Re: [LINK] AEC faces backlash over vote counting ???black box???

[Chris Maltby]

> At 10:27 PM 21/07/2016, Chris Maltby wrote:
> >The other audit capability is the (incomplete) counts of senate
> >first preferences by group that was conducted manually in polling
> >booths on election night. This data is available for statistical
> >comparison with the booth-by-booth final vote data and that would
> >also show up any significant favouritism in the data entry process. 

On Fri, Jul 22, 2016 at 07:51:00AM +1000, JanW wrote:
> I was going to suggest this as a QA measure: sample a subset of
> the votes in each machine to test accuracy. That wouldn't be too
> onerous and I suspect scrutineers would accept that as a reasonable
> demonstration of the reliability of the software.
> 
> In fact, I would push for this on every OCR/computer combination
> used for the final count. Anyone who has used it knows how OCR is
> UNreliable. If this is supposed to be interpreting the full spectrum
> of hand-written numbers, I would be questioning things as well.
>
> We're not talking about a binary tick or unticked box. Think how
> the US got into strife with the hanging chad fiasco in Florida and
> how Al Gore did not become president of the US as a result. This
> feels worse..

That idea has merit for picking up any systemic substitution of
images.

The unreliability of the OCR is catered for by two design features:
first, the OCR system has to have confidence that it made a match
for every mark on the paper (level unspecified), but any inconclusive
matches would cause the entire OCR to be rejected, and second, the
OCR is compared with a separate manual data entry of the same image
and any mismatch would escalate the image for an additional data
entry pass and possibly an examination by officials of the image or
the physical paper.

Chris
___
Link mailing list
Link@mailman.anu.edu.au
http://mailman.anu.edu.au/mailman/listinfo/link

Re: [LINK] AEC faces backlash over vote counting ???black box???

[Chris Maltby]

The key (as David says) is auditability of the process.

The new system of counting is effectively fully electronic, but
scrutineers can watch the data entry process of a clerk which will
be compared with a successful OCR of the scan. The scrutineer can
also request and be shown the physical paper at any time.  I would
hope that scrutineers do this often enough to make the margin of
error for failure to detect a significant tampering with the recorded
data low enough to give assurance to the results.

The other audit capability is the (incomplete) counts of senate
first preferences by group that was conducted manually in polling
booths on election night. This data is available for statistical
comparison with the booth-by-booth final vote data and that would
also show up any significant favouritism in the data entry process.

Finally, it's worth noting that the old senate counting system of
a manual sort into 1-above-the-line groups and others, done in the
divisional counting centres, is subject to a reasonably liklihood
of manual errors. The voided WA senate election of 2013 showed that
a significant number of above-the-line votes had been mis-sorted
at this stage and incorrect counts were then entered. Some were
also famously misplaced. The data entry process for below the line
votes was more accurate.

The new counting system will see all papers subject to dual data
entry, with at least one human operator and two if the OCR doesn't
deliver a high enough confidence result. A mismatch will see an
additional data entry step for the paper. If the process has the
integrity we hope for, the final data set is likely to be more
accurate than the old system.

Finally, it's worth noting that the changes to formality rules
should mean that there are a lot fewer ballots with all the
below-the-line boxes filled, which are the slowest to enter and
the ones most prone to voter and data entry error. It may be
that the overall data entry time won't be all that much longer
than in the past, as the vast bulk of papers will have just the
minimum 6 numbers above the line, with fewer using the below-the-
line option, and those who do probably numbering fewer boxes.

The data entry software identifies all the non-printed marks on the
paper and presents them one-by-one to the clerk, so a 6 or 12 mark
paper is pretty quick to enter as distinct from the former process
of entering the contents of every one of the 150+ below-the-line
boxes.

Chris

PS You won't hear any argument from me against release of the
   actual vote counting software's source code (and of course
   the actual entered vote data set as well).
___
Link mailing list
Link@mailman.anu.edu.au
http://mailman.anu.edu.au/mailman/listinfo/link

Re: [LINK] AEC faces backlash over vote counting ‘black box’

[David Lochrin]

On 2016-07-20 12:45 Brendan  wrote:

> To properly scrutinise it you'd also need to verify the operation of the/each 
> machine - what software was, in fact, loaded onto it, what did that software 
> do. Has the machine been compromised etc. Seems to me that vote stuffing 
> would be easier on a machine than a scrutinised ballot box.

