[tip:x86/pti] x86/speculation: Fix typo IBRS_ATT, which should be IBRS_ALL

[tip-bot for Darren Kenny]

Commit-ID:  af189c95a371b59f493dbe0f50c0a09724868881
Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/af189c95a371b59f493dbe0f50c0a09724868881
Author: Darren Kenny 
AuthorDate: Fri, 2 Feb 2018 19:12:20 +
Committer:  Thomas Gleixner 
CommitDate: Fri, 2 Feb 2018 23:13:57 +0100

x86/speculation: Fix typo IBRS_ATT, which should be IBRS_ALL

Fixes: 117cc7a908c83 ("x86/retpoline: Fill return stack buffer on vmexit")
Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny 
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk 
Cc: Tom Lendacky 
Cc: Andi Kleen 
Cc: Borislav Petkov 
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu 
Cc: Arjan van de Ven 
Cc: David Woodhouse 
Link: 
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180202191220.blvgkgutojecx...@starbug-vm.ie.oracle.com

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h 
b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
index d15d471..4d57894 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ extern char __indirect_thunk_end[];
  * On VMEXIT we must ensure that no RSB predictions learned in the guest
  * can be followed in the host, by overwriting the RSB completely. Both
  * retpoline and IBRS mitigations for Spectre v2 need this; only on future
- * CPUs with IBRS_ATT *might* it be avoided.
+ * CPUs with IBRS_ALL *might* it be avoided.
  */
 static inline void vmexit_fill_RSB(void)
 {

[tip:x86/pti] x86/speculation: Fix typo IBRS_ATT, which should be IBRS_ALL

[tip-bot for Darren Kenny]

Commit-ID:  af189c95a371b59f493dbe0f50c0a09724868881
Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/af189c95a371b59f493dbe0f50c0a09724868881
Author: Darren Kenny 
AuthorDate: Fri, 2 Feb 2018 19:12:20 +
Committer:  Thomas Gleixner 
CommitDate: Fri, 2 Feb 2018 23:13:57 +0100

x86/speculation: Fix typo IBRS_ATT, which should be IBRS_ALL

Fixes: 117cc7a908c83 ("x86/retpoline: Fill return stack buffer on vmexit")
Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny 
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk 
Cc: Tom Lendacky 
Cc: Andi Kleen 
Cc: Borislav Petkov 
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu 
Cc: Arjan van de Ven 
Cc: David Woodhouse 
Link: 
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180202191220.blvgkgutojecx...@starbug-vm.ie.oracle.com

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h 
b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
index d15d471..4d57894 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ extern char __indirect_thunk_end[];
  * On VMEXIT we must ensure that no RSB predictions learned in the guest
  * can be followed in the host, by overwriting the RSB completely. Both
  * retpoline and IBRS mitigations for Spectre v2 need this; only on future
- * CPUs with IBRS_ATT *might* it be avoided.
+ * CPUs with IBRS_ALL *might* it be avoided.
  */
 static inline void vmexit_fill_RSB(void)
 {