Hi Richard, Depending on the information your colleagues want to collect, and depending on how onerous the control of the telco system is, FrontLine SMS might be useful. http://www.frontlinesms.com/ http://www.frontlinesms.com/technologies/frontlinesms-overview/ Hope it helps, Bernard On 27 Aug 2013, at 17:36, Richard Brooks r...@acm.org wrote: I have colleagues living in a small country, far, far away with a history of rigged elections who want to put in place a system for collecting information using SMS. The local government keeps shutting down the systems that they put in place. I think I understand their needs and wants. SMS is really not my strong point. If anyone with an understanding of SMS, SMS web interfaces, and/or related security issues would be willing to point me in the right direction (or discuss potential issues) I (and by extension they) would be grateful. The alternative is for me to dedicate my excess cycles to researching those issues from scratch, which sounds time consuming. They kind of need help in the near future. -Richard -- Liberationtech is a public list whose archives are searchable on Google. Violations of list guidelines will get you moderated: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech. Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu. -- Bernard / bluboxthief / ei8fdb IO91XM / www.ei8fdb.org -- Liberationtech is a public list whose archives are searchable on Google. Violations of list guidelines will get you moderated: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech. Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu.
Re: [liberationtech] SMS questions
On 2013-08-27 11:36, Richard Brooks wrote: I think I understand their needs and wants. SMS is really not my strong point. If anyone with an understanding of SMS, SMS web interfaces, and/or related security issues would be willing to point me in the right direction (or discuss potential issues) I (and by extension they) would be grateful. You might want to also post this question to the TechSoup forum, either the Mobile and Wireless branch: http://forums.techsoup.org/cs/community/f/13.aspx Or the security branch: http://forums.techsoup.org/cs/community/f/29.aspx Just another way, potentially, of getting someone to help with this. -- Ms. Jayne Cravens MSc Portland, Oregon, USA The web site - http://www.coyotecommunications.com The email - j...@coyotecommunications.com Me on Twitter, other social networks, my blog: http://www.coyotecommunications.com/me/jayneonline.shtml -- Liberationtech is a public list whose archives are searchable on Google. Violations of list guidelines will get you moderated: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech. Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu.
Re: [liberationtech] SMS questions
The problem of SMS or any technology that requires phone numbers is that it is quite easy for a government to shut it down. In small countries far away they just have to ask the operator to disconnect you. You can use numbers in another country (international SMS), but then it becomes too expensive for the users. If you can solve the numbers problem, you can either install your own platform to manage e-mails (such as open source FrontLine or Kannel) or cooperate with an organization such as the NGO Instedd, which operates SMS services that directly solve your problems. There are a number of SMS services for human rights operating in Kenya and Tanzania. https://spidercenter.org/newsroom/article/ict4democracy-east-africa-network Javier On 8/27/13 11:36 PM, Richard Brooks wrote: I have colleagues living in a small country, far, far away with a history of rigged elections who want to put in place a system for collecting information using SMS. The local government keeps shutting down the systems that they put in place. I think I understand their needs and wants. SMS is really not my strong point. If anyone with an understanding of SMS, SMS web interfaces, and/or related security issues would be willing to point me in the right direction (or discuss potential issues) I (and by extension they) would be grateful. The alternative is for me to dedicate my excess cycles to researching those issues from scratch, which sounds time consuming. They kind of need help in the near future. -Richard -- Liberationtech is a public list whose archives are searchable on Google. Violations of list guidelines will get you moderated: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech. Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu.
Re: [liberationtech] SMS questions
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 On 08/27/2013 07:29 PM, Bernard Tyers - ei8fdb wrote: [ei8fde de oe3emb. will contaqt you offlist for a sked on HF. Consulted qrz.com HI] Depending on the information your colleagues want to collect, and depending on how onerous the control of the telco system is, FrontLine SMS might be useful. http://www.frontlinesms.com/ http://www.frontlinesms.com/technologies/frontlinesms-overview/ If it is such and such a government far away one can only strongly recommend _not to use SMS for any such purposes_ . SMS is service number one controlled by all local authorities. SMS are relayed via the telco SS7 [not a protocol but a signalling system ;] bulk data stream. You can log them at the local telco switching system easily even without the use of a monitoring centre. But there are all monitoring centers built into the telco premises even in remote places such as Mongolia or South Sudan. Astonishingly prominent delegations sent by these governments were spotted at the ISS surveillance equipment trade shows lately. In 2009 the Iranian protesters were fished off the streets one after another. Many of them had used twitter apps via sms-gateways from their mobiles. These SMS were read in at by the even before they When the Tehran clericofascist secret police could not cope with the new accounts any more they would block twitter. Three days later they would go for an other fishing trip opening up their firewall for twitter again. They did this three times in a row until the prisons were overcrowded. The twitter app was a trap as it ran over SMS. Below are some recommendations to Gezi park activists sent by a very distant 2/3 grade cousin of mine. The recommendations were adapted twice according to feedback. Interestingly there were only very few reports [compared to other regions] on net surveillance based arrests. That coincided with Squire Snowden's gallant information operations on Mediterranean fiber optic cables Servus Erich M. postscrypt: oe3emb now qsy 40m - -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 SECURITY BULLETIN 0.2 for the .TR DOMAIN 2013 06 18 Barev, This version overrules 0.1. It is adaptated roughly to the current situation estimate from here. Not for publication in the WWW-sphere but for informal circulation. 1. Please do recheck all your *mobile apps*. Some of these operate via SMS, never use one of these for tweeting live. The Sultanat owned machines have read it in before your message is published on Twitter. 2. Please do check the sanitary situation of all your computers. Do not fully trust the security of any, but check out the least suspectful machine. Best case would be a machine running a freshly installed operating system in a somewhat shielded network enviroment. This machine should be used only for sensitive information. 3. The Sultanat forces are after your machines to infiltrate these with trojan horses and other malware. They do this preferrably to people who they deem leaders. Beware of e-mail attachments seemingly coming from a friend, the attached doqument will bear a title that is designed to trigger your current interest. 4. Make sure that you have separated all sensitive communication channels from general and public messages. Classify your communications into two or three security levels, as you deem appropriate. Avoid crisscrossing these levels, so fewer people can unwittingly endanger your coordination. 5. Example: Level 1 could be family and best friends, all strictly personal. Level 2 is more or less public, for informing people. Write everything that is not mission critical there and does not compromise anybody directly. Level 3 is for sensitive issues that are critical to your cause. So the levels here are private, [semi]-public and sensitive. Choose any similar model that fits you best. 6. The three levels of communications or so are an abstract, not necessarily identical with a communications channel. This is an e-mail account, a mobile fone account. Apply these three levels of security to the internet communications channels you already use [diverse email accounts, Facebook, other chatrooms, chat clients, closed fora and so on]. Do not change your electronic communication habits abruptely. Try only to become less visible, try to fade out of their focus on the internet spots known to the Sultanat. 7. Prepare an emergency SMS code with a set of five or so short coded messages, known to the adressees. Hate to write this: arrested, hospitalized, you name it. This a last ressort communication means. Will still be available when internet traffic does not work. 8. On the mobile fone/internet level consider which of the available mobile providers shows least affiliation to the Sultanat. Decide how to distribute your communication onto these networks. Do not trust any of them, of course. Again: Do not mix up communication levels, keep these separate. If some points made here are already known
