[liberationtech] Bruce Schneier on the good, old air gap
http://www.wired.com/opinion/2013/10/149481/ Want to Evade NSA Spying? Don’t Connect to the Internet BY BRUCE SCHNEIER 10.07.13 6:30 AM Photo: Ariel Zambelich / WIRED; Illustration: Ross Patton / WIRED Since I started working with Snowden’s documents, I have been using a number of tools to try to stay secure from the NSA. The advice I shared included using Tor, preferring certain cryptography over others, and using public-domain encryption wherever possible. I also recommended using an air gap, which physically isolates a computer or local network of computers from the internet. (The name comes from the literal gap of air between the computer and the internet; the word predates wireless networks.) But this is more complicated than it sounds, and requires explanation. Since we know that computers connected to the internet are vulnerable to outside hacking, an air gap should protect against those attacks. There are a lot of systems that use — or should use — air gaps: classified military networks, nuclear power plant controls, medical equipment, avionics, and so on. Osama Bin Laden used one. I hope human rights organizations in repressive countries are doing the same. Air gaps might be conceptually simple, but they’re hard to maintain in practice. The truth is that nobody wants a computer that never receives files from the internet and never sends files out into the internet. What they want is a computer that’s not directly connected to the internet, albeit with some secure way of moving files on and off. But every time a file moves back or forth, there’s the potential for attack. And air gaps have been breached. Stuxnet was a U.S. and Israeli military-grade piece of malware that attacked the Natanz nuclear plant in Iran. It successfully jumped the air gap and penetrated the Natanz network. Another piece of malware named agent.btz, probably Chinese in origin, successfully jumped the air gap protecting U.S. military networks. These attacks work by exploiting security vulnerabilities in the removable media used to transfer files on and off the air gapped computers. Bruce Schneier is a security technologist and author. His latest book is Liars and Outliers: Enabling the Trust Society Needs to Survive. Since working with Snowden’s NSA files, I have tried to maintain a single air-gapped computer. It turned out to be harder than I expected, and I have ten rules for anyone trying to do the same: 1. When you set up your computer, connect it to the internet as little as possible. It’s impossible to completely avoid connecting the computer to the internet, but try to configure it all at once and as anonymously as possible. I purchased my computer off-the-shelf in a big box store, then went to a friend’s network and downloaded everything I needed in a single session. (The ultra-paranoid way to do this is to buy two identical computers, configure one using the above method, upload the results to a cloud-based anti-virus checker, and transfer the results of that to the air gap machine using a one-way process.) 2. Install the minimum software set you need to do your job, and disable all operating system services that you won’t need. The less software you install, the less an attacker has available to exploit. I downloaded and installed OpenOffice, a PDF reader, a text editor, TrueCrypt, and BleachBit. That’s all. (No, I don’t have any inside knowledge about TrueCrypt, and there’s a lot about it that makes me suspicious. But for Windows full-disk encryption it’s that, Microsoft’s BitLocker, or Symantec’s PGPDisk — and I am more worried about large U.S. corporations being pressured by the NSA than I am about TrueCrypt.) 3. Once you have your computer configured, never directly connect it to the internet again. Consider physically disabling the wireless capability, so it doesn’t get turned on by accident. 4. If you need to install new software, download it anonymously from a random network, put it on some removable media, and then manually transfer it to the air gapped computer. This is by no means perfect, but it’s an attempt to make it harder for the attacker to target your computer. 5. Turn off all auto-run features. This should be standard practice for all the computers you own, but it’s especially important for an air-gapped computer. Agent.btz used autorun to infect U.S. military computers. 6. Minimize the amount of executable code you move onto the air-gapped computer. Text files are best. Microsoft Office files and PDFs are more dangerous, since they might have embedded macros. Turn off all macro capabilities you can on the air-gapped computer. Don’t worry too much about patching your system; in general, the risk of the executable code is worse than the risk of not having your patches up to date. You’re not on the internet, after all. 7. Only use trusted media to move files on and off air-gapped computers. A USB stick you purchase from a store is safer than one given to you by someone you don’t
