Re: [PATCH 21/25] KVM: VMX: Add SGX ENCLS[ECREATE] handler to enforce CPUID restrictions
On Mon, 2021-03-01 at 09:20 -0800, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> On Mon, Mar 01, 2021, Kai Huang wrote:
> > +static int handle_encls_ecreate(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> > +{
> > + struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *sgx_12_0, *sgx_12_1;
> > + gva_t pageinfo_gva, secs_gva;
> > + gva_t metadata_gva, contents_gva;
> > + gpa_t metadata_gpa, contents_gpa, secs_gpa;
> > + unsigned long metadata_hva, contents_hva, secs_hva;
> > + struct sgx_pageinfo pageinfo;
> > + struct sgx_secs *contents;
> > + u64 attributes, xfrm, size;
> > + u32 miscselect;
> > + struct x86_exception ex;
> > + u8 max_size_log2;
> > + int trapnr, r;
> > +
>
> (see below)
>
> --- cut here --- >8
>
> > + sgx_12_0 = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 0x12, 0);
> > + sgx_12_1 = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 0x12, 1);
> > + if (!sgx_12_0 || !sgx_12_1) {
> > + kvm_inject_gp(vcpu, 0);
>
> This should probably be an emulation failure. This code is reached iff SGX1
> is
> enabled in the guest, userspace done messed up if they enabled SGX1 without
> defining CPUID.0x12.1. That also makes it more obvious that burying this in a
> helper after a bunch of other checks isn't wrong, i.e. KVM has already
> verified
> that SGX1 is enabled in the guest.
>
> > + return 1;
> > + }
>
> ---
>
> > +
> > + if (sgx_get_encls_gva(vcpu, kvm_rbx_read(vcpu), 32, 32, _gva)
> > ||
> > + sgx_get_encls_gva(vcpu, kvm_rcx_read(vcpu), 4096, 4096, _gva))
> > + return 1;
> > +
> > + /*
> > +* Copy the PAGEINFO to local memory, its pointers need to be
> > +* translated, i.e. we need to do a deep copy/translate.
> > +*/
> > + r = kvm_read_guest_virt(vcpu, pageinfo_gva, ,
> > + sizeof(pageinfo), );
> > + if (r == X86EMUL_PROPAGATE_FAULT) {
> > + kvm_inject_emulated_page_fault(vcpu, );
> > + return 1;
> > + } else if (r != X86EMUL_CONTINUE) {
> > + sgx_handle_emulation_failure(vcpu, pageinfo_gva, size);
> > + return 0;
> > + }
> > +
> > + if (sgx_get_encls_gva(vcpu, pageinfo.metadata, 64, 64, _gva) ||
> > + sgx_get_encls_gva(vcpu, pageinfo.contents, 4096, 4096,
> > + _gva))
> > + return 1;
> > +
> > + /*
> > +* Translate the SECINFO, SOURCE and SECS pointers from GVA to GPA.
> > +* Resume the guest on failure to inject a #PF.
> > +*/
> > + if (sgx_gva_to_gpa(vcpu, metadata_gva, false, _gpa) ||
> > + sgx_gva_to_gpa(vcpu, contents_gva, false, _gpa) ||
> > + sgx_gva_to_gpa(vcpu, secs_gva, true, _gpa))
> > + return 1;
> > +
> > + /*
> > +* ...and then to HVA. The order of accesses isn't architectural, i.e.
> > +* KVM doesn't have to fully process one address at a time. Exit to
> > +* userspace if a GPA is invalid.
> > +*/
> > + if (sgx_gpa_to_hva(vcpu, metadata_gpa, _hva) ||
> > + sgx_gpa_to_hva(vcpu, contents_gpa, _hva) ||
> > + sgx_gpa_to_hva(vcpu, secs_gpa, _hva))
> > + return 0;
> > + /*
> > +* Copy contents into kernel memory to prevent TOCTOU attack. E.g. the
> > +* guest could do ECREATE w/ SECS.SGX_ATTR_PROVISIONKEY=0, and
> > +* simultaneously set SGX_ATTR_PROVISIONKEY to bypass the check to
> > +* enforce restriction of access to the PROVISIONKEY.