Yes, an "audit" process should be part of the whole system.  Auditing is 
currently performed by scrutineers, and it would be interesting to know whether 
the legislation includes any relevant clauses.  But whatever the case, the AEC 
should not be allowed to quietly drop that function for the supposed benefits 
of machine processing.

I think it's best to audit the results rather than the means, in this case the 
software.  As a matter of interest, does anyone know what happens to the actual 
ballot papers after the results of an election are declared?  And for how long 
can a result be challenged?

David L.
___
Link mailing list
Link@mailman.anu.edu.au
http://mailman.anu.edu.au/mailman/listinfo/link

Re: [LINK] AEC faces backlash over vote counting ‘black box’

[Brendan]

On 07/20/2016 12:24 PM, Sam Silvester wrote:

On Wed, Jul 20, 2016 at 11:48 AM, Brendan 
wrote:


On 07/20/2016 11:54 AM, Bernard Robertson-Dunn wrote:


AEC faces backlash over vote counting ‘black box’
George Lekakis

http://thenewdaily.com.au/news/election-2016/2016/07/19/aec-backlash-vote-counting/



However, computer experts claim that the digital counting process cannot

be fully observed by the scrutineers of candidates because the AEC
refuses to disclose the source code of the automated system.



The lack of the ability to scrutinize electronic ballots is their major,
and I would hope fatal, flaw (not so in America, where they don't seem to
care about properly verifying the electoral process). I don't see that
access to source code helps the issue.



To be honest, I just don't see how it's possible to trust that there isn't
a fencepost error or the like in the preference distribution software
without the ability to scruitinise the process (hence, source code).

There's reviews conducted after each election where process issues are
discussed and improvements made - how would one even go about knowing
there's an issue to investigate if it's all closed?


To properly scrutinise it you'd also need to verify the operation of the/each 
machine - what software was, in fact, loaded onto it, what did that software 
do. Has the machine been compromised etc. Seems to me that vote stuffing would 
be easier on a machine than a scrutinised ballot box.

 






___
Link mailing list
Link@mailman.anu.edu.au
http://mailman.anu.edu.au/mailman/listinfo/link

Re: [LINK] AEC faces backlash over vote counting ‘black box’

[Sam Silvester]

On Wed, Jul 20, 2016 at 11:48 AM, Brendan 
wrote:

> On 07/20/2016 11:54 AM, Bernard Robertson-Dunn wrote:
>
>> AEC faces backlash over vote counting ‘black box’
>> George Lekakis
>>
>> http://thenewdaily.com.au/news/election-2016/2016/07/19/aec-backlash-vote-counting/
>>
>
> However, computer experts claim that the digital counting process cannot
>> be fully observed by the scrutineers of candidates because the AEC
>> refuses to disclose the source code of the automated system.
>>
>
> The lack of the ability to scrutinize electronic ballots is their major,
> and I would hope fatal, flaw (not so in America, where they don't seem to
> care about properly verifying the electoral process). I don't see that
> access to source code helps the issue.
>

To be honest, I just don't see how it's possible to trust that there isn't
a fencepost error or the like in the preference distribution software
without the ability to scruitinise the process (hence, source code).

There's reviews conducted after each election where process issues are
discussed and improvements made - how would one even go about knowing
there's an issue to investigate if it's all closed?

Sam
___
Link mailing list
Link@mailman.anu.edu.au
http://mailman.anu.edu.au/mailman/listinfo/link

Re: [LINK] AEC faces backlash over vote counting ‘black box’

[Brendan]

On 07/20/2016 11:54 AM, Bernard Robertson-Dunn wrote:

AEC faces backlash over vote counting ‘black box’
George Lekakis
http://thenewdaily.com.au/news/election-2016/2016/07/19/aec-backlash-vote-counting/



However, computer experts claim that the digital counting process cannot
be fully observed by the scrutineers of candidates because the AEC
refuses to disclose the source code of the automated system.


The lack of the ability to scrutinize electronic ballots is their major, and I 
would hope fatal, flaw (not so in America, where they don't seem to care about 
properly verifying the electoral process). I don't see that access to source 
code helps the issue.


___
Link mailing list
Link@mailman.anu.edu.au
http://mailman.anu.edu.au/mailman/listinfo/link