Re: [PATCH v2] crypto/fips: only panic on bad/missing crypto mod signatures
Am Donnerstag, 3. Juli 2014, 07:18:06 schrieb Neil Horman: >On Wed, Jul 02, 2014 at 03:37:30PM -0400, Jarod Wilson wrote: >> Per further discussion with NIST, the requirements for FIPS state >> that >> we only need to panic the system on failed kernel module signature >> checks for crypto subsystem modules. This moves the fips-mode-only >> module signature check out of the generic module loading code, into >> the crypto subsystem, at points where we can catch both algorithm >> module loads and mode module loads. At the same time, make >> CONFIG_CRYPTO_FIPS dependent on CONFIG_MODULE_SIG, as this is >> entirely necessary for FIPS mode. >> >> v2: remove extraneous blank line, perform checks in static inline >> function, drop no longer necessary fips.h include. >> >> CC: Herbert Xu >> CC: "David S. Miller" >> CC: Rusty Russell >> CC: Stephan Mueller >> CC: linux-cry...@vger.kernel.org >> Signed-off-by: Jarod Wilson > >Acked-by: Neil Horman Acked-by: Stephan Mueller -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majord...@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
Re: [PATCH v2] crypto/fips: only panic on bad/missing crypto mod signatures
On Wed, Jul 02, 2014 at 03:37:30PM -0400, Jarod Wilson wrote: > Per further discussion with NIST, the requirements for FIPS state that > we only need to panic the system on failed kernel module signature checks > for crypto subsystem modules. This moves the fips-mode-only module > signature check out of the generic module loading code, into the crypto > subsystem, at points where we can catch both algorithm module loads and > mode module loads. At the same time, make CONFIG_CRYPTO_FIPS dependent on > CONFIG_MODULE_SIG, as this is entirely necessary for FIPS mode. > > v2: remove extraneous blank line, perform checks in static inline > function, drop no longer necessary fips.h include. > > CC: Herbert Xu > CC: "David S. Miller" > CC: Rusty Russell > CC: Stephan Mueller > CC: linux-cry...@vger.kernel.org > Signed-off-by: Jarod Wilson Patch applied. -- Email: Herbert Xu Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/ PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majord...@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
Re: [PATCH v2] crypto/fips: only panic on bad/missing crypto mod signatures
On Wed, Jul 02, 2014 at 03:37:30PM -0400, Jarod Wilson wrote: > Per further discussion with NIST, the requirements for FIPS state that > we only need to panic the system on failed kernel module signature checks > for crypto subsystem modules. This moves the fips-mode-only module > signature check out of the generic module loading code, into the crypto > subsystem, at points where we can catch both algorithm module loads and > mode module loads. At the same time, make CONFIG_CRYPTO_FIPS dependent on > CONFIG_MODULE_SIG, as this is entirely necessary for FIPS mode. > > v2: remove extraneous blank line, perform checks in static inline > function, drop no longer necessary fips.h include. > > CC: Herbert Xu > CC: "David S. Miller" > CC: Rusty Russell > CC: Stephan Mueller > CC: linux-cry...@vger.kernel.org > Signed-off-by: Jarod Wilson Acked-by: Neil Horman -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majord...@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
Re: [PATCH v2] crypto/fips: only panic on bad/missing crypto mod signatures
On Wed, Jul 02, 2014 at 03:37:30PM -0400, Jarod Wilson wrote: Per further discussion with NIST, the requirements for FIPS state that we only need to panic the system on failed kernel module signature checks for crypto subsystem modules. This moves the fips-mode-only module signature check out of the generic module loading code, into the crypto subsystem, at points where we can catch both algorithm module loads and mode module loads. At the same time, make CONFIG_CRYPTO_FIPS dependent on CONFIG_MODULE_SIG, as this is entirely necessary for FIPS mode. v2: remove extraneous blank line, perform checks in static inline function, drop no longer necessary fips.h include. CC: Herbert Xu herb...@gondor.apana.org.au CC: David S. Miller da...@davemloft.net CC: Rusty Russell ru...@rustcorp.com.au CC: Stephan Mueller stephan.muel...@atsec.com CC: linux-cry...@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jarod Wilson ja...@redhat.com Acked-by: Neil Horman nhor...@tuxdriver.com -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line unsubscribe linux-kernel in the body of a message to majord...@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
