[GIT PULL] Audit fixes for v5.17 (#2)
Linus, Another audit fix for v5.17-rcX, this time a single rather small but important patch that fixes an oops/page-fault caused by improperly accessing userspace memory. Please merge for the next -rcX release. Thanks, -Paul -- The following changes since commit f26d04331360d42dbd6b58448bd98e4edbfbe1c5: audit: improve audit queue handling when "audit=1" on cmdline (2022-01-25 13:22:51 -0500) are available in the Git repository at: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit.git tags/audit-pr-20220209 for you to fetch changes up to 7a82f89de92aac5a244d3735b2bd162c1147620c: audit: don't deref the syscall args when checking the openat2 open_how::flags (2022-02-09 16:04:26 -0500) audit/stable-5.17 PR 20220209 Paul Moore (1): audit: don't deref the syscall args when checking the openat2 open_how::flags kernel/auditsc.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) -- paul-moore.com -- Linux-audit mailing list Linux-audit@redhat.com https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
Re: [PATCH] audit: don't deref the syscall args when checking the openat2 open_how::flags
On Wed, Feb 9, 2022 at 4:11 PM Paul Moore wrote:
>
> As reported by Jeff, dereferencing the openat2 syscall argument in
> audit_match_perm() to obtain the open_how::flags can result in an
> oops/page-fault. This patch fixes this by using the open_how struct
> that we store in the audit_context with audit_openat2_how().
>
> Cc: sta...@vger.kernel.org
> Fixes: 1c30e3af8a79 ("audit: add support for the openat2 syscall")
> Reported-by: Jeff Mahoney
> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore
> ---
> kernel/auditsc.c |2 +-
> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
Merged to audit/stable-5.17 with a note that Richard posted a similar
patch. Assuming this passes the automated testing (it should, manual
testing was fine), this will be sent up to Linus soon.
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Re: [PATCH v1] audit: fix illegal pointer dereference for openat2
On Wed, Feb 9, 2022 at 4:51 PM Richard Guy Briggs wrote:
>
> The user pointer was being illegally dereferenced directly to get the
> open_how flags data in audit_match_perm. Use the previously saved flags
> data elsewhere in the context instead.
>
> Coverage is provided by the audit-testsuite syscalls_file test case.
>
> Cc: sta...@vger.kernel.org
> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/c96031b4-b76d-d82c-e232-1cccbbf71...@suse.com
> Fixes: 1c30e3af8a79 ("audit: add support for the openat2 syscall")
> Reported-by: Jeff Mahoney
> Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs
> ---
> kernel/auditsc.c | 2 +-
> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
Thanks Richard. As this came in ~40m after the other patch, and both
are identical code changes, I've merged the other patch but I did add
a note that you also submitted a similar patch. Once the automated
testing completes I'll send this up to Linus.
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Re: [PATCH v4 2/3] audit: add support for the openat2 syscall
On Wed, Feb 9, 2022 at 5:14 PM Richard Guy Briggs wrote:
>
> On 2022-02-09 16:18, Paul Moore wrote:
> > On Wed, Feb 9, 2022 at 10:57 AM Paul Moore wrote:
> > > On Tue, Feb 8, 2022 at 10:44 PM Jeff Mahoney wrote:
> > > >
> > > > Hi Richard -
> > > >
> > > > On 5/19/21 16:00, Richard Guy Briggs wrote:
> > > > > The openat2(2) syscall was added in kernel v5.6 with commit
> > > > > fddb5d430ad9
> > > > > ("open: introduce openat2(2) syscall")
> > > > >
> > > > > Add the openat2(2) syscall to the audit syscall classifier.
> > > > >
> > > > > Link: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/67
> > > > > Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs
> > > > > Link:
> > > > > https://lore.kernel.org/r/f5f1a4d8699613f8c02ce762807228c841c2e26f.1621363275.git@redhat.com
> > > > > ---
> > > >
> > > > [...]