> > +*/
> > + contents = (struct sgx_secs *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
> > + if (!contents)
> > + return -ENOMEM;
>
> --- cut here --- >8
>
> > +
> > + /* Exit to userspace if copying from a host userspace address fails. */
> > + if (sgx_read_hva(vcpu, contents_hva, (void *)contents, PAGE_SIZE))
>
> This, and every failure path below, will leak 'contents'. The easiest thing
> is
> probably to wrap everything in "cut here" in a separate helper. The CPUID
> lookups can be , e.g.
>
> contents = (struct sgx_secs *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
> if (!contents)
> return -ENOMEM;
>
> r = __handle_encls_ecreate(vcpu, , secs);
>
> free_page((unsigned long)contents);
> return r;
>
> And then the helper can be everything below, plus the CPUID lookup:
>
> sgx_12_0 = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 0x12, 0);
> sgx_12_1 = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 0x12, 1);
> if (!sgx_12_0 || !sgx_12_1) {
> vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_INTERNAL_ERROR;
> vcpu->run->internal.suberror = KVM_INTERNAL_ERROR_EMULATION;
> vcpu->run->internal.ndata = 0;
> return 0;
> }
>
>
>
Hi Sean,
I ended up with below:
1) Copy contents is out of __handle_encls_ecreate(), since from my perspective
it is
more reasonable split in this way logically, that when __handle_encls_ecreate()
is
called, pageinfo is already ready, but policy enforcement still needs to be
checked.
2) Finding sgx_12_0/1 is at first in __handle_encls_ecreate(), since
provisionkey bit
check requires sgx_12_1->eax.
3) __handle_encls_ecreate() requires secs_gva since
Re: [PATCH 21/25] KVM: VMX: Add SGX ENCLS[ECREATE] handler to enforce CPUID restrictions
On Mon, 1 Mar 2021 09:20:15 -0800 Sean Christopherson wrote:
> On Mon, Mar 01, 2021, Kai Huang wrote:
> > +static int handle_encls_ecreate(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> > +{
> > + struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *sgx_12_0, *sgx_12_1;
> > + gva_t pageinfo_gva, secs_gva;
> > + gva_t metadata_gva, contents_gva;
> > + gpa_t metadata_gpa, contents_gpa, secs_gpa;
> > + unsigned long metadata_hva, contents_hva, secs_hva;
> > + struct sgx_pageinfo pageinfo;
> > + struct sgx_secs *contents;
> > + u64 attributes, xfrm, size;
> > + u32 miscselect;
> > + struct x86_exception ex;
> > + u8 max_size_log2;
> > + int trapnr, r;
> > +
>
> (see below)
>
> --- cut here --- >8
>
> > + sgx_12_0 = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 0x12, 0);
> > + sgx_12_1 = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 0x12, 1);
> > + if (!sgx_12_0 || !sgx_12_1) {
> > + kvm_inject_gp(vcpu, 0);
>
> This should probably be an emulation failure. This code is reached iff SGX1
> is
> enabled in the guest, userspace done messed up if they enabled SGX1 without
> defining CPUID.0x12.1. That also makes it more obvious that burying this in a
> helper after a bunch of other checks isn't wrong, i.e. KVM has already
> verified
> that SGX1 is enabled in the guest.
>
> > + return 1;
> > + }
>
> ---
>
> > +
> > + if (sgx_get_encls_gva(vcpu, kvm_rbx_read(vcpu), 32, 32, _gva)
> > ||
> > + sgx_get_encls_gva(vcpu, kvm_rcx_read(vcpu), 4096, 4096, _gva))
> > + return 1;
> > +
> > + /*
> > +* Copy the PAGEINFO to local memory, its pointers need to be
> > +* translated, i.e. we need to do a deep copy/translate.
