Re: [PATCH v5 2/5] random: Add and use arch_get_rng_seed
On Wed, Jul 23, 2014 at 09:57:28PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote: > Currently, init_std_data contains its own logic for using arch > random sources. This replaces that logic with a generic function > arch_get_rng_seed that allows arch code to supply its own logic. > The default implementation tries arch_get_random_seed_long and > arch_get_random_long individually. > > The only functional change here is that random_get_entropy() is used > unconditionally instead of being used only when the arch sources > fail. This may add a tiny amount of security. > > Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski Acked-by: Theodore Ts'o - Ted -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majord...@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
Re: [PATCH v5 2/5] random: Add and use arch_get_rng_seed
On Wed, Jul 23, 2014 at 09:57:28PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote: Currently, init_std_data contains its own logic for using arch random sources. This replaces that logic with a generic function arch_get_rng_seed that allows arch code to supply its own logic. The default implementation tries arch_get_random_seed_long and arch_get_random_long individually. The only functional change here is that random_get_entropy() is used unconditionally instead of being used only when the arch sources fail. This may add a tiny amount of security. Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski l...@amacapital.net Acked-by: Theodore Ts'o ty...@mit.edu - Ted -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line unsubscribe linux-kernel in the body of a message to majord...@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
Re: [PATCH v5 2/5] random: Add and use arch_get_rng_seed
On Wed, Jul 23, 2014 at 9:57 PM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> Currently, init_std_data contains its own logic for using arch
> random sources. This replaces that logic with a generic function
> arch_get_rng_seed that allows arch code to supply its own logic.
> The default implementation tries arch_get_random_seed_long and
> arch_get_random_long individually.
>
> The only functional change here is that random_get_entropy() is used
> unconditionally instead of being used only when the arch sources
> fail. This may add a tiny amount of security.
tytso, are you okay with this approach? I'd be happy to rework this
if you prefer some other way of doing it.
--Andy
>
> Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski
> ---
> drivers/char/random.c | 14 +++---
> include/linux/random.h | 40
> 2 files changed, 51 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
> index 0a7ac0a..be7a94e 100644
> --- a/drivers/char/random.c
> +++ b/drivers/char/random.c
> @@ -1236,6 +1236,10 @@ void get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, int nbytes)
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes_arch);
>
> +static void seed_entropy_store(void *ctx, u32 data)
> +{
> + mix_pool_bytes((struct entropy_store *)ctx, , sizeof(data),
> NULL);
> +}
>
> /*
> * init_std_data - initialize pool with system data
> @@ -1251,15 +1255,19 @@ static void init_std_data(struct entropy_store *r)
> int i;
> ktime_t now = ktime_get_real();
> unsigned long rv;
> + char log_prefix[128];
>
> r->last_pulled = jiffies;
> mix_pool_bytes(r, , sizeof(now), NULL);
> for (i = r->poolinfo->poolbytes; i > 0; i -= sizeof(rv)) {
> - if (!arch_get_random_seed_long() &&
> - !arch_get_random_long())
> - rv = random_get_entropy();
> + rv = random_get_entropy();
> mix_pool_bytes(r, , sizeof(rv), NULL);
> }
> +
> + sprintf(log_prefix, "random: seeded %s pool", r->name);
> + arch_get_rng_seed(r, seed_entropy_store, 8 * r->poolinfo->poolbytes,
> + log_prefix);
> +
> mix_pool_bytes(r, utsname(), sizeof(*(utsname())), NULL);
> }
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/random.h b/include/linux/random.h
> index 57fbbff..81a6145 100644
> --- a/include/linux/random.h
> +++ b/include/linux/random.h
> @@ -106,6 +106,46 @@ static inline int arch_has_random_seed(void)
> }
> #endif
>
> +#ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_GET_RNG_SEED
> +
> +/**
> + * arch_get_rng_seed() - get architectural rng seed data
> + * @ctx: context for the seed function
> + * @seed: function to call for each u32 obtained
> + * @bits_per_source: number of bits from each source to try to use
> + * @log_prefix: beginning of log output (may be NULL)
> + *
> + * Synchronously load some architectural entropy or other best-effort
> + * random seed data. An arch-specific implementation should be no worse
> + * than this generic implementation. If the arch code does something
> + * interesting, it may log something of the form "log_prefix with
> + * 8 bits of stuff".
