[PATCH 3.8 18/91] net: heap overflow in __audit_sockaddr()

2013-11-07 Thread Kamal Mostafa
3.8.13.13 -stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me 
know.

--

From: Dan Carpenter 

[ Upstream commit 1661bf364ae9c506bc8795fef70d1532931be1e8 ]

We need to cap ->msg_namelen or it leads to a buffer overflow when we
to the memcpy() in __audit_sockaddr().  It requires CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL to
exploit this bug.

The call tree is:
___sys_recvmsg()
  move_addr_to_user()
audit_sockaddr()
  __audit_sockaddr()

Reported-by: Jüri Aedla 
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa 
---
 net/compat.c |  2 ++
 net/socket.c | 24 
 2 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/compat.c b/net/compat.c
index f0a1ba6..8903258 100644
--- a/net/compat.c
+++ b/net/compat.c
@@ -71,6 +71,8 @@ int get_compat_msghdr(struct msghdr *kmsg, struct 
compat_msghdr __user *umsg)
__get_user(kmsg->msg_controllen, >msg_controllen) ||
__get_user(kmsg->msg_flags, >msg_flags))
return -EFAULT;
+   if (kmsg->msg_namelen > sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage))
+   return -EINVAL;
kmsg->msg_name = compat_ptr(tmp1);
kmsg->msg_iov = compat_ptr(tmp2);
kmsg->msg_control = compat_ptr(tmp3);
diff --git a/net/socket.c b/net/socket.c
index a61db06..809e941 100644
--- a/net/socket.c
+++ b/net/socket.c
@@ -1980,6 +1980,16 @@ struct used_address {
unsigned int name_len;
 };
 
+static int copy_msghdr_from_user(struct msghdr *kmsg,
+struct msghdr __user *umsg)
+{
+   if (copy_from_user(kmsg, umsg, sizeof(struct msghdr)))
+   return -EFAULT;
+   if (kmsg->msg_namelen > sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage))
+   return -EINVAL;
+   return 0;
+}
+
 static int ___sys_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr __user *msg,
 struct msghdr *msg_sys, unsigned int flags,
 struct used_address *used_address)
@@ -1998,8 +2008,11 @@ static int ___sys_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct 
msghdr __user *msg,
if (MSG_CMSG_COMPAT & flags) {
if (get_compat_msghdr(msg_sys, msg_compat))
return -EFAULT;
-   } else if (copy_from_user(msg_sys, msg, sizeof(struct msghdr)))
-   return -EFAULT;
+   } else {
+   err = copy_msghdr_from_user(msg_sys, msg);
+   if (err)
+   return err;
+   }
 
if (msg_sys->msg_iovlen > UIO_FASTIOV) {
err = -EMSGSIZE;
@@ -2207,8 +2220,11 @@ static int ___sys_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct 
msghdr __user *msg,
if (MSG_CMSG_COMPAT & flags) {
if (get_compat_msghdr(msg_sys, msg_compat))
return -EFAULT;
-   } else if (copy_from_user(msg_sys, msg, sizeof(struct msghdr)))
-   return -EFAULT;
+   } else {
+   err = copy_msghdr_from_user(msg_sys, msg);
+   if (err)
+   return err;
+   }
 
if (msg_sys->msg_iovlen > UIO_FASTIOV) {
err = -EMSGSIZE;
-- 
1.8.1.2

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[PATCH 3.8 18/91] net: heap overflow in __audit_sockaddr()

2013-11-07 Thread Kamal Mostafa
3.8.13.13 -stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me 
know.

--

From: Dan Carpenter dan.carpen...@oracle.com

[ Upstream commit 1661bf364ae9c506bc8795fef70d1532931be1e8 ]

We need to cap -msg_namelen or it leads to a buffer overflow when we
to the memcpy() in __audit_sockaddr().  It requires CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL to
exploit this bug.

The call tree is:
___sys_recvmsg()
  move_addr_to_user()
audit_sockaddr()
  __audit_sockaddr()

Reported-by: Jüri Aedla juri.ae...@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter dan.carpen...@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller da...@davemloft.net
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa ka...@canonical.com
---
 net/compat.c |  2 ++
 net/socket.c | 24 
 2 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/compat.c b/net/compat.c
index f0a1ba6..8903258 100644
--- a/net/compat.c
+++ b/net/compat.c
@@ -71,6 +71,8 @@ int get_compat_msghdr(struct msghdr *kmsg, struct 
compat_msghdr __user *umsg)
__get_user(kmsg-msg_controllen, umsg-msg_controllen) ||
__get_user(kmsg-msg_flags, umsg-msg_flags))
return -EFAULT;
+   if (kmsg-msg_namelen  sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage))
+   return -EINVAL;
kmsg-msg_name = compat_ptr(tmp1);
kmsg-msg_iov = compat_ptr(tmp2);
kmsg-msg_control = compat_ptr(tmp3);
diff --git a/net/socket.c b/net/socket.c
index a61db06..809e941 100644
--- a/net/socket.c
+++ b/net/socket.c
@@ -1980,6 +1980,16 @@ struct used_address {
unsigned int name_len;
 };
 
+static int copy_msghdr_from_user(struct msghdr *kmsg,
+struct msghdr __user *umsg)
+{
+   if (copy_from_user(kmsg, umsg, sizeof(struct msghdr)))
+   return -EFAULT;
+   if (kmsg-msg_namelen  sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage))
+   return -EINVAL;
+   return 0;
+}
+
 static int ___sys_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr __user *msg,
 struct msghdr *msg_sys, unsigned int flags,
 struct used_address *used_address)
@@ -1998,8 +2008,11 @@ static int ___sys_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct 
msghdr __user *msg,
if (MSG_CMSG_COMPAT  flags) {
if (get_compat_msghdr(msg_sys, msg_compat))
return -EFAULT;
-   } else if (copy_from_user(msg_sys, msg, sizeof(struct msghdr)))
-   return -EFAULT;
+   } else {
+   err = copy_msghdr_from_user(msg_sys, msg);
+   if (err)
+   return err;
+   }
 
if (msg_sys-msg_iovlen  UIO_FASTIOV) {
err = -EMSGSIZE;
@@ -2207,8 +2220,11 @@ static int ___sys_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct 
msghdr __user *msg,
if (MSG_CMSG_COMPAT  flags) {
if (get_compat_msghdr(msg_sys, msg_compat))
return -EFAULT;
-   } else if (copy_from_user(msg_sys, msg, sizeof(struct msghdr)))
-   return -EFAULT;
+   } else {
+   err = copy_msghdr_from_user(msg_sys, msg);
+   if (err)
+   return err;
+   }
 
if (msg_sys-msg_iovlen  UIO_FASTIOV) {
err = -EMSGSIZE;
-- 
1.8.1.2

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More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at  http://www.tux.org/lkml/