Re: [PATCH v2] crypto/fips: only panic on bad/missing crypto mod signatures
On Wed, Jul 02, 2014 at 03:37:30PM -0400, Jarod Wilson wrote: Per further discussion with NIST, the requirements for FIPS state that we only need to panic the system on failed kernel module signature checks for crypto subsystem modules. This moves the fips-mode-only module signature check out of the generic module loading code, into the crypto subsystem, at points where we can catch both algorithm module loads and mode module loads. At the same time, make CONFIG_CRYPTO_FIPS dependent on CONFIG_MODULE_SIG, as this is entirely necessary for FIPS mode. v2: remove extraneous blank line, perform checks in static inline function, drop no longer necessary fips.h include. CC: Herbert Xu herb...@gondor.apana.org.au CC: David S. Miller da...@davemloft.net CC: Rusty Russell ru...@rustcorp.com.au CC: Stephan Mueller stephan.muel...@atsec.com CC: linux-cry...@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jarod Wilson ja...@redhat.com Patch applied. -- Email: Herbert Xu herb...@gondor.apana.org.au Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/ PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line unsubscribe linux-kernel in the body of a message to majord...@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
Re: [PATCH v2] crypto/fips: only panic on bad/missing crypto mod signatures
Am Donnerstag, 3. Juli 2014, 07:18:06 schrieb Neil Horman: On Wed, Jul 02, 2014 at 03:37:30PM -0400, Jarod Wilson wrote: Per further discussion with NIST, the requirements for FIPS state that we only need to panic the system on failed kernel module signature checks for crypto subsystem modules. This moves the fips-mode-only module signature check out of the generic module loading code, into the crypto subsystem, at points where we can catch both algorithm module loads and mode module loads. At the same time, make CONFIG_CRYPTO_FIPS dependent on CONFIG_MODULE_SIG, as this is entirely necessary for FIPS mode. v2: remove extraneous blank line, perform checks in static inline function, drop no longer necessary fips.h include. CC: Herbert Xu herb...@gondor.apana.org.au CC: David S. Miller da...@davemloft.net CC: Rusty Russell ru...@rustcorp.com.au CC: Stephan Mueller stephan.muel...@atsec.com CC: linux-cry...@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jarod Wilson ja...@redhat.com Acked-by: Neil Horman nhor...@tuxdriver.com Acked-by: Stephan Mueller stephan.muel...@atsec.com -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line unsubscribe linux-kernel in the body of a message to majord...@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
[PATCH v2] crypto/fips: only panic on bad/missing crypto mod signatures
Per further discussion with NIST, the requirements for FIPS state that
we only need to panic the system on failed kernel module signature checks
for crypto subsystem modules. This moves the fips-mode-only module
signature check out of the generic module loading code, into the crypto
subsystem, at points where we can catch both algorithm module loads and
mode module loads. At the same time, make CONFIG_CRYPTO_FIPS dependent on
CONFIG_MODULE_SIG, as this is entirely necessary for FIPS mode.
v2: remove extraneous blank line, perform checks in static inline
function, drop no longer necessary fips.h include.
CC: Herbert Xu
CC: "David S. Miller"
CC: Rusty Russell
CC: Stephan Mueller
CC: linux-cry...@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jarod Wilson
---
crypto/Kconfig | 1 +
crypto/algapi.c | 14 ++
kernel/module.c | 4
3 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/crypto/Kconfig b/crypto/Kconfig
index ce4012a..36402e5 100644
--- a/crypto/Kconfig
+++ b/crypto/Kconfig
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ comment "Crypto core or helper"
config CRYPTO_FIPS
bool "FIPS 200 compliance"
depends on CRYPTO_ANSI_CPRNG && !CRYPTO_MANAGER_DISABLE_TESTS
+ depends on MODULE_SIG
help
This options enables the fips boot option which is
required if you want to system to operate in a FIPS 200
diff --git a/crypto/algapi.c b/crypto/algapi.c
index 7a1ae87..e8d3a7d 100644
--- a/crypto/algapi.c
+++ b/crypto/algapi.c
@@ -41,8 +41,20 @@ static inline int crypto_set_driver_name(struct crypto_alg
*alg)
return 0;
}