Re: [liberationtech] Bruce Schneier on the good, old air gap
On Mon, Oct 7, 2013 at 5:16 PM, Eugen Leitl eu...@leitl.org wrote: http://www.wired.com/opinion/2013/10/149481/ Want to Evade NSA Spying? Don’t Connect to the Internet BY BRUCE SCHNEIER 10.07.13 6:30 AM Photo: Ariel Zambelich / WIRED; Illustration: Ross Patton / WIRED Since I started working with Snowden’s documents, I have been using a number of tools to try to stay secure from the NSA. The advice I shared included using Tor, preferring certain cryptography over others, and using public-domain encryption wherever possible. I also recommended using an air gap, which physically isolates a computer or local network of computers from the internet. (The name comes from the literal gap of air between the computer and the internet; the word predates wireless networks.) But this is more complicated than it sounds, and requires explanation. Since we know that computers connected to the internet are vulnerable to outside hacking, an air gap should protect against those attacks. There are a lot of systems that use — or should use — air gaps: classified military networks, nuclear power plant controls, medical equipment, avionics, and so on. Osama Bin Laden used one. I hope human rights organizations in repressive countries are doing the same. Air gaps might be conceptually simple, but they’re hard to maintain in practice. The truth is that nobody wants a computer that never receives files from the internet and never sends files out into the internet. What they want is a computer that’s not directly connected to the internet, albeit with some secure way of moving files on and off. But every time a file moves back or forth, there’s the potential for attack. And air gaps have been breached. Stuxnet was a U.S. and Israeli military-grade piece of malware that attacked the Natanz nuclear plant in Iran. It successfully jumped the air gap and penetrated the Natanz network. Another piece of malware named agent.btz, probably Chinese in origin, successfully jumped the air gap protecting U.S. military networks. These attacks work by exploiting security vulnerabilities in the removable media used to transfer files on and off the air gapped computers. Bruce Schneier is a security technologist and author. His latest book is Liars and Outliers: Enabling the Trust Society Needs to Survive. Since working with Snowden’s NSA files, I have tried to maintain a single air-gapped computer. It turned out to be harder than I expected, and I have ten rules for anyone trying to do the same: 1. When you set up your computer, connect it to the internet as little as possible. It’s impossible to completely avoid connecting the computer to the internet, but try to configure it all at once and as anonymously as possible. I purchased my computer off-the-shelf in a big box store, then went to a friend’s network and downloaded everything I needed in a single session. (The ultra-paranoid way to do this is to buy two identical computers, configure one using the above method, upload the results to a cloud-based anti-virus checker, and transfer the results of that to the air gap machine using a one-way process.) 2. Install the minimum software set you need to do your job, and disable all operating system services that you won’t need. The less software you install, the less an attacker has available to exploit. I downloaded and installed OpenOffice, a PDF reader, a text editor, TrueCrypt, and BleachBit. That’s all. (No, I don’t have any inside knowledge about TrueCrypt, and there’s a lot about it that makes me suspicious. But for Windows full-disk encryption it’s that, Microsoft’s BitLocker, or Symantec’s PGPDisk — and I am more worried about large U.S. corporations being pressured by the NSA than I am about TrueCrypt.) 3. Once you have your computer configured, never directly connect it to the internet again. Consider physically disabling the wireless capability, so it doesn’t get turned on by accident. 4. If you need to install new software, download it anonymously from a random network, put it on some removable media, and then manually transfer it to the air gapped computer. This is by no means perfect, but it’s an attempt to make it harder for the attacker to target your computer. 5. Turn off all auto-run features. This should be standard practice for all the computers you own, but it’s especially important for an air-gapped computer. Agent.btz used autorun to infect U.S. military computers. 6. Minimize the amount of executable code you move onto the air-gapped computer. Text files are best. Microsoft Office files and PDFs are more dangerous, since they might have embedded macros. Turn off all macro capabilities you can on the air-gapped computer. Don’t worry too much about patching your system; in general, the risk of the executable code is worse than the risk of not having your patches up to date. You’re not on the internet, after all. 7.