> > > >
> > > > > diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
> > > > > index d775ea16505b..3f59ab209dfd 100644
> > > > > --- a/kernel/auditsc.c
> > > > > +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
> > > > > @@ -76,6 +76,7 @@
> > > > > #include
> > > > > #include
> > > > > #include
> > > > > +#include
> > > > >
> > > > > #include "audit.h"
> > > > >
> > > > > @@ -196,6 +197,8 @@ static int audit_match_perm(struct audit_context
> > > > > *ctx, int mask)
> > > > > return ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) && ctx->argv[0] ==
> > > > > SYS_BIND);
> > > > > case AUDITSC_EXECVE:
> > > > > return mask & AUDIT_PERM_EXEC;
> > > > > + case AUDITSC_OPENAT2:
> > > > > + return mask & ACC_MODE((u32)((struct open_how
> > > > > *)ctx->argv[2])->flags);
> > > > > default:
> > > > > return 0;
> > > > > }
> > > >
> > > > ctx->argv[2] holds a userspace pointer and can't be dereferenced like
> > > > this.
> > > >
> > > > I'm getting oopses, like so:
> > > > BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 7fff961bbe70
> > >
> > > Thanks Jeff.
> > >
> > > Yes, this is obviously the wrong thing to being doing; I remember
> > > checking to make sure we placed the audit_openat2_how() hook after the
> > > open_how was copied from userspace, but I missed the argv dereference
> > > in the syscall exit path when reviewing the code.
> > >
> > > Richard, as we are already copying the open_how info into
> > > audit_context::openat2 safely, the obvious fix is to convert
> > > audit_match_perm() to use the previously copied value instead of argv.
> > > If you can't submit a patch for this today please let me know.
> >
> > I haven't heard anything from Richard so I put together a patch which
> > should fix the problem (link below). It's currently untested, but
> > I've got a kernel building now with the patch ...
>
> Well, the day wasn't over yet... I've compiled and tested it.
Yes, I tested my patch too and everything looks good on my end.
For future reference, while I didn't explicitly ask you to acknowledge
this thread and that you were working on a patch (I probably should
have), it would have been nice if you could have sent a quick note to
the list.
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Re: [PATCH v4 2/3] audit: add support for the openat2 syscall
On Wed, Feb 9, 2022 at 4:41 PM Richard Guy Briggs wrote:
> On 2022-02-09 10:57, Paul Moore wrote:
> > On Tue, Feb 8, 2022 at 10:44 PM Jeff Mahoney wrote:
> > >
> > > Hi Richard -
> > >
> > > On 5/19/21 16:00, Richard Guy Briggs wrote:
> > > > The openat2(2) syscall was added in kernel v5.6 with commit fddb5d430ad9
> > > > ("open: introduce openat2(2) syscall")
> > > >
> > > > Add the openat2(2) syscall to the audit syscall classifier.
> > > >
> > > > Link: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/67
> > > > Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs
> > > > Link:
> > > > https://lore.kernel.org/r/f5f1a4d8699613f8c02ce762807228c841c2e26f.1621363275.git@redhat.com
> > > > ---
> > >
> > > [...]
> > >
> > > > diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
> > > > index d775ea16505b..3f59ab209dfd 100644
> > > > --- a/kernel/auditsc.c
> > > > +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
> > > > @@ -76,6 +76,7 @@
> > > > #include
> > > > #include
> > > > #include
> > > > +#include
> > > >
> > > > #include "audit.h"
> > > >
> > > > @@ -196,6 +197,8 @@ static int audit_match_perm(struct audit_context
> > > > *ctx, int mask)
> > > > return ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) && ctx->argv[0] ==
> > > > SYS_BIND);
> > > > case AUDITSC_EXECVE:
> > > > return mask & AUDIT_PERM_EXEC;
> > > > + case AUDITSC_OPENAT2:
> > > > + return mask & ACC_MODE((u32)((struct open_how
> > > > *)ctx->argv[2])->flags);
> > > > default:
> > > > return 0;
> > > > }
> > >
> > > ctx->argv[2] holds a userspace pointer and can't be dereferenced like
> > > this.
> > >
> > > I'm getting oopses, like so:
> > > BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 7fff961bbe70
> >
> > Thanks Jeff.
> >
> > Yes, this is obviously the wrong thing to being doing; I remember
> > checking to make sure we placed the audit_openat2_how() hook after the
> > open_how was copied from userspace, but I missed the argv dereference
> > in the syscall exit path when reviewing the code.
> >
> > Richard, as we are already copying the open_how info into
> > audit_context::openat2 safely, the obvious fix is to convert
> > audit_match_perm() to use the previously copied value instead of argv.