+static inline void crypto_check_module_sig(struct module *mod)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_FIPS
+ if (fips_enabled && mod && !mod->sig_ok)
+ panic("Module %s signature verification failed in FIPS mode\n",
+ mod->name);
+#endif
+ return;
+}
+
static int crypto_check_alg(struct crypto_alg *alg)
{
+ crypto_check_module_sig(alg->cra_module);
+
if (alg->cra_alignmask & (alg->cra_alignmask + 1))
return -EINVAL;
@@ -430,6 +442,8 @@ int crypto_register_template(struct crypto_template *tmpl)
down_write(_alg_sem);
+ crypto_check_module_sig(tmpl->module);
+
list_for_each_entry(q, _template_list, list) {
if (q == tmpl)
goto out;
diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c
index 81e727c..ae79ce6 100644
--- a/kernel/module.c
+++ b/kernel/module.c
@@ -60,7 +60,6 @@
#include
#include
#include
-#include
#include
#include "module-internal.h"
@@ -2448,9 +2447,6 @@ static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info)
}
/* Not having a signature is only an error if we're strict. */
- if (err < 0 && fips_enabled)
- panic("Module verification failed with error %d in FIPS mode\n",
- err);
if (err == -ENOKEY && !sig_enforce)
err = 0;
--
1.8.3.1
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majord...@vger.kernel.org
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
[PATCH v2] crypto/fips: only panic on bad/missing crypto mod signatures
Per further discussion with NIST, the requirements for FIPS state that
we only need to panic the system on failed kernel module signature checks
for crypto subsystem modules. This moves the fips-mode-only module
signature check out of the generic module loading code, into the crypto
subsystem, at points where we can catch both algorithm module loads and
mode module loads. At the same time, make CONFIG_CRYPTO_FIPS dependent on
CONFIG_MODULE_SIG, as this is entirely necessary for FIPS mode.
v2: remove extraneous blank line, perform checks in static inline
function, drop no longer necessary fips.h include.
CC: Herbert Xu herb...@gondor.apana.org.au
CC: David S. Miller da...@davemloft.net
CC: Rusty Russell ru...@rustcorp.com.au
CC: Stephan Mueller stephan.muel...@atsec.com
CC: linux-cry...@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jarod Wilson ja...@redhat.com
---
crypto/Kconfig | 1 +
crypto/algapi.c | 14 ++
kernel/module.c | 4
3 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/crypto/Kconfig b/crypto/Kconfig
index ce4012a..36402e5 100644
--- a/crypto/Kconfig
+++ b/crypto/Kconfig
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ comment Crypto core or helper
config CRYPTO_FIPS
bool FIPS 200 compliance
depends on CRYPTO_ANSI_CPRNG !CRYPTO_MANAGER_DISABLE_TESTS
+ depends on MODULE_SIG
help
This options enables the fips boot option which is
required if you want to system to operate in a FIPS 200
diff --git a/crypto/algapi.c b/crypto/algapi.c
index 7a1ae87..e8d3a7d 100644
--- a/crypto/algapi.c
+++ b/crypto/algapi.c
@@ -41,8 +41,20 @@ static inline int crypto_set_driver_name(struct crypto_alg
*alg)
return 0;
}
+static inline void crypto_check_module_sig(struct module *mod)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_FIPS
+ if (fips_enabled mod !mod-sig_ok)
+ panic(Module %s signature verification failed in FIPS mode\n,
+ mod-name);
+#endif
+ return;
+}
+
static int crypto_check_alg(struct crypto_alg *alg)
{
+ crypto_check_module_sig(alg-cra_module);
+
if (alg-cra_alignmask (alg-cra_alignmask + 1))
return -EINVAL;
@@ -430,6 +442,8 @@ int crypto_register_template(struct crypto_template *tmpl)
down_write(crypto_alg_sem);
+ crypto_check_module_sig(tmpl-module);
+
list_for_each_entry(q, crypto_template_list, list) {
if (q == tmpl)
goto out;
diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c
index 81e727c..ae79ce6 100644
--- a/kernel/module.c
+++ b/kernel/module.c
@@ -60,7 +60,6 @@
#include linux/jump_label.h
#include linux/pfn.h
#include linux/bsearch.h
-#include linux/fips.h
#include uapi/linux/module.h
#include module-internal.h
@@ -2448,9 +2447,6 @@ static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info)
}
/* Not having a signature is only an error if we're strict. */
- if (err 0 fips_enabled)
- panic(Module verification failed with error %d in FIPS mode\n,
- err);
if (err == -ENOKEY !sig_enforce)
err = 0;
--
1.8.3.1
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line unsubscribe linux-kernel in
the body of a message to majord...@vger.kernel.org
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