Re: [liberationtech] Bruce Schneier on the good, old air gap
Perhaps not every device, but maybe just one device you use for reading encrypted mail and the like. It could be a Raspberry Pi you carry in a knapsack, or something. n On Oct 7, 2013, at 12:14, yersinia yersinia.spi...@gmail.com wrote: On Mon, Oct 7, 2013 at 5:16 PM, Eugen Leitl eu...@leitl.org wrote: http://www.wired.com/opinion/2013/10/149481/ Want to Evade NSA Spying? Don’t Connect to the Internet BY BRUCE SCHNEIER 10.07.13 6:30 AM Photo: Ariel Zambelich / WIRED; Illustration: Ross Patton / WIRED Since I started working with Snowden’s documents, I have been using a number of tools to try to stay secure from the NSA. The advice I shared included using Tor, preferring certain cryptography over others, and using public-domain encryption wherever possible. I also recommended using an air gap, which physically isolates a computer or local network of computers from the internet. (The name comes from the literal gap of air between the computer and the internet; the word predates wireless networks.) But this is more complicated than it sounds, and requires explanation. Since we know that computers connected to the internet are vulnerable to outside hacking, an air gap should protect against those attacks. There are a lot of systems that use — or should use — air gaps: classified military networks, nuclear power plant controls, medical equipment, avionics, and so on. Osama Bin Laden used one. I hope human rights organizations in repressive countries are doing the same. Air gaps might be conceptually simple, but they’re hard to maintain in practice. The truth is that nobody wants a computer that never receives files from the internet and never sends files out into the internet. What they want is a computer that’s not directly connected to the internet, albeit with some secure way of moving files on and off. But every time a file moves back or forth, there’s the potential for attack. And air gaps have been breached. Stuxnet was a U.S. and Israeli military-grade piece of malware that attacked the Natanz nuclear plant in Iran. It successfully jumped the air gap and penetrated the Natanz network. Another piece of malware named agent.btz, probably Chinese in origin, successfully jumped the air gap protecting U.S. military networks. These attacks work by exploiting security vulnerabilities in the removable media used to transfer files on and off the air gapped computers. Bruce Schneier is a security technologist and author. His latest book is Liars and Outliers: Enabling the Trust Society Needs to Survive. Since working with Snowden’s NSA files, I have tried to maintain a single air-gapped computer. It turned out to be harder than I expected, and I have ten rules for anyone trying to do the same: 1. When you set up your computer, connect it to the internet as little as possible. It’s impossible to completely avoid connecting the computer to the internet, but try to configure it all at once and as anonymously as possible. I purchased my computer off-the-shelf in a big box store, then went to a friend’s network and downloaded everything I needed in a single session. (The ultra-paranoid way to do this is to buy two identical computers, configure one using the above method, upload the results to a cloud-based anti-virus checker, and transfer the results of that to the air gap machine using a one-way process.) 2. Install the minimum software set you need to do your job, and disable all operating system services that you won’t need. The less software you install, the less an attacker has available to exploit. I downloaded and installed OpenOffice, a PDF reader, a text editor, TrueCrypt, and BleachBit. That’s all. (No, I don’t have any inside knowledge about TrueCrypt, and there’s a lot about it that makes me suspicious. But for Windows full-disk encryption it’s that, Microsoft’s BitLocker, or Symantec’s PGPDisk — and I am more worried about large U.S. corporations being pressured by the NSA than I am about TrueCrypt.) 3. Once you have your computer configured, never directly connect it to the internet again. Consider physically disabling the wireless capability, so it doesn’t get turned on by accident. 4. If you need to install new software, download it anonymously from a random network, put it on some removable media, and then manually transfer it to the air gapped computer. This is by no means perfect, but it’s an attempt to make it harder for the attacker to target your computer. 5. Turn off all auto-run features. This should be standard practice for all the computers you own, but it’s especially important for an air-gapped computer. Agent.btz used autorun to infect U.S. military computers. 6. Minimize the amount of executable code you move onto the air-gapped computer. Text files are best. Microsoft Office files and PDFs are more dangerous, since they might have embedded macros. Turn off all macro
Re: [liberationtech] Bruce Schneier on the good, old air gap
On Mon, Oct 07, 2013 at 09:14:35PM +0200, yersinia wrote: I like Bruce much, i have read all of him, every book, mostly article, from years. But no normal person would follow these advice, all smartphones That advice is not exactly targeted towards Jane Doe. should be turned off, each tablet, and every pc should be turned in a Some people don't have mobile phones. Others leave them at home, or remove the power pack when it matters. anonyomous client of an anonymous network. Sure, who believe in the No. You just need to buy an offline machine, e.g. a used notebook. Separation by air gap was SOP in the intelligence community before virtualization allowed to separate trust compartments in one machine. I trust air gap much more than hypervisors. paranoiamodel definitely find comfort in these indications, for example i am one. But those who follow this model, really, are following it also not in only the cyberspace, but also in the real life, every day ? Really? Internet is I don't understand the problem. Bruce gave good basic opsec advice, what's the problem with following it up in practice but to tamper-proof against evil maid attacks? perhaps evil but perhaps also our world is not so a sane and secure place, sometime (or every time, depend). -- Liberationtech is public archives are searchable on Google. Violations of list guidelines will get you moderated: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech. Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu.