> > If you can't submit a patch for this today please let me know.
>
> Agreed. It would have been more awkward with the original order of the
> patches.
>
> The syscalls_file test in the audit-testsuite should have caught this.
> https://github.com/rgbriggs/audit-testsuite/commit/1c99021ae27ea23eccce2bb1861df4c9c665cd5b
> The test provided does essentially the same thing.
I would have thought so, but I've now run this multiple times on both
affected and patched kernels but I don't see the page fault on my test
system.
Anyway, that test has now been merged with the audit-testsuite as well
as some cleanup on top to test for the new OPENAT2 record when
applicable.
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Re: [PATCH v4 2/3] audit: add support for the openat2 syscall
On 2022-02-09 16:18, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Wed, Feb 9, 2022 at 10:57 AM Paul Moore wrote:
> > On Tue, Feb 8, 2022 at 10:44 PM Jeff Mahoney wrote:
> > >
> > > Hi Richard -
> > >
> > > On 5/19/21 16:00, Richard Guy Briggs wrote:
> > > > The openat2(2) syscall was added in kernel v5.6 with commit fddb5d430ad9
> > > > ("open: introduce openat2(2) syscall")
> > > >
> > > > Add the openat2(2) syscall to the audit syscall classifier.
> > > >
> > > > Link: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/67
> > > > Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs
> > > > Link:
> > > > https://lore.kernel.org/r/f5f1a4d8699613f8c02ce762807228c841c2e26f.1621363275.git@redhat.com
> > > > ---
> > >
> > > [...]
> > >
> > > > diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
> > > > index d775ea16505b..3f59ab209dfd 100644
> > > > --- a/kernel/auditsc.c
> > > > +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
> > > > @@ -76,6 +76,7 @@
> > > > #include
> > > > #include
> > > > #include
> > > > +#include
> > > >
> > > > #include "audit.h"
> > > >
> > > > @@ -196,6 +197,8 @@ static int audit_match_perm(struct audit_context
> > > > *ctx, int mask)
> > > > return ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) && ctx->argv[0] ==
> > > > SYS_BIND);
> > > > case AUDITSC_EXECVE:
> > > > return mask & AUDIT_PERM_EXEC;
> > > > + case AUDITSC_OPENAT2:
> > > > + return mask & ACC_MODE((u32)((struct open_how
> > > > *)ctx->argv[2])->flags);
> > > > default:
> > > > return 0;
> > > > }
> > >
> > > ctx->argv[2] holds a userspace pointer and can't be dereferenced like
> > > this.
> > >
> > > I'm getting oopses, like so:
> > > BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 7fff961bbe70
> >
> > Thanks Jeff.
> >
> > Yes, this is obviously the wrong thing to being doing; I remember
> > checking to make sure we placed the audit_openat2_how() hook after the
> > open_how was copied from userspace, but I missed the argv dereference
> > in the syscall exit path when reviewing the code.
> >
> > Richard, as we are already copying the open_how info into
> > audit_context::openat2 safely, the obvious fix is to convert
> > audit_match_perm() to use the previously copied value instead of argv.
> > If you can't submit a patch for this today please let me know.
>
> I haven't heard anything from Richard so I put together a patch which
> should fix the problem (link below). It's currently untested, but
> I've got a kernel building now with the patch ...
Well, the day wasn't over yet... I've compiled and tested it.
> https://lore.kernel.org/linux-audit/16111699.153511.15656610495968926251.stgit@olly/T/#u
>
> --
> paul-moore.com
>
- RGB
--
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[PATCH v1] audit: fix illegal pointer dereference for openat2
The user pointer was being illegally dereferenced directly to get the
open_how flags data in audit_match_perm. Use the previously saved flags
data elsewhere in the context instead.
Coverage is provided by the audit-testsuite syscalls_file test case.