> > +*/
> > + r = kvm_read_guest_virt(vcpu, pageinfo_gva, ,
> > + sizeof(pageinfo), );
> > + if (r == X86EMUL_PROPAGATE_FAULT) {
> > + kvm_inject_emulated_page_fault(vcpu, );
> > + return 1;
> > + } else if (r != X86EMUL_CONTINUE) {
> > + sgx_handle_emulation_failure(vcpu, pageinfo_gva, size);
> > + return 0;
> > + }
> > +
> > + if (sgx_get_encls_gva(vcpu, pageinfo.metadata, 64, 64, _gva) ||
> > + sgx_get_encls_gva(vcpu, pageinfo.contents, 4096, 4096,
> > + _gva))
> > + return 1;
> > +
> > + /*
> > +* Translate the SECINFO, SOURCE and SECS pointers from GVA to GPA.
> > +* Resume the guest on failure to inject a #PF.
> > +*/
> > + if (sgx_gva_to_gpa(vcpu, metadata_gva, false, _gpa) ||
> > + sgx_gva_to_gpa(vcpu, contents_gva, false, _gpa) ||
> > + sgx_gva_to_gpa(vcpu, secs_gva, true, _gpa))
> > + return 1;
> > +
> > + /*
> > +* ...and then to HVA. The order of accesses isn't architectural, i.e.
> > +* KVM doesn't have to fully process one address at a time. Exit to
> > +* userspace if a GPA is invalid.
> > +*/
> > + if (sgx_gpa_to_hva(vcpu, metadata_gpa, _hva) ||
> > + sgx_gpa_to_hva(vcpu, contents_gpa, _hva) ||
> > + sgx_gpa_to_hva(vcpu, secs_gpa, _hva))
> > + return 0;
> > + /*
> > +* Copy contents into kernel memory to prevent TOCTOU attack. E.g. the
> > +* guest could do ECREATE w/ SECS.SGX_ATTR_PROVISIONKEY=0, and
> > +* simultaneously set SGX_ATTR_PROVISIONKEY to bypass the check to
> > +* enforce restriction of access to the PROVISIONKEY.
> > +*/
> > + contents = (struct sgx_secs *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
> > + if (!contents)
> > + return -ENOMEM;
>
> --- cut here --- >8
>
> > +
> > + /* Exit to userspace if copying from a host userspace address fails. */
> > + if (sgx_read_hva(vcpu, contents_hva, (void *)contents, PAGE_SIZE))
>
> This, and every failure path below, will leak 'contents'. The easiest thing
> is
> probably to wrap everything in "cut here" in a separate helper. The CPUID
> lookups can be , e.g.
>
> contents = (struct sgx_secs *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
> if (!contents)
> return -ENOMEM;
>
> r = __handle_encls_ecreate(vcpu, , secs);
>
> free_page((unsigned long)contents);
> return r;
>
> And then the helper can be everything below, plus the CPUID lookup:
>
> sgx_12_0 = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 0x12, 0);
> sgx_12_1 = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 0x12, 1);
> if (!sgx_12_0 || !sgx_12_1) {
> vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_INTERNAL_ERROR;
> vcpu->run->internal.suberror = KVM_INTERNAL_ERROR_EMULATION;
> vcpu->run->internal.ndata = 0;
> return 0;
> }
>
>
Hi Sean,
I ended up with below:
1) Copy contents is out of __handle_encls_ecreate() since from my perspective
it is a more reasonable split logically.
2) In __handle_encls_ecreate(), finding sgx_12_0 and sgx_12_1 is at first since
provisionkey bit check requires sgx_12_1->eax.
3) __handle_encls_ecreate() needs secs_gva since sgx_inject_fault() requires it.
Is it OK to you?
