In order to protect against speculation attacks on
indirect branches, the branch predictor is flushed at
kernel entry to protect for the following situations:
- userspace process attacking another userspace process
- userspace process attacking the kernel
Basically when the privillege level change (i.e.the kernel
is entered), the branch predictor state is flushed.

Signed-off-by: Diana Craciun <diana.crac...@nxp.com>
---
v1-->v2
- fixed warnings reported by the automated build system

 arch/powerpc/kernel/head_booke.h     | 11 +++++++++++
 arch/powerpc/kernel/head_fsl_booke.S | 15 +++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 26 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/head_booke.h b/arch/powerpc/kernel/head_booke.h
index d0862a1..27f5249 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/head_booke.h
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/head_booke.h
@@ -32,6 +32,15 @@
  */
 #define THREAD_NORMSAVE(offset)        (THREAD_NORMSAVES + (offset * 4))
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_FSL_BOOK3E
+#define BOOKE_CLEAR_BTB(reg)                                                   
                \
+START_BTB_FLUSH_SECTION                                                        
        \
+       BTB_FLUSH(reg)                                                          
        \
+END_BTB_FLUSH_SECTION
+#else
+#define BOOKE_CLEAR_BTB(reg)
+#endif
+
 #define NORMAL_EXCEPTION_PROLOG(intno)                                         
     \
        mtspr   SPRN_SPRG_WSCRATCH0, r10;       /* save one register */      \
        mfspr   r10, SPRN_SPRG_THREAD;                                       \
@@ -43,6 +52,7 @@
        andi.   r11, r11, MSR_PR;       /* check whether user or kernel    */\
        mr      r11, r1;                                                     \
        beq     1f;                                                          \
+       BOOKE_CLEAR_BTB(r11)                                            \
        /* if from user, start at top of this thread's kernel stack */       \
        lwz     r11, THREAD_INFO-THREAD(r10);                                \
        ALLOC_STACK_FRAME(r11, THREAD_SIZE);                                 \
@@ -128,6 +138,7 @@
        stw     r9,_CCR(r8);            /* save CR on stack                */\
        mfspr   r11,exc_level_srr1;     /* check whether user or kernel    */\
        DO_KVM  BOOKE_INTERRUPT_##intno exc_level_srr1;                      \
+       BOOKE_CLEAR_BTB(r10)                                            \
        andi.   r11,r11,MSR_PR;                                              \
        mfspr   r11,SPRN_SPRG_THREAD;   /* if from user, start at top of   */\
        lwz     r11,THREAD_INFO-THREAD(r11); /* this thread's kernel stack */\
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/head_fsl_booke.S 
b/arch/powerpc/kernel/head_fsl_booke.S
index e2750b8..2386ce2 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/head_fsl_booke.S
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/head_fsl_booke.S
@@ -453,6 +453,13 @@ END_FTR_SECTION_IFSET(CPU_FTR_EMB_HV)
        mfcr    r13
        stw     r13, THREAD_NORMSAVE(3)(r10)
        DO_KVM  BOOKE_INTERRUPT_DTLB_MISS SPRN_SRR1
+START_BTB_FLUSH_SECTION
+       mfspr r11, SPRN_SRR1
+       andi. r10,r11,MSR_PR
+       beq 1f
+       BTB_FLUSH(r10)
+1:
+END_BTB_FLUSH_SECTION
        mfspr   r10, SPRN_DEAR          /* Get faulting address */
 
        /* If we are faulting a kernel address, we have to use the
@@ -547,6 +554,14 @@ END_FTR_SECTION_IFSET(CPU_FTR_EMB_HV)
        mfcr    r13
        stw     r13, THREAD_NORMSAVE(3)(r10)
        DO_KVM  BOOKE_INTERRUPT_ITLB_MISS SPRN_SRR1
+START_BTB_FLUSH_SECTION
+       mfspr r11, SPRN_SRR1
+       andi. r10,r11,MSR_PR
+       beq 1f
+       BTB_FLUSH(r10)
+1:
+END_BTB_FLUSH_SECTION
+
        mfspr   r10, SPRN_SRR0          /* Get faulting address */
 
        /* If we are faulting a kernel address, we have to use the
-- 
2.5.5

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