Cc: sta...@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/c96031b4-b76d-d82c-e232-1cccbbf71...@suse.com
Fixes: 1c30e3af8a79 ("audit: add support for the openat2 syscall")
Reported-by: Jeff Mahoney
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs
---
kernel/auditsc.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index fce5d43a933f..81ab510a7be4 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ static int audit_match_perm(struct audit_context *ctx, int
mask)
case AUDITSC_EXECVE:
return mask & AUDIT_PERM_EXEC;
case AUDITSC_OPENAT2:
- return mask & ACC_MODE((u32)((struct open_how
*)ctx->argv[2])->flags);
+ return mask & ACC_MODE((u32)(ctx->openat2.flags));
default:
return 0;
}
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Re: [PATCH v4 2/3] audit: add support for the openat2 syscall
On 2022-02-09 10:57, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Tue, Feb 8, 2022 at 10:44 PM Jeff Mahoney wrote:
> >
> > Hi Richard -
> >
> > On 5/19/21 16:00, Richard Guy Briggs wrote:
> > > The openat2(2) syscall was added in kernel v5.6 with commit fddb5d430ad9
> > > ("open: introduce openat2(2) syscall")
> > >
> > > Add the openat2(2) syscall to the audit syscall classifier.
> > >
> > > Link: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/67
> > > Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs
> > > Link:
> > > https://lore.kernel.org/r/f5f1a4d8699613f8c02ce762807228c841c2e26f.1621363275.git@redhat.com
> > > ---
> >
> > [...]
> >
> > > diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
> > > index d775ea16505b..3f59ab209dfd 100644
> > > --- a/kernel/auditsc.c
> > > +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
> > > @@ -76,6 +76,7 @@
> > > #include
> > > #include
> > > #include
> > > +#include
> > >
> > > #include "audit.h"
> > >
> > > @@ -196,6 +197,8 @@ static int audit_match_perm(struct audit_context
> > > *ctx, int mask)
> > > return ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) && ctx->argv[0] ==
> > > SYS_BIND);
> > > case AUDITSC_EXECVE:
> > > return mask & AUDIT_PERM_EXEC;
> > > + case AUDITSC_OPENAT2:
> > > + return mask & ACC_MODE((u32)((struct open_how
> > > *)ctx->argv[2])->flags);
> > > default:
> > > return 0;
> > > }
> >
> > ctx->argv[2] holds a userspace pointer and can't be dereferenced like this.
> >
> > I'm getting oopses, like so:
> > BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 7fff961bbe70
>
> Thanks Jeff.
>
> Yes, this is obviously the wrong thing to being doing; I remember
> checking to make sure we placed the audit_openat2_how() hook after the
> open_how was copied from userspace, but I missed the argv dereference
> in the syscall exit path when reviewing the code.
>
> Richard, as we are already copying the open_how info into
> audit_context::openat2 safely, the obvious fix is to convert
> audit_match_perm() to use the previously copied value instead of argv.
> If you can't submit a patch for this today please let me know.
Agreed. It would have been more awkward with the original order of the
patches.
The syscalls_file test in the audit-testsuite should have caught this.
https://github.com/rgbriggs/audit-testsuite/commit/1c99021ae27ea23eccce2bb1861df4c9c665cd5b
The test provided does essentially the same thing.
I should have a tested patch posted today.
> paul-moore.com
- RGB
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Re: [PATCH v4 2/3] audit: add support for the openat2 syscall
On Wed, Feb 9, 2022 at 10:57 AM Paul Moore wrote:
> On Tue, Feb 8, 2022 at 10:44 PM Jeff Mahoney wrote:
> >
> > Hi Richard -
> >
> > On 5/19/21 16:00, Richard Guy Briggs wrote:
> > > The openat2(2) syscall was added in kernel v5.6 with commit fddb5d430ad9
> > > ("open: introduce openat2(2) syscall")
> > >
> > > Add the openat2(2) syscall to the audit syscall classifier.
> > >
> > > Link: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/67
> > > Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs
> > > Link:
> > > https://lore.kernel.org/r/f5f1a4d8699613f8c02ce762807228c841c2e26f.1621363275.git@redhat.com
> > > ---
> >
> > [...]
> >
> > > diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
> > > index d775ea16505b..3f59ab209dfd 100644
> > > --- a/kernel/auditsc.c
> > > +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
> > > @@ -76,6 +76,7 @@
> > > #include
> > > #include
> > > #include
> > > +#include
> > >
> > > #include "audit.h"
> > >
> > > @@ -196,6 +197,8 @@ static int audit_match_perm(struct audit_context
> > > *ctx, int mask)
> > > return ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) && ctx->argv[0] ==
> > > SYS_BIND);
> > > case AUDITSC_EXECVE:
> > > return mask & AUDIT_PERM_EXEC;
> > > + case AUDITSC_OPENAT2:
> > > + return mask & ACC_MODE((u32)((struct open_how
> > > *)ctx->argv[2])->flags);
> > > default:
> > > return 0;
> > > }
> >
> > ctx->argv[2] holds a userspace pointer and can't be dereferenced like this.