+static int __handle_encls_ecreate(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+
Re: [PATCH 21/25] KVM: VMX: Add SGX ENCLS[ECREATE] handler to enforce CPUID restrictions
On Mon, 1 Mar 2021 09:20:15 -0800 Sean Christopherson wrote:
> On Mon, Mar 01, 2021, Kai Huang wrote:
> > +static int handle_encls_ecreate(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> > +{
> > + struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *sgx_12_0, *sgx_12_1;
> > + gva_t pageinfo_gva, secs_gva;
> > + gva_t metadata_gva, contents_gva;
> > + gpa_t metadata_gpa, contents_gpa, secs_gpa;
> > + unsigned long metadata_hva, contents_hva, secs_hva;
> > + struct sgx_pageinfo pageinfo;
> > + struct sgx_secs *contents;
> > + u64 attributes, xfrm, size;
> > + u32 miscselect;
> > + struct x86_exception ex;
> > + u8 max_size_log2;
> > + int trapnr, r;
> > +
>
> (see below)
>
> --- cut here --- >8
>
> > + sgx_12_0 = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 0x12, 0);
> > + sgx_12_1 = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 0x12, 1);
> > + if (!sgx_12_0 || !sgx_12_1) {
> > + kvm_inject_gp(vcpu, 0);
>
> This should probably be an emulation failure. This code is reached iff SGX1
> is
> enabled in the guest, userspace done messed up if they enabled SGX1 without
> defining CPUID.0x12.1. That also makes it more obvious that burying this in a
> helper after a bunch of other checks isn't wrong, i.e. KVM has already
> verified
> that SGX1 is enabled in the guest.
Agreed.
>
> > + return 1;
> > + }
>
> ---
>
> > +
> > + if (sgx_get_encls_gva(vcpu, kvm_rbx_read(vcpu), 32, 32, _gva)
> > ||
> > + sgx_get_encls_gva(vcpu, kvm_rcx_read(vcpu), 4096, 4096, _gva))
> > + return 1;
> > +
> > + /*
> > +* Copy the PAGEINFO to local memory, its pointers need to be
> > +* translated, i.e. we need to do a deep copy/translate.
> > +*/
> > + r = kvm_read_guest_virt(vcpu, pageinfo_gva, ,
> > + sizeof(pageinfo), );
> > + if (r == X86EMUL_PROPAGATE_FAULT) {
> > + kvm_inject_emulated_page_fault(vcpu, );
> > + return 1;
> > + } else if (r != X86EMUL_CONTINUE) {
> > + sgx_handle_emulation_failure(vcpu, pageinfo_gva, size);
> > + return 0;
> > + }
> > +
> > + if (sgx_get_encls_gva(vcpu, pageinfo.metadata, 64, 64, _gva) ||
> > + sgx_get_encls_gva(vcpu, pageinfo.contents, 4096, 4096,
> > + _gva))
> > + return 1;
> > +
> > + /*
> > +* Translate the SECINFO, SOURCE and SECS pointers from GVA to GPA.
> > +* Resume the guest on failure to inject a #PF.
> > +*/
> > + if (sgx_gva_to_gpa(vcpu, metadata_gva, false, _gpa) ||
> > + sgx_gva_to_gpa(vcpu, contents_gva, false, _gpa) ||
> > + sgx_gva_to_gpa(vcpu, secs_gva, true, _gpa))
> > + return 1;
> > +
> > + /*
> > +* ...and then to HVA. The order of accesses isn't architectural, i.e.
> > +* KVM doesn't have to fully process one address at a time. Exit to
> > +* userspace if a GPA is invalid.
> > +*/
> > + if (sgx_gpa_to_hva(vcpu, metadata_gpa, _hva) ||
> > + sgx_gpa_to_hva(vcpu, contents_gpa, _hva) ||
> > + sgx_gpa_to_hva(vcpu, secs_gpa, _hva))
> > + return 0;
> > + /*
> > +* Copy contents into kernel memory to prevent TOCTOU attack. E.g. the
> > +* guest could do ECREATE w/ SECS.SGX_ATTR_PROVISIONKEY=0, and
> > +* simultaneously set SGX_ATTR_PROVISIONKEY to bypass the check to
> > +* enforce restriction of access to the PROVISIONKEY.