> + *
> + * No arch-specific implementation should be any worse than the generic
> + * implementation.
> + */
> +static inline void arch_get_rng_seed(void *ctx,
> +void (*seed)(void *ctx, u32 data),
> +int bits_per_source,
> +const char *log_prefix)
> +{
> + int i;
> +
> + for (i = 0; i < bits_per_source; i += 8 * sizeof(long)) {
> + unsigned long rv;
> +
> + if (arch_get_random_seed_long() ||
> + arch_get_random_long()) {
> + seed(ctx, (u32)rv);
> +#if BITS_PER_LONG > 32
> + seed(ctx, (u32)(rv >> 32));
> +#endif
> + }
> + }
> +}
> +
> +#endif /* __HAVE_ARCH_GET_RNG_SEED */
> +
> /* Pseudo random number generator from numerical recipes. */
> static inline u32 next_pseudo_random32(u32 seed)
> {
> --
> 1.9.3
>
--
Andy Lutomirski
AMA Capital Management, LLC
--
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Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
Re: [PATCH v5 2/5] random: Add and use arch_get_rng_seed
On Wed, Jul 23, 2014 at 9:57 PM, Andy Lutomirski l...@amacapital.net wrote:
Currently, init_std_data contains its own logic for using arch
random sources. This replaces that logic with a generic function
arch_get_rng_seed that allows arch code to supply its own logic.
The default implementation tries arch_get_random_seed_long and
arch_get_random_long individually.
The only functional change here is that random_get_entropy() is used
unconditionally instead of being used only when the arch sources
fail. This may add a tiny amount of security.
tytso, are you okay with this approach? I'd be happy to rework this
if you prefer some other way of doing it.
--Andy
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski l...@amacapital.net
---
drivers/char/random.c | 14 +++---
include/linux/random.h | 40
2 files changed, 51 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
index 0a7ac0a..be7a94e 100644
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -1236,6 +1236,10 @@ void get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, int nbytes)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes_arch);
+static void seed_entropy_store(void *ctx, u32 data)
+{
+ mix_pool_bytes((struct entropy_store *)ctx, data, sizeof(data),
NULL);
+}
/*
* init_std_data - initialize pool with system data
@@ -1251,15 +1255,19 @@ static void init_std_data(struct entropy_store *r)
int i;
ktime_t now = ktime_get_real();
unsigned long rv;
+ char log_prefix[128];
r-last_pulled = jiffies;
mix_pool_bytes(r, now, sizeof(now), NULL);
for (i = r-poolinfo-poolbytes; i 0; i -= sizeof(rv)) {
- if (!arch_get_random_seed_long(rv)
- !arch_get_random_long(rv))
- rv = random_get_entropy();
+ rv = random_get_entropy();
mix_pool_bytes(r, rv, sizeof(rv), NULL);
}
+
+ sprintf(log_prefix, random: seeded %s pool, r-name);
+ arch_get_rng_seed(r, seed_entropy_store, 8 * r-poolinfo-poolbytes,
+ log_prefix);
+
mix_pool_bytes(r, utsname(), sizeof(*(utsname())), NULL);
}
diff --git a/include/linux/random.h b/include/linux/random.h
index 57fbbff..81a6145 100644
--- a/include/linux/random.h
+++ b/include/linux/random.h
@@ -106,6 +106,46 @@ static inline int arch_has_random_seed(void)
}
#endif
+#ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_GET_RNG_SEED
+
+/**
+ * arch_get_rng_seed() - get architectural rng seed data
+ * @ctx: context for the seed function
+ * @seed: function to call for each u32 obtained
+ * @bits_per_source: number of bits from each source to try to use
+ * @log_prefix: beginning of log output (may be NULL)
+ *
+ * Synchronously load some architectural entropy or other best-effort
+ * random seed data. An arch-specific implementation should be no worse
+ * than this generic implementation. If the arch code does something
+ * interesting, it may log something of the form log_prefix with
+ * 8 bits of stuff.
