Re: [liberationtech] the Blackberry and Surveillance?

2013-06-12 Thread michael gurstein
I haven`t been watching that closely but in the course of my following the
current discussions on surveillance I have yet to see a reference to
RIM/Blackberry... 

Is this because it`s recent loss of market share means it isn`t of
particular interest (I would have thought the up to recent user demographics
would rather make it of particular interest), because of some features which
put it outside of the current surveillance stream, have I missed it in the
current discussion, other?

Tks,

Mike

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Re: [liberationtech] the Blackberry and Surveillance?

2013-06-12 Thread Robert Guerra
Michael  Ale,

I gave numerous interviews back in 2010 when Blackberry started openly 
co-operating with governments to keep their service online. The concerns  
raised then, to this day then remain unanswered by the company. 

Given the company's unwillingness to constructively engage and be open 
regarding on their practices regarding data sharing has led me to recommend to 
activists to AVOID their devices and services at all costs. Other far more 
secure solutions exist, such as the open source Guardian Project. Their secure 
solutions for Android are excellent and quite respected by digital security 
practitioners.

regards

Robert

Refs:

BlackBerry has reportedly reached an agreement with Saudi Arabia to continue 
messaging services in the country. It's unclear what data will now be shared.
(August 10, 2010)
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Global-News/2010/0810/BlackBerry-caved-to-Saudi-demands-rights-group

The Guardian Project: Secure Mobile Apps and Open-Source Code for a Better 
Tomorrow
https://guardianproject.info/

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R. Guerra
Phone/Cell: +1 202-905-2081
Twitter: twitter.com/netfreedom 
Email: rgue...@privaterra.org

On 2013-06-12, at 9:51 AM, ale fernandez wrote:

 I remember also during the UK riots last year people started using BBM and it 
 was much more effective than other networks also partly due to not being as 
 obvious or closely tracked as facebook posts etc.
 
 Ale
 
 On Wed, 12 Jun 2013 14:15:33 +0100
 Michael Rogers mich...@briarproject.org wrote:
 
 -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
 Hash: SHA1
 
 On 12/06/13 09:14, michael gurstein wrote:
 I haven`t been watching that closely but in the course of my
 following the current discussions on surveillance I have yet to see
 a reference to RIM/Blackberry...
 
 Is this because it`s recent loss of market share means it isn`t of 
 particular interest (I would have thought the up to recent user
 demographics would rather make it of particular interest), because
 of some features which put it outside of the current surveillance
 stream, have I missed it in the current discussion, other?
 
 Hi Mike,
 
 As far as I know, the situation with BlackBerry is as follows. If
 you're an enterprise customer, you generate your own encryption key
 for BBM (I don't know whether it's used for email too), and run your
 own server. RIM claimed in August 2010 that it didn't have access to
 the encryption keys generated by enterprise customers and couldn't
 observe the content of their communication. The statement didn't say
 whether RIM could observe metadata.
 
 http://blogs.thenational.ae/business/beep-beep/full-rim-customer-statement-on-blackberry-security-issues
 
 If you're a non-enterprise customer, your BBM messages are scrambled
 with a key that's built into all BlackBerry devices and known to RIM.
 
 https://mailman.stanford.edu/pipermail/liberationtech/2013-April/008293.html
 
 RIM has come under pressure from several governments to decrypt BBM
 messages, so I think it's safe to assume that the key used for
 scrambling non-enterprise BBM messages is widely known by now.
 
 For both enterprise and non-enterprise customers, if you use a
 third-party email provider, that provider will have access to content
 and metadata regardless of what device you're using.
 
 I don't know whether wireless carriers can observe the metadata of BBM
 messages; they could collect the scrambled messages of non-enterprise
 customers, for descrambling by anyone who knows the key.
 
 Cheers,
 Michael
 
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