> > +*/
> > + contents = (struct sgx_secs *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
> > + if (!contents)
> > + return -ENOMEM;
>
> --- cut here --- >8
>
> > +
> > + /* Exit to userspace if copying from a host userspace address fails. */
> > + if (sgx_read_hva(vcpu, contents_hva, (void *)contents, PAGE_SIZE))
>
> This, and every failure path below, will leak 'contents'. The easiest thing
> is
> probably to wrap everything in "cut here" in a separate helper. The CPUID
> lookups can be , e.g.
>
> contents = (struct sgx_secs *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
> if (!contents)
> return -ENOMEM;
>
> r = __handle_encls_ecreate(vcpu, , secs);
>
> free_page((unsigned long)contents);
> return r;
>
> And then the helper can be everything below, plus the CPUID lookup:
>
> sgx_12_0 = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 0x12, 0);
> sgx_12_1 = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 0x12, 1);
> if (!sgx_12_0 || !sgx_12_1) {
> vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_INTERNAL_ERROR;
> vcpu->run->internal.suberror = KVM_INTERNAL_ERROR_EMULATION;
> vcpu->run->internal.ndata = 0;
> return 0;
> }
>
Hmm.. Obviously I wasn't careful enough. Thanks for pointing out.
Will do in your way.
>
> > + return 0;
> > +
> > + miscselect = contents->miscselect;
> > + attributes = contents->attributes;
> > + xfrm = contents->xfrm;
> > + size = contents->size;
> > +
> > + /* Enforce restriction of access to the PROVISIONKEY. */
> > + if (!vcpu->kvm->arch.sgx_provisioning_allowed &&
> > + (attributes & SGX_ATTR_PROVISIONKEY)) {
> > +
Re: [PATCH 21/25] KVM: VMX: Add SGX ENCLS[ECREATE] handler to enforce CPUID restrictions
On Mon, Mar 01, 2021, Kai Huang wrote:
> +static int handle_encls_ecreate(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> +{
> + struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *sgx_12_0, *sgx_12_1;
> + gva_t pageinfo_gva, secs_gva;
> + gva_t metadata_gva, contents_gva;
> + gpa_t metadata_gpa, contents_gpa, secs_gpa;
> + unsigned long metadata_hva, contents_hva, secs_hva;
> + struct sgx_pageinfo pageinfo;
> + struct sgx_secs *contents;
> + u64 attributes, xfrm, size;
> + u32 miscselect;
> + struct x86_exception ex;
> + u8 max_size_log2;
> + int trapnr, r;
> +
(see below)
--- cut here --- >8
> + sgx_12_0 = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 0x12, 0);
> + sgx_12_1 = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 0x12, 1);
> + if (!sgx_12_0 || !sgx_12_1) {
> + kvm_inject_gp(vcpu, 0);
This should probably be an emulation failure. This code is reached iff SGX1 is
enabled in the guest, userspace done messed up if they enabled SGX1 without
defining CPUID.0x12.1. That also makes it more obvious that burying this in a
helper after a bunch of other checks isn't wrong, i.e. KVM has already verified
that SGX1 is enabled in the guest.
> + return 1;
> + }
---
> +
> + if (sgx_get_encls_gva(vcpu, kvm_rbx_read(vcpu), 32, 32, _gva)
> ||
> + sgx_get_encls_gva(vcpu, kvm_rcx_read(vcpu), 4096, 4096, _gva))
> + return 1;
> +
> + /*
> + * Copy the PAGEINFO to local memory, its pointers need to be
> + * translated, i.e. we need to do a deep copy/translate.
> + */
> + r = kvm_read_guest_virt(vcpu, pageinfo_gva, ,
> + sizeof(pageinfo), );
> + if (r == X86EMUL_PROPAGATE_FAULT) {
> + kvm_inject_emulated_page_fault(vcpu, );
> + return 1;
> + } else if (r != X86EMUL_CONTINUE) {
> + sgx_handle_emulation_failure(vcpu, pageinfo_gva, size);
> + return 0;
> + }
> +
> + if (sgx_get_encls_gva(vcpu, pageinfo.metadata, 64, 64, _gva) ||
> + sgx_get_encls_gva(vcpu, pageinfo.contents, 4096, 4096,
> + _gva))
> + return 1;
> +
> + /*
> + * Translate the SECINFO, SOURCE and SECS pointers from GVA to GPA.