+ *
+ * No arch-specific implementation should be any worse than the generic
+ * implementation.
+ */
+static inline void arch_get_rng_seed(void *ctx,
+void (*seed)(void *ctx, u32 data),
+int bits_per_source,
+const char *log_prefix)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i bits_per_source; i += 8 * sizeof(long)) {
+ unsigned long rv;
+
+ if (arch_get_random_seed_long(rv) ||
+ arch_get_random_long(rv)) {
+ seed(ctx, (u32)rv);
+#if BITS_PER_LONG 32
+ seed(ctx, (u32)(rv 32));
+#endif
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+#endif /* __HAVE_ARCH_GET_RNG_SEED */
+
/* Pseudo random number generator from numerical recipes. */
static inline u32 next_pseudo_random32(u32 seed)
{
--
1.9.3
--
Andy Lutomirski
AMA Capital Management, LLC
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line unsubscribe linux-kernel in
the body of a message to majord...@vger.kernel.org
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
[PATCH v5 2/5] random: Add and use arch_get_rng_seed
Currently, init_std_data contains its own logic for using arch
random sources. This replaces that logic with a generic function
arch_get_rng_seed that allows arch code to supply its own logic.
The default implementation tries arch_get_random_seed_long and
arch_get_random_long individually.
The only functional change here is that random_get_entropy() is used
unconditionally instead of being used only when the arch sources
fail. This may add a tiny amount of security.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski
---
drivers/char/random.c | 14 +++---
include/linux/random.h | 40
2 files changed, 51 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
index 0a7ac0a..be7a94e 100644
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -1236,6 +1236,10 @@ void get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, int nbytes)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes_arch);
+static void seed_entropy_store(void *ctx, u32 data)
+{
+ mix_pool_bytes((struct entropy_store *)ctx, , sizeof(data), NULL);
+}
/*
* init_std_data - initialize pool with system data
@@ -1251,15 +1255,19 @@ static void init_std_data(struct entropy_store *r)
int i;
ktime_t now = ktime_get_real();
unsigned long rv;
+ char log_prefix[128];
r->last_pulled = jiffies;
mix_pool_bytes(r, , sizeof(now), NULL);
for (i = r->poolinfo->poolbytes; i > 0; i -= sizeof(rv)) {
- if (!arch_get_random_seed_long() &&
- !arch_get_random_long())
- rv = random_get_entropy();
+ rv = random_get_entropy();
mix_pool_bytes(r, , sizeof(rv), NULL);
}
+
+ sprintf(log_prefix, "random: seeded %s pool", r->name);
+ arch_get_rng_seed(r, seed_entropy_store, 8 * r->poolinfo->poolbytes,
+ log_prefix);
+
mix_pool_bytes(r, utsname(), sizeof(*(utsname())), NULL);
}
diff --git a/include/linux/random.h b/include/linux/random.h
index 57fbbff..81a6145 100644
--- a/include/linux/random.h
+++ b/include/linux/random.h
@@ -106,6 +106,46 @@ static inline int arch_has_random_seed(void)
}
#endif
+#ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_GET_RNG_SEED
+
+/**
+ * arch_get_rng_seed() - get architectural rng seed data
+ * @ctx: context for the seed function
+ * @seed: function to call for each u32 obtained
+ * @bits_per_source: number of bits from each source to try to use
+ * @log_prefix: beginning of log output (may be NULL)
+ *
+ * Synchronously load some architectural entropy or other best-effort
+ * random seed data. An arch-specific implementation should be no worse
+ * than this generic implementation. If the arch code does something
+ * interesting, it may log something of the form "log_prefix with
+ * 8 bits of stuff".
+ *
+ * No arch-specific implementation should be any worse than the generic
+ * implementation.