> >
> > I'm getting oopses, like so:
> > BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 7fff961bbe70
>
> Thanks Jeff.
>
> Yes, this is obviously the wrong thing to being doing; I remember
> checking to make sure we placed the audit_openat2_how() hook after the
> open_how was copied from userspace, but I missed the argv dereference
> in the syscall exit path when reviewing the code.
>
> Richard, as we are already copying the open_how info into
> audit_context::openat2 safely, the obvious fix is to convert
> audit_match_perm() to use the previously copied value instead of argv.
> If you can't submit a patch for this today please let me know.
I haven't heard anything from Richard so I put together a patch which
should fix the problem (link below). It's currently untested, but
I've got a kernel building now with the patch ...
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-audit/16111699.153511.15656610495968926251.stgit@olly/T/#u
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[PATCH] audit: don't deref the syscall args when checking the openat2 open_how::flags
As reported by Jeff, dereferencing the openat2 syscall argument in
audit_match_perm() to obtain the open_how::flags can result in an
oops/page-fault. This patch fixes this by using the open_how struct
that we store in the audit_context with audit_openat2_how().
Cc: sta...@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 1c30e3af8a79 ("audit: add support for the openat2 syscall")
Reported-by: Jeff Mahoney
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore
---
kernel/auditsc.c |2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index fce5d43a933f..a83928cbdcb7 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ static int audit_match_perm(struct audit_context *ctx, int
mask)
case AUDITSC_EXECVE:
return mask & AUDIT_PERM_EXEC;
case AUDITSC_OPENAT2:
- return mask & ACC_MODE((u32)((struct open_how
*)ctx->argv[2])->flags);
+ return mask & ACC_MODE((u32)ctx->openat2.flags);
default:
return 0;
}
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Re: [PATCH v4 2/3] audit: add support for the openat2 syscall
On Tue, Feb 8, 2022 at 10:44 PM Jeff Mahoney wrote:
>
> Hi Richard -
>
> On 5/19/21 16:00, Richard Guy Briggs wrote:
> > The openat2(2) syscall was added in kernel v5.6 with commit fddb5d430ad9
> > ("open: introduce openat2(2) syscall")
> >
> > Add the openat2(2) syscall to the audit syscall classifier.
> >
> > Link: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/67
> > Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs
> > Link:
> > https://lore.kernel.org/r/f5f1a4d8699613f8c02ce762807228c841c2e26f.1621363275.git@redhat.com
> > ---
>
> [...]
>
> > diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
> > index d775ea16505b..3f59ab209dfd 100644
> > --- a/kernel/auditsc.c
> > +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
> > @@ -76,6 +76,7 @@
> > #include
> > #include
> > #include
> > +#include
> >
> > #include "audit.h"
> >
> > @@ -196,6 +197,8 @@ static int audit_match_perm(struct audit_context *ctx,
> > int mask)
> > return ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) && ctx->argv[0] ==
> > SYS_BIND);
> > case AUDITSC_EXECVE:
> > return mask & AUDIT_PERM_EXEC;
> > + case AUDITSC_OPENAT2:
> > + return mask & ACC_MODE((u32)((struct open_how
> > *)ctx->argv[2])->flags);
> > default:
> > return 0;
> > }
>
> ctx->argv[2] holds a userspace pointer and can't be dereferenced like this.
>
> I'm getting oopses, like so:
> BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 7fff961bbe70
Thanks Jeff.
Yes, this is obviously the wrong thing to being doing; I remember
checking to make sure we placed the audit_openat2_how() hook after the
open_how was copied from userspace, but I missed the argv dereference
in the syscall exit path when reviewing the code.
Richard, as we are already copying the open_how info into
audit_context::openat2 safely, the obvious fix is to convert
audit_match_perm() to use the previously copied value instead of argv.
If you can't submit a patch for this today please let me know.
--
paul-moore.com
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