> + * Resume the guest on failure to inject a #PF.
> + */
> + if (sgx_gva_to_gpa(vcpu, metadata_gva, false, _gpa) ||
> + sgx_gva_to_gpa(vcpu, contents_gva, false, _gpa) ||
> + sgx_gva_to_gpa(vcpu, secs_gva, true, _gpa))
> + return 1;
> +
> + /*
> + * ...and then to HVA. The order of accesses isn't architectural, i.e.
> + * KVM doesn't have to fully process one address at a time. Exit to
> + * userspace if a GPA is invalid.
> + */
> + if (sgx_gpa_to_hva(vcpu, metadata_gpa, _hva) ||
> + sgx_gpa_to_hva(vcpu, contents_gpa, _hva) ||
> + sgx_gpa_to_hva(vcpu, secs_gpa, _hva))
> + return 0;
> + /*
> + * Copy contents into kernel memory to prevent TOCTOU attack. E.g. the
> + * guest could do ECREATE w/ SECS.SGX_ATTR_PROVISIONKEY=0, and
> + * simultaneously set SGX_ATTR_PROVISIONKEY to bypass the check to
> + * enforce restriction of access to the PROVISIONKEY.
> + */
> + contents = (struct sgx_secs *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (!contents)
> + return -ENOMEM;
--- cut here --- >8
> +
> + /* Exit to userspace if copying from a host userspace address fails. */
> + if (sgx_read_hva(vcpu, contents_hva, (void *)contents, PAGE_SIZE))
This, and every failure path below, will leak 'contents'. The easiest thing is
probably to wrap everything in "cut here" in a separate helper. The CPUID
lookups can be , e.g.
contents = (struct sgx_secs *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
if (!contents)
return -ENOMEM;
r = __handle_encls_ecreate(vcpu, , secs);
free_page((unsigned long)contents);
return r;
And then the helper can be everything below, plus the CPUID lookup:
sgx_12_0 = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 0x12, 0);
sgx_12_1 = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 0x12, 1);
if (!sgx_12_0 || !sgx_12_1) {
vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_INTERNAL_ERROR;
vcpu->run->internal.suberror = KVM_INTERNAL_ERROR_EMULATION;
vcpu->run->internal.ndata = 0;
return 0;
}
> + return 0;
> +
> + miscselect = contents->miscselect;
> + attributes = contents->attributes;
> + xfrm = contents->xfrm;
> + size = contents->size;
> +
> + /* Enforce restriction of access to the PROVISIONKEY. */
> + if (!vcpu->kvm->arch.sgx_provisioning_allowed &&
> + (attributes & SGX_ATTR_PROVISIONKEY)) {
> + if (sgx_12_1->eax & SGX_ATTR_PROVISIONKEY)
> + pr_warn_once("KVM: SGX PROVISIONKEY advertised but not
> allowed\n");
> + kvm_inject_gp(vcpu, 0);
> + return 1;
> + }
> +
> + /* Enforce CPUID
[PATCH 21/25] KVM: VMX: Add SGX ENCLS[ECREATE] handler to enforce CPUID restrictions
From: Sean Christopherson
Add an ECREATE handler that will be used to intercept ECREATE for the
purpose of enforcing and enclave's MISCSELECT, ATTRIBUTES and XFRM, i.e.
to allow userspace to restrict SGX features via CPUID. ECREATE will be
intercepted when any of the aforementioned masks diverges from hardware
in order to enforce the desired CPUID model, i.e. inject #GP if the
guest attempts to set a bit that hasn't been enumerated as allowed-1 in
CPUID.