+ */
+static inline void arch_get_rng_seed(void *ctx,
+void (*seed)(void *ctx, u32 data),
+int bits_per_source,
+const char *log_prefix)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < bits_per_source; i += 8 * sizeof(long)) {
+ unsigned long rv;
+
+ if (arch_get_random_seed_long() ||
+ arch_get_random_long()) {
+ seed(ctx, (u32)rv);
+#if BITS_PER_LONG > 32
+ seed(ctx, (u32)(rv >> 32));
+#endif
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+#endif /* __HAVE_ARCH_GET_RNG_SEED */
+
/* Pseudo random number generator from numerical recipes. */
static inline u32 next_pseudo_random32(u32 seed)
{
--
1.9.3
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majord...@vger.kernel.org
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
[PATCH v5 2/5] random: Add and use arch_get_rng_seed
Currently, init_std_data contains its own logic for using arch
random sources. This replaces that logic with a generic function
arch_get_rng_seed that allows arch code to supply its own logic.
The default implementation tries arch_get_random_seed_long and
arch_get_random_long individually.
The only functional change here is that random_get_entropy() is used
unconditionally instead of being used only when the arch sources
fail. This may add a tiny amount of security.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski l...@amacapital.net
---
drivers/char/random.c | 14 +++---
include/linux/random.h | 40
2 files changed, 51 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
index 0a7ac0a..be7a94e 100644
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -1236,6 +1236,10 @@ void get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, int nbytes)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes_arch);
+static void seed_entropy_store(void *ctx, u32 data)
+{
+ mix_pool_bytes((struct entropy_store *)ctx, data, sizeof(data), NULL);
+}
/*
* init_std_data - initialize pool with system data
@@ -1251,15 +1255,19 @@ static void init_std_data(struct entropy_store *r)
int i;
ktime_t now = ktime_get_real();
unsigned long rv;
+ char log_prefix[128];
r-last_pulled = jiffies;
mix_pool_bytes(r, now, sizeof(now), NULL);
for (i = r-poolinfo-poolbytes; i 0; i -= sizeof(rv)) {
- if (!arch_get_random_seed_long(rv)
- !arch_get_random_long(rv))
- rv = random_get_entropy();
+ rv = random_get_entropy();
mix_pool_bytes(r, rv, sizeof(rv), NULL);
}
+
+ sprintf(log_prefix, random: seeded %s pool, r-name);
+ arch_get_rng_seed(r, seed_entropy_store, 8 * r-poolinfo-poolbytes,
+ log_prefix);
+
mix_pool_bytes(r, utsname(), sizeof(*(utsname())), NULL);
}
diff --git a/include/linux/random.h b/include/linux/random.h
index 57fbbff..81a6145 100644
--- a/include/linux/random.h
+++ b/include/linux/random.h
@@ -106,6 +106,46 @@ static inline int arch_has_random_seed(void)
}
#endif
+#ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_GET_RNG_SEED
+
+/**
+ * arch_get_rng_seed() - get architectural rng seed data
+ * @ctx: context for the seed function
+ * @seed: function to call for each u32 obtained
+ * @bits_per_source: number of bits from each source to try to use
+ * @log_prefix: beginning of log output (may be NULL)
+ *
+ * Synchronously load some architectural entropy or other best-effort
+ * random seed data. An arch-specific implementation should be no worse
+ * than this generic implementation. If the arch code does something
+ * interesting, it may log something of the form log_prefix with
+ * 8 bits of stuff.
+ *
+ * No arch-specific implementation should be any worse than the generic
+ * implementation.
+ */
+static inline void arch_get_rng_seed(void *ctx,
+void (*seed)(void *ctx, u32 data),
+int bits_per_source,
+const char *log_prefix)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i bits_per_source; i += 8 * sizeof(long)) {
+ unsigned long rv;
+
+ if (arch_get_random_seed_long(rv) ||
+ arch_get_random_long(rv)) {
+ seed(ctx, (u32)rv);
+#if BITS_PER_LONG 32
+ seed(ctx, (u32)(rv 32));
+#endif
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+#endif /* __HAVE_ARCH_GET_RNG_SEED */
+
/* Pseudo random number generator from numerical recipes. */
static inline u32 next_pseudo_random32(u32 seed)
{
--
1.9.3
--
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the body of a message to majord...@vger.kernel.org
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
