The i_uid and i_gid are only ever used when logging for AppArmor. This is
already broken in a bunch of places where the global root id is reported
instead of the i_uid or i_gid of the file. Nonetheless, be kind and log the
mapped inode if we're coming from an idmapped mount.
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brau...@ubuntu.com>
---
/* v2 */
unchanged
---
security/apparmor/domain.c | 9 ++++++---
security/apparmor/file.c | 5 ++++-
security/apparmor/lsm.c | 12 ++++++++----
3 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c
index 16f184bc48de..4f997dba4573 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/domain.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c
@@ -10,12 +10,14 @@
#include <linux/errno.h>
#include <linux/fdtable.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/file.h>
#include <linux/mount.h>
#include <linux/syscalls.h>
#include <linux/tracehook.h>
#include <linux/personality.h>
#include <linux/xattr.h>
+#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
#include "include/audit.h"
#include "include/apparmorfs.h"
@@ -858,8 +860,10 @@ int apparmor_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
const char *info = NULL;
int error = 0;
bool unsafe = false;
+ struct user_namespace *user_ns = mnt_user_ns(bprm->file->f_path.mnt);
+ kuid_t i_uid = i_uid_into_mnt(user_ns, file_inode(bprm->file));
struct path_cond cond = {
- file_inode(bprm->file)->i_uid,
+ i_uid,
file_inode(bprm->file)->i_mode
};
@@ -967,8 +971,7 @@ int apparmor_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
error = fn_for_each(label, profile,
aa_audit_file(profile, &nullperms, OP_EXEC, MAY_EXEC,
bprm->filename, NULL, new,
- file_inode(bprm->file)->i_uid, info,
- error));
+ i_uid, info, error));
aa_put_label(new);
goto done;
}
diff --git a/security/apparmor/file.c b/security/apparmor/file.c
index 92acf9a49405..d6d9e71f1900 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/file.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/file.c
@@ -11,6 +11,8 @@
#include <linux/tty.h>
#include <linux/fdtable.h>
#include <linux/file.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/mount.h>
#include "include/apparmor.h"
#include "include/audit.h"
@@ -508,8 +510,9 @@ static int __file_path_perm(const char *op, struct aa_label
*label,
{
struct aa_profile *profile;
struct aa_perms perms = {};
+ struct user_namespace *user_ns = mnt_user_ns(file->f_path.mnt);
struct path_cond cond = {
- .uid = file_inode(file)->i_uid,
+ .uid = i_uid_into_mnt(user_ns, file_inode(file)),
.mode = file_inode(file)->i_mode
};
char *buffer;
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index ffeaee5ed968..ece9afc3994f 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -224,7 +224,8 @@ static int common_perm(const char *op, const struct path
*path, u32 mask,
*/
static int common_perm_cond(const char *op, const struct path *path, u32 mask)
{
- struct path_cond cond = { d_backing_inode(path->dentry)->i_uid,
+ struct user_namespace *user_ns = mnt_user_ns(path->mnt);
+ struct path_cond cond = { i_uid_into_mnt(user_ns,
d_backing_inode(path->dentry)),
d_backing_inode(path->dentry)->i_mode
};
@@ -266,12 +267,13 @@ static int common_perm_rm(const char *op, const struct
path *dir,
struct dentry *dentry, u32 mask)
{
struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
+ struct user_namespace *user_ns = mnt_user_ns(dir->mnt);
struct path_cond cond = { };
if (!inode || !path_mediated_fs(dentry))
return 0;
- cond.uid = inode->i_uid;
+ cond.uid = i_uid_into_mnt(user_ns, inode);
cond.mode = inode->i_mode;
return common_perm_dir_dentry(op, dir, dentry, mask, &cond);
@@ -361,11 +363,12 @@ static int apparmor_path_rename(const struct path
*old_dir, struct dentry *old_d
label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
if (!unconfined(label)) {
+ struct user_namespace *user_ns = mnt_user_ns(old_dir->mnt);
struct path old_path = { .mnt = old_dir->mnt,
.dentry = old_dentry };
struct path new_path = { .mnt = new_dir->mnt,
.dentry = new_dentry };
- struct path_cond cond = { d_backing_inode(old_dentry)->i_uid,
+ struct path_cond cond = { i_uid_into_mnt(user_ns,
d_backing_inode(old_dentry)),
d_backing_inode(old_dentry)->i_mode
};
@@ -420,8 +423,9 @@ static int apparmor_file_open(struct file *file)
label = aa_get_newest_cred_label(file->f_cred);
if (!unconfined(label)) {
+ struct user_namespace *user_ns = mnt_user_ns(file->f_path.mnt);
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
- struct path_cond cond = { inode->i_uid, inode->i_mode };
+ struct path_cond cond = { i_uid_into_mnt(user_ns, inode),
inode->i_mode };
error = aa_path_perm(OP_OPEN, label, &file->f_path, 0,
aa_map_file_to_perms(file), &cond);
--
2.29.2
--
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