Note, access to the PROVISIONKEY is not yet supported.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson
Co-developed-by: Kai Huang
Signed-off-by: Kai Huang
---
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 3 +
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c | 247
2 files changed, 250 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
index aa6b5146eafe..534e4dba8de1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
@@ -1035,6 +1035,9 @@ struct kvm_arch {
bool bus_lock_detection_enabled;
+ /* Guest can access the SGX PROVISIONKEY. */
+ bool sgx_provisioning_allowed;
+
struct kvm_pmu_event_filter *pmu_event_filter;
struct task_struct *nx_lpage_recovery_thread;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c
index f68adbe38750..65a77dfcb043 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c
@@ -11,6 +11,251 @@
bool __read_mostly enable_sgx;
+/*
+ * ENCLS's memory operands use a fixed segment (DS) and a fixed
+ * address size based on the mode. Related prefixes are ignored.
+ */
+static int sgx_get_encls_gva(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long offset,
+int size, int alignment, gva_t *gva)
+{
+ struct kvm_segment s;
+ bool fault;
+
+ /* Skip vmcs.GUEST_DS retrieval for 64-bit mode to avoid VMREADs. */
+ *gva = offset;
+ if (!is_long_mode(vcpu)) {
+ vmx_get_segment(vcpu, , VCPU_SREG_DS);
+ *gva += s.base;
+ }
+
+ if (!IS_ALIGNED(*gva, alignment)) {
+ fault = true;
+ } else if (likely(is_long_mode(vcpu))) {
+ fault = is_noncanonical_address(*gva, vcpu);
+ } else {
+ *gva &= 0x;
+ fault = (s.unusable) ||
+ (s.type != 2 && s.type != 3) ||
+ (*gva > s.limit) ||
+ ((s.base != 0 || s.limit != 0x) &&
+ (((u64)*gva + size - 1) > s.limit + 1));
+ }
+ if (fault)
+ kvm_inject_gp(vcpu, 0);
+ return fault ? -EINVAL : 0;
+}
+
+static void sgx_handle_emulation_failure(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 addr,
+unsigned int size)
+{
+ vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ vcpu->run->internal.suberror = KVM_INTERNAL_ERROR_EMULATION;
+ vcpu->run->internal.ndata = 2;
+ vcpu->run->internal.data[0] = addr;
+ vcpu->run->internal.data[1] = size;
+}
+
+static int sgx_read_hva(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long hva, void *data,
+ unsigned int size)
+{
+ if (__copy_from_user(data, (void __user *)hva, size)) {
+ sgx_handle_emulation_failure(vcpu, hva, size);
+ return -EFAULT;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int sgx_gva_to_gpa(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t gva, bool write,
+ gpa_t *gpa)
+{
+ struct x86_exception ex;
+
+ if (write)
+ *gpa = kvm_mmu_gva_to_gpa_write(vcpu, gva, );
+ else
+ *gpa = kvm_mmu_gva_to_gpa_read(vcpu, gva, );
+
+ if (*gpa == UNMAPPED_GVA) {
+ kvm_inject_emulated_page_fault(vcpu, );
+ return -EFAULT;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int sgx_gpa_to_hva(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa, unsigned long *hva)
+{
+ *hva = kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_hva(vcpu, PFN_DOWN(gpa));
+ if (kvm_is_error_hva(*hva)) {
+ sgx_handle_emulation_failure(vcpu, gpa, 1);
+ return -EFAULT;
+ }
+
+ *hva |= gpa & ~PAGE_MASK;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int sgx_inject_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t gva, int trapnr)
+{
+ struct x86_exception ex;
+
+ /*
+* A non-EPCM #PF indicates a bad userspace HVA. This *should* check
+* for PFEC.SGX and not assume any #PF on SGX2 originated in the EPC,
+* but the error code isn't (yet) plumbed through the ENCLS helpers.
+*/
+ if (trapnr == PF_VECTOR && !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SGX2)) {
+ vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ vcpu->run->internal.suberror = KVM_INTERNAL_ERROR_EMULATION;
+ vcpu->run->internal.ndata = 0;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+* If the guest thinks it's running on SGX2 hardware, inject an SGX
+* #PF if the fault matches an EPCM fault signature (#GP on
